An object is a unified whole. — Fooloso4
Where does he say that an atomic fact is about something? — Fooloso4
An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things) — 2.01
By elementary proposition, we naturally think of expressions such as "the apple is on the table ", "grass is red". "the Eiffel Tower is in London", "the house is next to the school". — RussellA
1. Examples of names (the simple symbols for objects) are: "x,y,z,etc.
2. Examples of elementary propositions are functions such as: "'fx'', 'ϕ(x, y)', etc. — 013zen
We might be able to infer that an atomic fact, for something like this, might be something like: "v=d/t". I wonder. This could also explain why Witt lists: "time" as a "form of an object". — 013zen
Therefore, a state of affairs being objects in possible combinations cannot be d/t but must be time divided by distance. If this state of affairs obtains, then the fact is distance divided by time, not d/t. — RussellA
I believe that he is not saying that the single letters x, y, z are objects, but is saying that these single letters indicate possible objects, such that the variable x indicates the objects ball, elephant or sandwich. — RussellA
Consider the logical function F(x), where F(x) is true if the value x satisfies the function F. But as F and x are not only unknown, don't refer to anything and have no sense, F(x) cannot picture the world, and if cannot picture the world cannot be an elementary proposition. — RussellA
Logic by itself, functions such as F(x), cannot fulfil the role of representatives, and as representatives are needed in addition to logic to picture the world, functions such as F(x) cannot be elementary propositions. — RussellA
the variable t cannot be the object — RussellA
Why can't more speculative epistemology and metaphysics be discussed intelligently in a language community? Why must we follow or agree with his ideology on the bounds of language use? — schopenhauer1
I see him to be trying to re-furnish the metaphysics that positivists had stripped to all but "positive facts" or experience. — 013zen
How is this the case when he clearly is trying to show that anything that is not about objects and how they "hang together" [ atomic facts/propositions.. yadayada, I'm not arguing his particularities so don't picayunish this point.. ] is "non-sense"? — schopenhauer1
Positivism developed slowly, but from some basic assumptions, one of which was that metaphysics needed to be put on proper footing. This is what Bacon, Hume, Kant, etc. were concerned with...they thought metaphysics lacked clarity and rigor.
Wittgenstein, is attempting to say with the final statement that any metaphysical statement will have to first and foremost be made logically clear. Until this is done, we should be cautious of wasting too much time talking about it, since language will lead us in circles. Clarity must be established first.
Throughout the work, he tries to offer suggestions on how to do this, and also gives examples of other thinkers formulations and how they are logically unclear, offering methods to reformulate the idea in a more clear manner. — 013zen
I think this is recasting Wittgenstein as just trying to be a simple corrector of grammar — schopenhauer1
I think that it is the latter that is exactly what he is doing. — schopenhauer1
He was indeed basically a logical positivist. — schopenhauer1
He might protest such a label, and find value in various forms of "non-sense", but he still labeled it "non-sense" — schopenhauer1
Basically, I think you are playing apologetics and putting early Wittgenstein as more heterodox than he was. — schopenhauer1
This is a recasting of my position :P I take him to be concerned with the logical clarification of thought, which might occasionally involve critiquing how one uses a term, and whether or not it makes sense. This isn't new to philosophy, in any sense, with Socrates objecting to how folks use the word "good", Aristotle to how others use the word "cause", etc. How else are we meant to clarify the thoughts in our heads, except, by occasionally engaging in correction of language. This is not to say that correcting grammar is the goal in and of itself. — 013zen
One might wonder why then, upon returning from the war, and having his work acclaimed by the positivists, that Wittgenstein so vehemently rejected them. Why, Witt considered Russell's atomist interpretation so foreign to his own in spirit that he spent three years of his life trying to get the work published, despite being poor from having given his fortune away - in the hopes that he'd find someone that understood the work. That's a pretty strong response to a bunch of people basically understanding what you were trying to do. — 013zen
these are not interchangeable. — 013zen
You know, historically, positivism was actually very pervasive in society. What I mean, is that it had real "pull" in the scientific community. Einstein's theory of special and general relativity was influenced by positivism, believe it or not. Einstein says that concepts like "space" and "time" were not clear at all, and he prepossess redefining them in a relativistic fashion ala Ernst Mach. — 013zen
Witt also says that he was influenced by Boltzmann and Hertz, and he studied to be a mechanic prior to studying philosophy, so he was no doubt familiar with the contemporary argument between positivism of Ernst Mach and the up and coming "picture theory" of Boltzman and Hertz that challenged it in an attempt to provide science with metaphysical speculation once again. — 013zen
One can say that he is castigating all the metaphysicians and epistemologists that came before. — schopenhauer1
I, actually, take Wittgenstein to be attempting to break away from this tradition (epistemology and metaphysics) — 013zen
His early work was influenced by that of Arthur Schopenhauer and, especially, by his teacher Bertrand Russell and by Gottlob Frege, who became something of a friend.
His philosophical education was unconventional (going from engineering to working first-hand with one of the greatest philosophers of his day in Bertrand Russell) and he seems never to have felt the need to go back and make a thorough study of the history of philosophy. He was interested in Plato, admired Leibniz, but was most influenced by the work of Schopenhauer, Russell and Frege.
The article is an attempt at explaining the category of logical form used by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus by using concepts from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s The Monadology.
Schopenhauer was the first and greatest philosophical influence on Wittgenstein, a fact attested to by those closest to him. He began by accepting Schopenhauer's division of total reality into phenomenal and noumenal, and offered a new analysis of the phenomenal in his first book, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus.
Would you say what Socrates was doing and what Wittgenstein were doing were equivalent? This is itself some clever word-play. — schopenhauer1
This is hipster fandom talk — schopenhauer1
I don't care that Wittgenstein felt misunderstood. — schopenhauer1
This is an engineer or programmer doing philosophy like an engineer and programmer. — schopenhauer1
Perhaps the following is relevant.
It may not be the case that Wittgenstein was trying to break away from the tradition of epistemology and metaphysics, but rather that he didn't know much about the tradition in the first place. From IEP Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951) — RussellA
He was influenced by Schopenhaur's division of reality into the phenomenal and the noumenal. From Schopenhauer's Influence on Wittgenstein by Bryan Magee. — RussellA
Now you're not even trying to be charitable to what I'm saying, if you take that bit to be me simply saying, "Witt and Socrates were doing exactly the same thing in every regard" :P — 013zen
Idk what that means. Providing historical context is this "hipster fandom talk"? — 013zen
I'm sure you wouldn't want to say the analytic tradition is nonsense, despite being the result of logicians and scientists "doing philosophy " like logicians and scientists. — 013zen
These folks were interested in what science could say about reality and how we can ensure that our theories map to reality. So, naturally they start from the assumption that our words should somehow tie back to reality in some guaranteed fashion. — 013zen
Thank goodness we had physicists like Helmholtz, Hertz, and Boltzmann engaging in philosophy otherwise the atomic theory would have continued to be ridiculed by positivists and younger thinkers like Einstein would have never engaged with the concept of atoms, particles, fields, etc. In the first place since they lacked empirical evidence. — 013zen
What I meant by this is that Socrates was not clarifying language itself but the notions and ideas of people, or its content. Wittgenstein is trying to determine what is in the bounds of language. — schopenhauer1
Socrates would not even be deemed worthy of his discussions on Forms, The Good, and a whole range of other things, because they are not corresponding to a "State of Affairs" that can be determined as true — schopenhauer1
I was commenting on the idea that he was such an outlier that he was wholly different from the projects of other analytics of the time. — schopenhauer1
A defense of any ambiguously phrased sentence can always be said, "No, THIS is what the author TRULEY meant" — schopenhauer1
But if he is misunderstood so thoroughly, this whole project of trying to interpret the "right" Wittgenstein itself is insipid to me because it just speaks to the lack of good communication of the author; it's a lack of quality explanation of ideas. — schopenhauer1
You are extrapolating that, but I did not say that. — schopenhauer1
They are committing to a form of philosophy whereby any metaphysical or epistemological claims cannot be stated without being non-sense. — schopenhauer1
Naturally. If philosophy started with "Naturally this that and the other..." that begs the question and is simply taking one's assumptions as given by fiat. — schopenhauer1
The problem here is where Schopenhauer (and previously Leibniz) actually laid out their reasoning for their premise and built a foundation, Wittgenstein simply asserts it to build his linguistic project of atomic facts and propositions that can be stated clearly. — schopenhauer1
I hear you...What I am saying is that just as it isn't uncommon to flip through a Socratic dialogue, and see Socrates challenging what others say about certain things (such as the good), and through dialogue shows how the thought leads to problems, we see Witt doing the same. In the preface to the Tractatus, Witt says his concern is first and foremost thoughts, not language...he just happens to concede that it is through language that the analysis has to be conducted since that's how we communicate our ideas with one another. — 013zen
My point is, let's assume that you're right and Witt is Saying that metaphysics such as Plato's theory of forms, really doesn't belong in a modern day metaphysics. Wouldn't you agree? (I, personally, wouldn't necessarily take Witt to be committing to this view)Is it so strange that someone that:
1. Graduated from a mechanical engineering program
2. Enrolled in an aeronautics doctorate program with the intent to design his own plane
3. Designed and patented his own propeller (tbh it was kinda a stupid design though lol)
And only after 5-6 years of this, when trying to manufacture his propeller, did Witt become interested in extremely complicated mathematics and learned about Frege and Russell. — 013zen
I am not saying that his project was different, but rather his approach, and some of his conclusions. — 013zen
So, to the original point, I don't find it even remotely odd that someone that worked in mechanical engineering for 5-6 years and then worked on philosophy for another 6 years wrote something that was somewhat of an outlier when compared to a lot of the other analytics at the time. He explicitly references Heinrich Hertz in the Tractatus, and is quoted elsewhere saying that his line of thinking was influenced heavily by Ludwig Boltzmann alongside Frege and Russell. — 013zen
Perhaps the following is relevant.
It may not be the case that Wittgenstein was trying to break away from the tradition of epistemology and metaphysics, but rather that he didn't know much about the tradition in the first place. From IEP Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889—1951) — RussellA
You've just summarized, like, 75% of the philosophy papers that I have read. xD — 013zen
He was well aware that he wasn't the most articulate, but he thought there was something of value in his thoughts. I'd like to say that just as each of us is articulate to differing degrees, that being less articulate than another neither preclude one from engaging in philosophy, nor does it inherently suggest that the ideas are wrong, or not useful at their core.
I've read plenty of philosophers that I couldn't make heads nor tales of (I'm looking at you Hegel), but others are able to discover some merit within. There is a reason that Witt says:
"This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it - or similar thoughts." — 013zen
Truthfully, I was being a bit tongue in cheek :P — 013zen
Positivists are. Not all analytic philosophers are positivists... it just so happens that historically, a lot of them have been. — 013zen
This is hardly the case. All philosophy, from Aristotle to Putnam has always started with some set of basic assumptions before moving forward. Its a perennial belief that can be endlessly quoted, and pointed out, whether it be a scientist assuming materialism or Aristotle assuming first principles. — 013zen
Well, of course it's done through language. But that is not his major point. That is just a truism. — schopenhauer1
It's not just a matter of how they are grammatically phrasing their words. It's not just that Plato could have kept his theory coherent if he had just worded his ideas of Forms more syntactically correct, but rather, that the content of his thoughts are non-sense, and thus are beyond the bounds of language. — schopenhauer1
His major point is that it is invalid to attempt to talk about the world outside certain bounds, that he sets out to limit. — schopenhauer1
However, what I don't really agree with is just because he was an engineer, this confers greater approaches to philosophy. As RussellA quoted: — schopenhauer1
(This is not a value judgement, btw). — 013zen
Perhaps it's the acolytes that are more to blame. — schopenhauer1
To circle back to my pointing out the version of the quote in the preface, wherein Witt ties the statement directly to the main project of “logical clarification”:Where do you think Witt stands? I present as evidence the "Whereof.." quote. — schopenhauer1
Objects are there behind the facts, but they are only useful for his idea of facts and propositions. Why doesn't he delve deeper into these initial beliefs? — schopenhauer1
It is exhausting to have philosophers not explain themselves well..................I think Wittgenstein has just particularly been mythologized. — schopenhauer1
A picture theory, however, would allow speculation, as long as you’re positing possibilities that logically follow from experience — 013zen
I can't think of an object in space without a shape — 013zen
Logical objects in logical space puts a limit on what is possible — RussellA
Objects such as apples and tables as logical objects are possible and therefore simples. — RussellA
There are no ‘logical objects’ (4.441) — Fooloso4
As part of a propositional analysis apples and tables can function as simples. — Fooloso4
Conceptual atomism is a radical alternative to all of the theories we’ve mentioned so far is conceptual atomism, the view that lexical concepts have no semantic structure (Fodor 1998, Millikan 2000). Conceptual atomism follows in the anti-descriptivist tradition that traces back to Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and others working in the philosophy of language (see Kripke 1972/80, Putnam 1975, Devitt 1981).
At 4.126 Wittgenstein introduces the term "formal concepts". — Fooloso4
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