But I think that it is possible in certain circumstances that P and not "P" is true. — Sapientia
but clearly this is possible, as I showed above
@Michael, if I understand you correctly, your claim hinges on saying that the same sentence cannot exist in more than one language. Is that correct? — The Great Whatever
There is likely a missing premise that you cannot articulate, — The Great Whatever
No. I'm saying that given the sentence mentioned on the one side is the sentence used on the other side, "X" is true iff X. That's not to say that some other schema won't work given that different sentences are used. — Michael
I don't understand. I just showed above that this isn't true, by showing a counterexample. You responded that I switched sentences.
But I did not -- I used the same sentence, viz. "there are no dinosaurs," in both cases. In what sense are those two not the same sentence?
You say that one is in English, and the other is in the new English. I say this makes no sense -- the same sentence is being used in both languages. — The Great Whatever
My name is Michael. The previous sentence is false.
They can't both be true. That would be a contradiction. If one is true then the other must be false. — Michael
'being the same sentence' is to be understood as being in the same language — Michael
2) The "X" mentioned on the left of the above and the "X" used on the right of the above are the same English sentence and so mean the same thing — Michael
Makes no sense unless you assume the same sentence cannot mean two different things in two different situations. If one sentence can change meaning over time (which it seems to me it obviously can), then what you follow with, 'and so mean the same thing,' cannot be asserted. — The Great Whatever
Okay, so how does my counterexample fail, then? If you have a situation where the very same sentence, "there are still dinosaurs," which now means there are still dinosaurs, instead means that there are no more dinosaurs — The Great Whatever
How many times do I have to repeat myself? The sentence mentioned means the same thing as the sentence used. So "there are still dinosaurs" means that there are still dinosaurs. — Michael
You cannot simply stipulate that such a situation cannot happen; in fact you are committed to it happening. — The Great Whatever
If you mean it as a material conditional, then only the current situation is relevant, making your claim trivially true, and at odds with the more grandiose claims you made at the beginning of this thread. — The Great Whatever
I think you are confusing the purpose of the biconditional. Do you mean it as a material equivalence, or something like, 'for any situation, if the thing on the left of the biconditional holds in that situation, then so does the thing on the right?' If you mean it as a material conditional, then only the current situation is relevant, making your claim trivially true, and at odds with the more grandiose claims you made at the beginning of this thread. — The Great Whatever
You do not want to claim the material equivalence — The Great Whatever
But in the way you want to use the biconditional, that is, to claim an equivalence in meaning between the thing on the left and the right
So, you are free to interpret the biconditional form as the conjunction of two subjunctive conditionals, or as the statement of a material equivalence. — Pierre-Normand
What circumstances would that be? — Pierre-Normand
Remember that philosophers who employ the disquotational schema (e.g. Tarskian truth theorists, disquotationalists, deflationists, minimalists, identity truth theorists, or prosentential truth theorists) are all using it in contexts where it is assumed that the truth conditions of the mentioned sentence are determined by means of the used sentence (on the right hand side of the biconditional). — Pierre-Normand
Hence, circumstances where its truth conditions would be different from the truth conditions of the used sentence are ruled out. — Pierre-Normand
So, it's rather like I were saying that if a natural number N is smaller than 3 then,
N is prime if and only if N = 2,
And you were to object that this biconditional is false because some natural numbers are prime other than 2. — Pierre-Normand
If there is no language. — Sapientia
They are ruled out because of the biconditional. Which is why it's also problematic to remove the biconditional and replace it with a material conditional. I don't want to allow the logical possibility of inappropriate truth conditions:
"P" is true if Q.
"The cat is on the mat" is true if the dog is on the bed. — Sapientia
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