I do too. But for me that "afterlife" does not include my ego--the Subject,"I"--nor any of its Narrative. So, admittedly this is that ego taliking: thanks but no thanks. — ENOAH

Yes, that's the part that is 'rub'-y. Harris (Sam) put its well - how is it possible that a decaying mind(dementia) that no longer recognises one's children suddenly departs from the body, in tact as at some random point in the past.
It's not coherent, to me. But again, I'm unsure that identity extends beyond the fact of the vessel. Consciousness doesn't, on it's face, consist in memories, so I see no reason to have them at-base.

I feel you brother! — ENOAH

It's a hard go, this lifetime :D

:up:

Consciousness doesn't, on it's face, consist in memories, so I see no reason to have them at-base. — AmadeusD

Might it be that the one which consists in memories, what I've referred to as the Narrative, is that Mind which does not persist. But, to differentiate, "real consciousness" does not consist in memories. And I think therefore ironically, real consciousness, the one which does not necessarily require the fleshy infrastructure to operate its memory store, if it persists in the afterlife, it is necessarily not the Narrative. Sad as it is, "I" is the Narrative, requires memory and its organic infrastructure. I goes never to return with the death of the Body. As for so called real consciousness, perhaps the incessantly present awareness Nature has in Be-ing. Perhaps what I really am, as/along with this body is that incessant presence where death doesn't matter where afterlife doesn't matter. All there is is Be-ing, and Be-ing is aware-ing be-ing. And, admittedly for drama, Tat Tvam Asi. Thou art that. But you are not the Narrative.

I think I am pretty much on this same wavelength. None of it matters, ultimately. But its all a lot of fun!

all a lot of fun! — AmadeusD

Right? And that too is a topic for further discussion somewhere. We know [it is Fiction] but [built into the Fiction is the reward of] we act as if [it is Real]

I think it would be a relatively short thread, for my part.

I am fine being in the experience machine.

I am fine being in the experience machine. — AmadeusD

There's no place like it

In Merlou-Ponty, the body itself is consciousness. According to his view, consciousness in the body would mean the body in the body, which sounds confusing. But the point seems clear. When the body dies, the consciousness also dies too.

Consciousness doesn't, on it's face, consist in memories, so I see no reason to have them at-base — AmadeusD

If memories aren't preserved in my after-life consciousness, in what sense is that still me? It hardly seems like something to look forward to.

This touches on the concept the individual identity, and essence. It sounds like Penelope Mackie's minimal essentialism - which entails a bare identity with no attached properties.

If memories aren't preserved in my after-life consciousness, in what sense is that still me? It hardly seems like something to look forward to. — Relativist

If half your memories suddenly disappeared, would you be half you? Wouldn't you still be you even if you lost 90% of your memories? If I had a conversation with my 20 year old self, I could tell my 20 year old self: "95% of what you do this year will be forgotten by the time you're 50." What should the reaction of my 20 year old self be upon hearing that? Fear that so much will be forgotten? Also, if my 80 year old self tells me that I won't have dementia, but through natural forgetting, 95% of this year I'm living right now will be forgotten, how should I feel about that right now?

To be ME at this point in time, 100% of my memories must be present.

Me (now) is not identical to the me of yesteday, much less to the infant me of 70 years ago.

I take the identity of indiscernibles seriously: entities x and y are identical if every predicate possessed by x is also possessed by y and vice versa

In terms of having an identity over time, it is a looser sort of identity. Perdurantism makes some sense: my identity has temporal parts: today's me was caused by yesterday's me, in a temporal chain that goes back to whatever we might call my origin. But there's a vast difference between 70 year old me and zygote me. Zygote me lacks an entire lifetime of my memories. Similarly with losing memories from dementia or trauma. In some sense, it's stll me - but a vastly different me depending on how much is lost, and if it's sudden or gradual. If it's gradual, then it's the mirror image of growing up and gaining memories- each day not much different from the last. But loss of all memories at death is a discontinuity. I don't see any sense that it's me. It's similar to zygote-me, but without the temporal connections to the subsequent temporal parts the zygote has. We'd label it me only if we choose to define individual identity that way, but that's arbitrary.

Yes, indeed. I think this is very well discussed by Nagel and Parfit, respectively.
Split-brain cases are rather important in considering this. Memories residing in more than one person is very troublesome. In the Teletransporter cases, someone who is not you, is exactly continuous with you.

I will return to this, as I am about to leave work - but I'm also about to finish Reasons and Persons. I have a lot fo thoughts lol.

Stevenson's research on children who remember their past lives might be of interest. Of course it's wildly controversial and a taboo subject but he assembled a large data set. See this article.

Me (now) is not identical to the me of yesteday, much less to the infant me of 70 years ago.

I take the identity of indiscernibles seriously: entities x and y are identical if every predicate possessed by x is also possessed by y and vice versa — Relativist

But you can never be identical to yourself in even the shortest amounts of time. At any point in time, atoms are moving in and out of your body, changing your physical makeup. But breathing doesn't make you a different person. Why should memory loss? Are you claiming the loss of one completely trivial memory in the next five seconds make you not you? That it turns you into a completely different person?

https://metaphysicist.com/problems/persistence/

Do you think idealism solves it? Did you see the conversation with Kastrup and Koch yet?

But you can never be identical to yourself in even the shortest amounts of time — RogueAI

In terms of strict identity, we can consider ourselves AT a point of time: RogueAI at t1 is identical to RogueAI at t1.

RogueAI at t1 has the same loose (perduring) identity as RougueAI at t2, t3, ...tn. This holds even if memory loss commences at some point - all are on a unique causal chain.

Let's suppose you die at tn, and all your memories cease to exist. Should we consider your loose identity to continue existing? The paradigm doesn't dictate an answer; it's a matter of semantics - what do we wish to refer to. We could talk about (loose identity) RogueAI in any of 3 ways:

1. The living person (which ceases to exist at death)
2. The physical body (which gradually decomposes after death)
3. A bare identity (a haeccity) that is your propertyless essense.

I don't believe in haeccity, so I generally wouldn't use sense #3. But we've been discussing an afterlife in which one's memories are gone. This seems to be a bare identity. Perhaps it reincarnates in a new infant.

Perhaps it reincarnates in a knew infant. — Relativist

But then we must ask, why a knew infant rather than an unknewn infant.

:grin:
Corrected.

It's fascinating, but frustrating. How best to account for these, metaphysically?

If actual reincarnation, it implies some (traumatic) memories are stored non-physically.

But it could be some telepathic connection across time, implying something about the nature of time and of mental activities.

It's frustrating because there seems to be no way to test any theories.

In the Teletransporter cases, someone who is not you, is exactly continuous with you. — AmadeusD

Or it could be considered a discontinuity: you are being destroyed and a new entity, an exact physical copy, is being produced. I tend to think there's no right answer; all answers are paradigm dependent.

It's frustrating because there seems to be no way to test any theories. — Relativist

But if a child's alleged memories of a previous life can be validated against documentary records and witness testimony, that amounts to some form of verification. (I've discussed Ian Stevenson previously but it usually generates such hostility that I refrain.) However his activities spanned a 30 year period and many thousands of cases. He himself never claimed to have proved that cases of re-incarnation occur, but that the evidence 'suggests it'. My knowledge of it is limited to a book I read about him by a journalist who travelled with him, and one of his publications borrowed from a library. Seems legit to me, but to a lot of people, not only is it not true, but it can't be true. Whereas I'm open to the idea.

Do you think idealism solves it? Did you see the conversation with Kastrup and Koch yet? — RogueAI

I watched about half of it, but I didn't notice anything about this topic. Besides, I don't know if idealism 'solves' the question of re-incarnation. Perhaps Sheldrake's morphic resonance at least provides a candidate for a medium of transmission. He says, as you will recall, that nature forms habits, that memories are not merely encoded in brains but in morphic fields. One question I've got is this: science only discovered electromagnetic fields in the mid-19th century. Until then, we had no idea of such a phenomenon, now they're thought to be more fundamental than sub-atomic particles. So what if there are fields other than electro-magnetic? How would they be detected? Electromagnetic fields are detected using instruments that register electric current. Even if there were morphic fields, presumably they are not detectable by those instruments, so they might exist undetected. There have been ideas like this in esoteric and occult circles for millenia. Maybe they're on to something, but it's a taboo subject as far as the mainstream is concerned.

Besides, I don't know if idealism 'solves' the question of re-incarnation. — Wayfarer

No, not that. The problem of personal identity across time.

But if a child's alleged memories of a previous life can be validated against documentary records and witness testimony, that amounts to some form of verification. — Wayfarer

I'm not challenging the fact that it's verification that the child has some knowledge of someone who's dead, and the knowledge was not obtained from contemporary sources, but rather due to something paranormal. Although it's consistent with reincarnation, it could be some other mechanism - and I was lamenting that there's no way to test what is actually going on- to know if it is reincarnation, or some form of ESP.

No, not that. The problem of personal identity across time. — RogueAI

The article I linked to mentions perdurance. That has to do with anything - and it doesn't have to be a being - maintaining identity through time even as some or all of its component parts are changed (per Ship of Theseus).

I was lamenting that there's no way to test what is actually going on- to know if it is reincarnation, or some form of ESP. — Relativist

Stevenson acknowledges that. It's why he says his data doesn't prove that reincarnation has occured.

It's probably worth acknowledging the Buddhist view of rebirth. As a matter of dogma, Buddhism denies that there is an eternally-existing self that migrates life to life. However, and paradoxically, rebirth is still fundamental to the religion. Consider the selection of lamas in Tibetan Buddhism, where children are shown artifacts from a purported previous incarnation, if they recognise them it's taken as evidence of their identity - even though there is no self or soul that migrates! Many would say it's evidence of a contradiction in Buddhism, but they say that a rebirth is more like a recurring pattern of existence - there's actually a rather lovely Sanskrit term for it, 'citta-saṃtāna':

Citta-saṃtāna (Sanskrit), literally "the stream of mind",[3] is the stream of succeeding moments of mind or awareness. It provides a continuity of the personality in the absence of a permanently abiding "self" (ātman), which Buddhism denies. The mindstream provides a continuity from one life to another, akin to the flame of a candle which may be passed from one candle to another:[4][5][a] William Waldron writes that "Indian Buddhists see the 'evolution' of mind i[n] terms of the continuity of individual mind-streams from one lifetime to the next, with karma as the basic causal mechanism whereby transformations are transmitted from one life to the next."[6]

According to Waldron, "[T]he mind stream (santāna) increases gradually by the mental afflictions (kleśa) and by actions (karma), and goes again to the next world. In this way the circle of existence is without beginning."[7] — Wikipedia

So that actually dovetails rather well with 'perdurance' theory, which could be summarised as 'not the same, but also not different'.

(Incidentally, William Waldron is a go-to scholar in this area, when I did Buddhist Studies, I emailed him and got a nice reply, with some unpublished articles attached. His latest book is this one.)

Or it could be considered a discontinuity: you are being destroyed and a new entity, an exact physical copy, is being produced. I tend to think there's no right answer; all answers are paradigm dependent. — Relativist

Well, as it is, that is how i conceptualise teletransportation.
My point was that the resulting person is psychologically continuous, and psychologically connected extremely strongly with you - to the point that no one but your original 'self' could be as connected.

Unless you take the Physical continuity, or further fact view, It doesn't seem like anything is being left out of the transmission. You're right that your paradigm informs how to think about the case, but it seems straight-forward to point out what is and isn't involved in these cases (branch-line case being an additional thing to ponder, and other versions). In this way, it seems clear that there are 'correct' ways to interpret the cases on each view
Parfit concludes that the above is all that matters and that 'personal identity' simply doesn't obtain, at all. He's a pretty harsh reductionist.

Interesting NDE - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ZfaPCwjguk

This is a good example of why I believe both religions and materialists have it wrong. There are 100,000's of testimonials like this.

This is an updated version of the argument with some editing and added statements for clarity. This was copied from my posts in Quora.

This is the argument I put forth in my thread Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body, in The Philosophy Forum under the name Sam26. I have also talked about this argument in other philosophy forums. I say this to allay questions of plagiarism. I have been posting on this subject for at least 12-15 years across many platforms.

My claim is that there is sufficient testimonial evidence to reasonably conclude that consciousness survives (that we survive, albeit in another form) the death of the body. So, I am making the claim that I know the conclusion of my argument is true. And, although I believe I could make other claims (and I will in later posts) based on the evidence, that is, claims of knowledge (by knowledge I mean justified true belief), I am limiting the scope of the conclusion in this initial post to keep confusion to a minimum. By limited, I mean I am not trying to give evidence of a God, heaven, that we are eternal beings, or any other spiritual or religious idea or doctrine; nor am I trying to give evidence of many of the other claims people are making while having such an experience. Although, as I have said, I do believe there is strong evidence to support other conclusions, and these conclusions have varying degrees of certainty, just as many of our everyday conclusions have varying degrees of certainty (subjective as well as objective certainty).

Preliminaries:

The first question is, what makes a strong inductive argument? The criteria for a good inductive argument are much different from the criteria for a good deductive argument. The criteria of a good inductive argument are as follows:

(1) number
(2) variety
(3) scope of the conclusion
(4) truth of the premises
(5) cogency

First, number. It seems rather obvious that if you have a greater number of testimonials that say something happened, then the stronger the argument. This does not mean that the conclusion relies solely on numbers because numbers in themselves are not always sufficient. It is important to the understanding of this argument that all of the criteria work together to strengthen the conclusion.

Second, variety. The greater the variety of cases cited the stronger the conclusion. When examining the conclusion of an inductive argument, the conclusion is either strong or weak, which is much different from a good deductive argument, where the conclusion follows with absolute necessity if it is sound (soundness means the deductive argument is both valid and the premises are true). The difference is what is probably or likely the case (inductive arguments), versus what necessarily follows (deductive arguments). A common misconception among some people is that if we do not know with absolute certainty then we do not know, but this is an error. Most of what we know is based on inductive reasoning, including many of the claims of science. Most of it is probability-based, so it is not known with absolute certainty, it is known with a high degree of certainty. So, when I use the phrase “I know..” in reference to the conclusion of this argument, I am referring to what is known based on what is probably the case; and since probability varies significantly I should say that I believe that the conclusion follows with a very high degree of probability based on the strength of the evidence.

Third, the scope of the conclusion. This has already been covered briefly in the opening paragraph (I'm referring to an opening paragraph in my Quora space.), it means that the less the conclusion claims the stronger the argument. In other words, conclusions that are broad in scope are much harder to defend. A conclusion that is limited in scope is easier to defend. The reason is that conclusions that are too broad require much more evidence than conclusions that are limited in their scope.

Fourth, truth of the premises. This means that the premises must be true, which by the way, is the same criteria that make a good deductive argument, that is, a good deductive argument must be sound (soundness has to do with whether the deductive argument is valid, plus the premises must be true).

(a) Since we are dealing with testimonial evidence, to know if the testimonial evidence is true, we first need corroboration, that is, we need an objective way to verify the testimonial evidence. This helps to establish the truth of the claims or the truth of the premises. Moreover, it helps add an objective way of verifying subjective experiences. There is both a subjective and objective component to this argument. The objective component helps to determine the objective facts of the experiences.

(b) Another important factor in determining the truth of testimonial evidence is firsthand testimony, as opposed to hearsay or secondhand testimony. Firsthand testimony is stronger than hearsay or second-hand testimony, all things being equal. This is an important component of all testimonial evidence and should be carefully considered when examining any kind of testimonial evidence.

(c) Consistency of the reports is another important criterion in terms of getting to the truth. However, testimonial evidence does not have to be perfectly consistent to be credible. When dealing with a large number of reports you will inevitably find some inconsistency. So, inconsistency itself is not enough to rule out the reports unless the inconsistency is widespread, and of such a number, that it affects the quality and number of consistent reports. So, although consistency is important, it must be looked at in terms of the overall picture. We often find inconsistent testimonial reports but that does not mean that all of the reports should be dismissed, it just means that our testimonial evidence should be based on those reports that are consistent.

Fifth is cogency. You rarely hear this criterion, but it is very important in terms of the effectiveness of the argument. There is a sense where any argument's (deductive or inductive) effectiveness is going to be based on whether the person to whom the argument is given, knows the premises are true. For example, if I give the following argument:

The base of a souffle is a roux.
This salmon dish is a souffle.
Hence, the base of this salmon dish is a roux (Dr. Byron I. Bitar, Classical Christian Wisdom, p. 70).

If you do not know what a souffle or a roux is, then you do not know if the premises are true, so how would you know if the conclusion is true? You may know that the argument is valid based on its form, but you would not know if the premises are true. So, you would not know if it is sound. For any argument to be effective, you have to know if the premises are true; and since knowledge varies from person to person, an argument's effectiveness is going to vary from person to person.

Now we have given some of the preliminaries, we will proceed to the argument itself.

The Inductive Argument:

The following argument is based on the testimonial evidence of those who have experienced an NDE, and the conclusion follows with a high degree of certainty. As such, one can claim to know the conclusion is true. This argument makes such a claim.

Each of the aforementioned criteria serves to strengthen the testimonial evidence. All of the criteria in the previous paragraphs work hand-in-hand to strengthen the conclusion, and the criteria serve to strengthen any claim to knowledge. If we have a large enough pool of evidence based on these five criteria, we can say with confidence that we know that consciousness survives the death of the body, namely, we can say what is probably the case, but not what is necessarily the case.

Again, if there is a high degree of probability that these testimonials reflect an objective reality, then we can also say with confidence, that we know consciousness survives the death of the body. Thus, our knowledge is based on objective criteria, not on purely subjective claims.

We will now look at the testimonial evidence in terms of the five stated criteria, and how these testimonials support the conclusion.

First, what is the number of people who claim to have had an NDE? According to a 1992 Gallop poll about 5% of the population has experienced an NDE; and even if this poll is off by a little, we are still talking about millions of people. So, the number of accounts of NDEs is very high, much higher than what we would normally need to add to the strength of the conclusion.

Also, as was mentioned in the previous post, numbers in themselves are not enough, which is why the other criteria must be coupled with numbers.

The second criterion of good testimonial evidence is variety, that is, do we have evidence from a variety of sources? The answer to this question is in the affirmative. NDEs have been reported in every culture from around the world, which by definition means that we are getting reports from different religious views, and different world views. NDEs also span every age group, from young children to the middle-aged and finally to the aged. The testimonial reports come from doctors, nurses, scientists, atheists, and agnostics, literally from every imaginable educational level and background. NDEs occur in a variety of settings, including drowning, electrocution, while awake, while on the operating table, after a heart attack, etc. People have also reported having shared an NDE with someone else, although rarely. They have happened when there is no heartbeat, with the blood drained from the brain, and with no measurable brain activity. They have been reported to happen with a minimal amount of stress, that is, without being near death.

The third criterion is the scope of the conclusion, and the scope of this conclusion is limited to consciousness surviving the body. The conclusion claims that we can know that consciousness survives bodily death.

The fourth criterion is the truth of the premises. To know if the premises are true, we need corroboration of the testimonial evidence, a high degree of consistency, and firsthand testimony. In all or most of these cases, it seems clear that we have all three. We have millions of accounts that can be corroborated by family members, friends, doctors, nurses, and hospice workers. Corroboration is important in establishing some objectivity to what is a very subjective experience. It gives credence and credibility to the accounts. One example of corroboration is given in Pam's NDE out of Atlanta, GA, which can be seen on YouTube, although the video is old.

Consistency is also important to the establishment of the truth of the premises. We have a high degree of consistency across a wide variety of reports. What are these consistent reports?

1) Seeing one's body from a third person perspective, that is, from outside one's body, and hearing and seeing what is happening around their bodies.
2) Having intense feelings of being loved, intense feelings of peace, and the absence of pain.
3) Seeing a light or tunnel in the distance and feeling that one is being drawn to the light, or moving towards the light.
4) Seeing deceased loved ones.
5) Seeing beings of light that one may interpret as Jesus, Mary, Muhammad, an angel, or just a loving being that one may feel connected with.
6) Heightened sensory experiences, namely, feeling that one is having an ultra-real experience, as opposed to a dream or a hallucination. This happens even when there is no measurable brain activity.
7) Communication that happens mind-to-mind, not verbally.
8) Seeing beautiful landscapes.
9) Seeing people who are getting ready or waiting to be born.
10) Having a life review by a loving being who is not judgmental, but simply showing you how important it is to love, and the importance of your actions on those you come in contact with.
11) Feeling as though one has returned home. This is also confirmed by people who were told they chose to come to Earth.
12) A feeling of oneness with everything, as though we are part of one consciousness.
13) Memories of who they are return, as though they temporarily forgot who they were, and where they came from.
14) There are also reports of knowledge returning, and many questions being answered as quickly as they think of the question.
15) Understanding that ultimately we cannot be harmed and that everything is perfect as it is.
16) That we are eternal beings simply entering into one of many realities. We are simply higher beings that choose to have a human experience. Ultimately, we are not human, being human is just a temporary experience. Our humanity ends when we die, then we assume our original form.

Another aid in establishing the truth of the testimonial evidence is firsthand accounts, as opposed to hearsay. There are thousands of firsthand accounts being reported by the International Association of Near-Death Studies, and according to polling, there are many millions of firsthand accounts.

The fifth criterion is the cogency of the premises. Whether the argument is cogent for you depends on many factors, but many people have heard of near-death experiences, so the concept is not an unfamiliar one. It is not going to be cogent for everyone, but with a little study and reading it can be cogent. It is not difficult to understand the concept. Although it is probably going to be difficult to understand how it is metaphysically possible. This argument claims that it is highly probable that consciousness survives the death of the body, and that the conclusion is very strong based on what makes for a strong inductive argument.

The further claim of this argument is that I know that I know the conclusion is true. Is it possible the conclusion is wrong? Of course it is possible, but we do not want to base a belief on what is possible, but on what is likely the case. All kinds of things are possible, but that does not mean we should believe them.

I loved this. Thank you. I am persuaded on the face of it. I can't help a couple of hesitations below. Your skill in logic/knowledge of the literature is far more advanced than mine, so maybe you can quickly dismiss them. And I'm not patronizing: I am truly impressed, but for...

First let me get what troubles me out of the way. I know and appreciate all of the complex layers of your cogent reasoning. But what stands out is the persuasiveness of the 5%=millions. Could millions be liars and or delusional and or themselves persuaded before its first conversion into data? Maybe, but assume not. Could you say (and I haven't looked into this) the same about those who claim to be born again, saved by the holy spirit (speaking in tongues, muscle spasms, new outlook etc) or those who claim Satori etc? Or visitations/alien viewings?

And you can't just say in those other e.g. consistencies arise from shared wishful thinking, without applying that to NDE testimonials.

What are these consistent reports? — Sam26

What if there might be other explanations for the consistencies besides that the claims are factual?

And it doesn't have to be deviant. Absorbed from human culture/History, are these shared "desires" regarding immortality/"an" afterlife, built into our collective Narratives to which we each assimilate by simply sharing in our locus in History. These manifest/are input when as children we express fear of the end of our own Narrative and a "teacher" (anyone) soothes them by inputting modifications to the Narrative: bright light, Jesus will call you, you'll be reunited with loved ones. And as for the tunnel: death is the otherside, the passage to etc.

Perhaps when one is close to death, or whatever such trauma is, these modifications flood the brain to trigger soothing feelings and to allay the pain of fear.

How can I know that the experience that I'm having (or remember having) is a near death experience?

Is it derived after the experience, e.g. from a doctor telling me that I was dead for a few minutes, plus from remembering having had an experience and deriving that I must have had it near or during those minutes?

Or is it inferred from recognizing or interpreting the experience as a typical near death experience because one has seen alleged near death experiences depicted or described?

I don't know if I've ever had experiences near death, only near unconscious states, such as when falling asleep or experiencing accidents. Extraordinary situations, disorientation, pain etc tend to evoke extraordinary experiences.