I limit myself to point out that Europeans can’t give for granted the U.S. partnership, if that means equal partnership, especially in matter of security, as history has shown, starting with NATO (“created to ‘keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’”) and all other examples of unilateralism in Middle East or toward Russia

Europe wouldn’t achieve equal partnership in terms of arms for a long time. It would take many decades to come anywhere near. The geopolitical shift here is towards the east. When it comes to China the U.S. needs a powerful Europe on its side. If they cut Europe loose and Europe becomes bogged down in wars with Russia, or collapses. It would leave the U.S. exposed on two fronts. The pacific front and the Atlantic front. With her being pulled into conflicts in Europe and in the pacific at the same time. The U.S. needs a strong Europe just as Europe needs a strong U.S..As I say, the post WW2 settlement is in the past now thanks to Putin.

This unilateralism for the U.S. has been undermined by the economic cue of China through globalisation. The U.S. economy is weak, the overstretch involved in policing the world is becoming to expensive.

Concerning NATO, the US is currently struggling between a historical intent “on preserving a 70-year-old framework that lets Washington call the shots and put its interests first” (https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-nato-problem-defense-procurement-training-research/) at the expense of American tax-payers, represented by Biden, and Trump’s America first approach (https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-foreign-policy-puts-america-first/) which arguably aims at preserving NATO but more at the expense of European tax-payers (while threatening to withdraw from NATO otherwise).

This supports my point, the U.S. needs to help the EU to become strong and strengthen NATO.

There is however a strategic issue here one may overlook: the problem is not just how much the Europeans spend for their defence and NATO, but how much they buy from the US defence industry at the expense of the European defence industry.

Yes this is something to guard against, but not for reasons of competition with the U.S. but for the economic benefit of the EU manufacturing her own arms.

I’ve also given my take on your take: “you didn’t clarify in a principled way what your very high bar is, nor offered evidence that ‘the deliberate starvation of probably now 1 million Palestinian citizens’ is a direct consequence of Israel’s decision”.

I’m deferring to the ICJ on this. However, I’ll eat my hat if the starvation of a captive population by restricting food and water turns out not to be genocide.

There's a plethora of violence, vandalism and a lot of emotions. Yet it's still politics.

The problem is really that people think their emotional response, usually revenge, would work. It doesn't. Basically with retaliation they simply reaffirm to the other side how evil they are and how right the other side is in not seeking a peaceful settlement.

Israel not allowing food to the civilians won't cower the Palestinians to give up an seek a settlement, but will harden their resolve. If not now, then the future generations will remember. The current leadership of Hamas were kids during the first Intifada. And terrorist attacks from the Palestinian side won't cower the Israelis, but reinforce their attitudes that you cannot negotiate with the Palestinians. The policy that the Likud party has cherished from it's birth.

The only thing that matters in their minds is the absolute righteousness of the cause. — Moses

I think on both sides there's ample amounts of this around. Especially when religion is involved, it's always extremely ugly. People are doing God's work, on both sides.

They are zealots who never cared about much larger amounts of muslim suffering elsewhere. — Moses

American protesters usually protest about what their own country does. Some can protest at a third country (like China) if their country continues to have ties with such a country. But if you have a somewhere a civil war where one or the both sides have come to the conclusion that genocide is the only way out, then you have huge amounts of suffering. And not much emotional outbursts of anger. But it's not done in their name, when neither side is supported by their government (by weapons etc.). Actually in these cases, the US is against these states of actions. Like in Syria or in Sudan with Darfur.

Israel not allowing food to the civilians won't cower the Palestinians to give up an seek a settlement, but will harden their resolve. — ssu

Yah. We think war is always functional because, of course, there are measurable, manifest effects. But it does not rule out more functional approaches.

People are more complex than Pavlov’s dogs. Look at the Taliban, the IRA, and Viet cong. Did the wars waged end them?

Also, Hamas. Did their horrendous attack end the plight of their people? No, if anything, it threatens the end of their people, period.

Realpolitik, far from suggesting war, actually ought to be more pragmatic, face the facts, and sit down for some immediate, open minded, bite the bullet, willing to compromise, negotiations. Both sides.

People are more complex than Pavlov’s dogs. Look at the Taliban, the IRA, and Viet cong. Did the wars waged end them? — ENOAH

With two example, yes, they were victorious, militarily. And if you refer to the original IRA, 1916-1922, that was victorious too, they did get their independent Ireland! But what's the point here?

Also, Hamas. Did their horrendous attack end the plight of their people? No, if anything, it threatens the end of their people, period. — ENOAH

You really think Israel will ethnically cleanse or kill seven million Palestinians? I don't think so.

Realpolitik, far from suggesting war, actually ought to be more pragmatic, face the facts, and sit down for some immediate, open minded, bite the bullet, willing to compromise, negotiations. Both sides. — ENOAH

Yet for that you should have leadership that would actually show true leadership, think forward and restrain from the emotional response for revenge. And that's difficult, to restrain people from the worst of their emotions yet to show that you do feel with them.

Start from obvious things: yes, try to destroy Hamas, but don't create a famine. I've again and again said one simple example: fight like the Americans.

Start from obvious things: yes, try to destroy Hamas, but don't create a famine. I've again and again said one simple example: fight like the Americans. — ssu

You're right. I was over zealous and reckless, even wilfully blind.

I agree with many of your comments on this.

The U.S. needs a strong Europe just as Europe needs a strong U.S..As I say, the post WW2 settlement is in the past now thanks to Putin. — Punshhh

The problem is that as long as the US is leading a military alliance , the US will have greater influence on the foreign policies of such alliance in the face of world crisis that threaten Western security, ALSO in other areas of interest: so e.g. if the US supports Israel even if Israel is accused of committing a genocide and Europeans do not, that’s a problem. There are also reputational costs into a military or strategic alliance with the US, European states must not ignore. American controversial policies are also what Europeans must swallow to keep the front united, otherwise they have to struggle for greater decision power on the coalition, but what are the odds to succeed, really?
The other issue is that Europeans need their own defense industry to gain strategic autonomy from the US, beside its economic return.
So, yes, the fact of the European rearming sounds good wrt the Russian threat, but this brings other political and economic concerns too, some of which are about the US leadership. On the other side, the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too. And if jumping on the US bandwagon doesn’t sound as good as balancing the US power, not doing so may have even nastier consequences for Europeans.

American controversial policies are also what Europeans must swallow to keep the front united, otherwise they have to struggle for greater decision power on the coalition, but what are the odds to succeed, really? — neomac

Actually here NATO works (...or doesn't work as a tool of US policy): only few American endeavors have been so that all NATO participates in them. And many times allies can opt out or simply give no actual support. Hence when an American President comes up with a too controversial policy of striking someone, it can be so that nobody shows up. This happened humiliatingly to Obama with Syria, if you remember. Not even the UK showed up and Obama had to backtrack away from his line drawn on the sand.

Besides, it has been more of the US simply changing it's mind without consulting to it's allies. Here Afghanistan is a great example: the US withdrawal came as a surprise to the other alliance members and they had to react to the whims of the US policy. Something that can be seen now in the support of Ukraine too.

On the other side, the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too. — neomac

To me this sounds a bit confusing. I think Europe is quite happy with the present, but it's the US who has these 'pivot-people' calling for 'pivot to Asia' all the time. Which is confusing.

@tim wood

Your feedback was deleted along with replies. It's not up for debate here not least because this is not feedback. Also, it's too obvious to be up for debate as far as I'm concerned, just as it would be if someone tried to speak of "Jewish bestiality" or "Black bestiality". There are no such things. And neither I nor any other mod is required to waste our time due to your inability to understand the very clear instructions you've been given or the rationale behind them. You will be banned if you repeat this kind of language. That will not change.

Of course, if you really feel the need to open a feedback thread, it's your right. My response will be to copy paste my previous instructions / explanation there so you can read it again.

If anyone else is confused, none of this is to say you can't criticize ideologies or religions.

There's a plethora of violence, vandalism and a lot of emotions. Yet it's still politics. — ssu

When was the last time you saw a crowd of angry Jews surrounding and protesting in front of a mosque and disrupting their services? Where are the Canadian or American or European Jews going into Muslim areas and vandalizing their businesses and assaulting people? Where are the mass pro-Israel marches disturbing public order leaving behind a trail of destruction and violence?

Christianity is weak in the West. We believe in nothing. Western birth rates are low.

But don't point it out or draw attention to it. We wouldn't want to do that.

When was the last time you saw a crowd of angry Jews surrounding and protesting in front of a mosque and disrupting their services? — BitconnectCarlos

There's few mosques here and very few Jews where I live. And people are quite well behaved.

It's a bit different in "Holy Land", where religious zealots have a field day:




Or dancing inside the Ibrahim Mosque?


Same mosque btw where Baruch Goldstein shot 39 Muslims and wounded 150 others before being killed by the crowd (and hence is a hero for the Zionist extremists).

And of course you have the religious zealots on the other side also, naturally, which people here don't support even if they are critical about Israel's actions...

Christianity is weak in the West. We believe in nothing. Western birth rates are low. — BitconnectCarlos

So you assume fundamentalists make a country strong? I beg to differ. In fact, I find the whole narrative of "the West being weak", especially "weaker than it's enemies" to be a load of bullshit.

And to discuss the demographic transition, it's also something that it isn't either so straight forward as people might think:

2April24

To date over 32,000 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed by Israel since 7Oct23 and the (US-backed) slaughter continues ...

Feel the Bern: "Stop murdering innocent people!"
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/apr/02/bernie-sanders-netanyahu-gaza-murdering-innocent-people

"Netanyahu branded 'traitor' by Israeli protestors"
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2487171/middle-east

It really does now seem entirely unreasonable to support Israel's ongoing violence here.

I really tried to stay on the fence, given there are legit grievances for both. But I am not able to continue to be so stoic. Israel is the aggressor now. They must stop.

It really does now seem entirely unreasonable to support Israel's ongoing violence here.

I really tried to stay on the fence, given there are legit grievances for both. But I am not able to continue to be so stoic. Israel is the aggressor now. They must stop. — AmadeusD

I agree. They have to start wrapping this up now.

And of course you have the religious zealots on the other side also, naturally, which people here don't support even if they are critical about Israel's actions... — ssu

Today a 10 month old Israeli boy, Shalhevet Pass, was shot in the head by a Palestinian terrorist. The secular Palestinian Authority will of course be paying (has paid?) the martyrs bounty of $300k USD for the deed. It's not just the Islamists.

But resistance, right?

There's few mosques here and very few Jews where I live. And people are quite well behaved. — ssu

Look around you to Sweden, Great Britain, Canada, and also the US to a slightly lesser extent. France would be another case.

So you assume fundamentalists make a country strong? I beg to differ. In fact, I find the whole narrative of "the West being weak", especially "weaker than it's enemies" to be a load of bullshit. — ssu

A country needs something that its citizens can sign onto. Some type of common value system. A sense of citizenship, a common purpose. What is it that unites us? A collective guilt in the sins of the West?

A country needs something that its citizens can sign onto. Some type of common value system. A sense of citizenship, a common purpose. What is it that unites us? A collective guilt in the sins of the West? — BitconnectCarlos

Self criticism can be our strength, assuming that we also will respect the achievements that we have made. Totalitarian systems cannot be self critical, they cannot openly debate their flaws. It's something that democracies can do, which for some makes the look weak. Democracies always look to be weak, sometimes as they would be being broken apart.

Common threats unite us. In my country even if the political parties keep up the normal fights over policy decision, the opposition and the ruling parties could immediately get together when the shit hit the fan. First when Covid pandemic started and then when Russia attacked Ukraine in a full scale assault and Finland had to seek NATO membership. On both occasions suddenly there wasn't the typical quarreling, but a quick consensus on what to do and rapid decisions taken.

Same actually you can see with Israel. Israel was looking as it would become apart in a political crisis before October 7th, but it unified quickly to the threat. This isn't at all surprising: people can heatedly disagree about some issues in a democracy, yet come together when needed.

The thing is that there is a common value system, but we don't talk about it. Those things that we agree upon are considered basically self evident. We talk about the differences we have an paint these caricatures of the others who don't think like us.

I agree that self-criticism is good.

You know the analogy of the frog in hot water? If you throw a frog into hot water he'll quickly escape, but if you just slowly turn up the heat he'll end up boiling himself to death slowly. The modern West is predicated on double standards. We can freely criticise certain groups without shame/stigma but not others. Only certain types of pride are allowed.

The West is not well-equipped to deal with such issues. It is a case where the water temperature is slowly creeping up as opposed to a 9/11 or a Pearl Harbor. It is an issue that stems from the core western values of tolerance and religious freedom and to challenge those is to challenge our Enlightenment-era heritage. I would say that Biden has flooded the country with migrants, but that would presuppose that Biden is in charge when the country knows he is not.

I can't help but shake the sense that the US is in decline. Maybe it can be reversed. School absences have roughly doubled over the past 5 years. You walk into stores and the items are locked up. Apparently "stealing is wrong" is no longer something we collectively agree on. It didn't use to be like this.

I see the issues you raise and they will have to be grappled with by the parties to the coalition. Provided the U.S. doesn’t veer off in another direction, Trumpism, for example. I don’t see any major problems going forward.

American controversial policies are also what Europeans must swallow to keep the front united, otherwise they have to struggle for greater decision power on the coalition, but what are the odds to succeed, really?

Yes, but I don’t see any controversial policies on the horizon. I say this because the foreign policies of the U.S. which have led to the majority of conflicts they have engaged in over the last period, since WW2, have now faded. Namely the struggle against the commies. Although I wouldn’t be surprised if an equivalent paranoia regarding China were to develop. Although I would expect this to be trade wars rather than land wars.
I’m in agreement with SSU that the so called Islamist threat, is rather over blown.

So, yes, the fact of the European rearming sounds good wrt the Russian threat, but this brings other political and economic concerns too, some of which are about the US leadership

I would think that this depends on the outcome of the Ukraine war and whether Russia can retain some sort of superpower status. Hence my description as pivotal.

On the other side, the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe un exploitable to its hegemonic competitors too

Yes, this is a factor, I’m not up to speed on how this played into the Ukraine crisis since the collapse of the USSR. But I acknowledge it, although I don’t see any reason why the U.S. and EU interest would diverge much on this issue. I reiterate though that the U.S. seeking to weaken or exploit the EU, or NATO for some political reason does seem nonsensical here.

The modern West is predicated on double standards. We can freely criticise certain groups without shame/stigma but not others. Only certain types of pride are allowed. — BitconnectCarlos

I don't think that this is our biggest problem. Public discourse simply can be annoying some times.

I can't help but shake the sense that the US is in decline. — BitconnectCarlos

If it helps you, you have a way to go still in that fall. So just enjoy the decadence. The Titanic sailing for the iceberg is still just being built...

I don't think that this is our biggest problem. Public discourse simply can be annoying some times. — ssu

I don't think it's our biggest problem it's just pervasive. It's more than discourse. Church and synagogue services get interrupted here frequently by the usual suspects. It usually gets swept under the rug. I can only imagine the hell that would break loose if people started doing this to mosques. I don't care much if it were just discourse but now it's becoming action. Jews are the canary in the coalmine.

Fortunately for me, I don’t belong to the simplistic Nickelodeon morality crew.

Yes, the simplistic nickelodeon morality crew that condemns those who breach a neighbor's fence, enters his home, murders a family and sets fire to a baby in a crib.

Nice to know that, like, you're, like, so philosophical and smart and you're able to see the nuance and shades of grey in that. So educated.

If you are in the Nickelodeon Morality Crew TM then Mikie must be in the Nick Jr crew.

Yes, but I don’t see any controversial policies on the horizon. I say this because the foreign policies of the U.S. which have led to the majority of conflicts they have engaged in over the last period, since WW2, have now faded. Namely the struggle against the commies. Although I wouldn’t be surprised if an equivalent paranoia regarding China were to develop. Although I would expect this to be trade wars rather than land wars. — Punshhh

We have two ongoing conflicts one in Ukraine and another in Israel, and many in the Rest and in West (including in the US) are blaming the US for one reason or the other (examples: https://www.jeffsachs.org/newspaper-articles/wgtgma5kj69pbpndjr4wf6aayhrszm, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/18/america-root-cause-war-israel-gaza-palestine/ ). That's the kind of foreign policies I'm referring to. If you do not see that, do not waste time answering me next time.
Imagine if Israel is not submitting to the UN security council’s resolution for a cease-fire so the next resolution is economic sanctions, diplomatic sanctions and/or an arms embargo. What if the US vetoes it? What should European countries like France which voted for the cease-fire do? Condemn the US and sanction Israel anyways?

I would think that this depends on the outcome of the Ukraine war and whether Russia can retain some sort of superpower status. Hence my description as pivotal. — Punshhh

So you mean that no matter how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict goes, it doesn’t change the superpower status of the US, while the conflict in Ukraine may change the superpower status of the US, is that it?

But I acknowledge it, although I don’t see any reason why the U.S. and EU interest would diverge much on this issue. — Punshhh

What issue? The US and EU diverged on the case of Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia to the point that Ukraine didn’t manage join NATO up until now, even if the US was warmly supporting it.

I reiterate though that the U.S. seeking to weaken or exploit the EU, or NATO for some political reason does seem nonsensical here. — Punshhh

Reiterating claims doesn’t help clarify them. Given what I understood earlier from your claims, I guess your reasoning is the following: if Russia wins the war in Ukraine, then the US might lose its superpower status, that’s why the US wants to the hegemonic conflict against Russia in Ukraine, and a strong EU and NATO are kind of necessary to achieve that. Is it that what you mean?

You have even in this thread many examples of people believing the Palestinians being something "artificial" construct, and that Palestinians simply should move to somewhere else in the Arab world. — ssu

To the extent nations are cultural phenomena, they ALL are artificial construct. There are however some traits about the Palestinian nationalism which make it more easy for Israel to question its ideological credibility: 1. its ideological roots are in pan-arabism and pan-islamism, both of which are broader ideologies than the idea of a Palestinian nation-state 2. Palestinians didn’t branch out as a separate politically self-conscious nation from within the Arab world, as the Ukrainians branched out from the Russian empire, the Argentinians from the Spanish empire, the Brazilians from the Portuguese empire, the Americans from the British empire despite the ethnic ties. So their national ideology looks very much shaped by a struggle against a foreign power (the Zionist one) with no ethnic ties, not because non-Palestinian, but because non-Arab (indeed, at the end of the Ottoman Empire Palestinians were mostly just fine to be part of Great Syria). That’s why there seems to be no Palestinian national identity, widely shared and politically conscious, prior to the conflict with Israel. 3. The link to Iran which may have hijacked the nation-state aspirations of the Palestinians (Hamas Islamism superseding the PLO secularism isn’t a good sign).

I think however that there are other factors that Israel can’t discount: 1. How the Arab states’ questionable attitude toward the Palestinians (and Palestinian refugees) may reinforce the Palestinians’ aspirations to a distinctive Palestinian nation-state. 2. How couching the Zionist project as a ethnocentric and Western-supported colonialist project is now more than ever detrimental to its perceived legitimacy, even in the West not only in the Rest. It feels now like fighting for Israel is done in the wrong time, in the wrong place, by the wrong people.

The obvious thing here is that there's not just one way to fight a war. There are many ways. Starting from the way you approach the civilian population. I've made the point right from the start in October last year that Israel should approach the fighting just like the US approached it's fight against Al Qaeda and ISIS in Iraq: to take into consideration the civilian population. But it didn't. It went with no political goals, hopes of "voluntary transfer" of Palestinians somewhere else and the creating a famine. This has been a strategic mistake in the long run, but this government isn't thinking in the long run. It's thinking about the next day and it's popularity among the voters. — ssu

This article offers a critical reading of such comparison with the Americans fighting in Iraq and Syria: https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-devastation-of-gaza-was-inevitable-a-comparison-to-us-operations-in-iraq-and-syria/ On the other side, other Western articles share your concern about the post-war scenario: https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/remaking-mistakes-in-gaza/
My understanding is that even if Israel had the sort of post-war plan the latter article is talking about, it still looks unlikely that Netanyahu will politically survive after the war ends to pursue any post-war plans. The uncertain support from Biden (and now even from Trump) is putting Netanyahu in a difficult spot which will hardly soften his resolution to pursue his war against Hamas and, possibly, other neighbouring enemies. So what the US, Arab and Israeli representatives may more easily work on is a post-Hamas and post-Netanyahu situation. And for such representatives may be enough to distance themselves from Netanyahu more than really trying to shut his personal mission in Gaza down.

Hence even if Egypt is an ally of the US, Saudi-Arabia is the ally of US (and Iraq was occupied and should have a Pro-US government), the US does feel cautious about how strong this relationship is. Iran and the fall of the Shah and the present relations with the country tells a lot. So could it happen in Saudi-Arabia? Or Egypt? — ssu

I get the need of being cautious, but to what extent? For example, how likely is that the US will call what is happening in Gaza a genocide as it did for genocides in ex-Yogoslavia with the ensuing NATO intervention, really?

American controversial policies are also what Europeans must swallow to keep the front united, otherwise they have to struggle for greater decision power on the coalition, but what are the odds to succeed, really? — neomac

Actually here NATO works (...or doesn't work as a tool of US policy): only few American endeavors have been so that all NATO participates in them. And many times allies can opt out or simply give no actual support. Hence when an American President comes up with a too controversial policy of striking someone, it can be so that nobody shows up. This happened humiliatingly to Obama with Syria, if you remember. Not even the UK showed up and Obama had to backtrack away from his line drawn on the sand. — ssu

If Europeans opt out or not support, that means Europeans’ interest diverges from the US wrt certain foreign policies, but then Europeans should wonder how the US might react if they care about the US military support. On the other side, if we are talking about partnership, this doesn’t mean to co-lead.

Besides, it has been more of the US simply changing it's mind without consulting to it's allies. Here Afghanistan is a great example: the US withdrawal came as a surprise to the other alliance members and they had to react to the whims of the US policy. Something that can be seen now in the support of Ukraine too. — ssu

I’m neither claiming that the Europeans should submit to the US foreign policies nor that the US is a reliable leader. I’m claiming that there are costs for Europeans, at worse, in terms of their own security for their attempts to question the US leadership or opposing US foreign policies.

On the other side, the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too. — neomac

To me this sounds a bit confusing. I think Europe is quite happy with the present, but it's the US who has these 'pivot-people' calling for 'pivot to Asia' all the time. Which is confusing. — ssu

What is the present Europe is happy about? What is so confusing in calling for “pivot to Asia” by American ‘pivot-people'?

Yes, the simplistic nickelodeon morality crew that condemns those who breach a neighbor's fence, enters his home, murders a family and sets fire to a baby in a crib. — BitconnectCarlos

That wasn’t the question.

Also, it’s very easy to condemn. Which I’ve done and any rational adult would do. The difference between you and me is that I’m capable of also condemning the murder of Palestinians, which is far greater in number.

What you do, as an educated adult with a semblance of rationality, is look at the specific situation, the context, the power dynamics, the decisions and actions, and the justifications— you then make a moral assessment.

Taking all this together, this situation is very clear. This war is an outcome of a brutal, protracted occupation by a US-backed state with overwhelming financial and military power. The history is very clear for anyone willing to look at it, and today’s actions are also very easy to understand. This is why Israel is becoming a pariah state and world opinion, including the US — where over half the country disproves of Israel’s actions — has completely turned on them.

True, it’s impossible to see if you presuppose everything Israel does is defensive. Same is done by US jingoists. — Mikie

You fit well into the latter camp. But keep up the good work of defending genocide. You’re doing god’s work I’m sure.

If you can condemn 10/7 as an atrocity it then presumably follows that Israel is justified in striking back at Hamas. So you're ok with Israel using military force against Hamas? Or do you see it as a law enforcement matter?

Now it's just a matter of how.

We have two ongoing conflicts one in Ukraine and another in Israel, and many in the Rest and in West (including in the US) are blaming the US for one reason or the other.

What’s new. This has been going on for decades with every conflict the U.S. has been involved in.

That's the kind of foreign policies I'm referring to.

So am I, the Israeli conflict won’t have big geopolitical consequences.
The Ukraine conflict will have big geopolitical consequences, but the direction of policy here hasn’t changed for decades. It’s the fallout from the Cold War and the U.S. and E.U. are pretty much in lockstep.

So you mean that no matter how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict goes, it doesn’t change the superpower status of the US, while the conflict in Ukraine may change the superpower status of the US, is that it?

Not U.S. superpower status, rather the strength of the anti China alliance.

What issue? The US and EU diverged on the case of Ukraine vis-à-vis with Russia to the point that Ukraine didn’t manage join NATO up until now, even if the US was warmly supporting it.

The partnership between the U.S. and the EU will have tensions, so what? If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now. Is that what the U.S. wanted?

if Russia wins the war in Ukraine, then the US might lose its superpower status, that’s why the US wants to the hegemonic conflict against Russia in Ukraine, and a strong EU and NATO are kind of necessary to achieve that. Is it that what you mean?

At no point have I said anything about the U.S. superpower status. Its position as a global superpower is secure and isn’t going to change.
I’m saying if Russia wins in Ukraine, it will greatly weaken and threaten the EU (as opposed to EU status if Russia loses the war). This will leave the U.S. vulnerable on two fronts, the Pacific and the Atlantic.
Perhaps bullet points will help.
If Russia wins;
1, Russia strengthens, becomes a threat to EU on her borders.
2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.
3, Russia becomes strong re-establishes the Russian empire forms a strong alliance with China.
4, U.S. is vulnerable on two fronts from China and from Russia via threat to EU. While China and Russia are in strong alliance.
5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.

If Russia loses;
6, Russia is greatly weakened, may even collapse.
7, Putin is seen as a failure, pariah
8, Ukraine becomes part of EU, NATO.
9, EU becomes strong with no threat on her border.
10, EU forms strong alliance with U.S.

In both cases a strong alliance is formed between two large powers. In the first case between China and Russia in the second case between U.S. and EU.

Now going back to the Israel Palestine conflict.
There is no global shift in power, with either outcome in the conflict. Israel either becomes an isolated country bristling with weapons. Or Israel collapses and becomes another failed state in the Middle East. Either way it makes no difference to the geopolitical balance in the world.
Let’s say Israel goes to war with Iran. Again two more failed states with no change in the global power dynamic. There are other things that can happen in the region which could have geopolitical consequences, like oil, or conflicts between larger regional players. But they are not influenced that much by what happens in Israel Palestine.

To the extent nations are cultural phenomena, they ALL are artificial construct. — neomac

One can say so, but the people aren't artificial.

1. its ideological roots are in pan-arabism and pan-islamism, both of which are broader ideologies than the idea of a Palestinian nation-state — neomac

I think that Palestines and Palestinians ideological roots have more to do with how the "Jewish Palestinians", the Israelis have gone with their own nation building.

2. Palestinians didn’t branch out as a separate nation from within the Arab world, as the Ukrainians branched out from the Russian empire — neomac

Independent Ukraine is only 33 years old. And many Russians are totally confident about the utter artificiality of the country as you are of the Palestinians...when compared to the Israelis.

Yet it's very typical in a world made of nation states, people think that there must be something wrong with the people that don't have their own country. Either they are weak, incapable or not actually genuine. This silly argumentation on who has more moral right to the land where they now live and have lived for generations shows this.

I think however that there are other factors that Israel can’t discount: 1. How the Arab states’ questionable attitude toward the Palestinians (and Palestinian refugees) may reinforce the Palestinians’ aspirations to a distinctive Palestinian nation-state. — neomac

As I've said, Palestinian aspirations are reinforced how Isreal treats them, starting from the thing that Israel never was for them in any way.

Yet is it questionable that Arabs now see Palestinians differently from them? Finns and Swedes are surely European, even Nordic, but two different countries and people still. Are Palestinians then Jordanians?

Well, remember Black September 1970 in Jordan. Then actually when Israeli Israeli tanks entered Lebanon in 1982, Lebanese people were at first clapping their hands for Israelis to do away with PLO fighters (yet that was short lived as Israel showed how ruthless and violent they would be and hence you have now Hezbollah there, thanks to the Israeli occupation.)

This article offers a critical reading of such comparison with the Americans fighting in Iraq and Syria: https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-devastation-of-gaza-was-inevitable-a-comparison-to-us-operations-in-iraq-and-syria/ On the other side, other Western articles share your concern about the post-war scenario: https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/remaking-mistakes-in-gaza/ — neomac

Which is more pro-Israeli and which would be more neutral? Just asking.

What is the present Europe is happy about? — neomac

Hmm... prosperity, peace, integration. When compared to Middle East, which is the more happy story?

What is so confusing in calling for “pivot to Asia” by American ‘pivot-people'? — neomac

Because the US is already there in SE Asia. So continuously repeating about "turning to Asia" that focus isn't here but there. What is message you try to say here? That's the thing confusing.

Well, Putin can hope the "Pivot people" get their way and the US pivots to Asia from I guess everywhere else (except North America). And from the astonishing success of the 20-year war in Afghanistan, Americans should learn what the impact to alliances, or fighting a war, if your Presidents keep on every possible opportunity declaring that they are going home, withdrawing from the war. Well, the Taleban listened to you and they got their Emirate back, now with full control of Afghanistan.

Especially after Trump, Europeans really do think about the possibility that the US will just leave Europe, leave NATO and dismantle everything it's built and go to bilateral defense agreements. That is a potential, if still unlikely option now discussed seriously.

And if Americans think that NATO is a burden, well, look at the South East Asia. SEATO didn't fly, it broke up and is now history. And your strongest allies there, South Korea and Japan, aren't as great friends as Germany and France. To put it short, unlike in Europe, there's no commitment for US allies to oppose together China because there is no NATO equivalent after SEATO. There are only bilateral defense agreements. There's just chatting organization and AUKUS, which has only ONE country, Australia, that is actually in the region. Hence the only thing AUKUS is basically bilateral defense agreement with Australia also with UK, which did naturally had already a defense pact with it's Commonwealth partner.

It seems that the US simply has either lost it's capability or it's appetite to form actual alliances and coalitions. It's just acting on itself and looks if it get some to come with it.

We have two ongoing conflicts one in Ukraine and another in Israel, and many in the Rest and in West (including in the US) are blaming the US for one reason or the other.

↪neomac

What’s new. This has been going on for decades with every conflict the U.S. has been involved in. — Punshhh

All right, so it’s not that you do not see. You do not see anything new. Even though foreign policies can be inherently controversial, especially if motivated by aggressive hegemonic ambitions, maybe the Gulf War was the least controversial among them.

What issue? The US and EU diverged on the case of Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia to the point that Ukraine didn’t manage join NATO up until now, even if the US was warmly supporting it.


The partnership between the U.S. and the EU will have tensions, so what? — Punshhh

There have been tensions between the US and the EU about economics.
Now we are talking divergence about security needs, military alliance, wars, genocides on top of the economic tensions. That’s the reason of concern especially if power balance wrt aggressive competitors is at stake as you too pointed out.

If Ukraine had joined NATO before now, there would be a war between Russia and NATO now. — Punshhh

I don’t find this counterfactual evidently true. It can argue that if Ukraine had joined NATO previously, Russia would have not tried to aggress it the way it did (example: https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/oa_edited_volume/chapter/3881915)

That's the kind of foreign policies I'm referring to.

So am I, the Israeli conflict won’t have big geopolitical consequences.
The Ukraine conflict will have big geopolitical consequences, but the direction of policy here hasn’t changed for decades. It’s the fallout from the Cold War and the U.S. and E.U. are pretty much in lockstep. — Punshhh

So you mean that no matter how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict goes, it doesn’t change the superpower status of the US, while the conflict in Ukraine may change the superpower status of the US, is that it?

Not U.S. superpower status, rather the strength of the anti China alliance. — Punshhh

if Russia wins the war in Ukraine, then the US might lose its superpower status, that’s why the US wants to the hegemonic conflict against Russia in Ukraine, and a strong EU and NATO are kind of necessary to achieve that. Is it that what you mean?

At no point have I said anything about the U.S. superpower status. Its position as a global superpower is secure and isn’t going to change.
I’m saying if Russia wins in Ukraine, it will greatly weaken and threaten the EU (as opposed to EU status if Russia loses the war). This will leave the U.S. vulnerable on two fronts, the Pacific and the Atlantic..
Perhaps bullet points will help.
If Russia wins;
1, Russia strengthens, becomes a threat to EU on her borders.
2, U.S. will be obliged to support EU, and be drawn into EU wars with Russia.
3, Russia becomes strong re-establishes the Russian empire forms a strong alliance with China.
4, U.S. is vulnerable on two fronts from China and from Russia via threat to EU. While China and Russia are in strong alliance
5, EU are vulnerable to Russia picking off states, pre-occupying EU while China can threaten U.S. play one off against the other.

If Russia loses;
6, Russia is greatly weakened, may even collapse.
7, Putin is seen as a failure, pariah
8, Ukraine becomes part of EU, NATO.
9, EU becomes strong with no threat on her border.
10, EU forms strong alliance with U.S.

In both cases a strong alliance is formed between two large powers. In the first case between China and Russia in the second case between U.S. and EU.. — Punshhh

I can appreciate your effort to clarify your views, but I still find your claims a bit misleading. On one side you support the idea that the US will keep its superpower status on the other the vulnerabilities of the US and the power balance against the US may increase for the US if the EU is weak.
So even if the US preserves a superpower status versus other superpowers in a one-to-one comparison, still you are talking about a scenario in which the unipolar world with the US on top of it is over and power balancing alliances are needed. Besides a weak EU would tilt the power balance AGAINST the US.

Now going back to the Israel Palestine conflict.
There is no global shift in power, with either outcome in the conflict. Israel either becomes an isolated country bristling with weapons. Or Israel collapses and becomes another failed state in the Middle East. Either way it makes no difference to the geopolitical balance in the world.
Let’s say Israel goes to war with Iran. Again two more failed states with no change in the global power dynamic. There are other things that can happen in the region which could have geopolitical consequences, like oil, or conflicts between larger regional players. But they are not influenced that much by what happens in Israel Palestine. — Punshhh

Everything that happens in the Middle East often has often links with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_oil_crisis
And even though Middle-Eastern countries individually have no superpower status, still they can very much weigh in not only in hegemonic conflicts in the Middle East but also in other parts of the world including Europe (see the support of Turkey alone to Ukraine and the support of Iran to Russia). Besides if one is reasoning in terms of alliance also an alliance between Russia, China and the Middle-Eastern countries can tilt the power balance at the expense of the US and EU alliance. The closer Western and anti-Western alliances get in terms of overall capacity, the greater the influence of yet unaligned minor powers is when it's time to pick sides. So I wouldn’t discount this factor when talking about the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

1. its ideological roots are in pan-arabism and pan-islamism, both of which are broader ideologies than the idea of a Palestinian nation-state — neomac

I think that Palestines and Palestinians ideological roots have more to do with how the "Jewish Palestinians", the Israelis have gone with their own nation building. — “ssu

As I've said, Palestinian aspirations are reinforced how Isreal treats them, starting from the thing that Israel never was for them in any way. — “ssu

Sure, I also already acknowledged that the conflict with the Jewish colonisers and Israel shaped Palestinian Nationalism. Yet, to distinguish Palestinians as a specific nation within the wider Arab ethnic group, Palestinians should also be able to see themselves as distinct from other Arabs, not simply as Arabs living in Palestine fighting against the Jews. And my understanding is that until Arafat the pan-Arabist views were dominant (e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Nationalist_Movement, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2009/7/13/the-nakba-catalyst-for-pan-arabism). Besides as long as Saddam Hussain was there and depicted himself as a pan-arabist leader (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA240117.pdf, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ba%27ath_Party), Arafat’s call for Palestinian nationalism seemed locked with a regional power game bigger than the Palestinian cause (https://www.aljazeera.com/program/plo-history-of-a-revolution/2009/8/22/arafats-costly-gulf-war-choice). This may be seen as a necessary compromise to serve the Palestinian nationalism, even more so with the strategic alliance with Iran (which replaced Saddam Hussein) and contributed to somehow estrange the Palestinian cause from the Arab world. However the rise of Hamas as an extremist and islamist fringe off-shooting from the pan-islamist Muslim Brotherhood with tighter financial and military ties with Hezbollah and the pan-islamist Khomeini (as Khaled Mashal declared in 2007 “Hamas is the spiritual son of Khomeini” https://israel-alma.org/2022/10/18/hamass-role-in-irans-grand-strategy-of-multi-front-attack-on-israel/), make Hamas’ nationalist ideology look more compromised, although at the same time I believe Hamas has greater autonomy from Iran than the shiite Hezbollah.

Independent Ukraine is only 33 years old. And many Russians are totally confident about the utter artificiality of the country as you are of the Palestinians...when compared to the Israelis. — “ssu

This is a poor analogy. Independent Ukraine is 33 years old, Ukrainian nationalism and sentiment has definitely a longer history, much longer than the Palestinian nationalism. Besides the historical Ukrainian nationalism is also about refusing to be identified with the Russians (as an ethnic group), while Palestinian nationalism defined in opposition to Zionism was not about refusing to be identified with the Arabs (as an ethnic group), at least not at the beginning. In any case, I do not believe in the “utter artificiality of the Palestinians”, not even “when compared to the Israelis”, reason why I didn’t express myself in these terms. I simply get to the plausible roots of Israelis’ skepticism about Palestinian nationalism. Yet I also questioned the excesses of such skepticism on several grounds: 1. All nations are “artificial” as cultural products 2. The short history of Palestinian nationalism doesn’t make it deeply felt and bloody conflict with Israel made it sure that Palestinian feelings sedimented in Palestinians’ hearts 3. Palestinian nationalism is not only grounded in the opposition to Israel, but also in how the predicament of the Palestinians has estranged them from the Arab world enough to give greater credibility to their nation-state aspirations. 4. Zionism as a colonialist enterprise run mainly by non-indigenous European jews has its own degree of artificiality.

Yet it's very typical in a world made of nation states, people think that there must be something wrong with the people that don't have their own country. Either they are weak, incapable or not actually genuine. This silly argumentation on who has more moral right to the land where they now live and have lived for generations shows this. — “ssu

That’s not my argument, though. My argument is that Palestinians and Israelis have to fight for their right to the land if their demands are incompatible, because there is no way to consistently ground both demands on the same justifying narrative. Notice also the following ideological asymmetry between Palestinians and Israelis: even when Palestinians claim to acknowledge Israel statehood (in favour of a two state solution), this is not grounded in a change of their anti-Zionist narrative about Israel. On the other side the more original and secular Zionist narrative was compelled since the beginning by the Palestinian Arabs as majoritarian indigenous people to Palestine, so it was more amenable to a compromise than Netanyahu’s approach.

I think however that there are other factors that Israel can’t discount: 1. How the Arab states’ questionable attitude toward the Palestinians (and Palestinian refugees) may reinforce the Palestinians’ aspirations to a distinctive Palestinian nation-state. — neomac

Yet is it questionable that Arabs now see Palestinians differently from them? Finns and Swedes are surely European, even Nordic, but two different countries and people still. Are Palestinians then Jordanians? — “ssu

What I care to focus on is to what extent Palestinians can see themselves as a distinct nation from the larger Arab community. I think the way they have been treated by other Arab governments and people may have contributed to a reciprocal estrangement which reinforced Palestinian Nationalism.

Which is more pro-Israeli and which would be more neutral? Just asking. — “ssu

It doesn’t matter if it is pro-Israeli to me, it matters if you have more compelling counter-arguments on the merit of what the article is arguing.

What is the present Europe is happy about? — neomac

Hmm... prosperity, peace, integration. When compared to Middle East, which is the more happy story?

What is so confusing in calling for “pivot to Asia” by American ‘pivot-people'? — neomac

Because the US is already there in SE Asia. So continuously repeating about "turning to Asia" that focus isn't here but there. What is message you try to say here? That's the thing confusing. — “ssu

It’s not me who is calling for “pivot to Asia”, but US administrations and advisors.

U.S. President Barack Obama's East Asia Strategy (2009–2017), also known as the Pivot to Asia, represented a significant shift in the foreign policy of the United States since the 2010s. It shifted the country's focus away from the Middle Eastern and European sphere and allowed it to invest heavily and build relationships in East Asian and Southeast Asian countries, especially countries which are in close proximity to the People's Republic of China (PRC) either economically, geographically or politically to counter its rise as a rival superpower.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Asian_foreign_policy_of_the_Barack_Obama_administration

Ideally Biden would support it:
https://www.npr.org/2021/10/06/1043329242/long-promised-and-often-delayed-the-pivot-to-asia-takes-shape-under-biden

But there are thorny issues with that: https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/the-lost-decade-of-the-us-pivot-to-asia/

Besides it’s not me to introduce the idea of “pivotal” (vs “distraction”), but Punshhh.
I find such distinction potentially misleading for reasons I’ve argued.