Wondering about inverted qualia

Matripsa

Hi everyone,

This is my first post on this forum. I'm not a philosophy expert by any means, but I find these kinds of thought experiments and debates really fascinating and fun to engage with.

In one of my recent classes, we discussed the famous "inverted qualia" argument against physicalism about consciousness. For those unfamiliar, it posits a scenario where two individuals (Alice and Mark) have qualitative experiences that are systematically inverted relative to each other (e.g. what feels like "red" to Alice feels like "green" to Mark), despite being physical/functional duplicates.

This is meant to show that qualia (the subjective feel of experiences) cannot be accounted for purely by physical/functional properties, as Alice and Bob's qualitative states differ while their physical states are identical by premise. However, I have some issues with using the example of color qualia inversion specifically to make this argument persuasive. Unlike other sensory modalities, our experience of color is deeply intertwined with linguistic labeling practices from the start. The way we divide up the continuous spectrum into discrete color categories is shaped by the language and cultural milieu we're embedded in.

So positing an "inversion" of color qualia may not actually establish a difference in phenomenal experience - it may just be describing a difference in linguistic labeling habits. In the end, it may not even make sense to talk about "experiencing the qualia of red" as if there is some objective, mind-independent property that fixes what "red" refers to. Rather, we may just be experiencing the qualia of what is agreed upon or linguistically coded to be "red" within a particular cultural/linguistic framework. The very notion of inverting an experience of "redness" might be incoherent without that shared linguistic coordination.
For example, instead of the color wheel being inverted for Alice, the color wheel labels are. So Alice and Mark both experience the same qualia of "green", but Alice has a different label for it, so when they look at "green", Mark says that's green, Alice says that's blue, and yet they both see the same color and are having the same qualia experience. Anyway, not sure where to go with that, I just wanted to show that our experience of color is inherently intertwined with language and it should somehow be a part of the argument or at least mentioned.
Anyway, I'm certainly no expert, but I wanted to share my perspective and see what others think!

Apustimelogist

But surely if they had different labels, they would learn after a while that they were not talking about the same things and they would end up changing their language use?

Edit: or maybe that was your point!?

AmadeusD

So positing an "inversion" of color qualia may not actually establish a difference in phenomenal experience - it may just be describing a difference in linguistic labeling habits. In the end, it may not even make sense to talk about "experiencing the qualia of red" — Matripsa

I agree. But if receiving a certain exact wavelength (termed Red, rather than the valence of it's presentation to an S being termed Red) causes a different phenomenal experience in two individuals who do not differ in their hardware (colour-blindness) then I think the argument is still live.

As it seems Apustimelogist below (above - I was still typing when he commented) has noted, it's not as if this wouldn't, from their perspective, mean one is 'right' and in line with the experience of those others without a physical aberration, and one is 'wrong' in the same way. This would mean the language would respond to the scenario, rather htan the other way around, over time. I think this is true, and why we have a very specific idea of Red globally.

However, I think this speaks to a point that will get very quickly political:

There are objective facts about colour. They are constructed, linguistically, but that to which they refer is objectively xxxHz or some such designation which is independent of experience or observation (it is hte same observation, however it is noted by the S observing it - the langauge is not important to this element).

Do we rely on these objective 'core' facts of perceivable objects to denote when, and where someone has deviated from the 'norm'?
I think its the only sensible way to deal with data. Others don't, and it gets aggressive quick. Apparently, noting that someone failed in being on-time, chronologically, is bigoted.

ENOAH

Unlike other sensory modalities, our experience of color is deeply intertwined with linguistic labeling practices from the start. — Matripsa

we may just be experiencing the qualia of what is agreed upon or linguistically coded to be "red" within a particular cultural/linguistic framework. — Matripsa

I agree with this observation, and, for me, the query goes further. Although I acknowledge that my explorations on this topic are not conventional.

I wonder whether or not other examples raised in the "qualia" argument against physicalism might be subjected to the scrutiny, that,
1. our experience of most things (i.e., not just color) are "deeply intertwined with linguistic labeling practices from the start." AND,
2. [For me] the coding is significant, not just within a particular culture, but universally. AND THEREFORE, [here is where I really deviate from both convention, and even your point]
3. Almost all of our sensory "experiences," which i will call perception to differentiate from unobscured sensation, has ineluctably been mediated by such "coding." Red is Red for everyone and any variations of that experience are relatively not significant enough to argue subjects are isolated from one another.

Edit: to clarify further, I'm saying we see "red" because we have made "clor" and "red" signifiers accepted by convention etc. Who knows what these are to organic sensation free of the mediation of perception?

wonderer1

But if receiving a certain exact wavelength (termed Red, rather than the valence of it's presentation to an S being termed Red) causes a different phenomenal experience in two individuals who do not differ in their hardware (colour-blindness) then I think the argument is still live. — AmadeusD

Everyone differs in their hardware. Color-blindness is just one sort of variation.

AmadeusD

↪wonderer1

this is true, yet doesn’t change my point.
Our hardware obviously all differs - but in ways which do not appear relevant to this case. In other cases, other differences may be relevant. I suppose you could convert this concept into that the hardware is doing the same thing, rather than is some fuzzy version of physically close-enoigh (as I wrongly intimated in the above quoted passage )

180 Proof

... qualia (the subjective feel of experiences) cannot be accounted for purely by physical/functional properties ... — Matripsa

So what accounts for "qualia" other, or more efficacious, than "physical/functional properties"?

AmadeusD

↪180 Proof

I could just say "non-physical properties" and that's a complete answer but I think that avoids the issue. Qualia are experienced as non-physical.

180 Proof

Qualia are experienced as non-physical. — AmadeusD

:roll:

AmadeusD

↪180 Proof

You'd be a lot cooler if you weren't too cool.

Ah well. Horse to water and all..

180 Proof

↪AmadeusD

:yawn:

Tom Storm

Qualia are experienced as non-physical. — AmadeusD

Is anything we experince non-physical? Can we demonstrate there is anything outside of brain states, physical processes? Asking for a friend.

AmadeusD

↪180 Proof

It strikes me as bizarre that you're not aware not responding is better for both of us at this point.

Parfit would be disappointed :snicker: Ah well. I'm here to talk philosophy. Do whatever you want i guess.

AmadeusD

Is anything we experince non-physical? Can we demonstrate there is anything outside of brain states, physical processes? Asking for a friend. — Tom Storm

I don't really understand the question. The entire point is that we cannot demonstrate the physical-ness(sorry, there's not a better word I know) of certain things such as memories (no, nothing in neuroscience changes this position at the current time) or desires. They are non-physical properties of experience, even if there is a correlated brain-state. This does not demonstrate that the experience is physical. It is patent that some experiences at non-physical. A change of opinion. Being awake/being asleep (in the phenomenal aspect).

That is, unless you take the entirety of phenomenal experience as an evolutionarily-required post-hoc sense-making program. This seems wrong to me on plenty of levels but it does seem plausible, for sure. IF that were the case, I'd be able to take your inference fully. It seems obviously that if this is hte case, the only possible information is physical states to inform the 'sense making' apparatus/i. Given I find issue with the theory i unfortunately cannot take that as sound.

Tom Storm

They are non-physical properties of experience, even if there is a correlated brain-state. This does not demonstrate that the experience is physical. — AmadeusD

But are you satisfied that it demonstrates the experience is non-physical? How would we demonstrate that conscious experience reflects a non-physical reality? Isn't it an inference based on a lack of data or knowledge?

That is, unless you take the entirety of phenomenal experience as an evolutionarily-required post-hoc sense-making program — AmadeusD

Perhaps that is the case. I have no idea, I'm not an expert on the nature of consciousness.

Anyway - all that aside - what is your explanation of consciousness? Are you a dualist, or more of an embodied cognition guy?

180 Proof

Ah well. I'm here to talk philosophy. — AmadeusD

:gasp:

Fire Ologist

So Alice and Mark both experience the same qualia of "green", but Alice has a different label for it, so when they look at "green", Mark says that's green, Alice says that's blue, and yet they both see the same color and are having the same qualia experience. Anyway, not sure where to go with that, I just wanted to show that our experience of color is inherently intertwined with language and it should somehow be a part of the argument or at least mentioned.
Anyway, I'm certainly no expert, — Matripsa

You sound like an expert, deep in the cave, unafraid of the light and the dark - welcome to the forum!

The concept of the qualia of experience is a great one. It makes an object of the purely subjective. Once we start talking about this as an object though, we lose the qualia to stumble through our languages. And we get all of the problems of labels.

There is no way to learn whether Mark was right or wrong to say “green” to describe the qualia of Mark’s own experience. Only Mark can know this. That’s why qualia is such a great concept - it is the “only Mark’s space” in the universe. You would have to be Mark to even know what word to say or judge the sense in saying anything like green.

Objectifying qualia is like saying “I am”. It turns something pre-linguistic, or extra-linguistic, or something that needs no words, into words, and the non-linguistic qualia is then lost to the distraction of its re-representation in text.

Qualia is better analyzed by a poet, or novelist, or shown in a painting. We scientific thinkers and philosophers stink at it. We come up with examples like “green” versus “red” and we think we might hit home on some nuance between qualia and language.

But whether qualia are physical (like feelings and sensations) or immaterial (like experiencing personified in the subject), I’m no expert either.

I guess I lean towards qualia being the union of the physical and the non-physical. Qualia unifies the physical senses with the reflective subject. Qualia is the experience of something coming to be, the experience of becoming, while it is the experience of something that already is, at the same time, in a subject, like Mark. Like Alice.

Philosophim

In one of my recent classes, we discussed the famous "inverted qualia" argument against physicalism about consciousness. For those unfamiliar, it posits a scenario where two individuals (Alice and Mark) have qualitative experiences that are systematically inverted relative to each other (e.g. what feels like "red" to Alice feels like "green" to Mark), despite being physical/functional duplicates. — Matripsa

I wouldn't call it an argument against physicalism, just a fun thought experiment. Physicalism would simply point out that they see different colors by subjective experience due to physical differences in their brains. Its a much greater leap of belief to assume you can get a completely different outcome from an identical physical process.

So Alice and Mark both experience the same qualia of "green", but Alice has a different label for it, so when they look at "green", Mark says that's green, Alice says that's blue, and yet they both see the same color and are having the same qualia experience. — Matripsa

Sure, this seems very possible in theory. One thing that helps with discussions like this is to find something objective that doesn't change despite a person's experience. The color 'red' objectively is a wavelength of light. How our brains process and produce the interpretation of that wavelength could very well differ. We already know this is possible through color blindness.

So if there can be different ways people interpret the wavelength, its very plausible that some people have a different qualitative experience of your interpretation of 'red'.

bert1

So what accounts for "qualia" other, or more efficacious, than "physical/functional properties"? — 180 Proof

Consciousness

180 Proof

↪bert1

How so?

NOS4A2

↪Matripsa

I like your objection. It’s a nice thrust at the inverted spectrum argument, but it would be easier to say the argument itself is conceptually inconceivable, like p-zombies.

flannel jesus

This is meant to show that qualia (the subjective feel of experiences) cannot be accounted for purely by physical/functional properties, as Alice and Bob's qualitative states differ while their physical states are identical by premise. — Matripsa

Seems like it assumes the thing it's meant to prove. Seems circular to me.

AmadeusD

But are you satisfied that it demonstrates the experience is non-physical? How would we demonstrate that conscious experience reflects a non-physical reality? Isn't it an inference based on a lack of data or knowledge? — Tom Storm

You're essentially asserting a no true scotsman here(which i note you do acknowledge at the end of this passage by suggestion). The only way I could agree with you, is if I believed that it was always likely further discovery would invalidate my current position[/i]. While this is obviously nominally true, It cannot be the case that an open-ended "well something is likely prove it wrong, sometime, somewhere, for some reason" is a valid argument, or defeater. It is self-effacing speculation.
It would be true for all but modal claims. Is that the case? Or can we - demonstrate - that certain things are almost certain, despite further discovery clearly being able to debunk that position?
I do not find that an appealing concept, or a valid way to approach claims. I believe we can demonstrate that something is not the case, only. I think this has been done, in the terms I've set out.

what is your explanation of consciousness? — Tom Storm

It seems clearly non-physical, to me. Otherwise, I don't think anyone saying they have a clue is being honest with themselves so i largely refrain from even speculating.

AmadeusD

This is meant to show that qualia (the subjective feel of experiences) cannot be accounted for purely by physical/functional properties, as Alice and Bob's qualitative states differ while their physical states are identical by premise.
— Matripsa

Seems like it assumes the thing it's meant to prove. Seems circular to me. — flannel jesus

Then i think you missed the bolded word.

flannel jesus

↪AmadeusD

Unfortunately I'm still not seeing what you apparently intend for me to see. The word "as" doesn't help me understand how the thought experiment isn't assuming the very thing it supposedly demonstrates

AmadeusD

↪flannel jesus

Fair enough.

Well, the way i'm reading it we have two distinct things 'in action':

1)

qualia (the subjective feel of experiences) cannot be accounted for purely by physical/functional properties — Matripsa

2)

Alice and Bob's qualitative states differ while their physical statesare identical — Matripsa

I understand that you read them as the same thing, and I can see why. I have, by way of formatting, linked the concepts I think need to be linked (and, by inference, that the two types of format (referring to the passages highlighted by each type of formatting) are not linked).

This is because 1. is a claim and 2. is exemplar. That is how supporting a claims works (not being facetious). IN this case, the two sentences seem very similar but their tenses and meanings are very different. "as" puts the latter into the empirical box (at least, on M's account) and the former into the conceptual box.

It is the specific, empirical instance in 2) of the concept discussed in 1) which gives rise to supporting the claim made about the concept in 1).

I happen to agree, so it's possible im reaching a bit but I'm having no trouble explaining this so i don't get the feeling i am reaching.

bert1

How so? — 180 Proof

I take 'quale' to be another (somewhat unhelpful) word for an experience. An experience has two defining ingredients, consciousness and content. The content part is indeed explained (or perhaps better to say described) by physical/functional properties. The consciousness ingredient is not explicable (or describable) by physical and functional properties, and on that I know we disagree. Consciousness has no internal structure and function that is further explicable. It is its own explanation.

flannel jesus

↪AmadeusD

To me, it just seems like they're saying:

"Consider these people we've imagined, alice and bob. They have the same physical states, but experience different things. Imagining this thing proves that people who have the same physical states can experience different things."

I don't think a thought experiment like that actually proves anything.

AmadeusD

↪flannel jesus

You've just said it proves that people with the same physical states can experience different things. Which is, indeed, the point being got-across in my view (and again, one with which I agree so perhaps I'm being a soft touch).

I do not see anything wrong with your passage being (rightly, a rehash of the quoted from M) totally sound.

If the claim is that the above isn't possible on account of experience being identical physical states, then we're good. You've shown it to be false (assuming you accept the above - but i figure that's what you're trying to ascertain - what does someone who accepts that read into it)

flannel jesus

I do not see anything wrong with your passage being (rightly, a rehash of the quoted from M) totally sound. — AmadeusD

I do. You can prove just about ANYTHING like that. "Imagine we live in a world where <x is true>. This proves we live in a world where <x is true>."

It's not a generally agreeable form of argument in my estimation.

Tom Storm

You're essentially asserting a no true scotsman here — AmadeusD

How so? I'm saying it could be more 'a woo of the gaps' situation, or a fallacy from ignorance, perhaps?

While this is obviously nominally true, It cannot be the case that an open-ended "well something is likely prove it wrong, sometime, somewhere, for some reason" is a valid argument, or defeater. It is self-effacing speculation. — AmadeusD

Who says it is open ended? It might seem that way to you now, but who knows? Actually I am open to the postion of mysterianism which argues we may never know. Open ended ignorance also seems possible.

Or can we - demonstrate - that certain things are almost certain, despite further discovery clearly being able to debunk that position? — AmadeusD

Well, it is the case that science provides reliable but tentative models which are regularly the subject of revision, so there's a sense in which we never arrive at absolute truth.

Otherwise, I don't think anyone saying they have a clue is being honest with themselves so i largely refrain from even speculating. — AmadeusD

I'd can't say either way, although I am skeptical that there is such a phenomenon as the non-physical (apart from concepts). 'Seems' like it isn't enough for me.

Wondering about inverted qualia

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