This is because it would be perfectly possible that one needs to believe while learning, but once they are an adept practitioner that belief ceases.
— Leontiskos
I don't think so. It just becomes a less conscious belief. — AmadeusD
Yep. And if know-how were a subset of know-that, that might be a problem. But if knowing-that is a subset of knowing-how, that is not a problem - is it? — Banno
I may know how to ride a bicycle and that knowledge seems to have nothing necessarily to do with belief.
— Janus
Well, it implies belief in Bicycles and riding.
Animals know how to do things, and we commonly attribute knowing-that to them. The cat knows that the bowl is empty, and so on.
The temptation is there to draw a hard line between knowing-how and knowing-that. But they are not as distinct as folk might presume. — Banno
1. How do you suppose Nietzsche "defines" knowing (besides the quote provided)? That is what (ontology(?) if I am using the word properly) does he "ascribe" to human knowledge? It is clearly not a thing inherent in the universe which our superior brains can uncover? Is it, to N, a fiction, an illusion? — ENOAH
2. How would N. characterize the conclusions about Being (as ontology(?)) made by Heidegger and Sartre, for e.g.? As "arrogant and mendacious"? Or meaningfully nonetheless, and if meaningful, then how? — ENOAH
But he was a true artist of a writer. He said many wise things. These refute his exaggerations, to me, and allow me to still cherish what he did for these discussions. — Fire Ologist
It’s easy to misrepresent Nietzsche, and when you try to briefly summarize what he says you are in danger of leaving so much out. — Fire Ologist
we have invented. It’s not that truth is not something. It’s not that we can avoid knowing and seeking the truth. It’s that we have over valued so many truths and then built obscene facades of dogma and institution out of these over-valuations. — Fire Ologist
I see this as with so much of what he says as an exaggeration to make a complex point — Fire Ologist
instead of being a truth seeker, of following the drive and will to truth, instead he was willing to live without it. — Fire Ologist
yes all science is only practical convention and can be over-valued as well — Fire Ologist
He ruined all good discussions of what is “knowledge.” Damn Nietzsche. — Fire Ologist
wisdom shines — Fire Ologist
I get lumping Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre (along with Camus, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Goethe, and others. They all use such different vocabularies (absurd, dread, anxiety, nausea) — Fire Ologist
He said many wise things. These refute his exaggerations — Fire Ologist
air enough. But I think you agree (are there people who don't?) we don't really judge these types of theories for there impact on history. . . wait, or is that exactly what we do but don't like to admit it, so when someone says, "I disagree with N because he ruined discourse," we call them out and remind them to judge the theory on the merits, as in, does it stand to reason? — ENOAH
I question whether all knowledge does require belief. — Janus
I think there is a valid distinction between knowledge and belief, although I also think that much of what is generally considered to be knowledge might be more accurately classed as belief. It may well turn out that I am sympathetic to Chet's belief. Let's see... — Janus
Knowledge, then, is multifaceted. Since to agree, to accept and to devote have different truth conditions - or none at all, like a devotion. One can say one knows in different senses. Knowledge isn't one kind of thing, and an item of knowledge need not be a statement. And knowing as conviction may not be itemizable at all. — fdrake
Yes, there are different kinds of knowing. There is 'knowing how', there is the knowing of familiarity and there is 'knowing that'. I think the salient question in this thread concerns only 'knowing that' or propositional knowing, because the other two categories do not necessarily involve belief. — Janus
The original argument you gave had to do with “avoiding danger,” and because of this it was a good example of the invalidity of the inference from learning to riding. — Leontiskos
There are a variety of ways in which the experienced rider is not avoiding danger in the way that someone who is learning is avoiding danger — Leontiskos
I question whether all knowledge does require belief.
— Janus
If such were the case, it reduces to belief being a necessary condition for knowledge. — Mww
Hey. Once again, for no particular reason while agreeing in a rhetorical fashion…..
I question whether all knowledge does require belief.
— Janus
Pretty dumb, methinks, to merely believe I know how to ride a bike while I’m actually doing it, and conversely, even dumber to claim to know I can ride a bike by merely believing I’ve been on one and in control of it. — Mww
Maybe I believe I can’t know how to ride a bike cuz I’m a hopeless klutz who believes he shouldn’t use a hammer given the historical precedent of experiencing serious bodily injury. But then, out of sheer well-being necessity, I find myself riding a bike in order to escape the neighbor’s mutt. If knowledge requires belief, and the belief is negative the knowledge must also be negative thereby how to ride a bike should not have been known to me, and under sufficiently strong negative belief that I can’t know how, I shouldn’t have even bothered to try. Yet given that riding a bike….which I’m now doing….presupposes at least the awareness of the mechanics and principles by which bike riding is accomplished, re: I’m peddling upright in a progressive series of times, it is the case what I believe about bike riding (I can’t know how) has nothing whatsoever to do with my coming to know how to do it (YEA!! Look it me, here I am bike riding).
So did I switch beliefs and come to believe I can know how to ride a bike? Like that little engine that could? Seems kinds silly to me, to take the time to believe something at the same time I’m discovering it for myself in conjunction with the extant experience that bikes are inherently ride-able. Even if IthinkIcanIthinkIcanIthinkIcan is running through my brain, am I navigating positively because of that alone, or am I concentrating on the objects of certain mechanics and principles necessary for transportation via bicycle? Do I really need to believe in the authority of those principles in order to use them, especially considering the fact I’m only interested in their objects I use and not the principles themselves I merely think as given?
Wonder why Nike, instead taglining with “Just do it”, didn’t instead go with “Believe you can know how to do it then just do it”? — Mww
Maybe I believe I can’t know how to ride a bike cuz I’m a hopeless klutz who believes he shouldn’t use a hammer given the historical precedent of experiencing serious bodily injury. — Mww
I know how to ride a bike, plane a board, paint a picture, write a poem, play the piano and so on, and I don't see how any of that requires belief. — Janus
For future events? Depends. In a practical sense, sure it's warranted in that not assuming (to the degree needed) would prevent action.
But I do not think it right that past events can warrant certainty about future events, in the strict sense. Constant conjunction and all.. — AmadeusD
One sees the bike, handles it...no need for belief. I have to go right now...will resume later. — Janus
Knowledge, then, is multifaceted. Since to agree, to accept and to devote have different truth conditions - or none at all, like a devotion. — fdrake
Each intentional state divides into two components: the type of state it is and its content, typically a propositional content. We can represent the distinction between intentional type and propositional content with the notation "(p)." For example, I can believe that it is raining, fear that it is raining, or desire that it be raining. In each of these cases I have the same propositional content, p, that it is raining, but I have them in different intentional types, that is, different psychological modes: belief, fear, desire, and so on, represented by the 'S'. Many intentional states come in whole propositions, and for that reason those that do are often described by philosophers as "propositional attitudes." This is a bad terminology because it suggests that my intentional state is an attitude to a proposition. In general, beliefs, desires, and so on are not attitudes to propositions. If I believe that Washington was the first president, my attitude is to Washington and not to the proposition. Very few of our intentional states are directed at propositions. Most are directed at objects and states of affairs in the world independent of any proposition. Sometimes an intentional state might be directed at a proposition. If, for example, I believe that Bernoulli's principle is trivial, then the object of my belief is a proposition, namely, Bernoulli's principle. In the sentence "John believes that Washington was the first president," it looks like the proposition that Washington was the first president is the object of the belief. But that is a grammatical illusion. The proposition is the content of the belief, not the object of the belief. In this case, the object of the belief is Washington. It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that "believe" and other intentional verbs name relations between believers and propositions. — Searle, my bolding
Who's made those claims anyway? — creativesoul
Do you think someone has made the argument that all belief is necessary for bike riding? — creativesoul
Bike riding - as we know it - is existentially dependent on the belief of the original bike makers. "Belief is not necessary for bike riding" is proven false. — creativesoul
The bike emerged onto the world stage through the belief of the original bike makers. — creativesoul
Impossible to ride a bike that you do not believe is there. — creativesoul
That's one way to talk about it. — creativesoul
Because of the brain in a bottle thought experiment we cannot be logically certain of any empirical truth. Instead of saying {there is} a dog in my living room right now we must qualify this {there appears to be} a dog in my living room right now. It is not 100% logically impossible that all of reality is not a mere figment of the imagination. We can be logically certain that 2 + 3 = 5; — PL Olcott
Even if you want to bracket out 'knowing how' (and I agree with Moliere and @Banno that knowing is entangled with doing), there is still more than one way in which 'knowing that' is used propositionally — SophistiCat
Knowledge is bound to objective criteria for understanding whereas belief may involve subjectivity. However, the interplay between the objective and subjective may mean that the nature of belief and knowledge remains fluid in human understanding. — Jack Cummins
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