Short: Yes
Mid: This is my view of morality, and we're lucky that only humans are sentient enough to be considered moral agents. This means most people's morality will align on my account, even if they have different moral frameworks for arriving at the "yes/no" portion of whether to act.
Long: Ah, well. There are millions. Millions of things make me uncomfortable, and I'd rather not be the kind of person who did them because that would be, on my account, shameful or embarrassing. These extend to no one else, even in cases that would effect someone else, attitudinally speaking. I don't want to be that person, regardless of who is effected.

This means most people's morality will align on my account, even if they have different moral frameworks for arriving at the "yes/no" portion of whether to act. — AmadeusD

I agree with this, and although I tried I cannot express it any better.

But most folks leave out of their life calculations that most actions are done or not-done for now-reasons, neglecting future-reasons. That is, when you get older, either you cannot any more, or you realize that should/should-not yields to either I will do, or I will die never having done. And add to this the importance of memory. You cannot remember what you have not done.

The "moral" of the story, I suppose, is that each of us had better be pretty damn careful as to what morality we allow to rule us, what rules it makes, and why, because the cost of mistakes is high, and is paid mainly by the person who makes the mistake(s).

One example: in many - maybe most - churches, sex outside of marriage is considered the sin of "fornication," an atrocious mistranslation of the Greek word πορνεία porneia. And so there are people unmarried for long periοds of time, or who maybe never marry, who never get laid. Which is to say that their moral code has made them deny a significant part of their own humanity.

But this does not just apply to sex; it applies to almost everything where a choice is to be made and the reasons for making that choice.

Ah, well. There are millions. Millions of things make me uncomfortable, and I'd rather not be the kind of person who did them because that would be, on my account, shameful or embarrassing. These extend to no one else, even in cases that would effect someone else, attitudinally speaking. I don't want to be that person, regardless of who is effected. — AmadeusD

I second this.

There are actions that aren't considered immoral, but I wouldn't be that person. Rudeness is not illegal or immoral, but I wouldn't do that face to face with people.

There are other more grievous actions that I know of. I say, no thanks.

What's considered immoral in one culture may be perfectly normal in another. People may not always agree with the judgements of their culture, but we can't help being influenced by early indoctrination: our reasoning self may be well aware that a taboo is silly, but our emotional self still recoils from it.

Is there anything wrong with seeing the nakedness of one's father? Or anybody? The people who had not yet invented clothing couldn't afford to think so. Contrary to the biblical version, people invented clothes to keep their bodies warm, and only much later realized that clothes also concealed their genitals.

Is there anything wrong with eating the flesh of a member of one's own species? Some tribes considered it a homage to the departed relative to retain some portion of their being; some paid their slain enemies a compliment by partaking of their might, or to communicate with the gods or to demonstrate their power over another group. There is some mystery (and pay-walls) over how cannibalism actually become a taboo. But you still wouldn't want to be the guy that ate his neighbour.

You also probably wouldn't want to be the kind of person who pisses in bus shelters (somebody does!) or wipes his nose on his sleeve or never leaves a tip at restaurants. There are many, many social conventions that we observe simply because we have been brought up to respect the sensibilities of our fellow citizens.

With this in mind do you think there things that aren’t immoral but you still shouldn’t want to be the kind of person that does them even if you’re the only person affected? — Captain Homicide

I wouldn't want to live an 'unexamined life' or without ever wholeheartedly loving anyone else. I also wouldn't want be a coward or servile. (I'm sure there's more ...)

There are actions that aren't considered immoral, but I wouldn't be that person. Rudeness is not illegal or immoral, but I wouldn't do that face to face with people. — L'éléphant

I believe that's known as "manners". Which manners are adhered to, differs according to social context, and manners can be classed as good or bad relative to that context. However, the good or bad which is associated with manners, since it varies according to social context, is not considered to be a moral good or bad. The moral good and bad is supposed to transcend all differences of social context.

Mid: This is my view of morality, and we're lucky that only humans are sentient enough to be considered moral agents. This means most people's morality will align on my account, even if they have different moral frameworks for arriving at the "yes/no" portion of whether to act.
Long: Ah, well. There are millions. Millions of things make me uncomfortable, and I'd rather not be the kind of person who did them because that would be, on my account, shameful or embarrassing. These extend to no one else, even in cases that would effect someone else, attitudinally speaking. I don't want to be that person, regardless of who is effected — AmadeusD

But it really doesn't get interesting until one brings up the hard cases that challenge our collective comfort. I recall a philosophy class in ethics that began with an article called On the Bus, or something similar, and it brought the reader through a process of increasing discomfort by describing scenes of increasing physical intimacy between a woman and her dog sitting across from you on a bus.

You know your moral intuitions are being directly assaulted when they start erupting in protest. The final scene I would rank as "unmentionable". It is a fascinating analysis, nevertheless: One the one hand, I am simply as liberal minded as a person can be, which means if this woman takes her behavior int he confines of her own home, then I cannot see the basis for moral concern, notwithstanding my physical revulsion. I am actually pretty proud I can think like this. Who am I to judge others? How about men with boys, fairly common, I have read, among certain of our ancestors. THAT is a tough case!

BUT: On the bus???? In front of everyone, this raises an entirely different question. My ethics is pretty simple: do no harm. Of course, this is an entangled mess in practical situations. The woman is doing no harm at all considered in itself what she does. But then, neither am I if I shout horrible epithets all by myself at the wall. Context is everything. In public, violations take on a different set of standards.

The question is, in my mind, IF an act is not morally objectionable as a private act, then what does this say about the public judgment that it IS objectionable? Isn't the latter rendered vacuous, no better than the same the personal "feelings" of revulsion that I suspend when trying to be objective and fair and nonjudgmental?

Is there anything wrong with eating the flesh of a member of one's own species? Some tribes considered it a homage to the departed relative to retain some portion of their being; some paid their slain enemies a compliment by partaking of their might, or to communicate with the gods or to demonstrate their power over another group. There is some mystery (and pay-walls) over how cannibalism actually become a taboo. But you still wouldn't want to be the guy that ate his neighbour. — Vera Mont

But if his neighbor was okay with it, and this has happened, then part of the immorality of this vanishes, for certainly consent is mitigating. All we are left with now is mere sentiment we all share, and this is difficult to make into a meaningful basis for a taboo like the one that exists. The question is, is cannibalism, or incest, or any of a number of victimless immoralities, only "bad" because "we" say so? Arguments like this apply to contemporary issues like same sex relations and the indeterminacy of sexual practices and identity. One looks at the direction, the "slippery slope," of this: Today same sex marriage, tomorrow

The moral good and bad is supposed to transcend all differences of social context. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a loaded statement. If true, then one would have to identify something that is good or bad "outside" of social contexts, but how is this possible since the good and bad are essentially social, conceived only in societies and about social circumstances. Can one "reduce" ethics to something not "social" in its nature?

With this in mind do you think there things that aren’t immoral but you still shouldn’t want to be the kind of person that does them even if you’re the only person affected? — Captain Homicide

Yes. Alcoholism.

The question is, is cannibalism, or incest, or any of a number of victimless immoralities, only "bad" because "we" say so? — Astrophel

Everything to do with morality and ethics is good or bad only because "we say so". This includes crimes like murder (killing a member of one's species not only okay but applauded in one situation, punishable by death in another, but the one who kills the illegal killer is hired for the task but shunned socially.) Our ideas of right and wrong originate from what is, or once was, considered harmful or beneficial to the social unit.

Much of written law is a holdover from religious taboo - not necessarily rational; often anachronistic. Some of it is preemptive against the threat or perceived threat of the abuse. For example, legalizing assisted suicide could result in murders in the guise of assisted suicide; legalized incest could lead to child abuse; letting people smoke marijuana could tempt them into the use of hard drugs. What our lawmakers don't like to admit is that people don't wait on legal permission to commit harmful acts, and that decriminalizing the harmless ones make no difference to social welfare - only to arrest statistics and police funding.

Everything to do with morality and ethics is good or bad only because "we say so". — Vera Mont

But how does one separate what is "merely" said from what has a grounding apart from the mere saying? The mere saying includes attitudes, historically based beliefs, enculturated taboos, cultural institutions that contain moral precepts, and so on. One grows up and then, once there, in the midst, if you will, of one's own culture, only then can step back and question, and here, one can ask if it is all just this collective sentiment, or is there something about the essence of what it is to be ethical that is for basic than this.
Ethics gets interesting when we move into the uncertain territories of underlying assumptions. Laws, rules, norms, principles are at best, prime facie compelling. Is there anything in ethics that is more than this?

Yes. Alcoholism. — fdrake

Closeted alcoholism, perhaps. But who lives like this? Some, yes. Off they go, then. But most bring their issues into this public arena, and this is where ethics gets its irritating ambiguity, for there is she is, my daughter, and there he is, an Adonis, looking so cool drinking and smoking, and she learns this from him, and so his right to drink publicly undoes my right to raise my daughter as I see fit.

One way to look at it is, it is a matter of positive and negative rights: One's positive right to drink publicly intrudes as a negative right on my part to live absent of this. Almost no one lives in a vacuum. I hold that a free society is very strong in the direction of positive rights as a default tendency.

But how does one separate what is "merely" said from what has a grounding apart from the mere saying? — Astrophel

One doesn't. One separates the mores and laws that make sense according to one's own judgment from those that are outmoded or counterproductive. Beyond socially imposed limitations, there is no "law of the jungle" or "natural law".

Ethics gets interesting when we move into the uncertain territories of underlying assumptions. Laws, rules, norms, principles are at best, prime facie compelling. Is there anything in ethics that is more than this? — Astrophel

Not unless they're handed down from heaven.

One doesn't. One separates the mores and laws that make sense according to one's own judgment from those that are outmoded or counterproductive. Beyond socially imposed limitations, there is no "law of the jungle" or "natural law". — Vera Mont

Not unless they're handed down from heaven. — Vera Mont

So ethics really has no foundation at all? "Outmoded" and "counterproductive" confer nothing beyond utility of ethics. But principles of utility have an "end" or telos. I mean for every practical measure, there is purpose, but if this purpose has no end in itself, then it either moves on for its justificatory basis to other assumptions, and these on to others, and there really is no end to this, or one simply has to stop inquiry at some point and declare there to be no grounding "in actuality" for ethics. Ethics thus just stands exclusively in the social construction. Both of these are the case, perhaps, but the trouble is, not so much heaven, a term of dubious meaning, but grounding real meanings apart from their mere cultural sources. The ethical violation of Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov lies beyond breaking a society's rules, don't you think?

So ethics really has no foundation at all? — Astrophel

It has philosophical foundations. Philosophy is also a product of human thought in response to human social interaction. Moralities are founded in the perceived welfare of the social unit.

"Outmoded" and "counterproductive" confer nothing beyond utility of ethics. — Astrophel

Exactly. If a rule doesn't apply to current social reality, or is no longer useful in promoting the well-being of the polity, why keep adhering to it? In fact, people don't. Laws usually get struck off the books long after people have been ignoring them and officials ceased to enforce them. It's how a society that actually operates that determines what's good and bad for it. How it usually happens is: social philosophers publish treatises, then journalist popularize their ideas, then people protest - it's the legal machinery that lags far behind.

Ethics thus just stands exclusively in the social construction. — Astrophel

What else could it be? Of course, you have to remember that 'social construction' has its roots in a 250 million-year-old termite mound. We descended from a very long line of social animals, all of which had and have rules of acceptable behaviour. When a species evolves out of a previous one, its abilities, requirements and behaviours change accordingly, an so must its social conventions. When the environment changes, or the social organization gains complexity, its mores are adjusted to the new configuration. The conduct or war is different from the rules of peacetime; what is acceptable in times of plenty becomes a crime in a time of famine.

The ethical violation of Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov lies beyond breaking a society's rules, don't you think? — Astrophel

Beyond.... to where? Seems a common enough crime to me. Of course, most criminals do not confess voluntarily.

Beyond.... to where? — Vera Mont

For this, one need only look at a given ethical situation and discover its essence. I don't think this is a very demanding analysis. Begin with strong examples because they are the clearest: take the moral obligation not to bludgeon, burn, rip and tear, or otherwise offend and afflict another's living body, assuming all things commonly in place in average conditions (the living body in question is not hypesthetic, e.g.). Is this morally exhaustively conceived in the social institutions that would express the prohibition? Or is there more to it than this set of rules, laws, sentiments toward, and so forth, that the put forward this prohibition?

Is this morally exhaustively conceived in the social institutions that would express the prohibition? — Astrophel

Yes, in every legal code ever devised. Also every unwritten social convention among wolves, elephants, dolphins and apes. Limited to one's own tribe, that is: the enemy or prey is available

to bludgeon, burn, rip and tear, or otherwise offend and afflict another's living body, — Astrophel

without moral sanction or legal repercussion. In most human cultures, no such prohibition applies to other species, which are considered legitimate prey. Many cultures have permitted or do still permit some unfavoured members of their own society to be treated that way.

Or is there more to it than this set of rules, laws, sentiments toward, and so forth, that the put forward this prohibition? — Astrophel

If you profess faith in a supreme being, you are required to believe there is.

Yes. Alcoholism. — fdrake

That's an interesting one. What do you mean by alcoholism? Alcohol use disorder includes a broad range of behaviours.

without moral sanction or legal repercussion. In most human cultures, no such prohibition applies to other species, which are considered legitimate prey. Many cultures have permitted or do still permit some unfavoured members of their own society to be treated that way. — Vera Mont

Well, herein lies the rub: You seem to be saying that the world of animals and their lack of ethical principles provides the substratum for the analysis of our world's ethics. This has to be shown, not assumed.

And "every legal code ever devised" really says nothing about the generational ground of ethics. I mean, even if they all DID say explicitly that social institutions AS institutions exhausted ethical meaning, that wouldn't make it true. (Of course, among these legal codes are the biblical ones, and they certainly thought quite the opposite.)

If you profess faith in a supreme being, you are required to believe there is. — Vera Mont

A supreme being would be question begging, for one has to first show what it is about ethical matters that would even warrant such a thing.

With this in mind do you think there things that aren’t immoral but you still shouldn’t want to be the kind of person that does them even if you’re the only person affected? — Captain Homicide

If morality involves the kinds of things that you do to yourself, which it should, no. Morality is generally the set of rules that we should upkeep in our demeanour. If we shouldn't do something, you can typically say that behaviour is immoral.

But I will say that, from a different perspective, 180 proof's answer is also quite agreeable.

But most folks leave out of their life calculations that most actions are done or not-done for now-reasons, neglecting future-reasons. That is, when you get older, either you cannot any more, or you realize that should/should-not yields to either I will do, or I will die never having done. And add to this the importance of memory. You cannot remember what you have not done. — tim wood

I've just been through a section of Parfit's Reasons and Persons which deals with exactly this issue - whether future reasons constitute 'now' reasons. Parfit feels that a bias toward the near, as he terms it, then means neglecting these reasons one will have - which means, overall, your life will go worse. An interesting position.

Which is to say that their moral code has made them deny a significant part of their own humanity. — tim wood

I personally take this sort of rule-following as non-moral. This person is just obeying. They haven't considered the morality of their acts outside of whether it is permitted.
I don't think the followers of rules are doing anything moral - the creator/s may be, though.

:ok:

The question is, in my mind, IF an act is not morally objectionable as a private act, then what does this say about the public judgment that it IS objectionable? Isn't the latter rendered vacuous, no better than the same the personal "feelings" of revulsion that I suspend when trying to be objective and fair and nonjudgmental? — Astrophel

Yep. Morals are emotional positions and nought else, on my view. Its a good idea to discuss them, and form groups of affinity. Some would very much enjoy seeing a woman 'engage' with her dog on a bus. It may be their optimal fantasy, in fact.

Yep. Morals are emotional positions and nought else, on my view. Its a good idea to discuss them, and form groups of affinity. Some would very much enjoy seeing a woman 'engage' with her dog on a bus. It may be their optimal fantasy, in fact. — AmadeusD

So the ethical prohibition against torture is all about my emotional regard for torture, the empathy, compassion and so forth that step forward when such a thing is witnessed, and the laws we have about this are grounded in this same thing, only collectively. Let's say this is true. But is this only what ethics is about, or is there that which we are ethical ABOUT that is also in ethics?

I probably don't understand the concluding question adequately, I don't think. I'll take a stab at the end.

As to the description of ethics generally - not yours. The collective emotional discomfort with it is what leads to policies. But, quite obviously, it is your moral position that prevents you from doing it regardless of policies.

If I'm understanding you, I think its redundant question. We are 'ethical' about many things, but this is also a function of our position on what is morally interested.

People who think that something is morally permissible but yet no one should do it, are either (1) confused about what morality is, (2) what they believe is actually immoral, or (3) holding onto an irrational belief.

If I'm understanding you, I think its redundant question. We are 'ethical' about many things, but this is also a function of our position on what is morally interested. — AmadeusD

If I have a moral regard for something, some issue about acquiring something, preventing something, and so on, I have an interest in that thing. Not so much what the thing is, but simply that one cares about it. This caring has to be in place in order for ethics to be part of an issue. No ones cares, no ethics. It is this caring I am interested in. Why does one care about a thing? It must have value for that person. So again, no value, no ethics. So what is value?

I am somewhat lost now. I don't know why you're asking these things here.

The metaethical discussion about why a person might find something morally interesting isn't that relevant to the thread. The thread assumes S has a moral outlook, and acts can be permissible but they wouldn't want to do them.

The OP didn't stipulate this. The OP stipulated that S thinks act A to be morally permissible, but they shouldn't do it. This is perfectly fine. It's permissible to have children on a lot of people's view, over the age of 35. But one may think this a bad idea.

The metaethical discussion about why a person might find something morally interesting isn't that relevant to the thread. The thread assumes S has a moral outlook, and acts can be permissible but they wouldn't want to do them. — AmadeusD

not my original intention, but then you did say, "Yep. Morals are emotional positions and nought else, on my view." Which I couldn't help wondering about. It's not a defensible position.

Hmm, fair. Thanks for clarifying.

It is, though. Nothing you've said comes close to even a reasonable objection to it. Those more meta-ethical bits you put forward do nothing to this account. Can you explain why it's not defensible? That's a very, very bold claim.

That's an interesting one. What do you mean by alcoholism? Alcohol use disorder includes a broad range of behaviours. — Tom Storm

I'll just go by a dictionary definition for the purposes of the thread since I don't think it matters. Only one thing matters to me really - finding an example of a something which isn't immoral but you shouldn't want to be the kind of person who does it. In my case, alcoholism and being an alcoholic.

Referring to "alcohol use disorder" as "alcoholism". So I'm making the claim that having alcohol use disorder isn't immoral, but simultaneously someone should not want to be an alcoholic.

a chronic relapsing disorder characterized by alcohol abuse or dependence, as compulsive use of alcoholic beverages, the development of physical or psychological symptoms upon reducing or ceasing intake, and decreased ability to function socially and professionally. — Dictionary.com, alcohol use disorder

Instead of finding necessary and sufficient conditions for being immoral, or for "a kind of person you should not be", I just want to demonstrate that you can be one but not the other. In order to do that I think it suffices to show they're not the same concept. Principally, an act can be immoral and a person can be said to be immoral. But only a person can be an example of a type of person which you should not be. There is thus a sense (in the OP) of immorality which may apply to acts, as well as another (not necessarily distinct) one which applies to persons.

( A1 ) Alcoholism is an illness.
( A2 ) A person who has any illness is not immoral on that basis alone.
( A3 ) Any alcoholic is not immoral on the basis of their alcoholism alone (from A1, A2)

The sense of "shouldn't" in the OP is also worth examining. As there are things we shouldn't do which aren't immoral - they may instead be foolish, irresponsible and other nice words for things which we shouldn't do for some reason. For example, sticking your hand in a fire, misplacing your wallet, never cleaning your house, walking out of the house without putting a shirt on when it's -1 Celcius outside...

I'm just going to assert without argument that an alcoholic behaving in a manner that sustains and potentiates a dependence on alcohol is very irresponsible. And for now assert without argument that people shouldn't want to do anything which is very irresponsible. Also assert without argument that someone will be an alcoholic if and only if they act in a manner which sustains and potentiates a dependence on alcohol.

That would give you:

(B1) Behaving in a manner that intentionally sustains and potentiates a dependence on alcohol is very irresponsible.
(B2) A person who wants to be an alcoholic behaves in a manner that intentionally sustains and potentiates their dependence on alcohol.
(B3) You shouldn't want to do anything very irresponsible.
(B4) You shouldn't want to behave in a manner that sustains and potentiates a dependence on alcohol. (from B1,B4)
(B5) You shouldn't want to be an alcoholic (from B2, B4)

( A3 ) and ( B5 ) taken together give you a sense in which someone shouldn't want to be an alcoholic (the type of person that an alcoholic is...someone with alcoholism), but that alcoholism isn't immoral.

The crux of this is really a distinction between the "should" of immorality (a thou shalt not!) and the gentle "should" that we shouldn't wish to behave foolishly. Is it immoral to want to be an alcoholic? No, but it is a rather silly aspiration. A supportive parent would not want their child to have that as their profession.