Maybe ask yourself the question of whether handwashing rose to the level of a "moral act" during COVID-19. — Leontiskos
I would say that ↪Lionino is correct. — Leontiskos
The answer lies on whether one sees morality in the act itself or in the person/intention. — Lionino
Apparently you are forced to conceive of these two things as entirely different acts, with no overlap, such that the latter act does not involve personal hygiene. — Leontiskos
Nope. Not the acts. The moral judgment. — Vera Mont
By being unable to specify the acts, — Leontiskos
They look specific to me.Break quarantine, greet people, — Vera Mont
Certainly. And it's not immoral to become ill due to lack of personal hygiene. It is immoral to make other people ill by having contact with them when one is carrying disease germs.As it turns out, personal hygiene and germs are closely related. — Leontiskos
What this means is that, in assessing alcoholism, it doesn’t matter a great deal whether alcoholism is viewed in terms of acts, intentions, or habits. — Leontiskos
I think it does matter, because that is the central distinction between consequentialism and non-consequentialist ethics. For the virtue ethicist, alcoholism, or any sort of self-harm would generally not be deemed as immoral if the subject did not know of the facts surrounding alcoholism.
The consequentialist will say that it is immoral for an ignorant child to touch the hot stove. — Lionino
No. If you don't want to be the kind of person that does X, then by definition you deem X immoral. — Leontiskos
Obviously, its by society. A mischievous fellow who follows your every move who transcended the plurality of the many to confine itself it to your head to critically examine every action or step taken. Perhaps with a gritty or dark monologue or two. Its obviously not you because the big "M", Morality, isn't owned by any one person? — substantivalism
Jesus Christ. No.
There are simply things I find unbecoming, and not immoral. Aesthetic disagreement is not moral. I don't want to wear bright Orange pants, or be the kind of person who would do so. Doesn't mean anyone who does is even on my bad side.
Yes, but I'd emphasize that this guide is a delusional one which through religion or philosophy we acknowledge its unreality yet we desire to hold to its dictates. If we had a great enough external, or internal, conflict to change it then we'd create not some truth but another delusion through which to carve the world up once more. Something about it all feels so tantalizing yet elusive and for that reason it seems also so fake.If 'society' is the light, then its merely mob rule. Morality isn't owned by anyone. It's a free-floating ideal which alters person-to-person and is used internally to guide one's behaviour. Social 'morality' is just "Oh, most of us agree so here's a policy. Nice". — AmadeusD
It seems to me that the virtue ethicist and the consequentialist will agree that if volition is involved, then what is occurring may be immoral — Leontiskos
but many other consequentialists would disagree — Leontiskos
I think all moral theories are capable of coming to the conclusion that alcoholism is not necessarily non-moral — Leontiskos
You may bring up the example of touching a hot pan, which involves ignorance surrounding a topic, but OP includes the verb "want", which implies that the subject is conscious of the context he is in. — Lionino
Aesthetic disagreement is not moral. — AmadeusD
Something about it all feels so tantalizing yet elusive and for that reason it seems also so fake. — substantivalism
not some truth but another delusion through which to carve the world up once more. Something about it all feels so tantalizing yet elusive and for that reason it seems also so fake. — substantivalism
I don't think the virtue ethicist will agree that it is a vice to do something you did not know had negative consequences, as humans we are always learning after all. — Lionino
That a moral theory does not get along with moral human intuition and with human semantic intuition (what linguistic subjects the predicate "is immoral" can apply to) is an indication that such moral theory is flawed or at least redefining what "moral" really means. — Lionino
How so? — Lionino
If we agree that the OP's premise includes awareness of the consequences of an action, for pretty much any ethical theory — including virtue ethics —, there would be no difference between things that aren’t immoral and things you shouldn't want to be the kind of person that does them. Because the "shouldn't want" basically collapses to "is wrong", which is "is immoral" in others words. — Lionino
It would be another story if the OP said "between things that aren’t immoral and things you don't want to be the kind of person that does them". Then it would become an aesthetic issue... — Lionino
If one does not know it has negative consequences (and they cannot be expected to know) then they do not have volition vis-a-vis the harm in question. Ignorance excuses because of a lack of volition. — Leontiskos
although it would seem that you made a rather crucial typo in saying "aren't immoral" instead of "are immoral." — Leontiskos
If this is right then "moral" in the colloquial sense falls far short of philosophical rigor. — Leontiskos
For example, by stipulating that morality is a species of decision making, and therefore the child who ignorantly places their hand on a hot stove has not made a decision with respect to moral categories, such as harm. If someone does not know that their act involves moral consequences, then they cannot be said to be making a moral decision. — Leontiskos
I don't know where you get this meaning of volition — Lionino
The second objection says that culpable negligence is not deliberate. This is where things get especially complicated in the realm of volition (and Book III of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is a standard text for a study of volition). First we should note that ignorance is capable of excusing, particularly in the case of what we now call "invincible ignorance." If someone neglects to do something with invincible ignorance, then they are not culpable for their "negligence" because their omission is not in any way deliberate. More precisely, they are not culpable because their omission is in no way traceable to their will. For example, suppose I am driving 55 mph on an unmarked road. A police officer pulls me over and tickets me for driving 55 when the speed limit is 45. I tell him that I did not know the speed limit was 45 mph because there are no speed limit signs. Did I neglect to drive the speed limit? — Leontiskos
Not a typo but I copy pasted straight from the OP's title when I shouldn't. You are right. I fixed it. — Lionino
That is true when it comes to degrees. The point you make about telephone hogging for example. A philosophically rigorous theory has to make away with this arbitrary line. — Lionino
My point was more that consequentialism falls out of the common usage of "immoral" because it does not take intention into consideration, only act, making it seem like it is describing harmfulness rather than good and evil. — Lionino
There is an interesting exchange on this very topic between two groups of philosophers. See my post on a different forum for links to the three papers in question (link). — Leontiskos
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