I will give the best example I have: being (viz., ‘to be’, ‘existence’, ‘to exist’, etc.). When trying to define or describe being, it is impossible not to use it—and I don’t mean just in the sense of a linguistic limitation: it is impossible to give a conceptual account without presupposing its meaning in the first place. — Bob Ross
I am curious as to how many people hold a similar view — Bob Ross
All I can say, is that ‘being’ is ‘to be’, ‘to exist’, ‘existence’, etc.; but this does not afford any real analysis into what ‘to be’ really is itself but, rather, is just a reiteration, in different words, of the same meaning. — Bob Ross
That peculiarity renders the chosen definition rather empty in my opinion. I shy from such definitions and prefer something more pragmatic such as a relational definition. A exists to B if A in any way has a causal effect on B. Hence the nonexistence of unicorns because no unicorn seems to have a causal effect on humans, despite the legends to the contrary.This pecularity indicates, by my lights, that ‘being’ is a primitive concept and, as such, is absolutely simple, unanalyzable, and (yet) still perfectly valid. — Bob Ross
I believe you are giving more of an ontological account of why it is absolutely simple — Bob Ross
First of all, all definitions are essentially circular, as evidence by somebody not being able to immediately glean a language simply by by being handed a dictionary
But with some ideas, the circularity of the definition becomes very short, such as in your example.
Do you have others?
That peculiarity renders the chosen definition rather empty in my opinion.
I shy from such definitions and prefer something more pragmatic such as a relational definition. A exists to B if A in any way has a causal effect on B. Hence the nonexistence of unicorns because no unicorn seems to have a causal effect on humans, despite the legends to the contrary.
I think Bob is trying to ascertain the word-resistant concepts we all accept prior to language. — AmadeusD
I don't even think our faculty of self-reflective reason can define certain concepts — Bob Ross
I can envision a concept which, in principle, could be a priori but isn't simple; because our representative faculties could be acquainted with it. — Bob Ross
I’m ok with that; word-resistant just means the concept is difficult to represent for the use of expression, and prior to language just means the concepts have no relation to communication.
This pecularity indicates, by my lights, that ‘being’ is a primitive concept and, as such, is absolutely simple, unanalyzable, and (yet) still perfectly valid. — Bob Ross
But ‘being’, as Aristotle tells us in Γ.2, is “said in many ways”. That is, the verb ‘to be’ (einai) has different senses, as do its cognates ‘being’ (on) and ‘entities’ (onta). So the universal science of being qua being appears to founder on an equivocation: how can there be a single science of being when the very term ‘being’ is ambiguous? .... — Aristotle's Metaphysics
do these so-called, alleged, primitive concepts need to be either (1) capable of non-circular definition or (2) thrown out? — Bob Ross
Are there pure and unanalyzable concepts? Put me in the affirmative/similar view column, re: the categories of transcendental philosophy. — Mww
All words are reductive, but concepts don't need to be. I think Bob is trying to ascertain the word-resistant concepts we all accept prior to language.
Comfort and discomfort probably fit here. — AmadeusD
this does not afford any real analysis into what ‘to be’ really is itself but, rather, is just a reiteration, in different words, of the same meaning. — Bob Ross
My preferred example is 'the principle of noncontradiction' (PNC).I hold that some concepts are primitive and absolutely simple [ ... ] the best example I have: being (viz., ‘to be’, ‘existence’, ‘to exist’, etc.) — Bob Ross
non-circular definitions — Bob Ross
:up:all definitions are essentially circular — noAxioms
OK, I accept that,and retract the bit about the dictionary.Firstly, I am NOT referring to linguistic definitions: I am referring to conceptual definitions. — Bob Ross
In general,no,but I gave an alternate definition that is very much about causality. It solves the circularity problem. It is analyzable,and it works for how most people use the word, even if the typical person would reach for the circular definition you reference.Firstly, not all definitions are about causality.
I didn't define 'exists' in terms of 'being'. I used something far less circular. 'Being' is just a synonym, and can be defined similarly if you choose.Secondly, I don't see how this would provide non-circular definitions for concepts like 'being'.
But the definitions of the complex concepts are not themselves circular: they don't refer to themselves in their definitions. — Bob Ross
I'm not certain these pre-linguistic concepts are 'word resistant' as such - are they not in a sense foundational for later vocabulary? — Tom Storm
I will give the best example I have: being (viz., ‘to be’, ‘existence’, ‘to exist’, etc.). When trying to define or describe being, it is impossible not to use it—and I don’t mean just in the sense of a linguistic limitation: it is impossible to give a conceptual account without presupposing its meaning in the first place. — Bob Ross
Re-reading that, I am unsure it makes entire sense, or adequately captures what I'm thinking. Cest la v'ie lol. — AmadeusD
Have you heard of Milik Capek? He is a writer and philosopher who has taken odds with spatialized approaches to the language of change/time present in much of Mainstream or Classical physics. In the spirit somewhat of Bergson and Whitehead. His own solution, as was the two approaches of the prior philosophers listed, was to refuse outright to give a definition of change/time as analyzable fully into something else. Yielding a primitive sense of temporal change/becoming that was fundamental to their philosophies.Would you include the so-called 'primary intuitions' of time and space? (It might be their very 'primitiveness' that makes them so hard to explain!) — Wayfarer
Is there a philosophical perspective on language/meaning/truth/metaphysics that acknowledges this weak inter-definability and balance of dependence/independence of our core concepts? — substantivalism
some concepts are primitive and absolutely simple, and as such cannot be defined without circular reference (to itself). — Bob Ross
He has a cheap E-book on Barnes & Nobles which outlines much of his thinking which is heavily influenced by Whitehead as well as Bergson among others. Its a peculiar set of interpretations of quantum mechanics as well as Classical physics that sort of seems to leave open the door to organicism or non-mechanistic views of nature. At least he seems to do so by attempting to diagnose what I would call mechanistic views of nature and then developing language that goes against it.No, I hadn't heard of him, although looked up his Wikipedia entry now you've mentioned him. — Wayfarer
I don't remember much from such a dialectic or the details therein. I'll have to go back and review this.But in some ways, what you're point to is the way dialectic was conceived in the classical tradition isn't it? You mention Heraclitus and Parmenides - wasn't Plato very much engaged in the dialectic between those two apparent contraries? All very deep and difficult questions. — Wayfarer
(1) capable of non-circular definition — Bob Ross
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