Nature isn't "the peaceable kingdom", but it isn't entirely "red in tooth and claw" either. Take a lion and a herd of grazers. The grazers can tell if the lion is stalking them or not. If not, they graze on. If yes, they take evasive action, collectively. Lions have limitations, they don't want to get kicked in the head, so they look for a the lame, the halt, the old, and go after them.

Many animals live in status systems. The top chicken gets to peck at the choice kernel first, on down to the lowest chicken who is lucky not to get pecked to death. The top cow goes through the barn door first; a challenger might try to go through the door first, in which case, the top cow and challenger right get stuck in the doorway.

Many animals also communicate with scent. They may not "design" the scent, but they take the initiative in marking territory. Tall male dogs try to piss higher up on the tree than everybody else, the better to establish 'place'. Please don't leap to any semblance you may see in human male behavior.

It all amounts to a reasonably decent arrangement.

BTW, I'm not finding this thread very interesting.

Getting from a state of affairs to a claim about what action ought follow from that isn't something you've established here. You've merely asserted there's a grounding in states of affairs, and then popped off to shop around your ethical values without establishing any move from one to the other. I have merely rejected that you've done the above. Which you have not. You have indicated that your view of ethics is not in line with your own reasoning. — AmadeusD

Very important to see that these are not MY personal ethical values. Anything I bring up is just to serve as an illustration.

True, I have asserted there is a grounding for ethical state of affairs, but you entirely lose me after this. Popping off? It suggests an arbitrary move. But i have done exactly the opposite. I am saying ethics is NOT arbitrary, and that it DOES have a foundation in actuality. This is the philosophical discovery of value-in-the-world.

I think this is alien thinking to you, because most popular thinking these says looks to scientific methods of discovery to determine justified belief in philosophical issues. You seem to have fallen prey. This is not an empirical argument. It is an analytical argument. Usually analytic matter turn on logical agreement. Here, there is a priority discovered in the world's existence. Rather momentous really. But you first have to pry yourself lose from interfering thinking from other quarters. One has to think purely analytically, as if the matter were of an entirely logical nature. Think of ethics, any situation will do. Ask what it IS for something to be ethical. And ask this looking for necessary and sufficient conditions for ethicality. See, it is conceptual. Value is inherent to ethics. So we look at value, and ask what this is. This moves to episodic actualities.

I did not do so. This is a rather extreme misinterpretation I find it hard to understand. I have put forward the empirical fact that the pain exists in your mind, and no where else. You don't deny this, but still for maintain the positions which it precludes.
Pain has a causal relationship with your physical body. Nothing in this suggests the 'toothache' is invented, other than the language... More below, in some sense.. — AmadeusD

Okay, more below. But just to be clear, are you saying the mind is distinct from the body? I find this rather hard to understand from a self professed physicalist. When I said you said pain is something we invented, I was referring to where you said it was only in the mind. It didn't occur to me that you might think the mind not a being a bodily entity. This does confuse. Look here:

Me: The pain in my sprained ankle IS in the world. Where else?
You: It is literally, figuratively and metaphorically in your mind. It is not in your c-Fibres. It is not in your ankle bone. It is not anywhere outside of your body. It exists solely in your mind.

Not even my c fibers?? Hmmmm. "Where" again is pain? Pain is only one "place": in the world.

Hmm.. I don't think my position and reasoning says any such thing. The pain, in your scenario exists in the person's head. That is a fact, not an inference or a 'position' that I hold uniquely somehow. It is a basic, clear reading of the facts of how pain works (again, unless you are a strict physicalist and claim that pain IS the firing of c-fibres in response to overstimulation - So your final two lines of this post are likely because you haven't grasped what I'm saying clearly). Further, I can't ascertain what your case would show. That someone is insensitive? Sure. Feeling pain sucks. Doesn't mean it exists anywhere but the mind. Mental anguish is the same. Where does that live? — AmadeusD

When I observe the dreadful pain, or bliss, and say it is in the world, I mean it is there. The world is all there is. I can see how a "strict physicalist" might try to push this out of existence, but you say you are not one of these. Now I don't really know where you stand ontologically. But the premise I would ask you to accept is simple: If it is there, then it is in the world. Even imagined things have a status of being in the world AS imagined things. Only this spear in my kidney (the agony, that is) is not imagined. Just the opposite: it is the least imagined thing one can conceive.

Insensitively has nothing to do with it. It can, however, play an important role in the mind of a policy maker in government where laws are made. Some would be fine reintroducing the Roman gladiatorial back into our entertainment. But nothing can mitigate pain. It is not an attitude about something that sucks. It is the Real foundation for ethical possiblity. This is where the argument lies. Value and ethics are like modus ponens and its conclusion: therefore, Q. This IS the point.

They communicate, and there is a structure to their language, just as there is to ours. The language of dogs consists of sounds, body stance, gestures of head, paws and tail, facial expressions, ear and hair erection. They are quite capable of reprimanding one another for rule breaking, status offenses and breaches of etiquette - and of responding appropriately to such a reprimand. — Vera Mont

But....THIS is incidental to the issue. I mean, seriously?

They communicate, and there is a structure to their language, just as there is to ours. The language of dogs consists of sounds, body stance, gestures of head, paws and tail, facial expressions, ear and hair erection. They are quite capable of reprimanding one another for rule breaking, status offenses and breaches of etiquette - and of responding appropriately to such a reprimand. — Vera Mont

:up: :up:

But for the fifth time, survival is question begging. To survive as such has no ethical meaning. — Astrophel

Fine.

But....THIS is incidental to the issue. I mean, seriously? — Astrophel

The "issue" is tucked up safe in bed. Good night.

Nature isn't "the peaceable kingdom", but it isn't entirely "red in tooth and claw" either. — BC

Why are you telling me this? I'm the one who has been attempting to explain that human ethical values evolved along with us, from the social systems of our ancestors, all the way back to insects; that they originate from the need to keep an orderly state of affairs going.

Please don't leap to any semblance you may see in human male behavior. — BC

Too late! About 70 years too late.

Very important to see that these are not MY personal ethical values. Anything I bring up is just to serve as an illustration — Astrophel

That's a fair comment - I think what I'm getting at though, is that these examples do not survive without being someone's personal view of the act/event/whatever. They cannot exist, free of the Subject's judgement.
You're right that I may be unfairly ascribing them - take those as examples, also, if you can.

True, I have asserted there is a grounding for ethical state of affairs, but you entirely lose me after this. Popping off? It suggests an arbitrary move. But i have done exactly the opposite. I am saying ethics is NOT arbitrary, and that it DOES have a foundation in actuality. This is the philosophical discovery of value-in-the-world. — Astrophel

Yep. Not sure what's being missed here, but for clarity (as this may meean me ignoring much of your response in light of this):

- I understand this is what you are putting forward;
- I also understand you are attempting to defend the thesis above;
- I am of the view that you have entirely failed to do so, and that your entire position boils down to an arbitrary move. I figured I had been very clear about this, so it's possible I will need to continue pointing out where i Believe you are either ignoring me, or perhaps misunderstand if the above is how you're reading, currently.
Onward...

I think this is alien thinking to you, because most popular thinking these says looks to scientific methods of discovery to determine justified belief in philosophical issues. — Astrophel

Wrong. It's not alien. It's incoherent.

Here, there is a priority discovered in the world's existence. — Astrophel

No. There isn't. ANd so far, you've don't nothing to defend this. All you've done is told me that I don't get it. I get it. It's wrong (is my position). It is a really common attempt to ensure one is making good decisions, based on some framework that isn't arbitrary. But, it is, at base. THe maths works. THe basis is false.

Ask what it IS for something to be ethical. And ask this looking for necessary and sufficient conditions for ethicality. — Astrophel

This, is also incoherent. You are presupposing that there is some objectivity about ethics to be found. There isn't, you've not provided anything that indicates there is other than the assertion. So, i'm left with not much to say.

Not even my c fibers?? Hmmmm. — Astrophel

Err, no. That's an empirical fact. If you are taking this to be the case, either you're a hard-line physicalist or you're making things up to suit your position, me thinks. I did provide an out for the former. THe latter, not so much.

"Where" again is pain? Pain is only one "place": in the world. — Astrophel

No. Not in any way, and you have literally not even bothered to discuss my point. You have just reasserted some Nietzschean/Wittgensteinian misleading statements. It's poetics not philosophy so say pain is "in the world". Your mind is in the world, sure. If you want to ignore that part, have hte cake and Eat it.

When I observe the dreadful pain, or bliss, and say it is in the world, I mean it is there. — Astrophel

Yeah, but you're wrong. So, what are you trying to do here except just in other words restate your position with no argument? "in the world" is absolutely meaningless in these passages, as they are. It may be something you grasp in your mind, but you've not said anything that fills the empty vessel that phrase provides me.

I can see how a "strict physicalist" might try to push this out of existence, but you say you are not one of these. — Astrophel

This is hte exact opposite, and it is now clear that you're not engaging with the Physicalist position I'm mentioning, and that you've misread what I've actually said.
Your position could be supported in strict Physicalist terms. C-fibres firing would constitute pain on that account. You could then claim the pain exist in the world. But, if you're not taking that line, the move isn't open. My understanding of your position here is that you do not know what you're discussing very well, as these things are directly conflicting in your passages.

If it is there, then it is in the world. Even imagined things have a status of being in the world AS imagined things. — Astrophel

This is a mere side-step of the clear distinction. It doesn't need answering, as the possible disagreement in this passage has been covered at least twice in this exchange: The mind is in the world. The Pain is in the mind. Claiming that your house is in (insert country) and nothing more doesn't help anyone locate it.

Only this spear in my kidney (the agony, that is) is not imagined. Just the opposite: it is the least imagined thing one can conceive. — Astrophel

The spear, the injury are not imagined. I have pointed that out.

The pain, resultant from a causal relationship with those things, is. It is in your mind. It doesn't exist elsewhere.

But nothing can mitigate pain. It is not an attitude about something that sucks. It is the Real foundation for ethical possiblity. This is where the argument lies. Value and ethics are like modus ponens and its conclusion: therefore, Q. This IS the point. — Astrophel

Then you're flat-out wrong and I need not engage further. This is against the empirical understanding of what Pain is and how it operates.

It also seems you've jettisonned most of your position now, instead giving me the basis for ethics as:

Physical pain. Alrighty. I reject that. And we're good :)

Not arbitrarily, but to fill in an oversight. I had neglected to point out earlier that people make national policy and religious doctrine while they are alive.
You eventually returned with a list of men who wrote books, that may later have influenced the thinking of men who made policy and revolution. None of the resulting policies and actions, AFAIK, yielded the outcome envisioned by the writers. — Vera Mont

I don't see how whether the ideas are adopted when the person is alive or dead is relevant to what we were talking about. You said: "Do these big-picture individuals attempt to communicate their vision? Of course they do. Do they make social policy, determine legal, ethical and moral codes?
No, never."

Clearly, whether the social policy is enacted before or after the person is dead, is irrelevant to the question of whether these people are the ones who "make" the policies.

Not by contact with human minds. That is incoherent. — AmadeusD

Let me remind you, that it was your words, you, who said the good comes in contact with human minds. You said: "It literally doesn't come into contact with anything but human minds."

I am having great difficulty trying to understand what you are saying. Now you are saying that what you said earlier is incoherent. What are you trying to say?

Good's are literally an invention of human minds. — AmadeusD

The issue is not whether goods are an invention of human minds, it is a question of whether these things, which you insist are created by human minds can transcend those minds.

Suppose for example, we name a concept "X", and we define X as a thing which transcends human minds. Clearly X must transcend human minds or else it is self-contradicting and incoherent, therefore not a concept. Since it is a very real possibility, and not contradictory at all, to propose such a concept, one which transcends human minds, then there is no logical basis for the rejection of such a proposition, the concept "X" which transcends human minds. Therefore regardless of whether the concept X is created by a human mind, it cannot be rejected on any principles of logic, and it must necessarily, by definition, transcend human minds.

It is very clear that what you are asserting is illogical. You claim that the supposed fact that human minds create goods, implies that goods cannot transcend human minds. This would mean that only a human mind could create a good. So here's another way that your position may be refuted. Your mind is not my mind. My mind creates its own goods, and your mind creates its own goods. My goods may transcend your mind, and your goods may transcend my mind. Unless you can prove that only a human mind could create a good, then we must allow that there could be goods which transcend all human minds, perhaps created by a mind which is not human. And clearly we have evidence of such goods. Birds build nests, and other animals make homes for themselves, so all these creatures produce their own goods, with their own minds, and these goods transcend all human minds.

Let me remind you, that it was your words, you, who said the good comes in contact with human minds. You said: "It literally doesn't come into contact with anything but human minds." — Metaphysician Undercover

This sentence does not make grammatical sense. From what I gather, you're trying to say I painted myself into a corner.
No. As noted, these are your positions I am illustrating the illogic of. I cannot stress enough how backwards you are reading these exchanges.

Now you are saying that what you said earlier is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is pretty clear evidence for the above. You're ascribing my description of your own position to my own position. No thank you, good sir.

Suppose for example, we name a concept "X", and we define X as a thing which transcends human minds. Clearly X must transcend human minds or else it is self-contradicting and incoherent, therefore not a concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not the case. It is a concept. A false concept. Things don't just cease to exist because they are contradictory. People hold contradictory concepts in mind all the time. These is very, very confused.
I also note the use of 'must' here relates only to achieving coherence. Nothing else is aimed at. Not an ethical claim.

Therefore regardless of whether the concept X is created by a human mind, it cannot be rejected on any principles of logic, and it must necessarily, by definition, transcend human minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is probably hte worst use of 'logic' to defend the indefensible I have seen since joining TPF, outside of Corvus. Nothing you've described is apt for your claim.

It seems you may be baiting and switching in part through this exchange too. Your use of 'goods' seems to flit between 'products' and 'the good'. This is not something I can engage with sensibly.
"the Good" is apt here, where "Goods" are not apt. They are just objects. If you are trying to say they are the same thing, I reject and simply move on with my life.

It's possible I wont reply if similar comments come back. If so, take care mate - I'm sure we'll have more productive exchanges elsewhere on TPF!

Do they make social policy, determine legal, ethical and moral codes?
No, never."
Clearly, whether the social policy is enacted before or after the person is dead, is irrelevant to the question of whether these people are the ones who "make" the policies. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is absolutely relevant. Once dead, the visionary has no control or ownership of his idea. Anybody can 'interpret' it, subsection it, misapply it, misdirect it any way they want. Paul ran with an idea Jesus had and made a complete hash of it. Lenin did similarly with Marx. And poor old Rousseau did not fare any better at the hands of Robespierre. The ones who enact are not the visionaries and not usually benevolent and the 'influence' is not reflected very well in the actuality that ensues.

Lenin did similarly with Marx. — Vera Mont

Not sure whether this name is allowed here, but Terence McKenna has made much this same point - that originators have no control of their ideas, in a general sense.
Not much could be done about Marxism once it got going. The chances are that Marx would have been shouted down and eventually turned out for trying to correct the Communist project of the early 20th Century. Tbf, I would do that to him anyway.

Yep. Not sure what's being missed here, but for clarity (as this may meean me ignoring much of your response in light of this):

- I understand this is what you are putting forward;
- I also understand you are attempting to defend the thesis above;
- I am of the view that you have entirely failed to do so, and that your entire position boils down to an arbitrary move. I figured I had been very clear about this, so it's possible I will need to continue pointing out where i Believe you are either ignoring me, or perhaps misunderstand if the above is how you're reading, currently. — AmadeusD

Well if you think I have entirely failed to do so, then I assume you have spoken clearly against this apriori argument of value and ethics stated several times. This is the first premise of the argument. You haven't done this. Just tell me how it is that ethics and value are not as I have argued? You haven't touched this.

Wrong. It's not alien. It's incoherent. — AmadeusD

Well, you don't seem to getting something obvious, and very often those who have taken classes in anthropology or biology come out thinking they know something about philosophy, because they have opinions and textbooks. But philosophy deals with the analysis of the presuppositions that are found in familiar knowledge claims, not so much in those familiar knowledge claims themselves.

Philosophy is not incoherent, but if you read it, something like Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, then I suspect it will sound alien to you. If you have actually read this, then you can borrow from the Kant's method of discovery to apply it here, for the same insight applies regard method. Take the ethical case, any will do. Ask yourself, what is in this case that were it to be removed from the case, the case would lose it meaning as ethical. This is value-in-being. This you have not even begun to do, despite all of your protestations to the contrary. And it is the essential feature! I don't get it. I hate to labor the point, but just don't be shy about it. Tell where this goes wrong if you want to send me packing.

No. There isn't. ANd so far, you've don't nothing to defend this. All you've done is told me that I don't get it. I get it. It's wrong (is my position). It is a really common attempt to ensure one is making good decisions, based on some framework that isn't arbitrary. But, it is, at base. THe maths works. THe basis is false. — AmadeusD

This is a case in point. I think you think you have argued the point. But there is more to it than "No. There isn't." Apriority, what is this? Generally we associate this with the inviolability of logically structured propositions. Analytic propositions are apriori, but then vacuous in terms of content. But what if there is a palpable feature of the actual world that that demonstrates the apodicticity of apriority, that is universal and necessary? (And putting aside the argument that even logic is not air tight, so to speak. After all, logic is constructed IN language, and language cannot be shown to be apriori. That is a longer story).
This is the fascinating thing about ethics. For there is G E Moore's "non natural" property that is an amazing part of this world. I invite you to read about this in his Principia Ethica. Easy to find on the internet. The issue is the notorious "good" of ethics. I can't remember if I talked about this already, but you have been so busy arguing against the obvious, I haven't had the chance.

But you have to get to first base, first. All you have to do is say something like, Okay, if an ethical problem is divested of the value that is in play, as when I borrow a valued tool like an ax, keeping in mind that if the ax in question has value to the borrower and the owner, then the ethics of the case simply vanishes. You SEE this, don't you?? You should simply say yes, and be done with it. You protest too much, methinks.

This, is also incoherent. You are presupposing that there is some objectivity about ethics to be found. There isn't, you've not provided anything that indicates there is other than the assertion. So, i'm left with not much to say. — AmadeusD

IT is not incoherent. The hard part hasn't even begun. By necessary and sufficient I am simply defining ethics. Not... what are you talking about? What are the necessary and sufficient condition for a circle? For a pizza? I am telling you about the procedure of discovering what it means for something to be ethical. All you have to do is say, well, this is not a necessary condition.... or a sufficient condition for such and such reasons. IS value a necessary condition or not, in defining ethics?? Just spill it.

Err, no. That's an empirical fact. If you are taking this to be the case, either you're a hard-line physicalist or you're making things up to suit your position, me thinks. I did provide an out for the former. THe latter, not so much. — AmadeusD

I am just listening to you tell me what you think. By all means, disabuse me on what you hold to be the case. Sounds like you are somewhere in the vicinity of being a physicalist.

No. Not in any way, and you have literally not even bothered to discuss my point. You have just reasserted some Nietzschean/Wittgensteinian misleading statements. It's poetics not philosophy so say pain is "in the world". Your mind is in the world, sure. If you want to ignore that part, have hte cake and Eat it. — AmadeusD

Your point about what the world is? Just say it. I'm listening.

Yeah, but you're wrong. So, what are you trying to do here except just in other words restate your position with no argument? "in the world" is absolutely meaningless in these passages, as they are. It may be something you grasp in your mind, but you've not said anything that fills the empty vessel that phrase provides me. — AmadeusD

So "in the world" is the issue. What is in the world? In order address a question like this, it might be best to say what is not in the world, since most of what we can think of is unproblematically in the world, like dogs and cats and people and fence posts. But there is an problem that instantly arises: to speak of something not in the world is going to be an event IN the world. Speaking is IN the world. I don't think this is to be doubted. But one can speak OF things not in the world, can't one? The speaking in the world, the spoken of not in the world, like a unicorn. But the trouble with imagined things like this is that they comprise parts of real things, and so even though there are no unicorns, there are horses and horns. But why are these unproblematic? Because they are experienced in observation. BUt then, if this is a standard for being in the world, being observed, do we not observe an emotion? A pain? Not in the same way as we observe a fence post.

A pain is "there" but has limited predicative possibilities. But does this dismiss it from the world? This is where you come in, I think. I don't think it can be argued that a pain isn't "there" at all. That is impossible. But it can be argued that a pain is not a physical object. But you would have show why only physical objects are allow to be both there AND in the world, while pain is not. Keeping in mind that if you are a physicalist, pain is at least given the status of being reducible to physicality. Though if you do this, you deprive the pain of its overt observable feature of being what it is. Nerve cells, c fibers, or however you would like to characterize a brain event, are not pain.

Pain is often called a phenomenon, or an epiphenomenon by physicalists. But here is the rub: how is it that dogs and cats and the rest are not themselves phenomena? After all, the only thing a person can experience is a phenomenon. One cannot step outside of phenomena, for to do so would require a position outside of experience. This is never possible. Sorry, but this is Wittgenstein's idea.

So "being in the world" I think, even if the matter comes down to understanding pain as a phenomenon along with all things, has some limited exposition here. Phenomena are in the world because they are there at all! And "being there" is sufficient.

This is hte exact opposite, and it is now clear that you're not engaging with the Physicalist position I'm mentioning, and that you've misread what I've actually said.
Your position could be supported in strict Physicalist terms. C-fibres firing would constitute pain on that account. You could then claim the pain exist in the world. But, if you're not taking that line, the move isn't open. My understanding of your position here is that you do not know what you're discussing very well, as these things are directly conflicting in your passages. — AmadeusD

Well, I haven't talked about anything except the argument about value and ethics. I haven't given you a single clue beyond affirming that pain is an inherent part of ethical statements that involve pain. If you want MY ontology just ask. See the preceding paragraphs. I read phenomenology. this is Kant through Derrida and beyond. What is real is phenomena. I only bring up physicality because you did, and I was surmising what you might think. Me? I am miles from this kind of naive thinking. C-fibres are themselves phenomenologically reducible to phenomena.

This is a mere side-step of the clear distinction. It doesn't need answering, as the possible disagreement in this passage has been covered at least twice in this exchange: The mind is in the world. The Pain is in the mind. Claiming that your house is in (insert country) and nothing more doesn't help anyone locate it. — AmadeusD

So you're saying that saying something is somewhere, like a house, doesn't locate the house? Confusing, at best.

Then you're flat-out wrong and I need not engage further. This is against the empirical understanding of what Pain is and how it operates.

It also seems you've jettisonned most of your position now, instead giving me the basis for ethics as:

Physical pain. Alrighty. I reject that. And we're good :) — AmadeusD

You are missing the point. It is not that pain cannot be medically of otherwise mitigated. Are you kidding? One cannot mitigate the pain qua pain by contextualizing pain. Let's say you have a choice between to terrible alternatives. Consider simple contingent conditions of a knife being a good one, sharp, balanced, etc. But use this knife for Macbeth, and the sharpness becomes bad. What if the real knife were used by accident? Then one could say the duller the knife the better. But the sharp knife being used could be mitigated if it were in fact dull. The point is that contingent values like Good sharp knives and Good comfortable couches, are not like the ethical Good. this Greek arete, standing for excellence is not suitable for ethics in this sense. Why? Because with pain, and dreadful pain makes the case more vividly, there is no mitigating the, well, the "badness" of the pain. A twisted arm behind the back cannot be undone not matter what the context. It cannot be undone, that is, when weighed in any circumstance, it remains what it is. This makes pain like logic, apodictic.

You know, this is jumping to the chase. You first have to get beyond simply admitting the analytic union of value and ethics.

I wonder what modern televangelists would do with Jesus.

( A1 ) Alcoholism is an illness. — fdrake

If we classify it as such, it would no longer fit OP's criterion of "not want to be a person who does it". We don't do diseases.

they may instead be foolish, irresponsible and other nice words for things which we shouldn't do for some reason — fdrake

Under many normative ethics, self-harm is considered immoral. You may bring up the example of touching a hot pan, which involves ignorance surrounding a topic, but OP includes the verb "want", which implies that the subject is conscious of the context he is in.

Is it immoral to want to be an alcoholic? No, but it is a rather silly aspiration. — fdrake

That seems to be dodging the implication that willingly being alcoholic is deemed as immoral by many as it involves self-harm by saying it is just "silly", doesn't it?

One thing I know for sure, for most religions, alcoholism is immoral.

If we classify it as such, it would no longer fit OP's criterion of "not want to be a person who does it". We don't do diseases. — Lionino

It's an odd disease then, where how you act both gives you it and keeps it going. It strikes me as something like football. You don't do football, but you are a football player. Which isn't quite being an instance of football...

Regardless, the original post's sense of immoral applies to person types and persons.

With this in mind do you think there things that aren’t immoral but you still shouldn’t want to be the kind of person that does them even if you’re the only person affected? — Captain Homicide

In fact the question is about that dynamic. If immorality only applies to acts, then we can end the discussion. The question remains open if you can consider a type of person immoral.

You may bring up the example of touching a hot pan, — Lionino

Good catch. I think it was sticking a hand in the fire? I had in mind a kid touching a hot thing intentionally. Foolish, I think, not immoral.

With this in mind do you think there things that aren’t immoral but you still shouldn’t want to be the kind of person that does them even if you’re the only person affected? — Captain Homicide

my italics
I took this to mean, acts that do not come under a moral code, but are nevertheless considered shameful; things that, if they are witnessed by other people, would diminish our social standing and/or self-esteem. Like throwing a tantrum in a public place or throwing food at the television screen.

I'm sure we'll have more productive exchanges elsewhere on TPF! — AmadeusD

Another example of how you make faulty assertions. It seems like you have a tendency to claim that you are sure about things, when your professed certainty really has no foundation, or support of any kind.

Anybody can 'interpret' it, subsection it, misapply it, misdirect it any way they want. — Vera Mont

I don't see how this significantly differs from when the person is alive. The difference is that when the person is alive one might attempt to interfere and correct the interpreter. But in most cases, they do not bother unless the interpretation is seriously offensive.

Paul ran with an idea Jesus had and made a complete hash of it. Lenin did similarly with Marx. And poor old Rousseau did not fare any better at the hands of Robespierre. The ones who enact are not the visionaries and not usually benevolent and the 'influence' is not reflected very well in the actuality that ensues. — Vera Mont

All those mentioned, Paul, Lenin, and Robespierre, are visionaries in their own right. I don't see how the fact that one visionary makes use of the ideas of another, and may be argued to misinterpret the other, alters the fact that the visionaries are the ones who enact the policies. It just relegates the original to secondary, as i said about Plato. But since the supposed "original" visionary derives ideas from a previous source. the infinite regress you are setting up is just a distraction from the reality of the situation. That reality is, the truth of the matter which you refuse to respect, and that is that visionaries really do enact policies, and where they derive their ideas from is not relevant to this truth. The very thing which you assert that visionaries never do, "make social policy, determine legal, ethical and moral codes", is actually impossible to do, if one is not a visionary. The non-visionaries are simple followers.

I don't see how this significantly differs from when the person is alive. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only in that the visionary was not in charge of making policy during his lifetime and is not in charge of making policy after he's dead. I.e. never.

All those mentioned, Paul, Lenin, and Robespierre, are visionaries in their own right. — Metaphysician Undercover

Certainly, but I cannot call them benevolent.

That reality is, the truth of the matter which you refuse to respect, and that is that visionaries really do enact policies, and where they derive their ideas from is not relevant to this truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mussolini qualifies on one count, anyway. So that's all right, just so somebody has a vision of some kind and the power to impose it on others. Sorry I can't respect them all equally.

Well if you think I have entirely failed to do so, then I assume you have spoken clearly against this apriori argument of value and ethics stated several times. This is the first premise of the argument. You haven't done this. Just tell me how it is that ethics and value are not as I have argued? You haven't touched this. — Astrophel

As noted, yes i have, and you have ignored it (it seems!).
You are asking to me prove the negation of your position. No thank you, Good sir. You fail to provide support your position, I reject it. It ends there. If we keep discussing, cool. But it is not an objection to the exchange that I've not accepted your position.

Well, you don't seem to getting something obvious — Astrophel

I reject your unsupported position. Nothing more.
If it were obvious, I'd think you could convince me. I tend to accept obviousness as obvious, by it's nature. You haven't tried, it seems, to provide anything in that capacity so far. Which is fine, if that's not what you're trying to do. I may be misunderstanding your intent - but based on your arguments, these remarks stand, i think.

Take the ethical case, any will do. Ask yourself, what is in this case that were it to be removed from the case, the case would lose it meaning as ethical. — Astrophel

Human judgement. That my version of the the answer, to any case. Fwiw, I have read Kant. You don't seem to be groking the situation we're in here. I understand your position and reject it.

This is value-in-being. — Astrophel

This is your assertion, which is fine. But you're acting as if you have ringfenced the claim against objection. You have not done so. It is simply your position. Perhaps one shared with many others, but that doesn't ringfence it.
My assumption is that you do not notice when you make subjective judgments, and take them to be somehow pursuant to. If you're suggesting that 'being' has some inherently value, i may need to walk away.

value to the borrower and the owner, then the ethics of the case simply vanishes. You SEE this, don't you?? You should simply say yes, and be done with it. You protest too much, methinks. — Astrophel

You have tacitly accepted my position. I have, in fact, said that this is hte case multiple times. I am now 100% convinced you are not reading, or understanding. This is not a mistake that could be made otherwise, I don't think. The bolded claim requires acceptance of my position. It is those subjects judgment in which the value consists, and therefore the Ethical 'content' of the event. We're good. As noted previously. There are not values free-floating in the World-at-large independent of human judgment.

IT is not incoherent. The hard part hasn't even begun — Astrophel

It is. Which is going to be harsh for you, if you think this isn't the hard part. Heh. I kid.

Sounds like you are somewhere in the vicinity of being a physicalist. — Astrophel

All I can say to this is that I don't think you're understanding much of anything I'm saying if this is the conclusion you've drawn. It is definitely wrong, at any rate.

I am telling you about the procedure of discovering what it means for something to be ethical. — Astrophel

Yes, indeed - and you're wrong, on my view. I have been over this, in discreet detail, a few times (above, three times). You can go back and find that if you wish. I'm not sure why you aren't just saying "Ok, fine, you disagree and that's okay" which it is. We are allowed to do so. That's one of the best parts of Philosophy, imo.

Your point about what the world is? Just say it. I'm listening. — Astrophel

This is an incoherent question. I am rebutting your point about 'what the world is'. I have canvassed two options. One is my position, and one is yours. I'll do a low-effort bit of highlighting:

Your mind is in the world, sure. If you want to ignore that part, have hte cake and Eat it. — AmadeusD

This is a mere side-step of the clear distinction. It doesn't need answering, as the possible disagreement in this passage has been covered at least twice in this exchange: The mind is in the world. The Pain is in the mind. Claiming that your house is in (insert country) and nothing more doesn't help anyone locate it. — AmadeusD

I wont be elaborating, if you can't grok the above. While i am sympathetic if that's the case, I do not have the time. Pain doesn't exist outside the mind(on my view). Whether hte mind is 'in the world' or not, is irrelevant. You are ignoring a clear distinction in order to use poetics instead of clear reason. I shall not. Though, if you're, in fact, an idealist, please say so. That brings the discussion to a new place.

Nerve cells, c fibers, or however you would like to characterize a brain event, are not pain. — Astrophel

*ahem* I brought this fact up. I have repeated this fact. It supports my position, directly. You are either being dishonest or this has gone so far off the rails we need to start again. Yeesh. You're arguing for a physicalist position by ..what..rejecting physcalism? Bizarre. I assume that's not what your intent is, but that is what's being conveyed to me in fairly clear terms.

Sorry, but this is Wittgenstein's idea. — Astrophel

To me, this is explains so much. If you follow Witty, we have not much to discuss. I don't rate him at all. In terms of deducing your positions - I did predict this.

t. You have just reasserted some Nietzschean/Wittgensteinian misleading statements — AmadeusD

;) No need to be sorry. He's a moron (hehehe, I kid).

But there is an problem that instantly arises: to speak of something not in the world is going to be an event IN the world. Speaking is IN the world. — Astrophel

This is the above in action, as an exemplar. These phrases have no meaning, as they are. None of this presents any objections. Though, I take your point here - it would probably have been better to note that, sure, pain is 'in the world' in a sense, but it is located far more specifically than that - It isn't present in the vast, vast, vast majority of the world (well, an instance of pain - and, pain, the abstract concept, obviously doesn't exist 'in the world'. Nothing of that kind does). Oh. It turns out that I infact, did do that, as re-quoted from my own comments above :)

But the trouble with imagined things like this is that they comprise parts of real things, and so even though there are no unicorns, there are horses and horns. — Astrophel

They do not 'comprise' these things. Im unsure how you're formulating that statement. It doesn't make sense. The opposite is true - the concept of a Unicorn is comprised of Horses and Horns. I don't really take that to be the case, but that's another discussion. There are examples where that's the case, to some degree, but you can't imagine parts of a real thing, which don't actually exist. If something is real, it's parts are necessarily real. If a Unicorn existed, it is partially because Horses and Horns already exist. A Donkey can fit this description somewhat aptly.

Phenomena are in the world because they are there at all! And "being there" is sufficient. — Astrophel

As noted above, I take this point but its just floating above the discussion and not actually engaging what is being discussed on my view. If you can point to pain outside the mind, go ahead. If you can't, my position remains and is untouched by this (accepted) reality. But, this is plainly not true of ideas. Which is why, if you're an idealist, this is a different discussion.

Well, I haven't talked about anything except the argument about value and ethics. I haven't given you a single clue beyond affirming that pain is an inherent part of ethical statements that involve pain. If you want MY ontology just ask. See the preceding paragraphs. I read phenomenology. this is Kant through Derrida and beyond. What is real is phenomena. I only bring up physicality because you did, and I was surmising what you might think. Me? I am miles from this kind of naive thinking. C-fibres are themselves phenomenologically reducible to phenomena. — Astrophel

Ah. You are, on my account, not talking any sense in this passage. I would recommend perhaps reviewing your comments as you go through respond to my comments. They are directly related to your utterances, whcih you seem to deny throughout this quasi-review.

As this appears to be an (incredibly) inaccurate overview of what you've said in this exchange, I feel the need to step away. I really appreciate the time and effort you've put in - it's been a fun exchange. But at this stage, it would definitely be diminishing returns for both of us. And that's fine.

Another example of how you make faulty assertions. It seems like you have a tendency to claim that you are sure about things, when your professed certainty really has no foundation, or support of any kind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seem to arguing for the sake of it here. All i put forth was some good faith indication that I expect we are able to have productive discussions. If your response above is not facetious... Wth dude lol. But in terms of hte exchange, this is just more non-engagement.

Let me rephrase .. I hope we can have productive discussions elsewhere on TPF!

You seem to be arguing for no real reason.

Only in that the visionary was not in charge of making policy during his lifetime and is not in charge of making policy after he's dead. I.e. never. — Vera Mont

The point though, is that another visionary just takes up the idea, and actually takes charge of enacting policy.

Certainly, but I cannot call them benevolent. — Vera Mont

That's just your subjective opinion.

Sorry I can't respect them all equally. — Vera Mont

I know you can't. You make the blanket generalization of assuming that those who have visions, but do not move toward bringing their visions to policy are "good", and those visionaries who move toward enacting the policies are evil. So be it, you've expressed your opinion.

Let me rephrase .. I hope we can have productive discussions elsewhere on TPF! — AmadeusD

From how you've shown yourself in this thread I don't see that as likely. You need to actually address the things which another has said, and show your reasons for disagreement, instead of repeatedly asserting that the other's position is erroneous, absurd, etc., if you really want a productive discussion.

From how you've shown yourself in this thread I don't see that as likely. You need to actually address the things which another has said, and show your reasons for disagreement, instead of repeatedly asserting that the other's position is erroneous, absurd, etc., if you really want a productive discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Given that this is precisely antithetical to the exchange (which we can go back and read) I will assume that you're wrong, which gives me hope for my intention to do so :)

The point though, is that another visionary just takes up the idea, and actually takes charge of enacting policy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that is a point, howbeit unrelated to the comment I made. Another visionary takes an idea, or part of an idea, and incorporates it into his own agenda to enact a policy that bears little or no resemblance to the one the big-picture guy had in mind. That doesn't ever put the originator of a big picture vision into a position of directing his society, which is pretty much all I said.

You make the blanket generalization of assuming that those who have visions, but do not move toward bringing their visions to policy — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say 'do not move toward; I said they lacked the power.

are "good",

Nope, didn't say that, either. I didn't say all visionaries are good, only that the good ones are not in charge.

and those visionaries who move toward enacting the policies are evil.

Not 'move toward'; seize the power to do so, and yes, many of those are bad.
That's not what I wrote, but it often is the case in real life.

Are there things that aren’t immoral but you still shouldn’t want to be the kind of person that does them? — Captain Homicide

No. If you don't want to be the kind of person that does X, then by definition you deem X immoral. The reason people in our culture resist this fact is because we have a taboo against moral claims, a "dictatorship of relativism." The taboo is common on this forum as well.

It's an odd disease then, where how you act both gives you it and keeps it going. — fdrake

I would say that is correct. The OP is concerned with that which involves volition, i.e. things that people do. Alcoholism qua disease/illness does not involve volition, and you spell this out explicitly in your A2. Only alcohol qua volitional/culpable malady fits within the context of the OP.

For instance, one could be born an alcoholic, but this form of alcoholism would be irrelevant to the OP, for it is not something that one does. Thus not all alcoholism is volitional, but the non-volitional forms of alcoholism are irrelevant to the OP. The non-volitional form of alcoholism you specified would be much like Down syndrome, and this would also be irrelevant to the OP even though it be deemed undesirable.

Yep. Morals are emotional positions and nought else, on my view. Its a good idea to discuss them, and form groups of affinity. Some would very much enjoy seeing a woman 'engage' with her dog on a bus. It may be their optimal fantasy, in fact. — AmadeusD

Its interesting to see someone who makes such a claim as to the identity of moral concerns as being confined largely to emotional concerns. Which is peculiar in view of common views of morality which emphasize their independence from emotional concerns or how one may personally view a moral dictate. I.E. moral dictates are given strength to survive regardless of whether we all became rather heavily apathetic or that the emotional views that one might have on certain issues is irrelevant to their straight faced immorality or morality. I guess this is because morality and justice are so often seen as perfectly interwoven.

Its a question I've been concerned with for a while about the current climate of media induced desensitization to worldly suffering and our perceived moral opinion on it. Should one, if able or possible through whatever means, force themselves to be more emotional about a particular issue or any such intuitive moral issue that arises? Given that we desire to be moral. . . to be moral may require us to entertain a proper emotional reaction to a given event. . . so perhaps it follows that if we do not have such a reaction its almost tantamount to declaring it as having less moral weight.

If that is the case, how would one obviously react introspectively to themselves if every issue they were met with in their greater awareness was met by their apathy or indifference? Perhaps they would not or should not see themselves as moral as they desire to see themselves as and therefore their self-worth would be found lacking as they lack moral footing. Its not the best ego boost to realize, "I'm not a rather morally respectable Human being."

"I'm not a rather morally respectable Human being." — substantivalism

Respectable by whose lights? ;)

Respectable by whose lights? ;) — AmadeusD

Obviously, its by society. A mischievous fellow who follows your every move who transcended the plurality of the many to confine itself it to your head to critically examine every action or step taken. Perhaps with a gritty or dark monologue or two. Its obviously not you because the big "M", Morality, isn't owned by any one person?

If you don't want to be the kind of person that does X, then by definition you deem X immoral. — Leontiskos

Not everything in human physiology or psychology is divided on strictly moral grounds. Some things are just embarrassing, or show weakness, or present one in an unfavourable light. Overeating is not immoral and we who indulge in too much good food don't regard ourselves as sinners, but still don't like to be regarded as fat. Concern for one's health is not immoral, but people don't like to identify as hypochondriacs. There is nothing immoral about lax personal hygiene, but nobody likes to be called Pigpen.

There is nothing immoral about lax personal hygiene, but nobody likes to be called Pigpen. — Vera Mont

We tend to use the word "moral" to identify that which surpasses an arbitrary degree of harm. Because personal hygiene usually only effects a negligible level of harm, it is not deemed moral. Yet if bad personal hygiene surpassed a certain threshold, such as when it would cause others to become physically sick, it would then be deemed "immoral." There is no qualitative difference between minor and major degrees of bad personal hygiene, and therefore there is no precise philosophical distinction between the two. No sound moral philosophy makes arbitrary distinctions. Or in other words: the uncritical, every day use of this term is not robust or ultimately coherent, and this is why moral philosophy has never defined the genus of the moral in terms of the casual speech of contemporary culture.

Yet if bad personal hygiene surpassed a certain threshold, such as when it would cause others to become physically sick, it would then be deemed "immoral." — Leontiskos

Would it? I've not seen it mentioned in any code. How do we determine whether others are becoming sick as a direct consequence of one person's state of cleanliness? Is he making then sick deliberately, or is it simply that he lacks access to hygiene facilities? What if his mental condition is unequal to the required judgment?

No sound moral philosophy makes arbitrary distinctions. — Leontiskos

And this is an arbitrary distinction, which is why cleanliness may be next to godliness, but filthiness is not next to satanism.