This is why I said that it is very much like a programmer writing a language setting out how the language will operate so that it doesn't run into errors. — schopenhauer1
(5.5563)In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order.
Sure, but imagine if any other thinker said that he doesn't have to explain themselves any further.. — schopenhauer1
It just seems like a strange thing to NOT demand from a thinker trying to give you such a comprehensive take on the world. — schopenhauer1
... the second thing in which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.
(6.52)We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of
life remain completely untouched.
With the purpose of obtaining a one-substance cosmology ... — Process and Reality- A.N. Whitehead
But it does start with a generalization of Locke's account of mental operations. — Process and Reality- A.N. Whitehead
Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an internal intuition of space. — Kant- Critique of Pure Reason
we shall first give an exposition of the conception of space. — schopenhauer1
the representation of space must already exist as a foundation. — schopenhauer1
... this external experience is itself only possible through the said antecedent representation. — schopenhauer1
We just accept that these statements must be true without why, how, what for, etc. — schopenhauer1
Witt seems to want to say that “truth” is nothing more than a manner of situating things in the world based on what we perceive as logically possible. — 013zen
we are also incapable of knowing whether our picture is true or not — 013zen
(2.224)It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
(2.21)A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.
(2.223)In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
(4.05)Reality is compared with propositions.
(4.06)A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality.
Rather, it considered as possible a relation between them that wasn’t considered possible before. — 013zen
What leads you to say this? He does say:
It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false. — Fooloso4
Leibniz did present a 'universal character' suitable for a principle of sufficient reason to be up to the task of sorting out what things are. Or at least provide a ground for talking about the fundamental elements in a coherent way. — Paine
Wittgenstein is taking a step backwards. Regrouping after failed attempts. — Paine
What's the point of "objects" for Wittgenstein, if he already has "atomic facts" as the primary constituents of his language? — schopenhauer1
I'm sorry, none of this makes much sense and the only way to make sense of it is to "reach beyond what Wittgenstein provides" (to borrow your phrasing of objects :wink:). — schopenhauer1
Wittgenstein views objects of the "aboutness" of the atomic facts. That is to say, the atomic facts has to be about something (the substance of the world), and so he proposes an anemic metaphysics (objects), which is scarcely explained, but is considered sort of fundamental and brute and simple. — schopenhauer1
I don't think this is quite right. Remember, Wittgenstein gave clear examples of atomic sentences; they have to do with the underlying logic of propositions. Proposition are about something...an atomic fact is merely the underlying logical form of that "about" relation, as stated by the proposition. A Wittgensteinian object is a logical object, or rather, the manner in which its discussed is meant to show what he has in mind as his focus. — 013zen
Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot
be compound.
2.0211If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had
sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.
2.0212 It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true
or false).
2.022 It is clear that however dierent from the real one an imagined
world may be, it must have somethinga formin common
with the real world.
2.023 This xed form consists of the objects.
2.0231 The substance of the world can only determine a form and not
any material properties. For these are rst presented by the
propositionsrst formed by the conguration of the objects.
2.0232 Roughly speaking: objects are colourless. — Tractatus
But then why even bring up "Substance of the world" in relation to objects? This puts it in the metaphysical camp, not simply "logical object". Which is it? You seem to mix form (the relation of objects to predicates.. how they "hang together"), and the objects themselves. And perhaps Wittgenstein is doing the same. — schopenhauer1
To me that is a very anemic, yet present metaphysics in what he is conveying. — schopenhauer1
Remember, objects may be the “substance of the world”, but “the world” exists in logical space (1.13).
There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. Nowhere in the text does Wittgenstein say that objects form the substance of reality...its only ever tied to the world. — 013zen
This is even more perplexing then. — schopenhauer1
He is expressing his ideas, and as it turns out is reading and commenting on the ideas of others is philosophy. — 013zen
The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. — 013zen
(1)The world is all that is the case.
I don't think this distinction is correct. — Fooloso4
↪013zen And of course, doesn't all of this rely upon Wittgenstein's presupposition of what a "fact" is? — DifferentiatingEgg
Doesn't Wittgenstein himself later overturns the logic of the Tractatus once he realizes the inherent bias in his presupposition? — DifferentiatingEgg
What is the case is often subject to perspective.A fact, is what is the case. — 013zen
The idea that Witt had a distinct early and late period wherein he outrightly dismissed his previous work developed when there was still good reason to wonder if the work was "pro-positivistic"....which the PI clearly is not. — 013zen
Logical empiricism is a philosophic movement rather than a set of doctrines, and it flourished in the 1920s and 30s in several centers in Europe and in the 40s and 50s in the United States. It had several different leaders whose views changed considerably over time. Moreover, these thinkers differed from one another, often sharply. Because logical empiricism is here construed as a movement rather than as doctrine, there is probably no important position that all logical empiricists shared—including, surprisingly enough, empiricism. And while most participants in the movement were empiricists of one form or another, they disagreed on what the best form of empiricism was and on the cognitive status of empiricism. What held the group together was a common concern for scientific methodology and the important role that science could play in reshaping society. Within that scientific methodology the logical empiricists wanted to find a natural and important role for logic and mathematics and to find an understanding of philosophy according to which it was part of the scientific enterprise. — SEP, Logical Empiricism
PI is, I personally think, an attempt to say something similar but, in his own style, so to speak. While structurally, the works are very similiar, the manner in which the ideas are presented is clearly not only written for people like Russell and Frege. — 013zen
Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is—just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.
Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.
It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes. — ibid
What is the case is often subject to perspective. — DifferentiatingEgg
↪013zen See how facts change? — DifferentiatingEgg
Tractatus is positivism simply by the first few lines. — DifferentiatingEgg
If it's not positivism, defend how it's not with something other than a deflection? Show us how it's not. — DifferentiatingEgg
Between the world as pictures in the mind and reality as not made up of pictures in our mind. — Fooloso4
The relationship between a means of expression and what is shown by it is what is being discussed. — Paine
Wittgenstein speaks of language in the context of it doing something. — Paine
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.