I just don't see how targeted bombings constitute crimes against humanity. — BitconnectCarlos
There is no apartheid. — BitconnectCarlos
Palestinian kills Jew = Resistance. Jew kills Palestinian = war crime. — BitconnectCarlos
Well, hasn't that been the Palestinian/neighbor's strategy since pretty much day one? We're oppressed so we can invade, annihilate, murder/rape/kidnap our way to whatever we want? - And how's that been working for them? - The history, past and recent, is not-so-simple, and 7 Oct. (imo) set it to a violent boil, where (imo) it will remain until the hostages are returned/accounted for, and accountability imposed/acknowledged.Palestinian kills Jew = Resistance. Jew kills Palestinian = war crime.
— BitconnectCarlos
That's how it works when one party is oppressed and the other is oppressed. That has nothing to do with identity. — Benkei
Quite obviously there are limits to how resistance can be executed. 7 Oct was over the line. But as pointed out before: Be prepared for it to happen again and again and again until the underlying reasons for such attacks are dealt with. — Benkei
And the underlying reasons are Israeli crimes. Hamas and PLO didn't exist before the Israeli occupation. They are reactionary. — Benkei
That’s a possibility, sure, but I would need a more solid argument for the likelihood of something happening in a hypothetical or counterfactual scenario. For example, if Ukraine managed to join NATO, would still Putin attack NATO out of anger? I doubt it and, as far as geopolitical actors are concerned, they seem to doubt it too:
Again it’s about risks, probability.indeed, the reason for Ukraine to join NATO was to deter Putin from attacking Ukraine, otherwise what would be the point of joining NATO if Putin would attack anyway just out of anger?
Yes, he might have a trick or two up his sleeve.Putin may attack NATO out of a more hawkish calculus though to the extent NATO countries show lack of resolve (due to economic dependency) and/or fear for escalation (for lack of readiness and will to fight for allies).
This is a complicated claim, I’m not even sure it’s saying anything.First of all, my claim was: “the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too.”
I’ve already agreed that Trump is crazy and could upset the apple cart. He’s not really a representation of the U.S. position. He’s an anomaly and I doubt he will make it to the election with any chance of winning.Secondly, I argued that the conflict in Ukraine and in Palestine are straining Western public opinion and nurturing conflict of interests among allies, to the point that for example a US candidate for the next presidential elections like Trump dared to say “he would encourage Russia to attack Nato allies” if they do not comply with Trump’s demands.
Besides, I do not think EU governments and advisors are downplaying the gravity of such claims, or the US questionable commitment toward the Ukrainian conflict.
https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-nato-russia-attack-white-house-appalling-unhinged/32814229.html
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-nuclear-warfare-detterence-manfred-weber-vladimir-putin-ukraine-russia-war/
Poland's foreign minister on concerns the U.S. will abandon Ukraine, Europe (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jHxjutEfhww)
If you do not see that, again do not bother answering me.
That’s a non sequitur, I doubt that the fact that Ukraine is not now in NATO is due to squabbling between U.S. and EU.If it wasn’t a controversial issue between EU and US why didn’t Ukraine join EU and NATO yet?
When you say hegemonic powers here, specifically, are you referring to superpowers, at any point? Or are you just referring to hegemonic power players in the Middle East?I think you underestimate the strategic leverages of Middle East regional powers in the international equilibria, considering also the influence they have in the once called “Third World”. And, again, the closer hegemonic powers get in terms of capacity, the greater the impact of smaller powers can be over the power struggle between hegemonic powers.
You repeat this and I agree that there has been some political interference from Russia in these issues. But I don’t see this fatal weakness you keep alluding to in EU, or U.S.The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, will turn Europe into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.
You seem to be grounding your arguments mostly on possibilities, but that’s not enough to assess likelihood. Sure it could be just a malaise that the West will manage to overcome, but it is too soon to see in Western re-arming a new stable trend that will succeed in building collective strategic deterrence, despite all persisting conflict of interests. While the decline of the US deterrence and leadership has just kept notably growing since 9/11.
Desalination will never produce enough fresh water to replace depleted water tables. The quantities required are vast and desalination a trickle.Sure that doesn’t mean they are hopeless vis-à-vis with climate change:
https://www.watermeetsmoney.com/saudi-water-investment-showcase-at-the-global-water-summit/
There aren’t any Middle Eastern powers competing for regional hegemony. Yes there are people’s who hate other peoples in the region, or call for their eradication etc. But this is just heated rhetoric. Of the states in the region, some are wealthy and benefit from international commerce travel etc, these states want to hold onto their comfortable lifestyles. There are states with authoritarian leaders like Iran, Egypt and Syria who are struggling with poverty and keeping power and extravagant lifestyles for themselves and their friends. There are poor countries who just bump along the bottom. None of these countries want war, or hegemony.Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population
Yes, China does seek to work with many countries like this around the world. This is a risk to the west, because of what it could, but might not lead to.(https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/why-the-world-s-fastest-growing-populations-are-in-the-middle-east-and-africa/), plus the mediation of greater powers, like China, may also solicit greater cooperation among them to face shared future challenges, including the threats of a multipolar world like hawkish non-middle eastern hegemonic powers.
I see this more as a case of “my enemies enemy is my friend”, Russia likes to engage in these ways. But has its own fears of Islamophobia and terrorist attacks in Russia.It depends if China and Russia perceive Islam as a greater threat than the West. So far it doesn’t seem to be the case, given the support/cooperation China and Russia grant to Iran (the only country in which the islamic revolution thus far succeeded), Hezbollah, Houthi and Hamas.
Agreed, with the added emphasis that Putin has hegemonic designs on neighbouring countries and is actively invading them.Clearly mine is just a speculation. But a principled one because I take into account strategic logic of geopolitical players and historical circumstances to assess likelihood. And the conclusion is that we have reasons to worry about how things may evolve in Ukraine but also in the Middle East given the current predicament.
Close, I’m insisting on the importance of U.S. EU coalition and cooperation to counter China (this requires the neutering of Russia) and observing a change in EU to re-arm, which will deliver it.Your argument seems mostly about downplaying the evidence I bring, insisting on the need for the US to have a strong EU to counter Russia and China, insisting on the fact of European re-arming, and on the incumbent crisis in the Middle East due to climate change.
As I say, I don’t seek to downplay this evidence. I just don’t find it evidence of important geopolitical developments at this time. (I’m happy to explain why if you remind me of some of it)What I counter is:
1. Downplaying the evidence I bring is rather pointless since what matters is to what extent geopolitical actors take such evidence seriously and act upon it. If Middle East wasn’t important to the US, the US wouldn’t engage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the expense of the conflict in Ukraine.
You refer to Trump again, yes a Trump presidency might well try to go down such a course. It’s madness of course, a fools errand. Even if Trump does win a second term in office, it is an anomaly in U.S. foreign policy, which will be corrected after he has left office.2. Insisting that the US needs something doesn’t imply it will get it. Besides the pivot to China, may lead the US to appease Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in Europe to turn Russia against China (which is the raising power, geographically closer to Russia than the US), as argued by various political analysts including Mearsheimer. Indeed, Trump's approach to Russia can be in line with such view (https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/24/donald-trump-s-plan-to-play-russia-against-china-is-fool-s-errand-pub-70067). Russia’s appeasement in Europe on the other side may be costly for EU/NATO/Ukraine, and also turn more destabilising than the US may tolerate (if not to Trump’s administration, to post-Trump’s administrations) , soliciting a hegemonic competition in Europe.
I only need to refer to one event which in a moment changed the course of EU foreign policy. On the day of the invasion of Ukraine, Putin threatened the EU with nuclear attack, while invading a large country on its border. Putin’s legacy.3. European re-arming is a recent phenomenon so it doesn't help much to assess the future and effectiveness of the collective European defence strategy (considering various strategic factors like defence industry, conscription, nuclear, etc.) given its controversial costs
This is often exaggerated and refers to a populist reaction to levels of immigration.for a population vulnerable to populist rhetoric
Lol.(and often pro-Russian)
Climate change will result in oil becoming a stranded asset. Also these countries may become dependent on food imports, when the desert cooks.4. Climate change is definitely an incumbent challenge that concerns the entire world, and Middle East governments are aware of its risks and urgency, especially due to how exposed they are. That doesn’t mean they are doomed to succumb to a climate crisis or to geopolitical irrelevance, given how pro-actively and effectively they are already acting wrt climate change and evolving geopolitical challenges.
The likely reason is just why Kuwait wasn't going to be let to be annexed by Iraq. This would change dramatically the power balance even globally. Do note just how big the opposing alliance was against Iraq, it had even Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Pakistan taking part in the alliance. Hence it's likely that if a small nation with geostrategic importance, it won't be overlooked. (However if some Senegal wants to take Gambia, likely an international alliance to defend Gambia won't emerge. If done eloquently and peacefully, a Senegambia could easily happen.)Clearly there are some smallish nations that exist throughout the centuries, but I see no reason why that would be the case for the Gulf States when they are surrounded by two vastly larger states, and sitting on immensely valuable strategic resources. — Tzeentch
And I would be extremely sceptical about historical trends. Especially in the near term (the next 50 to 100 years). As the saying goes, history never repeats, it just rhymes.History has followed that pattern multiple times over, so there is a clear historical trend that points in this direction - that doesn't make it a certainty, sure. — Tzeentch
The likely reason is just why Kuwait wasn't going to be let to be annexed by Iraq. — ssu
What I hope we can agree on is that if the US truly withdraws from the region, there will be a reshuffling of the cards certainly. That vacuum creates by itself a little whirlpools automatically. In fact, some could argue that whirlpool has already started as the US allies don't toe the line in similar fashion with the US as earlier. — ssu
That’s a possibility, sure, but I would need a more solid argument for the likelihood of something happening in a hypothetical or counterfactual scenario. For example, if Ukraine managed to join NATO, would still Putin attack NATO out of anger? I doubt it and, as far as geopolitical actors are concerned, they seem to doubt it too:
↪neomac
People doubted he would invade a large country like Ukraine too. It’s a risk, we are talking about risks here. — Punshhh
indeed, the reason for Ukraine to join NATO was to deter Putin from attacking Ukraine, otherwise what would be the point of joining NATO if Putin would attack anyway just out of anger?
Again it’s about risks, probability. — Punshhh
Possibilities and risks are all we’ve got in a discussion like this. Yes there has been a decline in U.S. deterrence. This is probably the shift from the unipole to the competing superpowers we see now. — Punshhh
First of all, my claim was: “the more the European strategic interest diverges from the US national interest and the European partnership turns unexploitable by the US, the more the US may be compelled to make Europe unexploitable to its hegemonic competitors too.”
This is a complicated claim, I’m not even sure it’s saying anything.
Surely by helping EU and forming a stronger alliance with them. the U.S. would be making Europe unexploitable to its competitors. By contrast why would U.S. make EU unexploitable to herself and her competitors? — Punshhh
I’ve already agreed that Trump is crazy and could upset the apple cart. He’s not really a representation of the U.S. position. He’s an anomaly and I doubt he will make it to the election with any chance of winning. — Punshhh
If it wasn’t a controversial issue between EU and US why didn’t Ukraine join EU and NATO yet?
That’s a non sequitur, I doubt that the fact that Ukraine is not now in NATO is due to squabbling between U.S. and EU. — Punshhh
I think you underestimate the strategic leverages of Middle East regional powers in the international equilibria, considering also the influence they have in the once called “Third World”. And, again, the closer hegemonic powers get in terms of capacity, the greater the impact of smaller powers can be over the power struggle between hegemonic powers.
When you say hegemonic powers here, specifically, are you referring to superpowers, at any point? Or are you just referring to hegemonic power players in the Middle East? — Punshhh
Can you point to a regional power who is in a strong position to influence international equilibria, or a coalition perhaps? — Punshhh
The point is that the combination of persisting EU vulnerabilities plus incumbent weakening of the US leadership, will turn Europe into a more disputable area for hegemonic competition among the US and other rival hegemonic powers, and this could threaten both NATO and EU project.
You repeat this and I agree that there has been some political interference from Russia in these issues. But I don’t see this fatal weakness you keep alluding to in EU, or U.S. — Punshhh
It’s true there has been a complacency in Europe in becoming involved with Russia in various ways since the collapse of USSR. But the Ukraine war has been a big wake up call and this will be corrected. Likewise in U.S., although the political problems in U.S. recently are due more to populist opportunism and hopefully it will be a wake up call there too. — Punshhh
Sure that doesn’t mean they are hopeless vis-à-vis with climate change:
https://www.watermeetsmoney.com/saudi-water-investment-showcase-at-the-global-water-summit/
Desalination will never produce enough fresh water to replace depleted water tables. The quantities required are vast and desalination a trickle. — Punshhh
Besides, even though they compete for regional hegemony, yet the most acute and local problems they have to face coming from Islamism, environmental challenges, growing population
There aren’t any Middle Eastern powers competing for regional hegemony. — Punshhh
It depends if China and Russia perceive Islam as a greater threat than the West. So far it doesn’t seem to be the case, given the support/cooperation China and Russia grant to Iran (the only country in which the islamic revolution thus far succeeded), Hezbollah, Houthi and Hamas.
I see this more as a case of “my enemies enemy is my friend”, Russia likes to engage in these ways. — Punshhh
I don’t seek to downplay what you bring to the table, I just don’t find the suggestions that there are big geopolitical risks in the Middle East compelling. Or that there is not a big geopolitical risk in Ukraine compelling. — Punshhh
1. Downplaying the evidence I bring is rather pointless since what matters is to what extent geopolitical actors take such evidence seriously and act upon it. If Middle East wasn’t important to the US, the US wouldn’t engage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the expense of the conflict in Ukraine.
As I say, I don’t seek to downplay this evidence. I just don’t find it evidence of importance geopolitical developments at this time. (I’m happy to explain why if you remind me of some of it) — Punshhh
You refer to Trump again, yes a Trump presidency might well try to go down such a course. It’s madness of course, a fools errand. Even if Trump does win a second term in office, it is an anomaly in U.S. foreign policy, which will be corrected after he has left office. — Punshhh
for a population vulnerable to populist rhetoric
This is often exaggerated and refers to a populist reaction to levels of immigration.
(and often pro-Russian)
Lol. — Punshhh
It comes down to control/power/hegemony over the holy land. It is the existence of Israel (i.e. an independent Jewish polity) that is the crime. — BitconnectCarlos
The crime, in their eyes, is that such land was taken from them by a coloniser (the British) to be promised to another coloniser (zionist Jews, later Israël). — Benkei
I'm sorry if you think Jewish autonomy in Palestine is unjust — BitconnectCarlos
You flatter me; I don't know enough to be a zionfascist apologist. But there does appear to be here a consistent representation that Gazans are simply innocent victims and responsibility-free. And if that be true, then who has been attacking Israel and Jews by thought, word, and deed for most of a century and more? The current situation is admittedly intolerable; no sensible person denies it. But that claim alone gets everyone nowhere, because the intolerable is happening and has been happening, and depending upon your sensibilities, has been happening for a long time....., tim wood..., zionfascist apologist — 180 Proof
Yes, that's why i linked you and others to this video on 'the history' of Israeli oppression of Gazans et al.I don't know enough ... — tim wood
Strawman, of course. 'Collective punishment' (e.g. domicide¹) and 'disproportionate retaliatory slaughter' of a several decades-long captive population for "October 7th" by (US client-state) Israel are, at least, ongoing war crimes.... representation that Gazans are simply innocent victims and responsibility-free.
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