and it is hard to say that such things are any less subjective than food — jasonm
every now and then certain people 'serve up' ethical behaviour that is 'rancid.' — jasonm
Such behaviour would then be far less subjective than what such camps would like to admit. — jasonm
But practically speaking, we live in herds and interact with other decision makers, and there are limited burgers, and we all agree that society, with its trading and divisions of labor, is beneficial
We have to assume an objective, mind independent group of herding animals called “other persons with other minds” exists in order to construct some form of ethical line, like “stealing money is OK but stealing a child’s life through murder is NOT OK,” and we have to interact with the other herd members to bump into these lines and seek enforcement of these lines by saying “no, stop it” or “yes, do it.”
This also applies to human behaviour as well; every now and then certain people 'serve up' ethical behaviour that is 'rancid.' Then it isn't just certain sensibilities that this irritates, but rather it is behaviour which makes almost all of us 'sick.'
Such behaviour would then be far less subjective than what such camps would like to admit.
Would you agree? — jasonm
The analogy works on two levels then. That certain acts seem almost universally morally offensive would seem to point to tastes grounded in human nature. These tastes aren't uncaused, there is a reason for them. That reason seems to be tied to the human good. — Count Timothy von Icarus
All too often in modern philosophy there is a tendency to think that if a relationship is dynamic and difficult to formalize it simply cannot exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The differences exist in a dynamic range of contexts, but that doesn't mean there are no differences. — Count Timothy von Icarus
To give this some application: murder is wrong, means: after running around with the other sheep watching this one kill that one, and this one die and that one live on, and after living myself so I can judge this myself, I propose a rule that murder is wrong, that each of us equally enjoys life more than death, and each of us has no individual right to take another one’s life.
However, with food, every now and then someone serves up something that is rancid. In such cases, we are no longer talking about different combinations of taste buds or brain chemicals - such food is almost universally foul to almost anyone's taste buds. — jasonm
I would also like to ask, how would you go about determining what is the "human good" which grounds our morality? — Max2
Finally, in terms of metaethics, is this a subjectivist or an objectivist position on the reality of moral claims? — Max2
would different types of creatures have different "ethics" due to plausibly having their own good that is distinct from the human good? — Max2
If you existed alone on a desert island there would be no need for ethics - every decision would be to determine the burger or the other burger ethically — Fire Ologist
Hilarious and flippant, but no.I have heard the argument before: moral principles are simply an emotional reaction - just a sophisticated 'grunt' toward certain behaviours, all without having any real logical basis in itself.
I have a different answer - I liken it to cooking; in terms of what 'tastes good,' or 'tastes bad,' there are a range of possibilities. For instance, someone could literally find that a 'Big Mac' tastes better than a burger from 'Five Guys' - even though people generally prefer Five Guys to McDonald's - maybe even something like 10 to 1. This is simply a relationship between things like permutations of taste buds, or the release of brain chemicals that makes one 'prefer' McDonald's to Five Guys - or vice versa. — jasonm
Not at all. Again, morality is objective. I am not saying I know the right answers about every moral question, but it is my assertion that there is always a singular right answer.In the same vein, whether abortion or euthanasia is right has a range of possible answers, and it is hard to say that such things are any less subjective than food, and might depend on things like brain chemistry as well. — jasonm
This is a horrendous and laughable way to treat morality.However, with food, every now and then someone serves up something that is rancid. In such cases, we are no longer talking about different combinations of taste buds or brain chemicals - such food is almost universally foul to almost anyone's taste buds. — jasonm
You make no sense.This also applies to human behaviour as well; every now and then certain people 'serve up' ethical behaviour that is 'rancid.' Then it isn't just certain sensibilities that this irritates, but rather it is behaviour which makes almost all of us 'sick.' — jasonm
Precisely. That is because subjective morality as a belief system is wishful thinking that is immoral.Such behaviour would then be far less subjective than what such camps would like to admit. — jasonm
Rather than frame morality in terms of principles, I think it more productive to think in terms of moral deliberation. We are in the realm of opinion, not absolutes or truths handed down from a higher authority. In the absence of such authority morals are by default relative and subjective. This does not mean that distinctions between right and wrong or good and bad cannot be made, but that we must critically evaluate and defend such opinions in an attempt to determine and do what seems best, while also recognizing that about certain things we may be wrong or that there may be others who hold defensible opinions that differ from our own. — Fooloso4
Silghtly off-topic I suppose, but I've found these sorts of Aristotelian "human good" accounts of morality, which I take you to be espousing, to be persuasive recently so I would like to ask whether you have made some posts previously elaborating and maybe formalizing these views to any larger extent? If not, are there any resources you would recommend for seeking out these views - both their proponents and critics?
Aristotle defines the human good in terms of the Greek term "eudaimonia." This term has been famously difficult to translate, corresponding to some blend of the English terms "happiness," "flourishing," and "well-being." Given the difficulties in defining this term, it may be helpful to first investigate what eudaimonia is not.
In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that pleasure, honor, and virtue are not equivalent to eudaimonia. Rather, these three are subordinate means of achieving eudaimonia, in the same way that “bridle making… [is] subordinate to horsemanship.”1 They are “lower ends… pursued for the sake of the higher,” i.e., eudaimonia.2
Aristotle calls the life spent pursuing pleasure “completely slavish… a life for grazing animals.”3 Pleasure is a “good of the body,” while eudaimonia is a “good of the soul,” unique to man because it requires reason.4 Pleasure is temporary, while eudaimonia must be measured across a lifetime.”*5 While “a truly good… person… will bear the strokes of fortune suitably,” a hedonist will fall into misery if their fortunes change.6 Neither is eudaimonia equivalent to honor. Those who seek honor wish to be honored for being virtuous. Thus, “in their view… virtue is superior [to honor].”7 Virtue cannot be equivalent with eudaimonia either, for one may be virtuous, yet still “suffer the worst evils and misfortunes.”8
Having said what eudaimonia is not, let us now turn to what it is. Eudaimonia is a self-sufficient cause for action, admitting no ancillary considerations. “Honor, pleasure… and every virtue we certainly choose because of themselves… but we also choose them… [so that] we shall [achieve eudaimonia ] .”9 However, “we always choose [ eudaimonia] because of itself, never for the sake of something else.”10 Other candidates for "the human good," (e.g. virtue, pleasure, etc.) cannot be equivalent to eudaimonia if what is true of eudaimonia is not true of them.
For Aristotle, eudaimonia is “activity of the soul in accord with virtue.”11 It is the development of what is unique to man: reason. Excellence in reason allows man to make good choices and turn his desires towards good aims. Virtue is a “necessary condition for eudaimonia ,” while honor and pleasure may be “cooperative instruments” that aid eudaimonia, but they are not eudaimonia itself. 12 We praise honor and justice, which bring eudaimonia about, but instead celebrate eudaimonia , as it is the greatest good we hope to achieve.13
What sort of life then best fulfills man's unique telos? This would be the life of theôria or "contemplation."14 For it is the contemplation of truth that is "best," and "the pleasantest of the virtuous activities."15 Further, it is theôria that is most unique to man as the "rational animal," and thus most indicative of man's telos. Such a life is also preferable because it is reason that is the most "divine" characteristic of man. Pursuit of reason is what allows us "to make ourselves divine" "as far as we can," and "live in accordance with the best thing in us."16 That said, Aristotle allows that other forms of life can nevertheless result in eudaimonia, it will just not be the highest form of it. **
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*For Aristotle, happiness might even be judged beyond a lifetime, involving what happens to one’s descendants, i.e. Solon's pronouncement that we must "count no man happy until the end is known."
** In Book X, it seems we can see more of Plato's influence on Aristotle; this corresponds more with the Phaedo.
1 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Book I, Chapter I § 4.
2 Ibid. Book I, Chapter I § 4
3 Ibid. Book I, Chapter V, § 3
4 Ibid. Book I, Chapter VII, § 2-3
5 Ibid. Book I, Chapter VII, § 5
6 Ibid. Book I, Chapter VII, § 5
7 Ibid. Book I, Chapter V, § 6
8 Ibid. Book I, Chapter VII, § 5
9 Ibid. Book I, Chapter VII, § 5
10 Ibid. Book I, Chapter IX, § 7
^11^Ibid. Book I, Chapter IX, § 7
^12^Ibid. Book I, Chapter IX, § 7
^13^Ibid. Book I, Chapter XII § 4
14 Ibid. Book X, Chapter 7 § 1
15 Ibid. Book X, Chapter 7 § 2
16 Ibid. Book X, Chapter 7 § 3
17 Ibid. Book X, Chapter 8 § 1
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Aristotle's arguement that the virtues are more similar to crafts than natural faculties (e.g. sight) hinges on how we come to possess the virtues. For Aristotle, the virtues are a type of habit. For instance, if we are generous, this means that we are in the habit of acting generously. Such habits can be ingrained in an individual through repeated action. Natural properties of objects can not be "trained" in this way. For example, Aristotle notes that it is not possible to train a rock into having the propensity to fall upwards simply by throwing it upwards repeatedly. Since nothing in nature can be trained to act against its nature, Aristotle concludes that the virtues are neither contrary to human nature, nor a product of it.
For Aristotle, one can become more brave by acting bravely in perilous situations and habituating oneself to overcoming fear. That is, we develop the virtue by practicing it. This is not the case for natural faculties. For example, we do not come to see or hear by often engaging in the acts of seeing or hearing. Rather, we see and hear by nature, and doing more seeing or hearing neither improves nor degrades either faculty.
By contrast, we do seem to learn the virtues in the same way we learn crafts. For example, a man learns to build houses by participating in the act of building houses in the same way that a man can learn to be prudent by regularly taking time to carefully assess situations before forming a judgement about them. Likewise, crafts can be taught, and it also seems possible to teach the virtues.
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Aristotle uses the concepts of the continent and incontinent person to develop a distinction in the ways people end up pursuing vices. Some people do not believe that their vices are immoral. Perhaps they were raised in a bad environment and have come to see cheating as a proper means to an end, or to see licentiousness and gluttony as natural routes to the "good life" of pleasure. These people do not perform their vices because they lack constraint, rather they do so because they have bad habits and believe engaging in vice to be proper behavior.
By contrast, the incontinent person knows their vices as vices. They will acknowledge that their sloth or gluttony is bad, and yet they are unable to exercise the self-control required to stop themselves from engaging in these vices. The incontinent person might even attempt to develop virtue, overcoming small temptations, and yet continually fail to overcome large ones - the triumph of appetite and passion over reason and virtue.
A continent person then, is one who is tempted by vice, but who acts in accordance with virtue and reason instead. They are not perfectly virtuous, for the person who is perfect in virtue enjoys being virtuous, but neither do they give in to vice. In the virtuous person, desire, reason, and action are in harmony, while in the continent person there is disharmony between desire on the one hand and reason and virtue on the other.
Aristotle notes that of these types, the incontinent person is the hardest to help. For the person raised in vice might reform if shown what is good, but the incontinent person already knows what is good and fails to do it.
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It's interesting to contrast Aristotle's view with that of modern thinkers who would have it that virtue lies precisely in following moral laws even when we don't desire to follow them. Afterall, where is the sacrifice or effort on our behalf if we are simply doing what we like?
I suppose the disagreement here probably lies in how virtue is defined. If virtue is those dispositions and skills needed to live a good life, then it would seem obvious that it is beneficial to enjoy doing what is good. However, if virtue is the ability to follow moral laws, then it seems like being able to override desire is more important than having right desires.
I tend to come down more with Aristotle. The good, meaningful life seems to entail freedom. One is freer if they do what they want than if they have to constantly wage war against themselves (e.g. St. Paul in Romans 7). I happened to come across a great line on this reading the Penguin Selected Works of Meister Eckhart last night: "[the just] person is free, and the closer they are to justice, the more they become freedom itself... For nothing created is free. As long as there is something above me which is not God, I am oppressed by it..." (German Sermon 3 on John 15:16)
No! You are spot on. Freedom is just another word for chaos and desire. So then, the only question and I do mean only in this case, is, can it ever be that all desire is moral? I think this is low hanging fruit, obvious, and deeply obvious, all at the same time. This answer has a lot of resonance.To reframe this to see if I am getting it right this would be something like: "I find all these murders unpleasant, you all do too. So let's not murder."
But then this seems to circle back to individuals' desires, or am I missing something? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Progress along the desire axis IS NOT NECESSARILY progress along the good axis. The question IS properly answered. Is there understanding though? What force is needed to push the result, the consequences, of choices, into the good direction? More anger and more fear are always the only right answer.What do we say to the sheep who says, "I personally enjoy the murders. Why should I follow this rule?" That is, what is the answer to the nihilists' question: "why is bumping bad?" — Count Timothy von Icarus
No, not at all. The answer is an equation, a law of the universe, the GOOD, perfection, and its many ramifications if it is properly considered.Is the answer "because that's what makes the most sheep happy?" But then why is this good? We could be like Nietzsche and denigrate the herd. Is the answer in human nature? — Count Timothy von Icarus
This statement is dangerous. Notice how in Plotinus' case he mentions intellect which is fear. He mentions being, which is anger. And he places the GOOD as transcendant. But since desire is not mentioned the risk is run that the immoral elements of desire are not properly treated by his far weaker model. If desire is not simply held as synonymous with the GOOD, the model is ... BETTER.I guess an example for contrast might be helpful. Consider Plotinus. The Good is the first principle above intellect, the first principle responsible for (although transcending) being. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is a very weak statement. It has some elements of truth to it. And its a warm fuzzy, so people like to glom on to it. But it partakes of the same error as Plotinus' dangerous model. It venerates desire at the expense of fear and anger.A sunset's goodness and beauty are according to its participation in being, rather than anything related to individuals. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Exactly! Aristotle is much more correct.Or we could consider Aristotle. There is a human telos, but rather than it simply being the ground for our preferences, it is also defines the perfection/actuality of a human life. Actuality is better than potentiality, so the life of theoria is higher (more divine), a greater actualization of freedom and purpose. However, this would remain true even if we had a horrible society, maybe something like A Brave New World, where no one agrees with this claim, because it isn't grounded in the individual(s). That is, what the sheep are currently saying doesn't determine the good. It's possible we could have a bunch of very vice addled sheep after all. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is true, but, it avoids some of the point.By contrast, even the Kantian deontology seems to me to be grounded in the individual. The unconditional good is the good will of the individual, acting in accordance with rationality. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is not true.There is an overlap with the earlier, dominant tradition in that there, good behavior is also in accord with reason, but there is a strange flip where it is no longer necessarily the case that being good is good for you. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, this is the flip side of the ideas that I am discussing. It is a great Pragmatists point of view towards all of these things, pesky moral questions, and living. That is be afraid when you do not desire something at all. And want more from your ideals than just a sense of duty. I like it.Indeed, you sort of end up in a place where you're most praiseworthy when you are doing things you hate out of a sense of duty, which IMO is an indication that we sheep have begun stumbling down the wrong path. — Count Timothy von Icarus
In terms of going deeper, Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue is one of the more influential works comparing the classical/medieval tradition and modern ethics. His thesis is that most modern moral discourse is not truly reasoned, but emotive and rationalized after the fact. That means that systems that appear to have rational principles are in fact voluntaristic frameworks disguised as rational. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That means that systems that appear to have rational principles are in fact voluntaristic frameworks disguised as rational.
— Count Timothy von Icarus
I've generally suspected that most, if not all philosophy or theory, is rationalisation after emotion. — Tom Storm
. Sure, like Chimpanzees, there was likely occasional reactions to feelings which drove a human to act aggressively, and even kill. And while members of the group might alienate the "killer" this would have to have been an instinct or drive based on other feelings (which now we might label "disgust" "contempt" or "fear" based feelings — ENOAH
This progress doesn’t get us closer and closer to the way things ‘really are’, it just gets us fresher and farther from who we used to be. And it also opens up increasingly intimate and peaceful ways of understanding each other that I believe will eventually allow us to jettison our blame-based moralisms. — Joshs
Have you read any Damasio? — Joshs
Supposedly, feeling is dumb, instinctive drive opposing itself to the ‘higher’ mental processes of rational cognition. — Joshs
The ‘affective turn’ argues that feeling is the organizing basis of cognition, not as source of mindless reinforcement , but as intextricably intertwined with cognition. — Joshs
Affect doesn’t determine the relevance and significance of those goals mindlessly, but by informing us about our relative success or failure in achieving our norm-driven goals. — Joshs
Language skills allow us to add layers of tremendous complexity to social structures, giving the impression that human morality is qualitatively different than social cooperation in animals — Joshs
For you and many others on this forum, morality is linked to a world with objectively determinable features, even if our pursuit of those objective truths can only ever be asymptotically achieved. — Joshs
Hmm. I'm saying this smiling, but had you not told me what my position is (and I accept I may have inadvertently expressed it thar way); had you simply presented me with those views, I would jump at the latter and reject the former (unless I'm not quite sure how you mean asymptotically achieved(?) Is that because of my reference to the "gap"? Did I reference gap? Maybe not)For me, the progress of human cognition is the continual remaking of a niche, which is the only world we will ever know. This progress doesn’t get us closer and closer to the way things ‘really are’, it just gets us fresher and farther from who we used to be — Joshs
And it also opens up increasingly intimate and peaceful ways of understanding each other that I believe will eventually allow us to jettison our blame-based moralisms. — Joshs
How would one demonstrate that virtue, in the context of such venerable system building, is an exception?
It is important to note that I am not claiming that Aristotelian moral theory is able to exhibit its rational superiority in terms that would be acceptable to the protagonists of the dominant post-Enlightenment moral
philosophies, so that in theoretical contests in the arenas of modernity, Aristotelians might be able to defeat Kantians, utilitarians, and contractarians. Not only is this evidently not so, but in those same arenas Aristotelianism is bound to appear and does appear as just one more type
of moral theory, one whose protagonists have as much and as little hope of defeating their rivals as do utilitarians, Kantians, or contractarians.
I've generally suspected that most, if not all philosophy or theory, is rationalisation after emotion.
Is MacIntyre's advocacy of a coherent moral framework (essentially by way of Aristotle), not just an example of that which pleases him emotionally or aesthetically? It also seems to be an appeal to tradition.
I have generally assumed that one can be a virtuous serial killer if one values excellence in a slightly different way to usual intersubjective custom. But is this difference an indication of flawed reasoning, or simply a different way of constructing values? What makes a value immutable?
MacIntyre suggests meta goods that one can observe vis-á-vis the "good life": "the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is.” The virtues are those qualities/habits that “achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.” — Count Timothy von Icarus
A person who is ruled over by appetites and passions cannot transcend their current beliefs and desires; their actions are determined by a mere part of themselves. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But I think you will have a problem explaining how it is the natural philosophy eventually gave us penicillin, air planes, and cars. If all theory is just following emotions, why should the tools of reason appear to work so much better than simply doing what one prefers? — Count Timothy von Icarus
But looking for "what is necessary for the 'good life' in all contexts," is already moving away from MacIntyre's more poignant criticism of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment era ethics. The more important question would seem to be: "in what context is the good life for man best achieved." This is sort of (in a vague way) like the difference between trying to find the optimal point on a social welfare function and trying to find the input conditions that produce the best possible social welfare function (i.e. finding the utility maximizing point on some single line versus figuring out which inputs create the lines with the highest peaks.) — Count Timothy von Icarus
It doesn't seem that value should have to be immutable to be objective, grounded in something outside emotion, or subject to rational understanding. From the classical view, it seems like what we generally term value has to relate to relative good. What would be immutable is the Good which mutable things participate in. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I'll respond to the rest later, but it's worth pointing out that that cocoon interest in Thomism, and his conversion to Catholicism, come after the publication of After Virtue. — Count Timothy von Icarus
His religious conversion then seems to follow from the shift in philosophical beliefs, or at least being concurrent with it, rather than him writing After Virtue as a sort of apology for beliefs he has always held. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Indeed, a flaw in After Virtue, at least from my perspective, is that it fails to adequately account for how metaphysics and epistemology are essential to ethics in the classical/Christian tradition, and this seems to be because he embraces the ethics without having yet come around on the metaphysics. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This kind of frame seems circular.
Perhaps, but I'm not certain if this is true or how common it is for anyone to transcend their beliefs and desires, regardless of passions.
Is it not the case that humans find results emotionally satisfying? One reason people embrace scientism might be the notion that only science, with continual demonstration of its effectiveness, can provide us with reliable knowledge about reality. You can see how emotionally satisfying this might be.
I am fine with people engaging in discourse and making agreements about what they think society should do and what is best pragmatically in certain situations. But one mustn't mistake this for absolute truth. It's just an ongoing and evolving conversation and the source of morality therein lies within human society and its evolving beliefs and practices rather than in any external, objective or 'perfect' reality.
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