and it is hard to say that such things are any less subjective than food — jasonm

That is where people who believe in the objective reality of morals come in.

every now and then certain people 'serve up' ethical behaviour that is 'rancid.' — jasonm

The issue is that food does not work as an analogy to morals. In ethics, a course of action is judged based on at least its consequences and the consequences of doing otherwise, not whether our gastric apparatus is equipped to digest wood or rotten fish. It seems no matter how rancid an action might be, we can always summon something more-rancid to happen if we don't take the action, which is when rancid becomes acceptable.

Interesting analogy which may or may not withstand further investigation.

I would like to point out that the OP is titled "All Ethics are Relative" but it is actually unclear from the post how exactly this conclusion - if it is the one the OP wanted to draw - follows from what is said. You seem to be pointing out a possibly plausible explanation grounded in biological/neurochemical facts for why people take certain stances on so-called ethical questions (such as the abortion debate). In other words, one might ask how does there being a naturalistic explanation for our ethical behavior imply that matters of ethics are relative in the normative sense (given that most people seems to already grant that ethics are relative in the descriptive sense). I am sure most naturalist realists - and probably even most non-naturalists - would grant this premise and yet still hold that there are objective moral facts.

Perhaps one could argue that given the existence of a naturalistic explanation for our ethical behavior, it would be surprising that there are additionally objective moral facts that go with these behaviors but this is a further argument in need of a defense of its own.

Of course ethical standards are relative to the principles they are conceived to serve.
There is nothing irrational about that, since ethics are about how one individual relates to others in his or her sphere of influence.
Every society has a central core of values and beliefs to which every member is expected to subscribe and contribute. Ethical behaviour consists of actions that uphold the society's values and support the society's belief system.

Such behaviour would then be far less subjective than what such camps would like to admit. — jasonm

It may be an objective fact that everyone hates murder. But this is no more objective than a fact of one person liking murder. So I don't see how anything is being made less subjective in your comparison. All that it suggests is that there is something in common in human brain functioning that leads them to agree on something.

So Five Guys versus McD’s is like yes or no to abortion, euthanasia, maybe lying, maybe stealing, maybe bullying, etc. - the more debatable, culturally transient ethical situations.

AND, rancid food is like raping children, torture and murder of the weak and innocent - just the most heinous things one could think of.

If that is correct you are saying that certain ethics are objective, like rancid food is always just bad.

Hence the quotation marks around the title I suppose.

I believe that there are ethical lines carved in stone for we conscience-bearing creatures to find and choose to cross or not. We make up our own rules, yes, but we don’t only make them up from our own heads in a box - we make them together as a group, sharing lines between me and you, and you, and that one, and that other one..

If you existed alone on a desert island there would be no need for ethics - every decision would be to determine the burger or the other burger ethically (unless you believed your life was not your own and God was with you and interested in your life and the choices as well).

Philosophy has put us all in mental boxes, unable to prove even the presence, let alone truth, of some sort of objective mind-independent reality.

But practically speaking, we live in herds and interact with other decision makers, and there are limited burgers, and we all agree that society, with its trading and divisions of labor, is beneficial.

Ethics assumes other people, other creatures exist with us in our heads as we are in their heads. We don’t get to decide whether to kill another person is right or wrong without another person to kill, and a third person who might agree or not with the killing or not, with whom we have to live with and who has to live with us after we’ve killed or not.

So the line that creates rancid food, the “always bad” objective morality that is out in the world, doesn’t form until the world of ethics forms which is the human, personal herd.

We have to assume an objective, mind independent group of herding animals called “other persons with other minds” exists in order to construct some form of ethical line, like “stealing money is OK but stealing a child’s life through murder is NOT OK,” and we have to interact with the other herd members to bump into these lines and seek enforcement of these lines by saying “no, stop it” or “yes, do it.”

Ethics has to have an objective world we live in together for ethics to exist in the first place.

I think it's a good analogy in some respects.

Two things worth pointing out:

1. That people differ in their opinions is as true for what are generally taken to be "is facts" as it is for "ought facts." For instance, you can find plenty of people who continue to argue that the Earth is not roughly spherical, but rather flat, or that its surface rests on the inside of a sphere with the Sun and Moon at its center. Similarly, if you spend any time on mathematics forums you will invariably come across people arguing that division by zero should be equal to infinity. We could also consider the endless Facebook debates about simple arithmetic with ambiguous notation and confusion over whether PEMDAS is supposed to work in the order of the acronym (multiplication before division), or if multiplication and division have equal precedence going left to right.

People often point to disagreement as evidence of the subjective nature of morality. However, if disagreement represents good evidence that morality is subjective then it seems we have good evidence that everything is subjective. My position would be that people can simply be wrong about things, and often are. This in no way entails that knowledge is impossible, just that disagreement may be common.

A similar issue comes up when the historical variability of morals is used as evidence of their subjectivity. If anything, scientific claims vary more through time than moral ones.

2. Consider why it is that everyone dislikes rancid food. It isn't just that rancid food is offensive to our tastes. Eating rotten food is a very good way to get yourself sick. From an evolutionary perspective, we can identify how our reaction to rancid food is a sort of defense mechanism to stop us from eating things that will harm us.

So there is a link here to human nature in two ways. First, in terms of the almost universal disgust people feel vis-á-vis rancid food, second because in a fairly obvious way rancid food can be "bad for us," making us ill.

The analogy works on two levels then. That certain acts seem almost universally morally offensive would seem to point to tastes grounded in human nature. These tastes aren't uncaused; there is a reason for them. That reason would seem to be tied to the human good.

Of course, a person might have a condition where rancid food simply isn't disgusting to them (psychopaths in the moral analogy). However, this doesn't negate the link to human nature. Such a person is going to be more likely to get food poisoning, resulting in harm to them. Likewise, psychopaths are far more likely to end up is prison or killed, neither of which is good for a person. The variance in their tastes seems to run counter to the human good; it is in some way defective, diseased.

People also sometimes eat disgusting tasting things because they see a higher good in it. I don't think anyone ever ate mescaline cactus and thought, "this is delicious." People might develop a taste for high proof whiskey, but I doubt anyone takes a sip of pure grain alcohol and says "yum, just the flavor I was hoping for." Rather, people consume these things because they are hoping to get some sort of higher good, and it is possible over time to acclimatize one's tastes to such things.

You can see a similar sort of thing happening with moral norms. Where the analysis goes wrong, IMO, is when this is taken to mean there can be no linkage to the human good. All too often in modern philosophy there is a tendency to think that if a relationship is dynamic and difficult to formalize it simply cannot exist or cannot be analyzed.

Ethics takes place in a social sphere defined by practices. You can't talk about "human nature in itself, cut off entirely from context." It's like asking "what are the differences between men and women simpliciter." People don't exist simpliciter. The differences exist in a dynamic range of contexts, but that doesn't mean there are no differences. Likewise, language exists in the context of social practices. That doesn't mean it doesn't "relate to how the world is," outside of social practices. We wouldn't have a word like "carcinisation" if multiple different lineages didn't develop the traits associated with crabs through convergent evolution. Carcinisation predates human language, and human language has a word for it because it exists.

But practically speaking, we live in herds and interact with other decision makers, and there are limited burgers, and we all agree that society, with its trading and divisions of labor, is beneficial

This is certainly how modern ethics has tended to frame things. I would argue though that this framing is essential to why it tends to collapse into emotivism. It's based on a sort of bourgeois metaphysics where self-interest and the individual lie at the center of the universe. Such a system is allergic to assertions of "Truth" with a capital T because it infringes on the individual's prerogative to determine what is true. But of course, such a position already has to assume certain things about truth and knowledge for it even to make sense that safeguarding the individual's right to "their truth," is something worthwhile or even possible.

We have to assume an objective, mind independent group of herding animals called “other persons with other minds” exists in order to construct some form of ethical line, like “stealing money is OK but stealing a child’s life through murder is NOT OK,” and we have to interact with the other herd members to bump into these lines and seek enforcement of these lines by saying “no, stop it” or “yes, do it.”

This is certainly the case. However, IMO we need to be careful about seeming to put such an ontological assumption prior to human nature (and thus practical reason). A person only has the words and understanding that are a prerequisite to expressing such an "assumption" because one is a member of the human species, the "rational/political animal."

Animals do not seem to question the ontic status of their enviornment. The drive to even consider such assumptions seems bound up in the fact that "all men by nature desire to know..." No one wants to have false beliefs. They do enter into a skeptical frame thinking "I sure hope I am wrong about what I come to believe." Skepticism itself assumes that it is worth doubting whatever pops into one's mind, that there is a value in knowing truth. But then this is essence (and the practical reason it includes) acting prior to the skeptical moment.

This also applies to human behaviour as well; every now and then certain people 'serve up' ethical behaviour that is 'rancid.' Then it isn't just certain sensibilities that this irritates, but rather it is behaviour which makes almost all of us 'sick.'

Such behaviour would then be far less subjective than what such camps would like to admit.

Would you agree? — jasonm

Yes, I think it is a useful argument. There is a common claim which says that if and only if there is widespread disagreement, then what is at stake is "taste" rather than truth. You are utilizing the contrapositive for cases where there is widespread agreement.

The analogy works on two levels then. That certain acts seem almost universally morally offensive would seem to point to tastes grounded in human nature. These tastes aren't uncaused, there is a reason for them. That reason seems to be tied to the human good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hey Count.

I totally agree with that. It’s why I went with the OP analogy to get into objectivity versus relativity in ethics.

All too often in modern philosophy there is a tendency to think that if a relationship is dynamic and difficult to formalize it simply cannot exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Modern philosophy puts everything on a spectrum (in this case, the good and bad spectrum) without any honest attempt to define the the two ends of the spectrum (in fact an earnest attempt to tear down and ignore the binary spectrum creators for sake of multiple gradations in the middle only. So yes, totally agree. We only have the middle with this and that absolute drawing out the spectrum.

The differences exist in a dynamic range of contexts, but that doesn't mean there are no differences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Amen to that. Sums up my approach to metaphysics, ethics and everything that follows. Preserves all the tendency to reify the spectrums, (dynamic ranges), while preserving room for knowledge and truth (differences I know exist).

In no way was I starting with self-interest. My view of ethics starts with multiple selves living in proximity at the outset, sort of sifting out ethics together. The interest that gives birth to ethics can’t be based on any one of those selves alone. The outset includes relationship among the multiple selves. The outset includes some regard for all selves at once, otherwise we aren’t doing ethics, only observing natural instinctual behavior.

Picture bumper cars - that’s the herd of selves (be they self-interested individuals or self-sacrificers, or disinterested). Ethical questions arise where cars bump. Ethics has them all able to drive with a goal of resolving the bumping, in one general direction, found by agreeing where we all will recognize the walls and how to drive within them. And it only works when all are in agreement that it is better not to bump into things.

To give this some application: murder is wrong, means: after running around with the other sheep watching this one kill that one, and this one die and that one live on, and after living myself so I can judge this myself, I propose a rule that murder is wrong, that each of us equally enjoys life more than death, and each of us has no individual right to take another one’s life. And I propose that this rule is not for the sake of my life, but instead for the sake of all of our lives, and therefore each one of us must agree this is good law if this law is to work at all. We individually recognize the authority of the law by our own free consent, but in so doing, we create its objective, universal application, equally distributed to myself as well as all others.

To give this some application: murder is wrong, means: after running around with the other sheep watching this one kill that one, and this one die and that one live on, and after living myself so I can judge this myself, I propose a rule that murder is wrong, that each of us equally enjoys life more than death, and each of us has no individual right to take another one’s life.

To reframe this to see if I am getting it right this would be something like: "I find all these murders unpleasant, you all do too. So let's not murder."

But then this seems to circle back to individuals' desires, or am I missing something?

What do we say to the sheep who says, "I personally enjoy the murders. Why should I follow this rule?" That is, what is the answer to the nihilists' question: "why is bumping bad?"

Is the answer "because that's what makes the most sheep happy?" But then why is this good? We could be like Nietzsche and denigrate the herd. Is the answer in human nature?

I guess an example for contrast might be helpful. Consider Plotinus. The Good is the first principle above intellect, the first principle responsible for (although transcending) being. A sunset's goodness and beauty are according to its participation in being, rather than anything related to individuals.

Or we could consider Aristotle. There is a human telos, but rather than it simply being the ground for our preferences, it is also defines the perfection/actuality of a human life. Actuality is better than potentiality, so the life of theoria is higher (more divine), a greater actualization of freedom and purpose. However, this would remain true even if we had a horrible society, maybe something like A Brave New World, where no one agrees with this claim, because it isn't grounded in the individual(s). That is, what the sheep are currently saying doesn't determine the good. It's possible we could have a bunch of very vice addled sheep after all.

By contrast, even the Kantian deontology seems to me to be grounded in the individual. The unconditional good is the good will of the individual, acting in accordance with rationality. There is an overlap with the earlier, dominant tradition in that there, good behavior is also in accord with reason, but there is a strange flip where it is no longer necessarily the case that being good is good for you. Indeed, you sort of end up in a place where you're most praiseworthy when you are doing things you hate out of a sense of duty, which IMO is an indication that we sheep have begun stumbling down the wrong path.

However, with food, every now and then someone serves up something that is rancid. In such cases, we are no longer talking about different combinations of taste buds or brain chemicals - such food is almost universally foul to almost anyone's taste buds. — jasonm

This isn't really distinguishable from events lower down the spectrum. Some people can't be in the same room as fish. There's nothing per se that separates these two examples, and so the thrust of the OP seems a bit misguided.
I'd say you've correctly summarized ethics, and shied away from giving us your moral framework into which that might feed. It's hard to know whether there's something to be objected to in your post.

Hi,

Silghtly off-topic I suppose, but I've found these sorts of Aristotelian "human good" accounts of morality, which I take you to be espousing, to be persuasive recently so I would like to ask whether you have made some posts previously elaborating and maybe formalizing these views to any larger extent? If not, are there any resources you would recommend for seeking out these views - both their proponents and critics?

I would also like to ask, how would you go about determining what is the "human good" which grounds our morality? I suppose - like the example you gave about rancid food - we are already biologically hardwired to find certain things to be "bad" but to what extent is this "human good" shared among different people and how much room is there for variation among individuals' "goods"?

Finally, in terms of metaethics, is this a subjectivist or an objectivist position on the reality of moral claims? It seems that it takes ethics to be grounded on the "human good" which we all share qua being human but do or would different types of creatures have different "ethics" due to plausibly having their own good that is distinct from the human good?

Enjoyed reading your answers.

- I would recommend Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. For more modern treatments, see my post <here>. Beyond that, Edward Feser is someone who tries to offer introductions to this paradigm, and he also has a blog.

I would also like to ask, how would you go about determining what is the "human good" which grounds our morality? — Max2

To give more references, this is what Aristotle focuses on at the beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics and what Aquinas focuses on in the beginning of the "First part of the second part" (Prima Secundae) of his Summa Theologiae. For Plato I would reach for The Republic but the idea is strewn liberally throughout his corpus.

Finally, in terms of metaethics, is this a subjectivist or an objectivist position on the reality of moral claims? — Max2

Neither, really. It tends to predate and transcend those divisions.

would different types of creatures have different "ethics" due to plausibly having their own good that is distinct from the human good? — Max2

It's possible, yes. But for this Platonic school all creatures participate in the same Good, and so the differences are not jarring or contradictory.

I agree.

seems no matter how rancid an action might be, we can always summon something more-rancid to happen if we don't take the action, which is when rancid becomes acceptable. — Lionino

When people are starving, they might eat something "rancid".

If you existed alone on a desert island there would be no need for ethics - every decision would be to determine the burger or the other burger ethically — Fire Ologist

This would also be true if idealism is the case and there is only one cosmic mind and we are all aspects of it.

In my opinion, the attempt to establish and defend some set of moral principles that can universally guide human behavior is bound to fail. The demand or expectation for objective grounds is misguided. The terms 'relative' and 'subjective' are often used by those who wish to defend objective moral standards in a way that puts a thumb on the scale.

Rather than frame morality in terms of principles, I think it more productive to think in terms of moral deliberation. We are in the realm of opinion, not absolutes or truths handed down from a higher authority. In the absence of such authority morals are by default relative and subjective. This does not mean that distinctions between right and wrong or good and bad cannot be made, but that we must critically evaluate and defend such opinions in an attempt to determine and do what seems best, while also recognizing that about certain things we may be wrong or that there may be others who hold defensible opinions that differ from our own.

I have heard the argument before: moral principles are simply an emotional reaction - just a sophisticated 'grunt' toward certain behaviours, all without having any real logical basis in itself.

I have a different answer - I liken it to cooking; in terms of what 'tastes good,' or 'tastes bad,' there are a range of possibilities. For instance, someone could literally find that a 'Big Mac' tastes better than a burger from 'Five Guys' - even though people generally prefer Five Guys to McDonald's - maybe even something like 10 to 1. This is simply a relationship between things like permutations of taste buds, or the release of brain chemicals that makes one 'prefer' McDonald's to Five Guys - or vice versa. — jasonm

Hilarious and flippant, but no.

Morality is an objective scenario. Perfection as an extant thing in the universe is the source of the emotion we refer to as desire. This is what pulls us into the future, all things, via evolution, it mechanism.

Opinion and subjective experience do not matter at all to objective moral truth. Truth does not change. Subjective human experience is still informed by objective reality, including morality.

The reason that people believe in subjective morality is essentially self-indulgent immorality, mostly.

This topic can be discussed much further, but effectively subjective morality is delusional and cannot exist. The 'proof' is a rather complicated thing. Happy to discuss if that is something you'd like to go on about.

In the same vein, whether abortion or euthanasia is right has a range of possible answers, and it is hard to say that such things are any less subjective than food, and might depend on things like brain chemistry as well. — jasonm

Not at all. Again, morality is objective. I am not saying I know the right answers about every moral question, but it is my assertion that there is always a singular right answer.

Another reason we are deluded into thinking there are many possible right answers is because we are at different places in intent space as a state when any choice is made. As such, although perfection is a single predefined point in intent space, the path to it differs based on the starting state. This confuses some people into a foolish belief in subjective morality.

However, with food, every now and then someone serves up something that is rancid. In such cases, we are no longer talking about different combinations of taste buds or brain chemicals - such food is almost universally foul to almost anyone's taste buds. — jasonm

This is a horrendous and laughable way to treat morality.

This also applies to human behaviour as well; every now and then certain people 'serve up' ethical behaviour that is 'rancid.' Then it isn't just certain sensibilities that this irritates, but rather it is behaviour which makes almost all of us 'sick.' — jasonm

You make no sense.

If you believe morality is subjective then your opinions about it to others does not matter. They get to choose their morality in your pov. So you have no right to judge anyone that way. But you are lucky. Morality IS NOT subjective. It's objective, so, in that case, (the real case), you are then allowed to judge others. It is logically incoherent to believe that morality is subjective and that some morals are better than others. There is no basis for judgement unless morality is objective.

Such behaviour would then be far less subjective than what such camps would like to admit. — jasonm

Precisely. That is because subjective morality as a belief system is wishful thinking that is immoral.

It looks like you may be new here: welcome to the forum, Jasonm!

Unfortunately, you did not eliminate what you sought to: it is entirely coherent for someone to posit that this "human taste" (viz., "range of possibilities") for morality is a reflection of the range of "human emotion" towards morality.

All you succeeded, at best, at adding is that the subjective dispositions (whether that be an emotions, preferences, beliefs, etc.) which make moral judgments true or false should be evaluated in terms of the vast majority collective of humans.

This doesn't negate moral cognitivism, nor does it provide a "logical basis" for your version of moral anti-realism.

Rather than frame morality in terms of principles, I think it more productive to think in terms of moral deliberation. We are in the realm of opinion, not absolutes or truths handed down from a higher authority. In the absence of such authority morals are by default relative and subjective. This does not mean that distinctions between right and wrong or good and bad cannot be made, but that we must critically evaluate and defend such opinions in an attempt to determine and do what seems best, while also recognizing that about certain things we may be wrong or that there may be others who hold defensible opinions that differ from our own. — Fooloso4

Nicely put.

Glad you liked it!

Silghtly off-topic I suppose, but I've found these sorts of Aristotelian "human good" accounts of morality, which I take you to be espousing, to be persuasive recently so I would like to ask whether you have made some posts previously elaborating and maybe formalizing these views to any larger extent? If not, are there any resources you would recommend for seeking out these views - both their proponents and critics?

I'm not sure how familiar you are with the tradition. I've written some very general summaries I'll share below.

In terms of going deeper, Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue is one of the more influential works comparing the classical/medieval tradition and modern ethics. His thesis is that most modern moral discourse is not truly reasoned, but emotive and rationalized after the fact. That means that systems that appear to have rational principles are in fact voluntaristic frameworks disguised as rational. Misology is a big problem here. Reason is said not to apply to many different areas, and so reason loses its coherence and relation to the whole.

It can be a little dry and "gets into the weeds," at times, but overall, it is quite accessible. A big point of his is that Nietzche's critique of ethics, so popular in our times, seems spot on for Kant, Hume, etc. (Enlightenment ethics) but doesn't really touch the older tradition. I found myself mostly agreeing with this. Nietzsche tends to deal with strawman versions of Plato and other older thinkers (or more charitably, how those thinkers are seen popularly in his time) and I don't think he adequately addresses some of the big challenges they have for his philosophy, particularly the need for reflexive "inner" freedom, and the ways in which our polis is prior to our personal identity.

Another really good one is Robert M. Wallace's Philosophical Mysticism in Plato, Hegel, and the Present, which is a fairly short and accessible book that lays out the classical idea of freedom (grounding ethics) quite well. For the ancients and medievals, freedom is perfected in actuality. Whereas today, we tend to look at freedom more in terms of potentiality, the freedom to "choose between."

The ancients certainly saw choice as part of freedom. However, consider that no one would seem to want to knowingly choose what is bad for them. If someone knows something to be evil or worse, there is a sense in which they will always choose the better if they are able. Thus, freedom is perfected in the actuality to choose the Good, not in the mere potentiality to choose anything. A person who choses the worse/evil is in some way constrained, be it by being disordered (Plato's civil war within the soul), having defective reason, or being in some way ignorant of what is truly best.

The relation between knowledge and freedom is crucial for the ancients. Plotinus' use of the story of Oedipus in the Enneads is instructive here. Sophocles’ Oedipus is in many ways a model of freedom. He is powerful, a king, competent, and wise. Yet he ends up doing the very thing he has been seeking to avoid his entire life, killing his father, due to a truth that lies outside his understanding. Here, we might also consider Homer's Achilles. Achilles is considered praiseworthy because he chooses a glorious death rather than a long but inglorious life. Such a choice requires that Achillesknow his options. Were Achilles to simply blunder into his death, he would be much less a hero, more a pathetic victim of a fate that lied outside his understanding

Then, for a look at the metaphysical shift the undercut Aristotle, Joshua Hochschild's look at the rise of nominalism in late-medieval scholastic philosophy is good: https://www.academia.edu/36162636/What_s_Wrong_with_Ockham_Reassessing_the_Role_of_Nominalism_in_the_Dissolution_of_the_West

Finally, there are D.C. Schindler's two books comparing the classical and medieval tradition with modernity: Freedom from Reality and Retrieving Freedom. The first looks at modern notions of freedom and ethics, primarily using Locke as an exemplar, and then compares it to Plato and Aristotle. You could probably skip to the Plato and Aristotle chapters and still get a lot of value. The second traces the evolution of the tradition through Plotinus, St. Augustine, Boethius, St. Bernard, St. Bonaventure, and St. Aquinas, before looking at how it was supplanted. Schindler has really strong analysis, but at times gets a little "preachy," or seems to undervalue many of the good things about modernity that help enhance freedom. I think this might turn off some readers. Wallace's work as the benefit of being shorter and lacking this element, although it doesn't go as deep into the Aristotelian tradition.

Schindler is someone who has worked in Catholic philosophy his entire life, and so whether he means to or not he tends to often write for his particular audience. This doesn't detract from the good analysis, but it can be grating at times.

In terms of primary sources, Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy is fantastic and a good synthesis of Plato, Aristotle, Neoplatonism, and the Christian philosophical tradition. Aristotle's ethics is also quite accessible too if a bit dry. For Plato, I might put the Republic and Phaedrus up to. Maybe Symposium too. The Sophist/Statesman too, but those get much more "into the weeds."

I'll try to get to the other questions later. Here are my attempts at very briefly summarizing key distinctions in Aristotle, although they necessarily miss out on quite a lot. Ancient and medieval ethics tend to be unified to epistemology and metaphysics. Hence, it's hard to give an adequate exposition of the part without the whole. They would almost certainly best be classified as "objective" though, although ethics contains subjective and socially constructed elements for Plato and Aristotle for sure.

Aristotle defines the human good in terms of the Greek term "eudaimonia." This term has been famously difficult to translate, corresponding to some blend of the English terms "happiness," "flourishing," and "well-being." Given the difficulties in defining this term, it may be helpful to first investigate what eudaimonia is not.

In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that pleasure, honor, and virtue are not equivalent to eudaimonia. Rather, these three are subordinate means of achieving eudaimonia, in the same way that “bridle making… [is] subordinate to horsemanship.”1 They are “lower ends… pursued for the sake of the higher,” i.e., eudaimonia.2

Aristotle calls the life spent pursuing pleasure “completely slavish… a life for grazing animals.”3 Pleasure is a “good of the body,” while eudaimonia is a “good of the soul,” unique to man because it requires reason.4 Pleasure is temporary, while eudaimonia must be measured across a lifetime.”*5 While “a truly good… person… will bear the strokes of fortune suitably,” a hedonist will fall into misery if their fortunes change.6 Neither is eudaimonia equivalent to honor. Those who seek honor wish to be honored for being virtuous. Thus, “in their view… virtue is superior [to honor].”7 Virtue cannot be equivalent with eudaimonia either, for one may be virtuous, yet still “suffer the worst evils and misfortunes.”8

Having said what eudaimonia is not, let us now turn to what it is. Eudaimonia is a self-sufficient cause for action, admitting no ancillary considerations. “Honor, pleasure… and every virtue we certainly choose because of themselves… but we also choose them… [so that] we shall [achieve eudaimonia ] .”9 However, “we always choose [ eudaimonia] because of itself, never for the sake of something else.”10 Other candidates for "the human good," (e.g. virtue, pleasure, etc.) cannot be equivalent to eudaimonia if what is true of eudaimonia is not true of them.

For Aristotle, eudaimonia is “activity of the soul in accord with virtue.”11 It is the development of what is unique to man: reason. Excellence in reason allows man to make good choices and turn his desires towards good aims. Virtue is a “necessary condition for eudaimonia ,” while honor and pleasure may be “cooperative instruments” that aid eudaimonia, but they are not eudaimonia itself. 12 We praise honor and justice, which bring eudaimonia about, but instead celebrate eudaimonia , as it is the greatest good we hope to achieve.13

What sort of life then best fulfills man's unique telos? This would be the life of theôria or "contemplation."14 For it is the contemplation of truth that is "best," and "the pleasantest of the virtuous activities."15 Further, it is theôria that is most unique to man as the "rational animal," and thus most indicative of man's telos. Such a life is also preferable because it is reason that is the most "divine" characteristic of man. Pursuit of reason is what allows us "to make ourselves divine" "as far as we can," and "live in accordance with the best thing in us."16 That said, Aristotle allows that other forms of life can nevertheless result in eudaimonia, it will just not be the highest form of it. **

---
*For Aristotle, happiness might even be judged beyond a lifetime, involving what happens to one’s descendants, i.e. Solon's pronouncement that we must "count no man happy until the end is known."

** In Book X, it seems we can see more of Plato's influence on Aristotle; this corresponds more with the Phaedo.

1 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Book I, Chapter I § 4.
2 Ibid. Book I, Chapter I § 4
3 Ibid. Book I, Chapter V, § 3
4 Ibid. Book I, Chapter VII, § 2-3
5 Ibid. Book I, Chapter VII, § 5
6 Ibid. Book I, Chapter VII, § 5
7 Ibid. Book I, Chapter V, § 6
8 Ibid. Book I, Chapter VII, § 5
9 Ibid. Book I, Chapter VII, § 5
10 Ibid. Book I, Chapter IX, § 7
^11^Ibid. Book I, Chapter IX, § 7
^12^Ibid. Book I, Chapter IX, § 7
^13^Ibid. Book I, Chapter XII § 4
14 Ibid. Book X, Chapter 7 § 1
15 Ibid. Book X, Chapter 7 § 2
16 Ibid. Book X, Chapter 7 § 3
17 Ibid. Book X, Chapter 8 § 1


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Aristotle's arguement that the virtues are more similar to crafts than natural faculties (e.g. sight) hinges on how we come to possess the virtues. For Aristotle, the virtues are a type of habit. For instance, if we are generous, this means that we are in the habit of acting generously. Such habits can be ingrained in an individual through repeated action. Natural properties of objects can not be "trained" in this way. For example, Aristotle notes that it is not possible to train a rock into having the propensity to fall upwards simply by throwing it upwards repeatedly. Since nothing in nature can be trained to act against its nature, Aristotle concludes that the virtues are neither contrary to human nature, nor a product of it.

For Aristotle, one can become more brave by acting bravely in perilous situations and habituating oneself to overcoming fear. That is, we develop the virtue by practicing it. This is not the case for natural faculties. For example, we do not come to see or hear by often engaging in the acts of seeing or hearing. Rather, we see and hear by nature, and doing more seeing or hearing neither improves nor degrades either faculty.

By contrast, we do seem to learn the virtues in the same way we learn crafts. For example, a man learns to build houses by participating in the act of building houses in the same way that a man can learn to be prudent by regularly taking time to carefully assess situations before forming a judgement about them. Likewise, crafts can be taught, and it also seems possible to teach the virtues.

---

Aristotle uses the concepts of the continent and incontinent person to develop a distinction in the ways people end up pursuing vices. Some people do not believe that their vices are immoral. Perhaps they were raised in a bad environment and have come to see cheating as a proper means to an end, or to see licentiousness and gluttony as natural routes to the "good life" of pleasure. These people do not perform their vices because they lack constraint, rather they do so because they have bad habits and believe engaging in vice to be proper behavior.

By contrast, the incontinent person knows their vices as vices. They will acknowledge that their sloth or gluttony is bad, and yet they are unable to exercise the self-control required to stop themselves from engaging in these vices. The incontinent person might even attempt to develop virtue, overcoming small temptations, and yet continually fail to overcome large ones - the triumph of appetite and passion over reason and virtue.

A continent person then, is one who is tempted by vice, but who acts in accordance with virtue and reason instead. They are not perfectly virtuous, for the person who is perfect in virtue enjoys being virtuous, but neither do they give in to vice. In the virtuous person, desire, reason, and action are in harmony, while in the continent person there is disharmony between desire on the one hand and reason and virtue on the other.

Aristotle notes that of these types, the incontinent person is the hardest to help. For the person raised in vice might reform if shown what is good, but the incontinent person already knows what is good and fails to do it.

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It's interesting to contrast Aristotle's view with that of modern thinkers who would have it that virtue lies precisely in following moral laws even when we don't desire to follow them. Afterall, where is the sacrifice or effort on our behalf if we are simply doing what we like?

I suppose the disagreement here probably lies in how virtue is defined. If virtue is those dispositions and skills needed to live a good life, then it would seem obvious that it is beneficial to enjoy doing what is good. However, if virtue is the ability to follow moral laws, then it seems like being able to override desire is more important than having right desires.

I tend to come down more with Aristotle. The good, meaningful life seems to entail freedom. One is freer if they do what they want than if they have to constantly wage war against themselves (e.g. St. Paul in Romans 7). I happened to come across a great line on this reading the Penguin Selected Works of Meister Eckhart last night: "[the just] person is free, and the closer they are to justice, the more they become freedom itself... For nothing created is free. As long as there is something above me which is not God, I am oppressed by it..." (German Sermon 3 on John 15:16)

I will first say that I am attempting to 'adjust' my approach here. Even though there is one right objective way to proceed, some may not be ready for that. So here goes.

To reframe this to see if I am getting it right this would be something like: "I find all these murders unpleasant, you all do too. So let's not murder."

But then this seems to circle back to individuals' desires, or am I missing something? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No! You are spot on. Freedom is just another word for chaos and desire. So then, the only question and I do mean only in this case, is, can it ever be that all desire is moral? I think this is low hanging fruit, obvious, and deeply obvious, all at the same time. This answer has a lot of resonance.

But then we have to stop and actually think. Thinking is order. The combination of order and chaos is ... balance. I submit that the concept of balance as being 'more right' is correct. That is because it's low hanging fruit, it obvious, and deeply obvious; all at the same time.

Balance is wisdom. But dead with nothing happening is also balance and we would venture easily to say that such a state is not good. So we need balance in our final set of good things, but there is another factor that must be included.

Examining the 'dead' state, and that word is in quotes, we get the impression, right off the bat, that there should be more 'life' involved, more activity. What causes that assumption, that observation? Let's talk about why dead was in quotes. Dead was in quotes because the dead I am talking about is everything, all at once, the ALL is completely dead. 'God is dead'. And where have we heard that before?

So, rather than the 'dead' state, what should we prefer? The very living state. I mean we could infuse as meta gods that pile of dead balance with energy and start things popping. But more seems to be better, yes? SO, more, more, more! Pile in on. But there is now a firm caveat. Balance it!

What is it we want more of? Well we like this silly freedom idea. So let's start with more desire. We know desire is chaos, or you know, maybe we don't. We should, so I will continue as if. Desire can go in any random direction. We know people can want things that are 'wrong'. So desire is not only good, it is also evil. But in what percentages? It's balanced, of course, 50/50.

So we want more desire. What else? We like the idea of order balancing chaos so now we have to do that. Order as you probably know by now, in my model, is represented by fear. Fear is really all logic, all reasoning, all thought, all structure. All of these artifacts are limits. They behave according to the limit function in their use. Define a category, draw a line that otherwise does not exist. YOU, the chooser, is making this distinction. This restraint 'appears' because you imagined it exists. Thus YOUR order is born. Others may agree. The fact that they do so is problematic. That is because others may not agree. So, order is in many ways delusional. But for now, without getting too much deeper, we will add fear into the list of things that we need to have more, more, more of.

SO if we increase fear and desire they polarize rather quickly. And never the twain shall meet. The universe would be destroyed in the false duality. More and more individuals would add their choice to one side or the other creating something. That something is a 'mass effect'. And in this case we have some split universe of fear types and desire types. This is what happens. Even in something as real to us as politics, we see this dichotomy, thesis (desire), antithesis (reaction-fear). Something must exist as a force to cause synthesis. What is that force?

That force is anger. Anger says 'no' to fears. It gets big and it gets loud to push past fears. Anger says 'no' to desires. It gets aloof and unresponsive to desire. It says 'we do NOT want this, because we are already sufficient unto ourselves. We belong and we cannot be made to un-belong!' Anger stands its ground. But the trick to realize is that anger causes that ground to exist.

The mass effect of polarization of fear and desire is only undone with anger stepping in. Before anyone objects, there is anger led by fear and anger led by desire. That anger is impure and imbalanced. It is immoral. The purpose of the pure anger is to bring balance and of course it then cannot be led. If we arrive at the point of balance there is harmony and no is leading or following. The decision is agreed upon and followed by all. And if that following is not in action yet, then the first step is belief, the precursor to action.

So now, we have found a third to add into our more, more, more list. And this time we see how and why the list must needs be complete. Intuition 'feels' like this set is complete. The duality has become a trinary relationship. Fear, anger, and desire together, balanced and maximized. The word and concept and all of its procedural glory , 'maximized' was missing previously from our balanced idea.

So, the good, is balancing and maximizing fear, anger, and desire. Which is order , chaos, and the balancing force between them.

Please note that desire and fear must be balanced. That is level 1. But also anger must be balanced within itself to half support and half resist each. That is level 2. But DO NOT proceed. Why not? Why not suggest that there is then a third balance? That is because we already decided, or did we, that good is only in the direction of the maximal emotions. Why should be not talk about the level 3 balance? That is because the level 3 balance is the balance between good and evil. We do not want more evil. We want only increasing good. Is this possible? If we add in the third balance we become terrified that perhaps it is not possible and we just start grasping for the desire side more, more perfection, more good. But these both are imbalanced reactions, again imbalanced = immoral.

If we draw a line along the good evil axis and a line on the order chaos axis, what is the third axis to allow us to add equal volumes of fear, anger, and desire into the system mathematically? It is just an axis that contains the amplitude of each of these emotions in ever increasing amounts. (the third axis is also likely TIME. That is to say, as time increases evolution works its magic and more of the GOOD prospers, but that seems overly warm fuzzy). And the high side of the amounts is what is properly called GOOD. That 3d map is THE map of all reality. It is the emotional map which in turns out means it is also the map for physical reality. Why is that?

That is because with the addition of anger to our more more more list, we have created balance. The tension of balance is something we see in nature in every way. Functions come but then they must go. The tides come in and they receded. Apogee gives ways to Perigee. Intensity gives way to calm. The waves have troughs and crests. Passion comes and goes. Understanding is solid for a time and then overturned or a new depth of possibilities discovered as always present, meaning we never really understood in the first place, finally.

So, anger is responsible for the tension, the balance, between fear (order) and desire (chaos). This tension causes what we refer to as physical reality to 'spring' into being. I would say 'thus our universe is born' but that is not as cool as we would believe. Clearly these truths and forces predated the universe or let's say this, 'they always were the universe'.

So, what is takeaway from this ... 'thesis by accident' I just wrote? None of it is accidentally observed, I promise you. Only I just started to answer this post and accidentally was compelled to write it all by way of interaction.

The takeaway is that desire alone is an immoral leader to the chooser. The choose MUST morally include EQUAL amounts of fear and anger to arrive at the most good.

So, that being said, on we go.

What do we say to the sheep who says, "I personally enjoy the murders. Why should I follow this rule?" That is, what is the answer to the nihilists' question: "why is bumping bad?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Progress along the desire axis IS NOT NECESSARILY progress along the good axis. The question IS properly answered. Is there understanding though? What force is needed to push the result, the consequences, of choices, into the good direction? More anger and more fear are always the only right answer.

And in the practical sense, that we can better relate to, what is an example?

The addict is tied to their desire of 'one more hit'. The feeling that is had by 'a hit' is misrepresented as 'good'. So, desire can lie. Supposed happiness is not actually happiness. What is it? Why is it? Well, we already know (not really) but we are working on a theory that we need more fear and more anger. How does that translate and why? So, we can take several angles on this. First let's decide, using our model, that the happiness we feel IS NOT full happiness. It is some lesser variant at best and maybe even not happiness at worst. But it is compelling in the same way as desire. It is desire somehow. So how can this trouble be solved?

We must think. Thinking is ordering, adding fear. What is the danger? What should we be afraid of? Is following this desire bad/evil in some way. You bet it is. Addiction is destructive, rotting the self, and this is easily observed. Observation is awareness is fear. Logic is fear. Restraint of all kinds is fear. Thus we counsel the addict to stop wanting the drug. We make a case for why it is bad. I want to mention here that ALL desire follows this pattern. The drug addiction angle just makes it clear. There is only one desire that is objectively aimed properly. From any point in intent space that choice, that desire, is the one perfectly constrained (almost imprisoned but by choice) to the single line between the current state of the chooser and perfection itself. That is the OBJECTIVE GOOD choice. There is no other choice possible that is as good.

So we have made the case for fear. Yay! Even if you do not believe this rather free flowing non proof of these ideas, it can still be compelling to you. Compelling enough to suggest the cracks in other models, other confusions, of reality. This is a majestic observation I am about to make. It occurred to me just now, writing the above gerund, that gerunds themselves are a map to truth, in a special way. They remove the subject and object from the statement. They resonate truth in that way because subject and object are changeable, and the same; at the same time. Gerunds thus represent what properly of balance I am now going to say is necessary to make the model work.

The balance between order and chaos AT ANY POINT is just a first step in balance. Why? It is because we are not making ANY progress towards the good. The level 1 balance is static in relation to the GOOD. We already discussed that a prospective level 3 balance was a bad idea. That would just add more evil. So where is our progress?

Progress to the good is only possible if we can add more fear and desire. It appears, on the surface, that fear and desire are disinterested in that progress. It's only an illusion like all fear and all desire is. But, with skin in the game, with mass, something to feel the loss and the gain, we can proceed. In order to break the tie between each of these forces, fear and desire, they must be made to feel the overall trouble, good vs evil. They must be made, FORCED, to understand and want the right things. And the greater level 2 balance of anger shows these truths to them.

As anger rises, it can help fear hold immoral desire back, not by restraining it, but instead by forcing it to realize its own mistakes. Likewise we can step into the great mystery of the future by suggesting to fear that being calm and unafraid is just the right way to be, even in danger. So, get over your panic when facing the unknown. And since fear gets trapped into what it 'knows' (like a bunch of clowns in a clown car) when it really knows nothing; with anger balancing fear, we can proceed.

Each of the three emotions, and there are only three, works this way. In balance and with MORE of each we properly aim at the GOOD.

How does this finally relate to your murderous sheep?

Any self entity has a peer group. That peer group is equivalent roughly to it in terms of how it grows morally. There is balance. Disturbing balance, even on the surface, is something we just discussed as fairly suspect as wrong morally. The investment in time to arrive at any state is epic. And it does not matter what the embedded immorality of that state ... is. To deny that investment by eliminating a peer is immoral because it is an act of bad faith in the system of morality itself. By contrast, treating less evolved entities with too much preference is also ill advised. If the moral state of the new entity, new set of peers is superior, that greatness must be respected in some ways. This does not mean we treat non peers with immorality. So, we are then tasked to say amid peers and morally less advanced entities, which one is on the RIGHT path? So here again is the need to differentiate between desires, and not just the sheep that have them.

Your murderous sheep offers us no greater insight into its desires than 'it feel good'. Any truth can be taken to its limit and remain true. Delusion cannot. If the murder sheep represents good then its murdering ALL THE OTHER SHEEP has to be good. Is it? The non-murdery sheep if taken the same way has counseled 'don't murder other sheep'. If taken all the way that has to be GOOD. Is it? Notice that we are not talking about natural death here. Notice that living sheep can evolve and become even more than they were. It is ostensibly objective that same species murder is immoral. The temporal investment by evolution in that entity type is being disrespected. They who are thus afflicted are not 'paying it forward' properly.

And on we go ...

Is the answer "because that's what makes the most sheep happy?" But then why is this good? We could be like Nietzsche and denigrate the herd. Is the answer in human nature? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, not at all. The answer is an equation, a law of the universe, the GOOD, perfection, and its many ramifications if it is properly considered.

Human nature is just one of many such plateaus. It is special but humans are far too likely to treat it with too much specialness. When something becomes 'my precious' it can lead you to immorality very fast. here again is seen the delusional nature of many forms of desire, many aspects of so-called 'freedom'.

I guess an example for contrast might be helpful. Consider Plotinus. The Good is the first principle above intellect, the first principle responsible for (although transcending) being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This statement is dangerous. Notice how in Plotinus' case he mentions intellect which is fear. He mentions being, which is anger. And he places the GOOD as transcendant. But since desire is not mentioned the risk is run that the immoral elements of desire are not properly treated by his far weaker model. If desire is not simply held as synonymous with the GOOD, the model is ... BETTER.

A sunset's goodness and beauty are according to its participation in being, rather than anything related to individuals. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is a very weak statement. It has some elements of truth to it. And its a warm fuzzy, so people like to glom on to it. But it partakes of the same error as Plotinus' dangerous model. It venerates desire at the expense of fear and anger.

If I were a real teacher, I would ask for an essay into all the ways that the setting of the sun was good that are not merely related to its presence as beauty. In fact I would ask specifically that at least some of the work shown clearly relates directly to individuals to DISPROVE your assertion here. Such a task is not actually difficult. That is how weak the statement was.

Or we could consider Aristotle. There is a human telos, but rather than it simply being the ground for our preferences, it is also defines the perfection/actuality of a human life. Actuality is better than potentiality, so the life of theoria is higher (more divine), a greater actualization of freedom and purpose. However, this would remain true even if we had a horrible society, maybe something like A Brave New World, where no one agrees with this claim, because it isn't grounded in the individual(s). That is, what the sheep are currently saying doesn't determine the good. It's possible we could have a bunch of very vice addled sheep after all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Exactly! Aristotle is much more correct.

What is must partake of the good in many ways, but devotion to the good is choice only. And the good remains objective despite any and all choices we or anyone else makes.

If this is true, then faith is a belief in objective morality. Bad faith is a belief in anything else. And these beliefs are both by degrees. So, a person's belief is either moral OR NOT. At any time the state of any entity in belief is merely a summation of moral and immoral beliefs. We are not perfect. So we are non zero on our immorality. Judging what is objectively moral is the ONLY real worthy goal of life and this belief is the precursor to action, to being. Your murderous sheep is in more bad faith than the other sheep was. But that supposedly good sheep still spits its cud at little lambs while they eating ivy. I mean, the nerve!

There is more to the discussion on desire. Obviously the desire gives us some consequential feedback such that the murder sheep is claiming to 'feel good' about murder. The non murder sheep presumably 'feel good' as mentioned about refraining from murder. This causes confusion. We must clear that up to proceed.

All virtues are part of an emotion. In general, the classical virtues are born of one emotion mostly. But each emotion, and each virtue offers each of us, all entities, a result, a consequence of choice. And these offerings, these consequences, are additive. In other words each entity experiences happiness differently. And achieving one's desires in general IS A PART of happiness. But, if an entity is relatively unaware it will not realize that 'things are not as good as they could be'. Or maybe that entity does realize this and simply does want to put in the effort to make things better. Here we see again the relationship between happiness and effort.

Both desire and fear tend to seek ease. One seeks more of itself, the other less. And both call that ease. The beauty of these two statements is not easily understood fully. Anger also falls prey here. And anger is already different than the other two emotions in that it does not partake of the first duality, the delusional duality that still runs the show in today's world. Anger is better than that. But, it still falls to immorality here. In fact, anger causes this problem. That is to say, the sin of anger is laziness. What could be more synonymous with ease?

Thus we are led to a scary truth, a great truth, and a hard truth: A moral choice, the choice that shows us the most GOOD, is the hardest choice in all cases. The seeming does not matter. The seeming is your fear and your desire and anger even, lying to you that there is an easier way.

So each virtue causes this seeming with its normal contribution to happiness. If that happiness is still the most happiness an individual has ever known, they will kill, steal, cheat, do everything in their power, to keep it. They are unaware that there is a better way. We see this in movies all the time when an individual from a less moral culture joins or is captured by a group of a more moral culture. It takes time, but, the resonant happiness of the new more moral culture begins to sink in. And this is no guarantee. Some really murderous sheep will realize they 'just can't' be so moral. And they will still, even knowing they should not murder, murder. But that is a deeper level of bad faith, resigned to evil. Many and most will at least try to resonate the greater happiness within the new more moral group. What is this called, this 'greater happiness'. I call it GENUINE HAPPINESS.

Genuine happiness is the full or total happiness, all of it. It does not happen. But it does come by degrees. The more and more moral your choices are (and there is only one objective path to the GOOD ), the more of genuine happiness you will experience. It is true that many divergent paths are long and meandering ways to get to the GOOD also. But they are LESS THAN BEST and should be challenged as such. So, subjective morality is immorality.

By contrast, even the Kantian deontology seems to me to be grounded in the individual. The unconditional good is the good will of the individual, acting in accordance with rationality. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is true, but, it avoids some of the point.
You only allude to anger here, balancing desire and fear. Your word 'grounded' is that allusion. Mass, matter, being, all are anger.

There is an overlap with the earlier, dominant tradition in that there, good behavior is also in accord with reason, but there is a strange flip where it is no longer necessarily the case that being good is good for you. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is not true.

The reason it is not true is that GOOD is universally GOOD. It is our awareness of it, desire for it, and embodiment of it, all three, that are constantly in error in some way.

For example one huge statement of challenge to fear, to Pragamtism is this statement that is true:
'It is better to die than to be immoral in any way and spread that corruption.'

A pragmatist almost cannot deal with that truth. In this lack of compliance fear is immoral.

Likewise desire has tests of equal truth and dread for them:
'What you want is not relevant, unless it is the GOOD, and that is one and only one thing, finally.'

These are paramount statements of truth that literally slap both fear and desire in the face. 'What you want, and death; neither of them matter unless they are in support of the only thing that does matter, the GOOD.'

Indeed, you sort of end up in a place where you're most praiseworthy when you are doing things you hate out of a sense of duty, which IMO is an indication that we sheep have begun stumbling down the wrong path. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, this is the flip side of the ideas that I am discussing. It is a great Pragmatists point of view towards all of these things, pesky moral questions, and living. That is be afraid when you do not desire something at all. And want more from your ideals than just a sense of duty. I like it.

A very interesting reply.

In terms of going deeper, Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue is one of the more influential works comparing the classical/medieval tradition and modern ethics. His thesis is that most modern moral discourse is not truly reasoned, but emotive and rationalized after the fact. That means that systems that appear to have rational principles are in fact voluntaristic frameworks disguised as rational. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've generally suspected that most, if not all philosophy or theory, is rationalisation after emotion. How would one demonstrate that virtue, in the context of such venerable system building, is an exception?

Is MacIntyre's advocacy of a coherent moral framework (essentially by way of Aristotle), not just an example of that which pleases him emotionally or aesthetically? It also seems to be an appeal to tradition.

I have generally assumed that one can be a virtuous serial killer if one values excellence in a slightly different way to usual intersubjective custom. But is this difference an indication of flawed reasoning, or simply a different way of constructing values? What makes a value immutable?

That means that systems that appear to have rational principles are in fact voluntaristic frameworks disguised as rational.
— Count Timothy von Icarus

I've generally suspected that most, if not all philosophy or theory, is rationalisation after emotion. — Tom Storm

And emotion is rationalization after feeling. Let me see if I can explain this and how this ties in, without frustrating those who are practicing an admirably tight process when they "do" discourse. I apologize in advance for my anticipated deficiency (neither sarcasm nor self deprecating. Seriously).

If morality is not just rationalization of emotion, then what is its root, at least "for us?" Imagine prehistoric humans with either no language or extremely primitive language like grunts and gesticulations, and focus on the most obvious moral "issue," say murder. I cannot imagine there was a homicide problem. Sure, like Chimpanzees, there was likely occasional reactions to feelings which drove a human to act aggressively, and even kill. And while members of the group might alienate the "killer" this would have to have been an instinct or drive based on other feelings (which now we might label "disgust" "contempt" or "fear" based feelings)

So if what my imagination tells me is plausible, the imperative, "do not kill," better, the principle, "it is wrong to kill," would have emerged after that stage. I currently believe it emerged with the emergence/evolution of Language to a given level (which I won't elaborate on now). That level of Language gave us the equipment and inventory to construct rationalizations we now know as morals.

I also believe that before that hypothetical level of Language development, feelings were organically triggered in response to environmental "events" and we reacted to those feelings, like drives. Some would drive us to aggression, like if a predator or hostile intruder threatened; others drove us to cooperate, share, caress, groom and bond. Once that hypothetical level of Language evolved/emerged, those feelings too, could be rationalized as emotions, hatred or love for e.g., or anger and happiness.

For humans now, with Mind at the helm, "do not kill" is a rationalization of all of the emotions which are rationalizations of all the feelings which are triggered at the presentation of (no longer witnessing or participating in the hostile killing, but sufficiently at the presentation of) related Signifiers: death, kill, violence etc. And we construct the imperative that one should never kill as the fitting response to the manifestation of those signifiers. And we are now lost in that process, believing it to be, not just true and natural, but for some, absolute.

We do not need the moral imperatives. We are not made to rape and murder. We are made to bond, mate and form bonds which we are driven to protect with our lives. But if someone is presented with a "Hitler," and has the opportunity to stop him, it is not the constructed "thou shall not kill," which should play the primary role in the decision not to.

. Sure, like Chimpanzees, there was likely occasional reactions to feelings which drove a human to act aggressively, and even kill. And while members of the group might alienate the "killer" this would have to have been an instinct or drive based on other feelings (which now we might label "disgust" "contempt" or "fear" based feelings — ENOAH

This thinking seems to follow an old set of assumptions concerning the difference between the rational and the affective. Supposedly, feeling is dumb, instinctive drive opposing itself to the ‘higher’ mental processes of rational cognition. Feeling is located in the ‘lower’ part of the brain dedicated to reflexive fight or flight, the limbic cortex, whereas rationality belongs to the more recently appearing neocortex. Have you read any Damasio? He helped usher in a revolution in thinking about feeling and emotion The ‘affective turn’ argues that feeling is the organizing basis of cognition, not as source of mindless reinforcement , but as intextricably intertwined with cognition.

Rationality is organized around norms on the basis of which creatures like us are motivated purposefully. Affect doesn’t determine the relevance and significance of those goals mindlessly, but by informing us about our relative success or failure in achieving our norm-driven goals. Dominance hierarchies in mammals arent the product of dumb instinctive feeling. Rather, cognitively determined norms of social interaction are guided and policed by feelings. Human moral systems can be traced back to those norm-based dominance hierarchies in animals. Language skills allow us to add layers of tremendous complexity to social structures, giving the impression that human morality is qualitatively different than social cooperation in animals. But even seemingly simple behaviors like play, a skill many higher animals possess, shows their use of a morality of action. How does a. dog at play know not to bite to kill its partner? Is that a dumb reflex or a moral capacity?

For you and many others on this forum, morality is linked to a world with objectively determinable features, even if our pursuit of those objective truths can only ever be asymptotically achieved. Since that path of intellectual progress is not open to other species, neither is moral improvement a coherent goal for them. For me, the progress of human cognition is the continual remaking of a niche, which is the only world we will ever know. This progress doesn’t get us closer and closer to the way things ‘really are’, it just gets us fresher and farther from who we used to be. And it also opens up increasingly intimate and peaceful ways of understanding each other that I believe will eventually allow us to jettison our blame-based moralisms. What separates our ‘moral’ sense from that of animals is our ability to constantly transform and complexify our niche, whereas other species must live out their entire life within a single niche with its normative moral dictates.

This progress doesn’t get us closer and closer to the way things ‘really are’, it just gets us fresher and farther from who we used to be. And it also opens up increasingly intimate and peaceful ways of understanding each other that I believe will eventually allow us to jettison our blame-based moralisms. — Joshs

I think the tendency to blame is innate, and it seems unrealistic to me to think we will "jettison" such an innate tendency. I'd think at best humanity might come to have better recognition of the nature of blame arising in our minds, and the value in dealing with such in a skillful way.

Anyway, I'd be interested in hearing about how you imagine such a jettisoning occurring.

Have you read any Damasio? — Joshs

No. And the information you've provided seems very interesting. I appreciate it.

Supposedly, feeling is dumb, instinctive drive opposing itself to the ‘higher’ mental processes of rational cognition. — Joshs

The ‘affective turn’ argues that feeling is the organizing basis of cognition, not as source of mindless reinforcement , but as intextricably intertwined with cognition. — Joshs

Sorry, it's not clear to me. Are the two above, opposing (or at least divergent) views.

Which, if any, are you suggesting my current belief seems to "follow"? (Not asked, to turn around and 'aha' you. Asked so I can Guage how poorly I'm expressing my thoughts)
Which, if any, do you currently prefer?

Affect doesn’t determine the relevance and significance of those goals mindlessly, but by informing us about our relative success or failure in achieving our norm-driven goals. — Joshs

My hope would be that you address my question above with reference to my last post and not how I respond here. But the immediately preceding makes sense to me, and so far presents no problem with my "thinking" (not to deny my previous post may inadvertently appear to suggest other
wise)

Language skills allow us to add layers of tremendous complexity to social structures, giving the impression that human morality is qualitatively different than social cooperation in animals — Joshs

Ah! OK. Yah, I admit, that is compelling me to (at the very least) rethink. Thank you.

For you and many others on this forum, morality is linked to a world with objectively determinable features, even if our pursuit of those objective truths can only ever be asymptotically achieved. — Joshs

For me, the progress of human cognition is the continual remaking of a niche, which is the only world we will ever know. This progress doesn’t get us closer and closer to the way things ‘really are’, it just gets us fresher and farther from who we used to be — Joshs

Hmm. I'm saying this smiling, but had you not told me what my position is (and I accept I may have inadvertently expressed it thar way); had you simply presented me with those views, I would jump at the latter and reject the former (unless I'm not quite sure how you mean asymptotically achieved(?) Is that because of my reference to the "gap"? Did I reference gap? Maybe not)

Any way, your information is very helpful, and nicely articulated. Especially below, which again I seem to think fits in exactly with my views. Go figure.

And it also opens up increasingly intimate and peaceful ways of understanding each other that I believe will eventually allow us to jettison our blame-based moralisms. — Joshs

Thanks again!

How would one demonstrate that virtue, in the context of such venerable system building, is an exception?

MacIntyre's theses are difficult to adequately sum up. It might be worth quoting his warning from the second edition:

It is important to note that I am not claiming that Aristotelian moral theory is able to exhibit its rational superiority in terms that would be acceptable to the protagonists of the dominant post-Enlightenment moral
philosophies, so that in theoretical contests in the arenas of modernity, Aristotelians might be able to defeat Kantians, utilitarians, and contractarians. Not only is this evidently not so, but in those same arenas Aristotelianism is bound to appear and does appear as just one more type
of moral theory, one whose protagonists have as much and as little hope of defeating their rivals as do utilitarians, Kantians, or contractarians.

The Enlightenment demand that ethics be explained in "objective terms," where "objective" has been redefined to be something like "without reference to social practice," (or even, "without reference to minds") is itself what is broken for MacIntyre. It's akin to asking "what are the differences between men and women sans enviornment." It doesn't make sense because humans cannot exist outside an enviornment. "Objectivity: A Very Short Introduction," is a really great, short work on these issues. Unfortunately , a great deal of analytic philosophy seems to focus on trying to fix this terminally defective vision of objectivity and its relation to truth, whereas some Continental philosophy sometimes seems to lapse into using it as a strawman to dismiss "all prior philosophy."

Aristotle was aware of the role of social context in shaping the human good. Indeed, one of the critiques MacIntyre has of Aristotle is that his ethics seems truncated in that it cannot apply outside the bounds of the polis, cutting slaves and barbarians off from a "common good." This is an issue resolved by later thinkers in the tradition.

However, while we can't say things about individuals' telos outside of any context, we might be able to say things about man's telos that hold for all contexts (or at least, all realistic/historical contexts.) MacIntyre suggests meta goods that one can observe vis-á-vis the "good life": "the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is.” The virtues are those qualities/habits that “achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.”

And I'd argue that there appear to be good arguments for such meta virtues. For example, Plato's"being ruled over by the rational part of the soul," seems to contain a constellation of traits that are necessary for being self-determining and self-governing, for being a good learner, and for "living a good life." A person who is ruled over by appetites and passions cannot transcend their current beliefs and desires; their actions are determined by a mere part of themselves.

Even for the nihilist, the rule of reason seems important. It seems that "this is good," cannot simply be another way to say "I currently prefer this," since it's clear that we can often make choices that we agree were "bad for us." The Good seems to at least have to also involve "what we will prefer to have done in the future." But then there are "facts of the matter," related to what we will prefer to have done in the future, and determining and acting according to these facts requires the traits associated with Plato's "rule of reason." The philosopher who denies this is essentially saying that we can never be wrong about what is good for us. But if this is the case, Plato's critique of Protagoras in the Theatetus applies. If no one can ever be wrong, there is no point in having philosophers or teachers, engaging in discourse, or even thinking before we act.

But looking for "what is necessary for the 'good life' in all contexts," is already moving away from MacIntyre's more poignant criticism of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment era ethics. The more important question would seem to be: "in what context is the good life for man best achieved." This is sort of (in a vague way) like the difference between trying to find the optimal point on a social welfare function and trying to find the input conditions that produce the best possible social welfare function (i.e. finding the utility maximizing point on some single line versus figuring out which inputs create the lines with the highest peaks.)

I've generally suspected that most, if not all philosophy or theory, is rationalisation after emotion.

It's a consistent explanation for sure. By contrast, most moral nihilists are not epistemic nihilists. They want to deny that the judgements of practical reason (judging good versus bad) have any truth value (or that such judgements are always false). But then they also want to have it that the judgements of theoretical reason do have truth values. Indeed, they often use evidence to support their claims of nihilism, which presupposes some ability to distinguish truth from falsity. But you really can't have one coherently without the other.

But I think you will have a problem explaining how it is the natural philosophy eventually gave us penicillin, air planes, and cars. If all theory is just following emotions, why should the tools of reason appear to work so much better than simply doing what one prefers?

Is MacIntyre's advocacy of a coherent moral framework (essentially by way of Aristotle), not just an example of that which pleases him emotionally or aesthetically? It also seems to be an appeal to tradition.

In the classical tradition, part of what makes the Good good is precisely that it is emotionally and aesthetically pleasing, so it seems impossible that it could be an either/or. The virtuous man, by definition, enjoys virtuous action. For Plato, the philosopher has eros (erotic appetitive desire) and love (the attraction of the passions) for the Good. The higher part of the soul has reached down and oriented the "whole person," to the Good. If a theory of the good isn't beautiful and pleasing we should question it's legitimacy.

Anyhow, I find such "arguments from psychoanalysis" border on being their own category of fallacy. Someone having emotional reasons to want their position to be true in no way precludes their being correct. If the Celtics are up 126-89 with 30 seconds left in the game, my being a Celtics fan in no way undermines my judgement that they are going to win the game. You can generally think up reasons for why someone "wants x to be the case," for essentially every argument. E.g., "extreme relativism is appealing because it means there is no responsibility and we never have to feel guilty," etc. It seems to be a fact of human nature that people want to both know the truth and to be seen to be responsible "agents of truth," which in turn means there is virtually always an emotional reason to desire that what one is arguing for us true.

I have generally assumed that one can be a virtuous serial killer if one values excellence in a slightly different way to usual intersubjective custom. But is this difference an indication of flawed reasoning, or simply a different way of constructing values? What makes a value immutable?

Consider other things we construct; say an automobile. You can construct an automobile many different ways according to all sorts of different tastes. You might be able to construct an infinite number of different automobiles. Yet it remains true that there are very many ways to construct an automobile such that it fails to do the things that automobiles are supposed to do, fails to do them well, or simply fails to be an automobile at all.

It doesn't seem that value should have to be immutable to be objective, grounded in something outside emotion, or subject to rational understanding. From the classical view, it seems like what we generally term value has to relate to relative good. What would be immutable is the Good which mutable things participate in.

A very thoughtful and nuanced response.

MacIntyre suggests meta goods that one can observe vis-á-vis the "good life": "the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is.” The virtues are those qualities/habits that “achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.” — Count Timothy von Icarus

This kind of frame seems circular.

A person who is ruled over by appetites and passions cannot transcend their current beliefs and desires; their actions are determined by a mere part of themselves. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps, but I'm not certain if this is true or how common it is for anyone to transcend their beliefs and desires, regardless of passions. But I can see the point. Are there not those who consider one's passion to be a driver towards radical reappraisal of self, a la Nietzsche?

But I think you will have a problem explaining how it is the natural philosophy eventually gave us penicillin, air planes, and cars. If all theory is just following emotions, why should the tools of reason appear to work so much better than simply doing what one prefers? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is it not the case that humans find results emotionally satisfying? One reason people embrace scientism might be the notion that only science, with continual demonstration of its effectiveness, can provide us with reliable knowledge about reality. You can see how emotionally satisfying this might be.

But looking for "what is necessary for the 'good life' in all contexts," is already moving away from MacIntyre's more poignant criticism of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment era ethics. The more important question would seem to be: "in what context is the good life for man best achieved." This is sort of (in a vague way) like the difference between trying to find the optimal point on a social welfare function and trying to find the input conditions that produce the best possible social welfare function (i.e. finding the utility maximizing point on some single line versus figuring out which inputs create the lines with the highest peaks.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this is a good point. But isn't it the case that MacIntyre is a type of Christian (a Thomist?) so he is bound to see the world as having intrinsic meaning. Surely underpinning his views is that God's nature is conceived as perfectly good, and moral values and obligations are grounded in this divine nature. The enlightenment, from his worldview must be an affront to the classical tradition (in theology, if not philosophy).

I am fine with people engaging in discourse and making agreements about what they think society should do and what is best pragmatically in certain situations. But one mustn't mistake this for absolute truth. It's just an ongoing and evolving conversation and the source of morality therein lies within human society and its evolving beliefs and practices rather than in any external, objective or 'perfect' reality.

Where the rubber hits the road is when we talk about specific moral issues. This is more interesting than the interminable debate about whether morality is objective or not. What to do about abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, trans rights, etc? I think we'd learn a lot more from these sorts of conversations - where an actual issue is explored - rather than partake in more theoretical embroidery.

It doesn't seem that value should have to be immutable to be objective, grounded in something outside emotion, or subject to rational understanding. From the classical view, it seems like what we generally term value has to relate to relative good. What would be immutable is the Good which mutable things participate in. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Fair point.

I'll respond to the rest later, but it's worth pointing out that that MacIntyre's interest in Thomism, and his conversion to Catholicism, come after the publication of After Virtue. That is, the causal chain seems to be sort of the reverse; he becomes Catholic in part because he believes the ethical arguments, he doesn't make the arguments because he is Catholic.

MacIntyre was not a Christian for much of his long career. He was an agnostic Marxist and wrote in support of/to develop Marxism early on, largely from the perspective of analytical philosophy. You can see an interest in Christianity that predates his conversion, but it's filtered through Marxism. He's publishing largely on Hume, Marx, Hegel, and Marcuse, not Aristotle, Augustine, or Aquinas, who he turns to later. Indeed, a flaw in After Virtue, at least from my perspective, is that it fails to adequately account for how metaphysics and epistemology are essential to ethics in the classical/Christian tradition, and this seems to be because he embraces the ethics without having yet come around on the metaphysics.

After Virtue comes out in 1981 and is the fruit of his growing dissatisfaction with Marxism, which he has been publishing in favor of for about three decades at this point. To hear him tell it (and his story is backed up by the order of publication), the first thing that happens is he loses his faith in Marxism and begins to think that Nietzsche, Hume, and the other "masters of suspicion," really don't understand or have good arguments vis-á-vis pre-Enlightenment ethics. The interest in Aquinas seems to flow from interest in Aristotle, which makes sense in terms of Aquinas being the most famous Aristotlean. His religious conversion then seems to follow from the shift in philosophical beliefs, or at least being concurrent with it, rather than him writing After Virtue as a sort of apology for beliefs he has always held.

It's also pretty clear from some of the witty barbs that he has become even more disillusioned with analytic philosophy than with Marxism.

I'll respond to the rest later, but it's worth pointing out that that cocoon interest in Thomism, and his conversion to Catholicism, come after the publication of After Virtue. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I thought you might argue this. But he's obviously been working through religious perspectives for some time and his official conversion came shortly after the book came out. As you suggest, I'd bet that he's been thinking along these lines for many years. I've known a number of Marxists and atheist like this. As it happens, both Wayfarer and I have been waiting for Nagel to come out as a theist, but perhaps it won't happen.

His religious conversion then seems to follow from the shift in philosophical beliefs, or at least being concurrent with it, rather than him writing After Virtue as a sort of apology for beliefs he has always held. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'd probably argue that After Virtue is a transitional work. Never intended to suggest it was more significant than this.

Indeed, a flaw in After Virtue, at least from my perspective, is that it fails to adequately account for how metaphysics and epistemology are essential to ethics in the classical/Christian tradition, and this seems to be because he embraces the ethics without having yet come around on the metaphysics. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe he just needed to believe in something transcendent for emotional reasons and the metaphysics might have come later. :wink: I've often thought Marxism was held by many as a kind of a substitute for religion.

This kind of frame seems circular.

How so? Even if the human good is just defined by personal preference, it is clear that people can make choices that they themselves regret. Hence, people say things like "I have ruined my life," or complain that "my life has become meaningless to me."

It's also clear that "what is good," is generally not obvious. People often make choices that, upon later analysis, they decide were bad. "If I only knew then what I know now," etc. And people often disagree about what the Good consists in.

In this case, certain meta-virtues seem essential, in that people will need both the epistemic virtues required to investigate what the Good is and the self-control to be able to make themselves act on that knowledge.

The nihilist might say, "but there is no Good, so any search is doomed." However, it's hard to see how they can know this from the outset. The Good—like truth, freedom, conciousness, and beauty—has been hard to decisively pin down—to give "a philosophically adequate explanation of," (at least based on some standards.) But that hardly means it can be eliminated. No on buys a car without any consideration of if it is a "good car." The same is true with all sorts of considerations. It is quite impossible to live one's life without reference to practical reason. The nihilist can't leave practical judgement behind, they still live their life according to it. So, it seems strange that they'd not want to investigate it at all.

Think about it this way: people don't knowingly want to believe falsehoods. People are often upset with what the truth reveals itself to be. They might even prefer to not know the details of certain specific truths. However, we don't want to be fundamentally deluded about the basics of being itself, merely blundering through life. If Aristotle is correct, and there is an identifiable purpose to human life that can effectively guide us to happiness and flourishing, who would want to remain ignorant of this fact? It seems like everyone would want to know it. But then certain virtues are required for exploring this question effectively.

Likewise, if the Good reduces to personal preference, it is still true that we can make better or worse choices relative to this deflated Good. And our ability to make better choices still seems predicated on knowledge about the world and ourselves and the exercise of self-control, so certain meta-virtues still show up as beneficial.

Perhaps, but I'm not certain if this is true or how common it is for anyone to transcend their beliefs and desires, regardless of passions.

It seems ubiquitous. People are attached to their opinions because they are their opinions. We have a desire to be right and to be seen as being right (i.e., as responsible agents of truth). So if you ever work on fixing a car, plumbing, electrical, etc. with someone else, you will invariably run into disagreements about what is broken, and people tend to defend their own diagnoses, and this is a source of many arguments. But when one party definitively shows, "hey, look, this is disconnected, that's why it won't start," it's not at all uncommon for the other party to say, even if grudgingly, "oh, you're right, I was wrong."

The same sort of thing shows up and a fact is looked up, e.g., "who won the World Series in 2004." It's a trivial example, but a common one. Faced with a truth that cuts against current belief and desire the person is forced to change in conformity with the truth, to go beyond current belief and desire.

Is it not the case that humans find results emotionally satisfying? One reason people embrace scientism might be the notion that only science, with continual demonstration of its effectiveness, can provide us with reliable knowledge about reality. You can see how emotionally satisfying this might be.

Sure. "All men by nature desire to know." But the contention wasn't "emotion is never involved in science, mathematics, etc.," it was against the claim that reason reveals itself to be "nothing but," emotion, i.e., that rational decisionmaking occurs "rarely if ever."

But I am not sure how you plausibly explain the development of the natural philosophy into the modern scientific method or mathematical proofs being emotion "all the way down." It doesn't seem like any methodology for solving problems should be any better than any other in this case — all claims about methodology would reduce to emotional preferences.

I am fine with people engaging in discourse and making agreements about what they think society should do and what is best pragmatically in certain situations. But one mustn't mistake this for absolute truth. It's just an ongoing and evolving conversation and the source of morality therein lies within human society and its evolving beliefs and practices rather than in any external, objective or 'perfect' reality.

Isn't the "mustn't" there an ought statement? But wouldn't this just be an expression of emotion? Or something to the effect of "I am fine with people discussing things so long as it is frivolous. But no one can make meaningful decisions about how society works unless their position agrees with my view."

But this seems like an odd view to hold if you think all assertions of truth are just assertions of current preferences. If this were itself true, it seems quite impossible that people could ever be wrong about what is good, so what here is the "mustn't" about?

Anyhow, this is sort of the essence of bourgeois metaphysics. Everyone is entitled to their own beliefs so long as they are beliefs about things that make no real difference. But of course, "[questions of morality are] just an ongoing and evolving conversation and the source of morality therein lies within human society and its evolving beliefs and practices rather than in any external, objective or 'perfect' reality," is itself a truth claim, and it one that seems to be justifying an all encompassing view of what constitutes proper governance and the shape of human life.