I think the problem is that those who attempt to reduce moral deliberation to some set of self consistent propositions forget that what is at issue is not an abstracted analysis of the truth of moral propositions, but how our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think.

Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others — Leontiskos

Should the moral proposition, 'you must not abort a fetus but carry it to term' be binding? What makes this proposition either true or false? By what moral authority can this be determined and by what force is it made binding?

:up:

I don't understand what you mean by saying:
but then moral propositions do not exist, which seems pretty absurd. — Bob Ross

Can you explain?

A moral proposition is any proposition which is normative that pertains to what is morally good. Propositions like “I believe <...>” are NOT normative and do not pertain to what is morally good: they are non-normative facts about one’s psychology.

The moral statements, of which the moral subjectivist was supposed to be arguing is still propositional, are like “one ought not torture babies”; but re-writing them like “I believe one ought not torture babies” transforms the statement into a proposition about one’s psychology and NOT about the original moral statement.

If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, then why can I not say that it is truly morally wrong for me?

There is nothing about “I believe torturing babies is wrong” being true that obligates you not to torture babies: it is a non-normative statement about your belief about babies being tortured. It isn’t expressing that “I shouldn’t torture babies”.

:up:

I think the easier rejoinder might be to let go of one or the other belief, if they agree with the argument, but redefine Moral Subjectivism in a palatable way -- for instance, a Moral Subjectivist will often say that it's not beliefs about the Moral Proposition which make it true, but our sentiments which make it true -- there's not a cognitive justification so much as a cognitive expression of feeling. What makes "One ought not murder the innocent" true is that when a person says

(1) "One ought not murder the innocent",

that statements means

(2) "I feel like murdering the innocent is abhorrent"

What you just described is moral non-cognitivism (e.g., emotivism); and NOT moral subjectivism. You have abandoned moral subjectivism for a different position; which, prima facie, is fine but does not contend with my OP.

- As long as it is meant to binding then it fulfills the necessary condition I set out—a necessary condition which subjectivism and emotivism do not meet. Prohibitions against abortion are the same kind of propositions as prohibitions against murder. To say more would be to go beyond the scope of this thread and the argument at hand, and to move into a discussion of your personal political positions, which is probably what you are aiming at.

The problem wouldn't be that these beliefs are arbitrary, but rather that they are determined by a biology, social and personal history, etc. that can be completely explained without any reference to "goodness," e.g., for the eliminitivist/epiphenomenalism, an explanation entirely in mechanical terms. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think I would conclude that this can be distilled into 'arbitrary'. We use that term in reference to basically 'unchangeable' characteristics elsewhere, so it seems apt here to me.I think that even on what you quoted, this still fits if you insert your description in place of arbitrary, and the flavour, for me, remains the same. But, this is all to say i more-or-less agree intuitively ..just in this context, anything but some external moral influence of some objective nature (whcih, I don't believe exists) is required to defeat the arbitrary label.

So, it seems that the truth value of a proposition can be more or less independent of beliefs about it. In some cases, they seem like there will be quite a bit of interdependence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with this. This might be what you're, in general, outlining, but it seems to me nothing moral at all to accept this.

I think it does though. My criticism is that P1 begs the question. — Lionino

I think the moral subjectivism will outright reject that very first premise. — Lionino

The discontinuity here is what I was 'agreeing' with. Not many subjectivists would accept that premise. This, to me, indicates it doesn't capture the position well. Perhaps this is just bad wording.

you would have to transform moral judgments from “one ought to X” to “I believe one ought to X”. — Bob Ross

This appears to be the only rational case in terms of encapsulating moral claims. I think it is simply ignoring, for convenience, the first two words, that has caused much of the debates. Obviously, to me, this precludes any moral realism, but that's by the by in terms of discussing this point.
But, even if some moral P is true in virtue of it being veridical in some weird, unascertainable metaphysical way, one's belief simply has no connection with that fact (by definition, here). The belief is still essentially a best-guess guised as a belief.
EDITED IN THE NEXT DAY: I see you, Bob, have noted this elsewhere. Sorry for repeating.

As long as it is meant to binding then it fulfills the necessary condition I set out—a necessary condition which subjectivism and emotivism do not meet. — Leontiskos

What I am questioning is the claim that some as yet unspecified set of obligations are binding. I am also asking how it is determined that these moral propositions are objective and true?

To say more would be to go beyond the scope of this thread and the argument at hand ... — Leontiskos

To not say more is to skirt the issue at hand. If you are claiming that there are objective moral truths then you must not simply assert that they exist, but provide and defend at least some of them.

Prohibitions against abortion are the same kind of propositions as prohibitions against murder. — Leontiskos

There are significant differences that render the comparison problematic and questionable.
There is a generally accepted distinction between killing and murder. Murder is by definition wrong, killing is not. There are cases where killing is regarded as acceptable.

The point is not to argue the morality of abortion but rather to point to the fact that it is arguable moral issue. Rational people are unable to agree. That should not be the case with propositions that are objectively true.

... and to move into a discussion of your personal political positions, which is probably what you are aiming at. — Leontiskos

The relation between morality or ethics and political philosophy is important but is not what I am aiming at.

According to Wikipedia ethical subjectivism is cognitive-propositional, and I have found this to be the case among self-professed subjectivists. I don't think you are disputing this even though your thesis draws near to emotivism, but here is the problem I see with subjectivism and emotivism:

Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others
Subjectivist and emotivist propositions are in no way binding upon oneself and others
Therefore, subjectivist and emotivist propositions are not moral propositions

(I.e. Subjectivism and emotivism are therefore not moral theories, because they fail to achieve normativity.)

"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. Feelings do not seem to be adequate to justify moral propositions. Going back to the OP, I would say that it is not only beliefs that are inadequate to justify moral propositions, but that feelings are also inadequate. — Leontiskos

Thanks for the correction. So a subjectivist must be cognitivist. I didn't understand that.

EDIT: Oh, regarding the end -- what makes feelings inadequate? And what if they aren't justifiers so much as truth-makers?

What you just described is moral non-cognitivism (e.g., emotivism); and NOT moral subjectivism. You have abandoned moral subjectivism for a different position; which, prima facie, is fine but does not contend with my OP. — Bob Ross

Got it.

Then consider this rendition that's not quite emotivism, but is an attempt at reformulating the thesis to avoid your contradiction.

The cognitive aspect is the truth of moral propositions.

Truth isn't a truth-maker, though. In the same way that states of affairs make statements true (but the state of affairs isn't truth) so goes it that the sentiments make moral propositions true.

The moral proposition is still true, but truth is not an emotion, and so it's perfectly fine to claim that emotions are the truth-makers of moral propositions.

I think the problem is that those who attempt to reduce moral deliberation to some set of self consistent propositions forget that what is at issue is not an abstracted analysis of the truth of moral propositions, but how our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think. — Fooloso4

How our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think is certainly more important to my mind than these exercises in categorization.

But we don't need to be too serious all the time, and there's something fun in the exercise, I think

Thanks for the correction. So a subjectivist must be cognitivist. I didn't understand that. — Moliere

I don't know that you deviated from cognitivism. You spoke of "a cognitive expression of feeling," which is a bit opaque but still prima facie cognitive. My point was that whether we are talking about subjectivism (cognitivism) or emotivism (non-cognitivism), they both seem to fail for the same reason.

EDIT: Oh, regarding the end -- what makes feelings inadequate? And what if they aren't justifiers so much as truth-makers? — Moliere

I don't think they are truth-makers either. I just don't see how feelings confer moral obligations. I think the burden of proof is on the person who claims that their mere feelings establish moral obligations of some kind.

...so goes it that the sentiments make moral propositions true. — Moliere

Are you just playing devil's advocate, or do you actually believe that feelings can make moral propositions true? I mean, I don't usually say, "I wonder if I have an obligation to do such-and-such? Let me check in with Moliere's feelings to know for sure..." :razz:

- If you want to start a thread on abortion or the epistemology of moral obligation or intractable disagreement then you should go do that; I'm not biting on the derailment.

I don't know that you deviated from cognitivism. You spoke of "a cognitive expression of feeling," which is a bit opaque but still prima facie cognitive. — Leontiskos

True, but I could see how I slipped from cognitivism at the beginning into emotivism at the end when going back and re-reading, so it was muddled and confusing. I think I'm being clear now.

My point was that whether we are talking about subjectivism (cognitivism) or emotivism (non-cognitivism), they both seem to fail for the same reason. — Leontiskos

I don't think they are truth-makers either. I just don't see how feelings confer moral obligations. I think the burden of proof is on the person who claims that their mere feelings establish moral obligations of some kind. — Leontiskos

Are you just playing devil's advocate, or do you actually believe that feelings can make moral propositions true? I mean, I don't usually say, "I wonder if I have an obligation to do such-and-such? Let me check in with Moliere's feelings to know for sure..." :razz: — Leontiskos

I'm playing with the idea, yeah, but I also genuinely doubt that the position must be internally inconsistent -- usually there's a way to accommodate criticism.

I think people take up duties out of emotional commitments to something or someone, and if they cease to have that emotional tie then the duty loses its appeal and what was a commitment becomes an ideal.

So, in a practical sense at least, our feelings are very important when it comes to moral propositions and maintaining duty.

True, but I could see how I slipped from cognitivism at the beginning into emotivism at the end when going back and re-reading, so it was muddled and confusing. — Moliere

Fair enough, although I think subjectivism easily falls into all of these ruts.

I'm playing with the idea, yeah, but I also genuinely doubt that the position must be internally inconsistent... — Moliere

I think it's mistaken but not necessarily inconsistent.

I think people take up duties out of emotional commitments to something or someone, and if they cease to have that emotional tie then the duty loses its appeal and what was a commitment becomes an ideal.

So, in a practical sense at least, our feelings are very important when it comes to moral propositions and maintaining duty. — Moliere

I would want to say that emotion often reinforces duty, but does not cause duty. For example, a friendship implies duties to the friend, and there will be an emotional reinforcement of this reality, but it does not follow that the duty derives from the emotion. In this case you have a rational emotion, because it is reinforcing a true duty. But given that there are also irrational emotions, emotion is not the per se thing that informs practical reason. We legitimately act from emotion-as-a-sign, but not from emotion-as-a-cause. We should say, "This emotion probably signifies that I have a good reason to do such-and-such," not, "This emotion proves that I should do such-and-such." A key problem with emotion-based moral theories is that they fail to make sense of the fact that moral obligations sometimes require us to ignore the emotions at play. Going back to Plato, the passions are not primary; they should not constitute the charioteer. They are secondary, and as such can be well-formed or malformed.

Edit: I actually think subjectivism is a cultural phenomenon, deriving from the you-can't-tell-me-what-to-do culture. Peter Simpson has a nice excursus on this in his, “On Doing Wrong, Modern-Style,” in Vices, Virtues, and Consequences. Subjectivist claims are not meant to be "binding upon oneself and others" (). Instead they are rooted in a defensive posture which wishes to safeguard personal autonomy. Emotion-based claims dovetail well with this, for they are not binding on anyone, and therefore infringe on personal autonomy in no way at all. But my initial point holds, for what is at stake is more of a teenager's attitude than an ethical theory. Of course, as Simpson points out, there is one traditional moral proposition present in the you-can't-tell-me-what-to-do attitude, namely the absolute prohibition against autonomy infringement.

- Aquinas' article on this topic is sort of fun to look at:

Article 1. Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?

[...]

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good."

I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (I-II:18:5). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.

[...] — Aquinas, ST I-II.24.1

The quote from Augustine in the sed contra is actually very interesting as far as Thomistic moral philosophy goes. For Thomas all of the passions (emotions) are rooted in natural love. For example, fear is aversion to future evil, and because aversion to evil is always rooted in love of that which the evil destroys, fear is rooted in (natural) love. So if my dog develops a lump and I fearfully take him to the vet, I possess an aversion to a possible future evil (harm to my dog) which derives from my love for my dog. Following Augustine, if my love for my dog is properly ordered, then the fear I experience will be good. For example, even the simple fact that I took him to the vet is fear-induced, and it is presumably a good act, motivated by good fear. Yet if my love for my dog is disordered/evil, then the fear that I experience will be disordered/evil. For example, it may be out of proportion, tending to imbalance me in an undue manner.

There is nothing about “I believe torturing babies is wrong” being true that obligates you not to torture babies: it is a non-normative statement about your belief about babies being tortured. It isn’t expressing that “I shouldn’t torture babies”. — Bob Ross

There is nothing about any moral proposition that obligates anyone to adhere to it. If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, I am unlikely to torture babies,

If I say, "I believe torturing babies is wrong" then that amounts to saying, "I believe no one should torture babies". It follows that I believe it to be a normative claim. Saying Torturing babies is wrong" is really just shorthand for the former "I believe......"

How do moral propositions become normative under your view? Does it require that they be believed by many people? How many people would be sufficient or insufficient?

a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief — Bob Ross

The first part of the above quoted is what you are setting out to prove, the second part I can't figure out what it means. What is the part that can't be coherently evaluated? "One ought not to kill"? All the parts of the phrase are well-defined and refer to outside things, even "ought", which is that a course of action is preferrable over another. Janus expressed the same feeling above. The MS evaluates the proposition according to whether he believes it or not. Yes, the belief includes the proposition, is your argument that this goes in a circle?

I tried reading 's post to understand but, unless you are referring to MSs that do explicitly convert moral propositions X to «I believe X», I don't see how the view is inconsistent, and P1 will still beg the question.

Truth isn't a truth-maker, though. In the same way that states of affairs make statements true (but the state of affairs isn't truth) so goes it that the sentiments make moral propositions true.

The moral proposition is still true, but truth is not an emotion, and so it's perfectly fine to claim that emotions are the truth-makers of moral propositions.

This is what a moral subjectivist would be inclined to say; but it isn’t a rejoinder to my OP: as far as I can tell, you just explicated the position that I was arguing is internally inconsistent. What you described, is that a belief about a proposition can make that proposition true or false.

There is nothing about any moral proposition that obligates anyone to adhere to it. If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, I am unlikely to torture babies,

If “I should not torture babies” is true, then you are obligated to not torture babies. You can’t affirm that it is true that “I should not torture babies” without conceding it is true that I shouldn’t torture babies: that’s incoherent.

It follows that I believe it to be a normative claim.

But it wouldn’t be a normative claim, and that’s the point.

How do moral propositions become normative under your view?

If the proposition expresses something about how something ought to be. Saying “I believe one ought to ...” is not a proposition about what ought to be: it is about what one believes ought to be.

What you described, is that a belief about a proposition can make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

The proposition is "One ought X"

The feeling is not a proposition, and since all beliefs are propositional, the proposition is not being justified by a belief -- the justification is non-cognitive, but the belief, that one ought X, is cognitive.

a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief — Bob Ross

The first part of the above quoted is what you are setting out to prove, the second part I can't figure out what it means. What is the part that can't be coherently evaluated? "One ought not to kill"? All the parts of the phrase are well-defined and refer to outside things, even "ought", which is that a course of action is preferrable over another. Janus expressed the same feeling above. The MS evaluates the proposition according to whether he believes it or not. Yes, the belief includes the proposition, is your argument that this goes in a circle?

In that quote of me, I was presupposing that one understands the nature of a proposition: they are always objective and absolute. If one wants to deny that, then they are not talking about propositions in the traditional sense of the word. I have never met a moral subjectivist that would deny this point.

Propositions are not made true or false relative to beliefs about them; and this is why the moral subjectivist wants to rewrite “one ought ...” to “I believe one ought ...”. Saying “one ought ...” is true or false relative to a belief is incoherent with the nature of a proposition: it would no longer be truth-apt.

unless you are referring to MSs that do explicitly convert moral propositions X to «I believe X»,

If you think that X, which is a proposition, is true or false relative to a belief about it; then you don’t understand what a proposition is. Propositions are truth-apt, and they can only be truth-apt if they express something objective. That’s why a moral subjectivist has to rewrite them.
Another way to think about it, is that if a belief about X made X true or false; then X is just the belief. You can’t have a separate claim which is being verified by a belief about it. That’s patently incoherent.

I am not following, I guess. Are you saying that moral judgments are propositional, but that they are made true by desires? E.g., "one ought not X" is true or false relative to whether or not "I desire one ought not X"?

If so, then that is plagued by the same issue: a desire about a proposition cannot make it true; and that's why emotivists reject that moral judgments are propositional---they have to.

I am not following, I guess. Are you saying that moral judgments are propositional, but that they are made true by desires? E.g., "one ought not X" is true or false relative to whether or not "I desire one ought not X"? — Bob Ross

Yes.

If so, then that is plagued by the same issue: a desire about a proposition cannot make it true; and that's why emotivists reject that moral judgments are propositional---they have to.

I don't think the desire is about the proposition, though. In the abstract it's just a desire -- but the object of desire is not the proposition, but rather what the proposition is about. What justifies "One ought X" is that the speaker is sincerely committed to what the proposition is about -- it's the emotional commitment that makes it true, under this rendition.

So what say you?

You are just saying "an emotional commitment makes the proposition true or false" with different words; and that is incoherent.

The only other thing I could envision you saying here, is that you are not commenting on whether or not the proposition is true or not with desires; instead, the desires just tell us whether or not a person behaves as though it were true. That would provide a gap between the proposition and the desire that isn't incoherent; but, then, it becomes an open-question what your position is on the actual moral proposition (judgment). The original question you are supposed to be addressing is whether or not moral judgements are propositional, true, and objective; and not whether or not people treat moral judgments as if they are propositional based off of their desires.

But we don't need to be too serious all the time, and there's something fun in the exercise, I think — Moliere

I took the tone of the thread to be serious. I find any serious attempt to think about ethics in terms of the construction and assault on categories comical.

I am reminded of Arthur Koestler's definition of philosophy:

The systematic abuse of a terminology specially invented for that purpose.

(The Act of Creation)

And, for good measure, from Wittgenstein:

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight.

(CV, p. 47)

If you want to start a thread on abortion or the epistemology of moral obligation or intractable disagreement then you should go do that; I'm not biting on the derailment. — Leontiskos

I don't know if you are trying to avoid addressing the problems raised by declaring them out of bounds or if you are simply unable to see what is at issue. What is at issue is the claim that moral subjectism (sic) is internally inconsistent. In support of that claim you say:

Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others — Leontiskos

but when I question what it means to be binding you complain it is a derailment.

You claim that:

The question is whether ethics concerns statements of type (1) or type (2). — Leontiskos

and:

When we do philosophy we are usually concerned with statements of type (1) — Leontiskos

The type 1 proposition you cite is: 2+2=4. If ethics and more generally philosophy is concerned with this type of proposition then the problem of agreement with some propositions of this type such as 2+2=4 and disagreement with others of this type such as abortion needs to be explained. Once again, what is at issue is not abortion but the lack of agreement regarding moral propositions. When I point to this problem you complain it is a derailment.

You say "the epistemology of moral obligation" is a derailment and yet you ask:

When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? — Leontiskos

If we are inquiring into whether something is right or wrong then the question of how we know that something is right or wrong is not a derailment. If it is of the indisputable, demonstrable, objective type 1 then it is not a derailment to point out that moral propositions are not true to type.

The original question you are supposed to be addressing is whether or not moral judgements are propositional, true, and objective; and not whether or not people treat moral judgments as if they are propositional based off of their desires. — Bob Ross

I'd say the position I'm forging here believes that moral judgments are propositional, true, and subjective.

"One ought X" means "I feel commitment to Y" (be it due to disgust or love, it doesn't matter, it only matters that there's an attachment).

So "One ought X" can be true or false on the basis of whether or not the speaker feels commitment to Y because that's all that "One ought X" means -- it may look like it's talking about these objective oughts, and due to being in the form of a statement it's true or false, but the statement is actually about feelings of commitment, and it also acts as a sort of imperative: Not only I feel, but because "One ought..." I also feel others should too.

The feeling isn't a proposition, but neither are red cups propositions -- red cups make "The cup is red" true, and likewise, under this rendition, feelings make "One ought X" true, so it fulfills the requirements of being propositional and true, just not being objective -- hence Subjectivism.

I took the tone of the thread to be serious — Fooloso4

Fair, I could be the one being too insulting here -- I like these exercizes, but I don't think the categorization of ethical stances is really too serious. Just kind of fun to think through.

Though every once and again I think the categorical exercise can help you trip across something you didn't think of. In a sense the "lightness" allows one to look at what we tend to think of in too serious a manner and look for its flaws more easily.

I think it's mistaken but not necessarily inconsistent. — Leontiskos

I'm less certain about it being mistaken, though that does not in turn mean I'm attracted to it either.

I'm still in the "playing around" phase.

I would want to say that emotion often reinforces duty, but does not cause duty. For example, a friendship implies duties to the friend, and there will be an emotional reinforcement of this reality, but it does not follow that the duty derives from the emotion. In this case you have a rational emotion, because it is reinforcing a true duty. But given that there are also irrational emotions, emotion is not the per se thing that informs practical reason. We legitimately act from emotion-as-a-sign, but not from emotion-as-a-cause. We should say, "This emotion probably signifies that I have a good reason to do such-and-such," not, "This emotion proves that I should do such-and-such." A key problem with emotion-based moral theories is that they fail to make sense of the fact that moral obligations sometimes require us to ignore the emotions at play. Going back to Plato, the passions are not primary; they should not constitute the charioteer. They are secondary, and as such can be well-formed or malformed. — Leontiskos

I don't like to separate reason from emotion in such a hard-and-fast manner. There's a difference, but it's more of a difference because we've marked it in English -- the Subjective and the Objective -- but I think there's too much philosophical hay made out of the distinction.

Neither the passions nor the mind are primary -- they form a unity that is the judger.