either way, i see Sams descriptions of freewill and morality as being entirely 'practical reasoning'...whatever that means :P
I see it as the same as anyone else's views in this area, just more coherent and defend-able.

I haven't made up my mind yet on the possibility of libertarian free will. I will say that if it does turn out to be impossible in a conceptual sense, in an a priori sense, just like the concept of a square circle is impossible, I would argue that desiring to have libertarian free will would make about as much sense as desiring to draw a square circle.Which is to say, it would make no sense to desire it. Because, why would you desire something that is not even conceptually possible, let alone physically possible?

i STILL dont see the difference...

obviously no one has a perfect model of another human being, we certainly dont have that capacity yet.
so what? i dont see your point. — PeterPants

I just argued that *even if* you had a perfect predictive/causal model of the behavior of a human being, that still would not tell you how it is that you ought to behave towards her. And that's because knowing how your interactions with (or manipulations of) that human being will affect her doesn't tell you whether you should do it. To gain knowledge of the potential effects of your actions is a matter of theoretical reasoning. To arrive at a decision regarding what it is that you ought to do is a matter of practical reasoning.

You have read The Moral Landscape, right? In that book Harris takes as an unquestionable premise that it is morally better that every sentient creature experience well-being rather than that every sentient creature feel crappy. From this unique premise, Harris purports to derive his "moral landscape" utilitarian theory. But the premise can't be supported by empirical scientific investigation. Harris is the first to admit this. In fact he pretends that only intuition can support it and that he doesn't know how to respond to someone who would deny it. So, Harris himself recognizes that his utilitarian theory can not rest entirely on a predictive/causal model of the behavior of human beings (and other sentient creatures). You need, in addition to any such model, however perfect or imperfect it might be, some premise or principle about what it is best to do. But deciding what is best to do, or arguing for the validity of moral principles is traditionally regarded to be a topic for practical reason. Harris rather regards it as a matter of faith in his own intuition and he simply voices astonishment that anyone else's intuition could be different.

He does insist, though, that any moral system requires some unquestioned premise. But this is merely to assume moral foundationalism. Principles of morality need not be structured similarly to a mathematical axiomatic system. Practical reason need not rest on rules of deductive inference at all.

I still entirely think your distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning is a distinction without a difference. or at least i fail to see how this argument about morality is diminished in the least due to this seemingly bizarre distinction.

I just argued that *even if* you had a perfect predictive/causal model of the behavior of a human being, that still would not tell you how it is that you ought to behave towards her. And that's because knowing how your interactions with (or manipulations of) that human being will affect her doesn't tell you whether you should do it. To gain knowledge of the potential effects of your actions is a matter of theoretical reasoning. To arrive at a decision regarding what it is that you ought to do is a matter of practical reasoning. — Pierre-Normand

I think your missing the point of a 'should'.. there are no 'should's' magically floating about in the void. A should must be couched upon a goal.
no one is claiming that anyone 'should' do anything as an abstract absolute, that would be silly.

what Sam claims, what i believe, is that IF you desire wellbeing, then you should strive to improve it. which is admittedly a completely obvious point.

So your main criticism of what im actually claiming, is simply not of a claim im actually making, nor is Sam IMO.

"Harris rather regards it as a matter of faith in his own intuition and he simply voices astonishment that anyone else's intuition could be different."

this is absolutely false, and based on your mistaken view of him claiming a should exists where it does not. he makes no claim that anyone should act this way as an absolute rule of reality. he is just saying that it is objectively better if people are well off, which is incredibly obvious.

The intention is the choosing; whether that choosing is conscious or not. You are confusing yourself by reifying abstract notions. — John

Intention is a desire that stimulates and directs action. I don't see what you find confusing.

The classical example concerns the nicotine addict who wishes that she would not desire to smoke but can't help but acting on this desire. If we imagine that she indeed is powerless in getting rid of her addiction (and may be blameless for her having acquired it, let us suppose) then, in a clear sense, her addiction constitutes a restriction on her freedom. — Pierre-Normand

When we talk about coercion we typically mean external coercion but there can also be internal coercion such as addictions, diseases or handicaps that force us to do something or prevent us from doing something, against some of our wishes, and thus constitute impediments to compatibilist free will.

On such a simple account, mature human beings wouldn't be anymore or any less free than dogs and cows are. However, we don't hold dogs and cows morally responsible for what they do (although we may reward or punish then when this is effective). So, there ought to be something more to our own freedom on account of which we can hold ourselves responsible for what we do than merely being uncoerced by external agents or circumstances. — Pierre-Normand

Sure, as I mentioned, humans have a higher level of consciousness than animals. This entails more capacity for compassion and more sophisticated intelligence, so we regard humans as more morally responsible than animals. Humans are also more free than animals in the sense that human intelligence enables them to find more ways or more effective ways to satisfy their desires and needs.

What you say here leads me to highlight something about litewave's determinism. According to it, there is no source of action that is not an "external coercion" or "external impediment"; whether it is "felt" or not is really a matter of indifference. The idea of a self that originates intention is simply seen as an illusion on that view. The whole notion of moral responsibility is logically inconsistent with such a view, which is what I have been, apparently unsuccessfully, trying to point out. On such a view all circumstances are extenuating circumstances. — John

I pointed out that humans have a higher level of consciousness than animals, with greater capacity for compassion and greater intelligence - and this constitutes grounds for their moral responsibility.

Yes, I think most compatibilists, because of the metaphysical picture that comes bundled up with the uncritically accepted doctrine of universal determinism, generally have a hard time distinguishing what it is in the aetiology of human action that constitutes external constraint to our freedom from what it is that is a constitutive part of (internal to) our power of free agency. — Pierre-Normand

I don't think compatibilists have a problem with distinguishing the constitutive part of free agency - they think that free agency consists in the ability to satisfy desires, carry out intentions. But libertarians surely have this problem because of their insistence on the incoherent concept of ultimate control. And by the way, compatibilists don't require that reality should be completely deterministic; they claim that free will is compatible with determinism and that a certain degree of determinism is necessary for the exercise of free will, simply so that we can determine our actions and cause what we want to cause.

The case where humans are being influenced by principles of rationality or morality is quite different. The principles of rationality are not part of the initial state of the universe or the laws of physics. — Pierre-Normand

If by principles of rationality you mean logic and mathematics then principles of rationality are pretty much features of the universe - that's why science is so successful in predicting the behavior of nature and in harnessing the behavior of nature in technology. The behavior of nature reaches its most complex manifestation in human consciousness and thought. Morality stems from this consciousness and thought, from the feelings of joy and pain, compassion and intelligence.

In the specific case of morality, looking for its source in our evolutionary past, for instance, leads one straight to the commission of the naturalistic fallacy. What makes something worthy of being valued can not be reduced to any sort of causal explanation as to why you actually came to value it. — Pierre-Normand

We value joy and hate pain; it actually seems to be true by definition: joy is that which is valued (accepted and sought) and pain is that which is hated (resisted and avoided). Evolution tends to arrange that that which is valued is useful for survival, health and reproduction, while that which is hated is the opposite. Thus our values are formed.

I still entirely think your distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning is a distinction without a difference. or at least i fail to see how this argument about morality is diminished in the least due to this seemingly bizarre distinction. — PeterPants

If someone tells you that she believes the weather will be rainy tomorrow, you can ask her why she believes it. If she tells you that she intents to spend her next vacations in Pyongyang you can ask her why she intends to do so. Although in both cases you are expecting her do provide you with some reason, those reasons also are expected to have different forms. In the first case you expect to be given some form of evidence for her beliefs while in the second case you expect, in addition to evidence, to learn something about her values, preferences or prior commitments, and/or her abilities and opportunities. Those latter practical considerations, though, are generally irrelevant to the rasons why someone believes something. If she would tell you that she believes that the weather will be rainy tomorrow because she is fed up with the recent sunny weather, that would be irrational.

The distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning is very commonplace in philosophy (since, at least, Aristotle who has done much to articulate the distinctive forms of practical and theoretical syllogisms), as well as social sciences, economic modelling, mathematical game theory, rational choice theory, cognitive science etc. It is quite uncontroversial that there is such a distinction although the specific manner in which both forms of reasoning are related is a topic of great interest and controversy. I think the onus is on you to explain why you think there is no difference.

what Sam claims, what i believe, is that IF you desire wellbeing, then you should strive to improve it. which is admittedly a completely obvious point. — PeterPants

It certainly is quite obvious and there indeed is little reason for anyone to deny it. What is questionable is Harris's use of this commonplace assertions as a unique ground for building up an all encompassing moral theory. Just because pleasure is more fun than pain hardly proves utilitarianism right. Likewise, just because it's better to get your own stuff rather than steal it from someone else hardly means that Ayn Rand's libertarianism is right. This is another theory that is hopelessly simplistic because it strives to reduce all of morality to one single moral consideration.

Sure, as I mentioned, humans have a higher level of consciousness than animals. This entails more capacity for compassion and more sophisticated intelligence, so we regard humans as more morally responsible than animals. Humans are also more free than animals in the sense that human intelligence enables them to find more ways or more effective ways to satisfy their desires and needs. — litewave

Finding ways to satisfy your needs and desires just is a small part of the function of practical reason and of the scope of human freedom. Human beings aren't merely more skilled than dogs are at finding food and shelter. They also have the ability of assessing what their needs are; when their needs of the needs of other take precedence, what habits and desires are worthy of being cultivated; and lastly, and most importantly: given the desires that they actually have, which ones among them are worthy of being satisfied in particular situations.

I don't think compatibilists have a problem with distinguishing the constitutive part of free agency - they think that free agency consists in the ability to satisfy desires, carry out intentions. — litewave

I don't know any contemporary compatibilist philosopher who endorses such a simplistic conception of compatibilist free will. Can you point me to one?

But libertarians surely have this problem because of their insistence on the incoherent concept of ultimate control.

Maybe most libertarian philosophers face some problems (such as the luck objection, or the problem of intelligibility) but you haven't shown that any specific libertarian proposal is incoherent. Rather, you have straddled all libertarians with a dilemma regarding the source of "intentions", but you have in the process misconstrued what it is for one to have an intention as if it were caused by an antecedent act of the will rather than its being itself an act of the will.

If by principles of rationality you mean logic and mathematics then principles of rationality are pretty much features of the universe - that's why science is so successful in predicting the behavior of nature and in harnessing the behavior of nature in technology. — litewave

If you have a suitably abstract view of "the universe" such that numbers and other abstracta make up an integral part of it, then, maybe, you could argue that principles of theoretical and practical rationality are "parts" of the early universe. But they are not parts of physical laws or of the initial conditions of the universe as those two thing are generally conceived to jointly determine human behavior according to the standard deterministic picture. To view them as such would be patent nonsense. It would mean, for instance, that if a friend of yours purports to have proven Goldbach's conjecture, and ask you if her demonstration is sound, then it would make sense to say that you can't know for sure until such a time when physicists have discovered the fundamental laws of nature or what the past state of the universe precisely was. But surely, those two things simply are irrelevant to the question of the soundness of the mathematical proof. Principles of mathematical rationality, though, are quite relevant.

Likewise if someone would seek you advice over some moral dilemma that she is facing: She promised to return a gun that she borrowed from a friend who she suspects might make use of it to commit a crime, say. It wouldn't make any sense, in that case either, to claim that you can't know what is advisable to do until such a time when physicists have gained a more precise knowledge of the laws of nature or of the past state of the universe. The principles of morality, just like the principles of theoretical rationality, happily abstract away from such contingent facts about the laws of nature and the past "state" of the universe.

Evolution tends to arrange that that which is valued is useful for survival, health and reproduction, while that which is hated is the opposite. Thus our values are formed. — litewave

Evolution has its own agenda. Human beings have a different agenda. For sure, contingent features of our evolutionary history can account for some tendencies and general abilities that we have. The naturalistic fallacy is the fallacy of inferring what it is that one ought to do on the basis of what it is natural that one would be inclined to do.

No, this is too simplistic; intention is the decision, whether conscious or not, to act on one desire rather than another.

I think your missing the point of it.. You have said just before, that Sam Harris says that we ought to act like x, because of y, this is entirely false, he makes no claim that anyone ought to do anything. an ought cant just exist on its own, that makes no sense whatsoever.
An ought MUST be based on a goal.
So, sam is simply pointing out what is the best goal. the real thing he is doing though, is claiming that all of morality can be objectively studied, thats really where his point lies.
And i have no idea how anyone can doubt it. wellbeing is everything that could possibly matter, by definition. To say its 'simplistic' is to miss the point entirely. its defined as everything that could matter so it can hardly miss stuff out can it?

I think your missing the point of it.. You have said just before, that Sam Harris says that we ought to act like x, because of y, this is entirely false, he makes no claim that anyone ought to do anything. an ought cant just exist on its own, that makes no sense whatsoever.
An ought MUST be based on a goal. — PeterPants

It doesn't seem like you have read The Moral Landscape then. Or, if you have, you may not have paid sufficient attention. Harris is a moral realist. On his view, what it is that one ought morally to do is an objective fact. Furthermore, on his view, there is no distinction between empirical facts and moral imperatives; there is no is/ought distinction.

"For instance, to say that we ought to treat children with kindness seems identical to saying that everyone will tend to be better off if we do. The person who claims that he does not want to be better off is either wrong about what he does, in fact, want (i.e., he doesn’t know what he’s missing), or he is lying, or he is not making sense." -- Sam Harris, The Moral Landcape

So, sam is simply pointing out what is the best goal. the real thing he is doing though, is claiming that all of morality can be objectively studied, thats really where his point lies.
And i have no idea how anyone can doubt it. wellbeing is everything that could possibly matter, by definition. To say its 'simplistic' is to miss the point entirely. its defined as everything that could matter so it can hardly miss stuff out can it? — PeterPants

Since Harris denies the categorical distinction between facts and values, that would not make much sense for him to make values only rest on contingent goals. I've searched the few dozen instances of "goal" in The Moral Landscape and nowhere does he make moral values rest on goals. If anything, he seems to think contingent goals of human being ought to be aligned with objective values, although how this would come about he doesn't say. His epistemology of values is non-existent. If queried about the source of his knowledge that his fundamental moral premise is right, he simply asserts that it's a self-evident truth and anyone who disagrees must be confused. So, he's also an ethical intuitionist.

An ought MUST be based on a goal.
So, sam is simply pointing out what is the best goal. the real thing he is doing though, is claiming that all of morality can be objectively studied, thats really where his point lies.
And i have no idea how anyone can doubt it. wellbeing is everything that could possibly matter, by definition. — PeterPants

What you say here is circular. If well-being is the best goal (which is itself questionable because of the ambiguity of the notion "well-being", but granted for the sake of the argument) and we ought to act according to the best goal; then the principle that we ought to act according to the best goal is dependent only upon itself; which means it is entirely circular and thus groundless.

So when you say an ought must be based on a goal (the goal is well-being, so we ought to aim for it); your argument also implies that a goal must be based on an ought (we ought to aim for the best goal; which just happens to be well-being; so we ought to aim for that).

And none of this deliberation about what we ought to do makes any sense at all under the presumption of hard determinism, because it would want to claim that all our deliberations, decisions and actions are exhaustively determined by microphysical events which are unknown to us (at least in the 'real time' of their activity) and are thus completely beyond our control.

BTW, it would show some consideration for your readers if you took the trouble to edit your posts. It would also make it seem more like you what you write is backed by some real conviction.

And i have no idea how anyone can doubt it. wellbeing is everything that could possibly matter, by definition. To say its 'simplistic' is to miss the point entirely. its defined as everything that could matter so it can hardly miss stuff out can it? — PeterPants

In that case it is also useless. In any given practical situation, a real human being -- as opposed to a God who contemplates the whole universe from outside of it, say, and could evaluates how high it ranks on the "moral landscape" -- is faced with several things that matter to her (and, indeed, that ought to matter to her) and that she can't all pursue or salvage at once. Hence she has to make choices.

Utilitarians believe that everything that matters can be ranked on one single scale of 'utility'. But if what matters extends over things that can't be valued on a single scale, then Harris's theory comes crashing down. It provides no guidance for action except in the very simple situations where everything that matters can be neatly quantified on a unique one-dimensional scale. (Classical utilitarians and their consequentialist descendants strive to address those problems, but Harris seems not to have given any thought to them.)

I typed out long responses to both of you, then deleted it realizing how pointless it all was.. basically i feel that none of your criticisms actually hit anything i believe at all.

the biggest thing would be that neither me nor Sam are actually claiming that people 'should' act a certain way as an absolute rule, we are saying that people should act a certain way IF they want to achieve a certain outcome. (a truism for sure, right?)

so instead of going down a rabbit hole of, 'i didnt say that, i dont believe that' etc. ill just try and restate what im actually arguing for.

1- wellbeing is being defined as 'everything that matters, everything of value, all past present and future facts that have any effect on the quality of life of all beings' (hence the argument that wellbeing is not necessarily that, is pointless, because its the idea we are using, the word is irrelevant)
2- morality is about values,in order for anything to have value, it has to have value to something sentient, therefore morality is entirely about wellbeing (as defined above).
3- If we desire more wellbeing, then we ought to try and understand how wellbeing works and how to effect it.
4- it is objectively better to improve wellbeing.

those claims are really all im claiming, most of it is totally obvious and almost silly to even point out.

The main thing people seem to argue against is the notion that we could objectively say some action or desire is better or worse. do you guys feel this way?

Please note though that im certainly not claiming that we can know 100% what is the best thing to do, its likely far to complex to ever get there. But this is not a reason to not work towards a better understanding, obviously. We wouldn't stop doing biology if we found out it was fundamentally impossible to know every biological fact.

Utilitarians believe that everything that matters can be ranked on one single scale of 'utility'. But if what matters extends over things that can't be valued on a single scale, then Harris's theory comes crashing down. It provides no guidance for action except in the very simple situations where everything that matters can be neatly quantified on a unique one-dimensional scale. (Classical utilitarians and their consequential descendants strive to address those problems, but Harris seems not to have given any thought to them.) — Pierre-Normand

How can you say this? The very title of the book you yourself have brought up a number of times, is 'the moral landscape'. The whole point of the analogy to a landscape is to show how its a complex system with multiple peaks and troughs, he explicitly says a number of times that there may be many equal peaks, there may be better or worse ways to get to a peak etc.

of course their are multiple ways of being 'well off'. this is the whole point, we should study it. Is it generally preferable to have a life of blissful pleasure, or a life of intellectual stimulation? a life of overcoming hardship, or a life of ease? If either can be equally as good given the right upbringing and thinking tools, then which is more sustainable? etc.

these are moral questions with objective factual answers, whether we can ever know those answers or not.

1- wellbeing is being defined as 'everything that matters, everything of value, all past present and future facts that have any effect on the quality of life of all beings' — PeterPants

You might want to rethink this. Things that have a causal impact (positive or negative) on the wellbeing of sentient creatures aren't part of wellbeing anymore than than a thief or a robbery figure themselves among the stolen goods.

2- morality is about values, in order for anything to have value, it has to have value to something sentient, therefore morality is entirely about wellbeing (as defined above).

Morality keeps an eye on value; but it is also concerned with rights, obligations, justice, virtue, human dignity, human autonomy, personal relationships, etc.

3- If we desire more wellbeing, then we ought to try and understand how wellbeing works and how to effect it.

Oftentimes, doing what is right is done for its own sake rather than for the sake of making something "work". The idea that understanding what one ought to do (or what is right) amounts to understanding how something "works" confuses theoretical rationality with practical rationality. One can understand fairly well how things work and be quite in the dark regarding what to do. Were this not the case, Harris would have no need for his fundamental premise grounded on pure intuition. He rather would be able to demonstrate it through investigating how things work, but this is impossible to do by his own admission.

4- it is objectively better to improve wellbeing.

This can be construed rather tautologically as the claim that it is objectively better to do whatever ought to be done (which your definition of "wellbeing" suggests) or as the claim that when favoring someone's wellbeing (ordinarily construed) conflicts with something else then this something else (e.g. personal duty, respect for human dignity, or justice) must always be sacrificed for the sake of wellbeing.

The main thing people seem to argue against is the notion that we could objectively say some action or desire is better or worse. do you guys feel this way?

No. I am a moral realist as are very many philosophers who aren't utilitarians.

How can you say this? The very title of the book you yourself have brought up a number of times, is 'the moral landscape'. The whole point of the analogy to a landscape is to show how its a complex system with multiple peaks and troughs, he explicitly says a number of times that there may be many equal peaks, there may be better or worse ways to get to a peak etc. — PeterPants

Yes, this is just one of the glaring contradictions in Harris's confused theory. To be fair, such inherent contradictions have a tendency to crop up within most efforts to account for the demands of ordinary principles of justice or morality within a strict consequentialist framework.

The trouble with this is that the measure of elevation at some point on the multi-dimensional "moral landscape" represents the aggregate state of wellbeing of all sentient creatures, according to Harris. It follows from this definition that there can't be better or worse ways to reach a given peak consistently with Harris's insistence that wellbeing exhausts the content of morality. If there were better and worse ways, then, presumably, reaching some slightly lower peak would be a better option than reaching a slightly higher neighboring peak, on account of the paths available and the worthiness of the paths. But if that's the case, that means that wellbeing (the elevation of the peaks) is not the only objective moral consideration. Harris's theory is thus self-contradictory.

I don't know any contemporary compatibilist philosopher who endorses such a simplistic conception of compatibilist free will. Can you point me to one? — Pierre-Normand

This is from Wikipedia's entry on compatibilism:

Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained.

Rather, you have straddled all libertarians with a dilemma regarding the source of "intentions", but you have in the process misconstrued what it is for one to have an intention as if it were caused by an antecedent act of the will rather than its being itself an act of the will. — Pierre-Normand

Intention is a mental state, a desire that stimulates and directs action. If the intention was not caused by an antecedent act of will then it was not intended - it formed in our minds without our intending to do so and thus without our control.

If you have a suitably abstract view of "the universe" such that numbers and other abstracta make up an integral part of it, then, maybe, you could argue that principles of theoretical and practical rationality are "parts" of the early universe. But they are not parts of physical laws or of the initial conditions of the universe — Pierre-Normand

Why not? Physical laws and initial conditions of the universe have mathematical and logical features; they can be accurately described with the mathematical and logical apparatus of science.

It would mean, for instance, that if a friend of yours purports to have proven Goldbach's conjecture, and ask you if her demonstration is sound, then it would make sense to say that you can't know for sure until such a time when physicists have discovered the fundamental laws of nature or what the past state of the universe precisely was. — Pierre-Normand

I have no idea what you meant here. Computers - causal machines - can perform logical and mathematical operations, so why would humans need something non-causal to perform such operations?

Likewise if someone would seek you advice over some moral dilemma that she is facing: She promised to return a gun that she borrowed from a friend who she suspects might make use of it to commit a crime, say. It wouldn't make any sense, in that case either, to claim that you can't know what is advisable to do until such a time when physicists have gained a more precise knowledge of the laws of nature or of the past state of the universe. — Pierre-Normand

We act based on the limited information we have. That doesn't mean that our thought processes are non-causal.

Evolution has its own agenda. Human beings have a different agenda. For sure, contingent features of our evolutionary history can account for some tendencies and general abilities that we have. The naturalistic fallacy is the fallacy of inferring what it is that one ought to do on the basis of what it is natural that one would be inclined to do. — Pierre-Normand

Evolution also allows random mutations - so we can have any values that can possibly happen to us. But natural selection will tend to remove those that are detrimental to survival, health or reproduction.

No, this is too simplistic; intention is the decision, whether conscious or not, to act on one desire rather than another. — John

Any mental state is a decision, because the state is what it is rather than another state.

Evolution also allows random mutations - so we can have any values that can possibly happen to us. But natural selection will tend to remove those that are detrimental to survival, health or reproduction. — litewave

This hardly answers the charge of naturalistic fallacy. Some inherited agressive tendencies, which may contribute to explaining why some people commit murder or rape, may have had evolutionary advantages in the past and have been selected for that reason. That doesn't make rape or murder moral. Just because a form of behavior has a tendency to promote survival and reproduction doesn't make such behaviors moral.

This is from Wikipedia's entry on compatibilism: — litewave

This is clearly a simplification. This simplified definition is immediately followed by a quote from Schopenhauer. I had asked you if you knew a contemporary compatibilist philosopher who endorses such a simplistic conception of an act of free will. Wikipedia often offers fine explanations, but it is not an actual philosopher. It is a collection of articles written and edited by people like you and me.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is generally better source.

"It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in the philosophical work devoted to this notion there is probably no single concept of it. For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct. Different attempts to articulate the conditions for moral responsibility will yield different accounts of the sort of agency required to satisfy those conditions. What we need as a starting point is a malleable notion that focuses upon special features of persons as agents. As a theory-neutral point of departure, then, free will can be defined as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the manner necessary for moral responsibility. Clearly, this definition is too lean when taken as an endpoint; the hard philosophical work is about how best to develop this special kind of control." -- From the SEP entry on Compatibilism