i STILL dont see the difference...
obviously no one has a perfect model of another human being, we certainly dont have that capacity yet.
so what? i dont see your point. — PeterPants
I just argued that *even if* you had a perfect predictive/causal model of the behavior of a human being, that still would not tell you how it is that you ought to behave towards her. And that's because knowing how your interactions with (or manipulations of) that human being will affect her doesn't tell you whether you should do it. To gain knowledge of the potential effects of your actions is a matter of theoretical reasoning. To arrive at a decision regarding what it is that you ought to do is a matter of practical reasoning. — Pierre-Normand
The classical example concerns the nicotine addict who wishes that she would not desire to smoke but can't help but acting on this desire. If we imagine that she indeed is powerless in getting rid of her addiction (and may be blameless for her having acquired it, let us suppose) then, in a clear sense, her addiction constitutes a restriction on her freedom. — Pierre-Normand
On such a simple account, mature human beings wouldn't be anymore or any less free than dogs and cows are. However, we don't hold dogs and cows morally responsible for what they do (although we may reward or punish then when this is effective). So, there ought to be something more to our own freedom on account of which we can hold ourselves responsible for what we do than merely being uncoerced by external agents or circumstances. — Pierre-Normand
What you say here leads me to highlight something about litewave's determinism. According to it, there is no source of action that is not an "external coercion" or "external impediment"; whether it is "felt" or not is really a matter of indifference. The idea of a self that originates intention is simply seen as an illusion on that view. The whole notion of moral responsibility is logically inconsistent with such a view, which is what I have been, apparently unsuccessfully, trying to point out. On such a view all circumstances are extenuating circumstances. — John
Yes, I think most compatibilists, because of the metaphysical picture that comes bundled up with the uncritically accepted doctrine of universal determinism, generally have a hard time distinguishing what it is in the aetiology of human action that constitutes external constraint to our freedom from what it is that is a constitutive part of (internal to) our power of free agency. — Pierre-Normand
The case where humans are being influenced by principles of rationality or morality is quite different. The principles of rationality are not part of the initial state of the universe or the laws of physics. — Pierre-Normand
In the specific case of morality, looking for its source in our evolutionary past, for instance, leads one straight to the commission of the naturalistic fallacy. What makes something worthy of being valued can not be reduced to any sort of causal explanation as to why you actually came to value it. — Pierre-Normand
I still entirely think your distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning is a distinction without a difference. or at least i fail to see how this argument about morality is diminished in the least due to this seemingly bizarre distinction. — PeterPants
what Sam claims, what i believe, is that IF you desire wellbeing, then you should strive to improve it. which is admittedly a completely obvious point. — PeterPants
Sure, as I mentioned, humans have a higher level of consciousness than animals. This entails more capacity for compassion and more sophisticated intelligence, so we regard humans as more morally responsible than animals. Humans are also more free than animals in the sense that human intelligence enables them to find more ways or more effective ways to satisfy their desires and needs. — litewave
I don't think compatibilists have a problem with distinguishing the constitutive part of free agency - they think that free agency consists in the ability to satisfy desires, carry out intentions. — litewave
But libertarians surely have this problem because of their insistence on the incoherent concept of ultimate control.
If by principles of rationality you mean logic and mathematics then principles of rationality are pretty much features of the universe - that's why science is so successful in predicting the behavior of nature and in harnessing the behavior of nature in technology. — litewave
Evolution tends to arrange that that which is valued is useful for survival, health and reproduction, while that which is hated is the opposite. Thus our values are formed. — litewave
I think your missing the point of it.. You have said just before, that Sam Harris says that we ought to act like x, because of y, this is entirely false, he makes no claim that anyone ought to do anything. an ought cant just exist on its own, that makes no sense whatsoever.
An ought MUST be based on a goal. — PeterPants
So, sam is simply pointing out what is the best goal. the real thing he is doing though, is claiming that all of morality can be objectively studied, thats really where his point lies.
And i have no idea how anyone can doubt it. wellbeing is everything that could possibly matter, by definition. To say its 'simplistic' is to miss the point entirely. its defined as everything that could matter so it can hardly miss stuff out can it? — PeterPants
An ought MUST be based on a goal.
So, sam is simply pointing out what is the best goal. the real thing he is doing though, is claiming that all of morality can be objectively studied, thats really where his point lies.
And i have no idea how anyone can doubt it. wellbeing is everything that could possibly matter, by definition. — PeterPants
And i have no idea how anyone can doubt it. wellbeing is everything that could possibly matter, by definition. To say its 'simplistic' is to miss the point entirely. its defined as everything that could matter so it can hardly miss stuff out can it? — PeterPants
Utilitarians believe that everything that matters can be ranked on one single scale of 'utility'. But if what matters extends over things that can't be valued on a single scale, then Harris's theory comes crashing down. It provides no guidance for action except in the very simple situations where everything that matters can be neatly quantified on a unique one-dimensional scale. (Classical utilitarians and their consequential descendants strive to address those problems, but Harris seems not to have given any thought to them.) — Pierre-Normand
1- wellbeing is being defined as 'everything that matters, everything of value, all past present and future facts that have any effect on the quality of life of all beings' — PeterPants
2- morality is about values, in order for anything to have value, it has to have value to something sentient, therefore morality is entirely about wellbeing (as defined above).
3- If we desire more wellbeing, then we ought to try and understand how wellbeing works and how to effect it.
4- it is objectively better to improve wellbeing.
The main thing people seem to argue against is the notion that we could objectively say some action or desire is better or worse. do you guys feel this way?
How can you say this? The very title of the book you yourself have brought up a number of times, is 'the moral landscape'. The whole point of the analogy to a landscape is to show how its a complex system with multiple peaks and troughs, he explicitly says a number of times that there may be many equal peaks, there may be better or worse ways to get to a peak etc. — PeterPants
I don't know any contemporary compatibilist philosopher who endorses such a simplistic conception of compatibilist free will. Can you point me to one? — Pierre-Normand
Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained.
Rather, you have straddled all libertarians with a dilemma regarding the source of "intentions", but you have in the process misconstrued what it is for one to have an intention as if it were caused by an antecedent act of the will rather than its being itself an act of the will. — Pierre-Normand
If you have a suitably abstract view of "the universe" such that numbers and other abstracta make up an integral part of it, then, maybe, you could argue that principles of theoretical and practical rationality are "parts" of the early universe. But they are not parts of physical laws or of the initial conditions of the universe — Pierre-Normand
It would mean, for instance, that if a friend of yours purports to have proven Goldbach's conjecture, and ask you if her demonstration is sound, then it would make sense to say that you can't know for sure until such a time when physicists have discovered the fundamental laws of nature or what the past state of the universe precisely was. — Pierre-Normand
Likewise if someone would seek you advice over some moral dilemma that she is facing: She promised to return a gun that she borrowed from a friend who she suspects might make use of it to commit a crime, say. It wouldn't make any sense, in that case either, to claim that you can't know what is advisable to do until such a time when physicists have gained a more precise knowledge of the laws of nature or of the past state of the universe. — Pierre-Normand
Evolution has its own agenda. Human beings have a different agenda. For sure, contingent features of our evolutionary history can account for some tendencies and general abilities that we have. The naturalistic fallacy is the fallacy of inferring what it is that one ought to do on the basis of what it is natural that one would be inclined to do. — Pierre-Normand
Evolution also allows random mutations - so we can have any values that can possibly happen to us. But natural selection will tend to remove those that are detrimental to survival, health or reproduction. — litewave
This is from Wikipedia's entry on compatibilism: — litewave
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