Wittgenstein himself warns in the preface that PI isn't a very good book and not the book he intended to write — sime

Wittgenstein’s standards for himself were so high that he refused to publish any work in his lifetime except the Tractatus. There is a tendency among those who struggle to understand his ideas to attribute the disarray in Wittgenstein scholarship to the supposed incompleteness of the work. But I believe that even if Wittgenstein had been thrilled with PI and declared it to be exactly as he intended to write it , this would make no difference to the disagreement in the field of Wittgenstein interpreters. Every great philosopher produces camps of readers fighting tooth and nail against each other’s interpretations of the master. The so-called ‘gatekeeping’ associated with Wittgenstein scholars is far from unique to him. Just look at the battles within Nietzsche (Leiter vs Deleuze) or Heidegger (Sheehan vs Capobianco) scholarship. If Heidegger is correct, perhaps none of today’s readers fully understand Wittgenstein.

“…a philosophy is creatively grasped at the earliest 100 years after it arises. We Germans are now precisely beginning to prepare ourselves to grasp Leibniz.”

Even when a significant body of published writing is available from a philosopher , many prefer their sloppy unpublished scribblings. Heidegger recommended we ignore Nietzsche’s published writing in favor of his unpublished notes. Many consider Merleau-Ponty’s greatest work to be his unpublished , unedited and incomplete Visible and Invisible.

I do think we are circling the gist of the grievance, but you frame it as: “Wittgenstein is either saying something or else he is not.” First, wanting him to just “say something” misses the reason that about half of PI is questions; as I said, questions for you to work out, to change you. But your dichotomy also overlooks the crucial part of who he might be saying it to. Do you mean to say that he is either saying something to you, or he is not saying anything? (Nietzsche felt his audience hadn’t been born yet.) But I do hear the desire to want Witt to, in a sense: just stand still already so one can punch him in the face. Why can’t Witt just take a stand?

Witt isn’t being coy when he confronts us with a riddle like “My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul.” P. 178 (emphasis in the original). He is definitely making a claim about the way my position to others works (confronting the classical problem of other minds, for @Shawn and @kindred and @schopenhauer1 to see he actually is addressing history). But he is also forcing you through the wringer because (for some) it must be like an epiphany to see that although we, obviously, can not know (be certain) about another, we do not, because of that fact, fall back onto opinion, or other well-worn lessor ideas of knowledge, like: belief, or emotion, or “subjectivity”, or, with respect @Joshs, theoretical interpersonal gymnastics (perhaps including “knowing subjects” with “intentions”). We cannot know other minds because our relation to others is not knowledge, but how we treat them, our “attitude” in relation to them, in its sense of: position “towards”. I treat you as if you have a soul. His claim is that is how our relation to others works; that is the categorical transcendental mechanics of it.

Now that’s saying more than something; it’s a revolution in terms, perspective, and frameworks, going back to Plato. And of course he could be wrong. But the disagreement is between two (or more) totally different ways of picturing philosophy and the human condition. Someone just “saying” (stating, telling) something of that nature is going to sound incomprehensible to the other. So, if you want to fight from your own turf, you will feel like he isn’t playing fair. But with any philosopher (worth their salt), if you don’t try to understand them on their terms, your “disagreement” will just be a dismissal without hitting the actual target (thus perhaps the feeling of frustration).

how are we to interpret [“Wittgenstein’s language” (terms)] without recourse to the categories of intention and knowing subjects? — Leontiskos

The same way we interpret other philosophical terms: context, distinction, implication, comparison to other senses of the words, and all our other time-tested practices.

Edit: I think the subject is important in the sense that I am the person that can be held responsible for explaining further (or may try to duck out).

But he is also forcing you through the wringer because (for some) it must be like an epiphany to see that although we, obviously, can not know (be certain) about another, we do not, because of that fact, fall back onto opinion, or other well-worn lessor ideas of knowledge, like: belief, or emotion, or “subjectivity”, or, with respect Joshs, theoretical interpersonal gymnastics (perhaps including “knowing subjects” with “intentions”). We cannot know other minds because our relation to others is not knowledge, but how we treat them, our “attitude” in relation to them, in its sense of: position “towards”. I treat you as if you have a soul. His claim is that is how our relation to others works; that is the categorical transcendental mechanics of it.

Now that’s saying more than something; it’s a revolution in terms, perspective, and frameworks, going back to Plato. And of course he could be wrong. But the disagreement is between two (or more) totally different ways of picturing philosophy and the human condition. Someone just “saying” (stating, telling) something of that nature is going to sound incomprehensible to the other. So, if you want to fight from your own turf, you will feel like he isn’t playing fair. But with any philosopher (worth their salt), if you don’t try to understand them on their terms, your “disagreement” will just be a dismissal without hitting the actual target (thus perhaps the feeling of frustration). — Antony Nickles

Well, we have a disagreement then on legitimate forms of discourse. If I give you a premise with little reasoning or evidence to back it up, you can rightfully accuse me of a poorly constructed, or bad argument.

However, if I provid numerous details for a premise I do not make, that is not so much a bad argument, as a bad faith argument. For the adherent to demand then, that you really don't "know" what he's doing, it's "radically different" and "playing on a different turf", then we are already not playing the game.. Ironic, because Wittgenstein's very point in PI is that we must understand the language of the game in order to understand how to use language.. Yet here we are abusing language to let Wittgenstein have a free pass to not play the game.. because he's playing with different rules and it is somehow UP TO US, to understand his rules. Why? And if that's the case, why can't I make the rules, and you go to me? Does merely fandom qualify as making someone worth paying attention to in some kids-glove special way, where only THEY cannot play by the rules?

@Sam26 @Leontiskos @Wayfarer @Tom Storm @Joshs

However, if I provide numerous details for a premise I do not make, that is not so much a bad argument, as a bad faith argument. For the adherent to demand then, that you really don't"know" what he's doing, it's "radically different" and "playing on a different turf", then we are already not playing the game. — schopenhauer1

emphasis added

His conclusion would be for you to see what is being pointed out, which in this case involves a shift in perspective, seeing something we may be blind to, avoiding. The difference in outcome though does not excuse Witt from being responsible for evidence (what we imply when we say what, when), in claiming premises that must be acknowledged (the mechanics of an activity), and coming to conclusions (as I discussed above, even about the human condition).

To move us forward, I think the actual problem here is not his lack of “saying something” but more his style of saying it, which, I grant you, comes off as not “saying” anything: being cryptic, cagey, etc. And, worse, that some nevertheless take the text as self-evident anyway, and then cannot provide, as you point out, anything else but the (impotent) words themselves (as if they were patently clear), rather than further elucidation. I would go so far as to grant that anyone is copping-out who refuses to answer (continue) any call for further intelligibility, though, importantly, not only in a required form, even an “answer”** (as if philosophy were only about problems to be solved).

I can only say that he is writing to a particular audience (certain philosophers), as embodied by the Tractatus’ (his previous) rigid, imposed requirement for judging whether we are saying anything. Given this fixated intransigence, he is now (in the PI) resorting to any means necessary to break that death-grip hold for knowledge (certainty) to take our place (the “picture that holds us captive” PI, #115). Thus the questions without answers, the foil of the interlocutor, the riddles, the… indirectness. He is doing this because he feels that philosophy needs to be radically revolutionized, and so his style, as Cavell puts it, “wishes to prevent understanding which is unaccompanied by inner change”, i.e., change from the position we are in (philosophy has been in), our “attitude” (see above), how we judge (our “method”).

…he's playing with different rules and it is somehow UP TO US, to understand his rules. Why?” — schopenhauer1

Again, I would argue he is not asking for, nor does he avoid, “the rules” (evidence, premise, conclusion), but, yes, it is up to us, as it is with any philosopher, to work to get through our assumptions, first impressions, etc., in order to understand the other from “within”, as, in other cases: the place of “forms” to the Good; what “God” is to Descartes; what imperative, categorical, and on-and-on are for Kant. These are not “rules” but grounds for understanding, agreement, shared vision and criteria for judgment. The import of philosophical expressions are much, much less self-evident than I think most take them to be, and, yes, I absolutely think it is up to US to do that work (you would grant that we are not asking to be spoon-fed); more, I would argue this intellectual empathy is the point of philosophy: to better ourselves in seeing the world as a larger place.

Wittgenstein's very point in PI is that we must understand the language of the game in order to understand how to use language. — schopenhauer1

I see here how you maybe take him to be dictating the terms of argument (“…why can't I make the rules, and you go to me?”). I would reframe your paraphrase that he is looking at the language of an activity (“game”), not for us to be allowed to “use language” (or to bar grounds for disagreement) but to understand an activities’ specific rationale. The point being not to normatively police our activities (though some use him this way) but to take the que first from our history (not our desires for knowledge). Thus why Wittgenstein is not outside the tradition as much as cutting across it in a new but rational way.

Which makes this critique so fascinating because the main realization of his investigation is that imposing a standard (the requirement for “crystalline purity”, PI #27), before looking at what matters to a particular activity, limits our ability to see the different yet rational (“truth value”) ways in which the world works—to our issue, including philosophical discourse.

**And, anyway, isn’t a claim to what is or is not a “legitimate form of discourse” to (ironically) guard the gate?

Existential Comics has a good take on Witt this week:

https://existentialcomics.com/comic/551

Permalink

Thanks! Just edited my post.

Haha this is great!!

I can only say that he is writing to a particular audience (certain philosophers), as embodied by the Tractatus’ (his previous) rigid, imposed requirement for judging whether we are saying anything. Given this fixated intransigence, he is now (in the PI) resorting to any means necessary to break that death-grip hold for knowledge (certainty) to take our place (the “picture that holds us captive” PI, #115). Thus the questions without answers, the foil of the interlocutor, the riddles, the… indirectness. He is doing this because he feels that philosophy needs to be radically revolutionized, and so his style, as Cavell puts it, “wishes to prevent understanding which is unaccompanied by inner change”, i.e., change from the position we are in (philosophy has been in), our “attitude” (see above), how we judge (our “method”). — Antony Nickles

Do you realize why both the Tractatus and the PI come off as infinitely arrogant?

And if you cannot answer, then I ask you to

Thus the questions without answers, the foil of the interlocutor, the riddles, the… indirectness. He is doing this because he feels that philosophy needs to be radically revolutionized, and so his style, as Cavell puts it, “wishes to prevent understanding which is unaccompanied by inner change”, i.e., change from the position we are in (philosophy has been in), our “attitude” (see above), how we judge (our “method”). — Antony Nickles

So I am not going to explain anything to you from now on.. I want you to interpret my indirectness, as otherwise you will not be transformed :roll:

And mind you much of philosophy is arrogant-adjacent.. like the asshole, is the arrogance the product of the person, the context, or the activity?

Look at me with my questions! I must be a zetetic skeptic practicing maieutics.

I do think we are circling the gist of the grievance, but you frame it as: “Wittgenstein is either saying something or else he is not.” First, wanting him to just “say something” misses the reason that about half of PI is questions; as I said, questions for you to work out, to change you. — Antony Nickles

Plato's dialogues don't just "say something," they provide questions for you to work out, to change you. Wittgenstein's monologues are comparatively banal and flat, a shallow study of the shadows on the wall of the cave, perhaps helpful to those who are mired very deep in the cave. They don't show evidence of philosophical insight, and I see no reason to conjure up fancy reasons to make up for this fact. Wittgenstein possesses no authority to try to change us, and submitting to his tutelage is harmful. The fact that our age thinks Wittgenstein is above average is a problem with our age. Wittgenstein is nothing like Socrates.

Wittgenstein's monologues — Leontiskos

His writings are not monologues. There is often if not always an interlocutor, even when the interlocutor is silent.

Wittgenstein possesses no authority to try to change us ... — Leontiskos

Authority? The fact is that many have acknowledged that Wittgenstein has changed them.

Having been deeply influenced by Plato, my first impression of Wittgenstein was similar to yours. It took me years of struggling to interpret him to change my mind. As with Plato it is a matter of participation, of engagement with the texts, of questioning and challenging, of sorting things one way or another.

I'm going to not go out on a limb here and defend .. Where as Socrates directly addressed pertinent issues of ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, Wittgenstein was hampered by his own need to appeal to the linguistic turn, thus relating everything to either "sense" vs. "nonsense" as to how language was employed or "use" and "forms of life", and the inherent breakdown of various usages of words in different contexts. This already draws from a more shallow pool, or at least tethers one to a more shallow pool, and it leads to pedantic pointing out of how language can lead to confusion, which I am not sure was not pointing out what was obvious for the common reader.. It seems more transformative if you drank the analytic kool-aid beforehand, but then that also makes the readership more shallow, and less relevant.. And then the conclusions become again, not interesting beyond the exercise in watching various ways he attempts to show language working or not working.

And my basic premise stands here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/906391

I think that might be where Leontiskos is coming from.. And again, I would tend to agree.

And I get it, the big canard is "YoU JuST DoNT GeT HiM!!" But that is the point.

I can employ his method of indirectness.. I can implicitly demand that you need to read into my writing, and that I have a methodology, and once you get it, you will be transformed.. And if you are not, you just don't understand enough yet.. but that is Appeal to Prophecy... And at that point, it becomes an Appeal to Popularity as to how legitimate your Appeal to Prophecy should be deemed.. which I also don't think is legitimate.

It took me years of struggling to interpret him to change my mind. — Fooloso4

I was hooked immediately, from the moment I opened the Blue and Brown Books:

What is the meaning of a word?

Let us attack this question by asking, first, what is an explanation of the meaning of a word; what does the explanation of a word look like?

The way this question helps us is analogous to the way the question "how do we measure a length?" helps us to understand the problem "what is length?"

It's tempting just to quote the whole first page.

I thought then and still think now that this is brilliant. Here is someone I could learn something about thinking from.

I did not read this passage and think, "Ah. Wittgenstein is grounding the meaning of concepts in our customary practices." I've never gone to him for "doctrines".

There's so much to like here, but the main thing is to give your mind a little shake, get out of the sort of rut that we tend to get in thinking not just about philosophical problems but about anything. When the front door is shut tight, do you just look for bigger and bigger things to hit it with? That might work eventually or it might not. But why not have a look around? Maybe there's back door or a window open.

:up: :flower:

Wittgenstein was hampered by his own need to appeal to the linguistic turn, thus relating everything to either "sense" vs. "nonsense" — schopenhauer1

One aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy was a response to prevailing assumptions, but there is more to the saying/showing distinction. In the Tractatus he follows what others said regarding facts and propositions, but by doing so he left open and guarded rather then forced closed the problems of life, beauty, and what is higher.

Although commentator's attention continued to focus on propositions, this reflects their own training and assumptions. As a result little attention was paid until recently on seeing and experiential aspects of his work.

"forms of life" — schopenhauer1

Forms of life have more to do with might be called his anthropological turn than with linguistics.

When the front door is shut tight, do you just look for bigger and bigger things to hit it with? — Srap Tasmaner

At the risk of raising the ire of Schopenhauer1 I will once again quote Wittgenstein:

A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push.

(Culture and Value)

Forms of life have more to do with might be called his anthropological turn than with linguistics. — Fooloso4

Yeah, and so I look to anthropology for those answers.. I'll give credit to pointing there though.. if not explicitly..

In the Tractatus he follows what others said regarding facts and propositions, but by doing so he left open and guarded rather then forced closed the problems of life, beauty, and what is higher. — Fooloso4

What does this even "mean"? And I'm being serious. Can you explain, and not cutsey-koan "show" me.. I indeed ask you to just tell me what you meant there. What does language need protecting from? Because the use of "nonsense" itself seems to imply various things that HE created/expounded upon from others...

Edit: In other words, it seems like a problem (nonsense) that didn't even need protecting...

What does this even "mean"? — schopenhauer1

For example, questions about God, questions about the good and beauty,

What does language need protecting from? — schopenhauer1

It is not a matter of what language needing protection from but of what is off limits when language is restricted to facts. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein holds to this restriction, but this means that ethics and aesthetics are not propositional problems. They are experiential not linguistic.

Yeah, and so I look to anthropology for those answers — schopenhauer1

Answers to what questions?

Ha! I almost did "Did anyone check to see if it's unlocked?" (Culture & Value contains many gems.)

(I have actually had such a comical experience. I once found several other managers standing around a dead terminal, trying the power buttons and talking about who to call, etc. I looked under the counter and plugged it back in. For real.)

As a further side note, there's a lovely little self-published book called "Are Your Lights On?" The title comes from a story about a highway tunnel through a mountain, in Canada I think. There's sign as you enter that says "Turn on lights" so the highway department people helpfully put a sign at the other end that says "Turn off lights." But that's obviously terrible, because it might be night-time, so round 2 of the sign was more complicated. But then what if it's raining? Whoops. Finally someone said you only need a sign that says "Are Your Lights On?" and people will do the right thing. --- The book was written by an IT guy who got tired of people coming to him wanting a particular solution (more bandwidth, more storage, whatever) to a problem they had not actually identified clearly. (Maybe we're copying too much data around. Maybe we're saving stuff we could dump.)

Lots of philosophy involves this "looking where the light is best" (or "hammer entails nail") sort of behavior, or solutions in search of problems.

Answers to what questions? — Fooloso4

Stuff relating to language

It is not a matter of what language needing protection from but of what is off limits when language is restricted to facts. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein holds to this restriction, but this means that ethics and aesthetics are not propositional problems. They are experiential not linguistic. — Fooloso4

Contra whom? Not Hume.. ha.. but really.
You know where this is going...

By what authority can you limit sense versus nonsense? What standards...

Who is he explicitly against here? Other philosophers (like the German Idealists, Dutch and French and German Rationalists, certain Empiricists, the Platonists, Medieval philosophers of various sorts).. would that be correct?

"What" would count as propositional anyways without being self-referential? States of Affairs (what counts as states of affairs) are not self-evident.. without simply defining so by one's particular fiat "so I proclaim!".

That is to say, if I defined states of affairs as X, Y, Z, certainly my conclusion would thus come out a certain way.. That is only if I define states of affairs as X, Y, and Z, which besides personal prejudice/preference, doesn't seem to have a reason to be defined such and such way and not another way, one which might lead to a different conclusion.

And so on...

Stuff relating to language — schopenhauer1

The concept of forms of life extends beyond language. That is the point.

By what authority can you limit sense versus nonsense? What standards... — schopenhauer1

Propositions, as he uses the term, are about the facts of the world, the facts of natural science. They are either true or false. If something cannot be determined to be either true or false, as he thinks is the case with ethics/aesthetics, then it does no good and potentially much harm to treat it as if it were a linguistic or propositional problem.

The other day, in one of these threads, I had a disagreement with @Leontiskos about an author's responsibility for how they might be misunderstood. This is a great example.

His writings are not monologues. There is often if not always an interlocutor, even when the interlocutor is silent. — Fooloso4

I think my point holds. A preacher also has an interlocutor, for instance.

Having been deeply influenced by Plato, my first impression of Wittgenstein was similar to yours. It took me years of struggling to interpret him to change my mind. As with Plato it is a matter of participation, of engagement with the texts, of questioning and challenging, of sorting things one way or another. — Fooloso4

Well, I admit that I was being a bit hyperbolic in the face of Nickles' persistence, but I think Wittgenstein is deeply time-bound in a way that Plato is not. In my estimation no one will read Wittgenstein 50 years hence. Part of it is that Plato's method is better at pulling people in and appealing to a broad audience, but that is part of his magic.

This already draws from a more shallow pool, or at least tethers one to a more shallow pool, and it leads to pedantic pointing out of how language can lead to confusion, which I am not sure was not pointing out what was obvious for the common reader.. It seems more transformative if you drank the analytic kool-aid beforehand, but then that also makes the readership more shallow, and less relevant. — schopenhauer1

Agreed.

...but by doing so he left open and guarded rather then forced closed the problems of life, beauty, and what is higher. — Fooloso4

I am by no means an expert on Wittgenstein, but given the attitude of his adherents this strikes me as doubtful.

A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push.

Good. Compare that to Plato's Cave. I think it falls short, though it does have its limited use.

In general his thought strikes me as cramped and artificial, although I recognize that in relation to what he was surrounded by it was just the opposite. Perhaps he was a corrective more than a lasting figure. Of course I could be wrong.

Propositions, as he uses the term — Fooloso4

Sure, and I can use the term a different way..

re about the facts of the world, the facts of natural science. — Fooloso4

Exactly! You start with a premise you get a conclusion. What is to say you cannot use a different premise as what "facts about the world" are and thus a different conclusion? It's a preference for discussing reality in terms of empirical findings using a certain institutionally defined method...Of course if I started with those fiat assumptions I would come up quickly not only with the conclusion of Tractatus, but with quite the opposite notion (that it's basically how you use the words in a language community) in Investations.. It seems like a big conversation he is having with his own views...

They are either true or false. If something cannot be determined to be either true or false, as he thinks is the case with ethics/aesthetics, then it does no good and potentially much harm to treat it as if it were a linguistic or propositional problem. — Fooloso4

Why would it do "much harm"? But the bigger question, and the one that's more important is why non-scientific/empirical kinds of questions cannot be true or false.. Different criteria can be used, for example, as to what counts as "evidence". But this to me seems so strikingly apparent, I am not sure why it isn't brought up more against his case and thus I ponder what the big deal is... If your sentiments on things are (haughtily) in line with his ideas to begin with, then it's just a big "Yeah I think that too!" echo chamber, but no real justification for why science/empiricism. In fact, if he spent any/more time on that and not simply the assumption of that, perhaps we would be having a different discussion!

I am by no means an expert on Wittgenstein, but given the attitude of his adherents this strikes me as doubtful. — Leontiskos

There have now been several generations of Wittgenstein scholars and several different ways in which he has been read and understood. In addition, he has gained the attention of artists and poets.