In his article Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (1995), David Chalmers posed the (hard) question: "Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel?"
↪Luke

I think Dennett suggested that it was an evolutionary "neat trick". In other (anthropomorphising of evolution) words, it is a means evolution stumbled upon which achieved an adaptive end. Perhaps a more adaptive end could have been reached by neurological processes evolving differently with no consciousness evolved, and perhaps not.

I see consciousness as a function of our brain's innate tendency to develop a model of physical reality based on our sensory and motor interactions with reality. Qualia might be seen as the symbols various parts of our brain present to 'modeling central' to represent the state of things in reality - the marks on the map, so to speak. Consciousness may simply be, what happens when some parts of the brain are outputting symbols in the form we associate with qualia. while simultaneously other parts of our massively parallel processing brains are monitoring the cloud of symbols being presented.

I don't see why it would be unreasonable to answer Chalmers with, "That's just the way evolution went." Unfortunately succinct perhaps, and I could suggest reasons to think that's the case, but I think this post is long enough. — wonderer1

Chalmers isn't wondering about the purpose, or the benefit, of consciousness when he asks that. He's wondering about the mechanism.

The physical processes would work fine without being aware of themselves. They do so in many other life forms. Damage is being done, the sensory system detects the damage, and it pulls away. How many other species even learn from the experience, and avoid the thing that caused the damage whenever they sense it?

There are machines that can perceive different frequencies of the visible spectrum with much greater accuracy than we can. They can perform actions based on which frequency they perceive. They can choose between actions if there are multiple perceptions.

If all off our mental activity is entirely physical, how is it we are not like those other life forms and machines? We aren't like them. How is what makes us different accomplished?

The physical processes would work fine without being aware of themselves. They do so in many other life forms.

It is a hasty generalization to go from, "The behavior of many lifeforms occurs without consciousness." to, "All of the behavior of humans could occur without consciousness."

The fact is, we expect the behavior of humans who are unconscious to be different from the behavior of humans who are conscious. So what reason do we have to think human behavior in general could be as it is without consciousness?

Damage is being done, the sensory system detects the damage, and it pulls away. How many other species even learn from the experience, and avoid the thing that caused the damage whenever they sense it?

You have selected a pattern of behavior that is relatively trivial and can be explained relatively trivially. How about if we decide the behavior of interest is composing sonnets? How many species are doing it? Why don't we expect a poet to be as apt to produce a sonnet while under anesthesia, as she was before she was under anesthesia?

If all off our mental activity is entirely physical, how is it we are not like those other life forms and machines? We aren't like them.

We have a different evolutionary history that resulted in us having different brains than other species do.

How is what makes us different accomplished?

I need clarification as to how to take your question. Are you asking how evolution resulted in human brains being as they are? Are you asking, given the way human brains are, how is consciousness a consequence of that brain structure? Something else?

I might answer your question by saying, "With lots of neurons which have lots of connections to other neurons." I don't suppose that is very satisfying though. However, it is not as if we have a complete schematic diagram of a human brain that scientists can study, so it doesn't seem surprising to me that neuroscientists don't have the thorough explanation we might like.

Do you think that if physicalism is the case, it is reasonable to expect neuroscientists to be able to answer your question in a comprehensive way at this point in human history, and if so why?

Have you read the article? It's not long.

I just skimmed through parts of it. It was interesting, but to be honest, I asked my question because based on what I did read I thought it unlikely that the authors suggested the notion that "qualia constitute the self".

Thank you for quoting the specific excerpt. However, I'm still not seeing why you think the author suggested that "qualia constitute the self". I think the authors would likely agree with the statement that, "If there were no qualia there likely would be no self.", but that is a different statement.

I don't see why it would be unreasonable to answer Chalmers with, "That's just the way evolution went."
— wonderer1

"That's just the way evolution went" does not explain the "adaptive end", the evolutionary purpose, or the biological advantage of the development of phenomenal consciousness. In other words, it does not answer the hard problem of why we have phenomenal consciousness. "Evolution did it" is about as explanatory as "God did it".

First off, I made that statement with the following sentence immediately after, "Unfortunately succinct perhaps, and I could suggest reasons to think that's the case, but I think this post is long enough."

Yes, I know I did not support my answer to Chalmer's question. I thought I made it obvious that I recognized that. I only have so much time to participate in these discussions, so I suggested an 'in a nutshell' answer.

Suppose miraculously I was able to produce an accurate account of every detail of the evolutionary path leading to humans. Would it then be unreasonable to conclude with, "So that's just the way evolution went?"

BTW, Do you think Chalmers is an evolution skeptic?

That said, I would believe an AI is conscious if it acted in a spontaneous way that could not be explained by its programming, and which showed that it really cared about something. — Janus

That's one way to detect consciousness. Maybe there won't be any Ai's that claim they're conscious. Maybe they'll always just say, "I don't have experiences. I'm a p-zombie".

Are one’s thoughts on the same constitutive footing as one’s qualia in terms of their sense of self or are one’s thoughts a step removed or a step “higher” than one’s qualia? Would I still have a sense of self without any qualia but with my thoughts? — Luke

Thoughts - both linguistic and visual imaginings - are based on sensory input. Verbs, nouns, syntax/grammar reflect the actions, objects/locations and structure or relationship between theses respectively.

Language reflects the 4 dimensions we exist in. The Who, what, where, when, how and why reflect the features of the reality we sense - subjects, material, location, time, relationships and cause-effect.

I just skimmed through parts of it. It was interesting, but to be honest, I asked my question because based on what I did read I thought it unlikely that the authors suggested the notion that "qualia constitute the self". — wonderer1

If you haven't read the full article, then how are you in a position to question my reading of it? You think that your ability to guess about the parts that you didn't even bother to read is better than my actual reading of the article? If you think it's unlikely for the authors to suggest that "qualia constitute the self" then read the bloody article and find out. Have you read it all yet?

However, I'm still not seeing why you think the author suggested that "qualia constitute the self". — wonderer1

Explain why you think "qualia constitute the self" is not implied by the article:

Then, imagine if you were to lack qualia of any kind at all, and to find that none of your sensory experience was owned by you? I’m sure your self would disappear. — the article

I think the authors would likely agree with the statement that, "If there were no qualia there likely would be no self.", but that is a different statement. — wonderer1

Firstly, that isn't a quote from the article. Secondly, how does your statement "if there were no qualia there likely would be no self" not imply that "qualia constitute the self"? I might be wrong about it, but it seems to me to be strongly implied by the article.

Yes, I know I did not support my answer to Chalmer's question. I thought I made it obvious that I recognized that. I only have so much time to participate in these discussions, so I suggested an 'in a nutshell' answer. — wonderer1

Oh sorry, I didn't realise you were busy.

BTW, Do you think Chalmers is an evolution skeptic? — wonderer1

I don't consider myself a Chalmers expert by any stretch, but from what I've read, no, I don't think Chalmers would be sceptical about evolution.

Language reflects the 4 dimensions we exist in. — Benj96

Have you read any fiction? Language need not "reflect the 4 dimensions we exist in". Neither is language limited to that function alone. Language can have other uses besides those you mentioned.

My questions - in the section that you quoted - were about the self. I don't see how your post addresses that (assuming that you intended to).

Have you read any fiction? Language need not "reflect the 4 dimensions we exist in". — Luke

No I'm not talking about the content of language. I'm speaking about the structure of language.
Fiction writings still uses nouns, verbs, adjectives, grammar and syntax. Read what I said more carefully.

My questions - in the section that you quoted - were about the self. I don't see how your post addresses that (assuming that you intended to). — Luke

I answered it. Human spoken language is based on sensorium - the input and construction of our perceptions (qualia). Language is on a higher tier if cognition than sensory input. But requires it.
Languages structure reflects how we communicate our perceptions of time (syntax/chronology), verbs (action), grammar (relationship/mechanics), location and objects (nouns) and adjectives (distinction/définition). Language is communicable coding for these things.

The physical processes would work fine without being aware of themselves. They do so in many other life forms.
↪Patterner

It is a hasty generalization to go from, "The behavior of many lifeforms occurs without consciousness." to, "All of the behavior of humans could occur without consciousness." — wonderer1

I quite agree. But, if my understanding is correct, this is the position many have that Chalmers is arguing against. As is William James.

If you haven't read the full article, then how are you in a position to question my reading of it?


I don't suppose you'd accept, "Through the use of mutant superpowers."?

Anyway, I'm at work now and undoubtedly my brain will be contemplating in the background, whether and how to respond further in light of you having gotten so riled up over me questioning you. So we'll see what the results of those background processes are later.

In the meantime, some things for you to contemplate...

Aren't qualia transient events?
What would it mean to say that something is composed of transient events?

No I'm not talking about the content of language. I'm speaking about the structure of language.
Fiction still uses nouns, verbs, adjectives, grammar and syntax. Read what I said more carefully — Benj96

Could you clarify the point of these remarks in relation to the section you quoted? I don't follow how your references to the structure of language relate to my questions about the self.

If you haven't read the full article, then how are you in a position to question my reading of it?
—Luke

I don't suppose you'd accept, "Through the use of mutant superpowers."? — wonderer1

Have you read the full article yet? If so, explain why you believe the article does not indicate or imply that "qualia constitute the self". If you have not bothered to read the full article, I see no reason to respond to you further.

If you haven't read the full article, then how are you in a position to question my reading of it?

I wish you would have saved me the time by dismissing my claim of "mutant super powers" and just moving on, but...

I've been following neuroscience for 36 years while having a background in electrical engineering and having studied the behavior of artificial neural nets. Thirty-six years ago, while contemplating what seemed like a weirdness to my cognitive processing (despite my scoring highly on various standardized tests) I had an epiphany about how variations in low level neural interconnection might explain my relative weirdness. Although I had myself tested for learning disabilities soon after (and was diagnosed as having one) it wasn't until 14 years ago that my wife recognized that it was likely that I was on the autism spectrum. This past year I happened on empirical evidence supporting my epiphanic hypothesis.

https://autismsciencefoundation.wordpress.com/2015/08/30/minicolumns-autism-and-age-what-it-means-for-people-with-autism/

Anyway, over the past 36 years, that insight I had into the functioning of human brains has been the basis for a lot of prescience. For example, I foreshadowed the two system view presented by Kahneman in his book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, though I was coming at things from a neuroscience perspective whereas (to the best of my knowledge) Kahneman came to the two systems view on the basis of psychological findings.

You think that your ability to guess about the parts that you didn't even bother to read is better than my actual reading of the article?

I would put it more like, I thought the probability was high that I was bringing a much more relevantly informed perspective to reading the article than you did. Furthermore, my understanding of the sort of information processing that neural networks are good at, leads me to understand the importance of testing my intuitions. So I saw questioning your interpretation of the article as a good test of my intuitions which were based on merely skimming the article.

If you think it's unlikely for the authors to suggest that "qualia constitute the self" then read the bloody article and find out. Have you read it all yet?

Yeah, I've read the article now, and I still don't have the foggiest idea why you think Humphrey was suggesting what you think he was. Anyway, I've reached out to Humprey. So maybe we will learn from him what his view is.

Whether I subconsciously picked up on it during my initial skim I have no idea, but when I read it through today I noted that Humphrey puts scare quotes around self when he first uses the phrase the self. That leads me to believe that Humphrey was only using the word self as a matter of convenience in conveying his idea to a lay audience, and also seems to me like a point against your interpretation.

Explain why you think "qualia constitute the self" is not implied by the article:

I think that what most people mean by "the self" includes not just qualia, but that which acts on the basis of qualia as well, and at the very least. That which acts on the basis of qualia is not itself qualia.

I think the authors would likely agree with the statement that, "If there were no qualia there likely would be no self.", but that is a different statement.
— wonderer1

Firstly, that isn't a quote from the article. Secondly, how does your statement "if there were no qualia there likely would be no self" not imply that "qualia constitute the self"? I might be wrong about it, but it seems to me to be strongly implied by the article.

1. I didn't suggest it was a quote from the article.
2. I've explained that I think the 'self' is more than qualia, and I think the functionality of the self would be likely to break down without qualia to sustain its functionality. Not immediately, but given time.

I wish you would have saved me the time by dismissing my claim of "mutant super powers" and just moving on, but... — wonderer1

Nobody is forcing you to reply.

You think that your ability to guess about the parts that you didn't even bother to read is better than my actual reading of the article?
— Luke

I would put it more like, I thought the probability was high that I was bringing a much more relevantly informed perspective to reading the article than you did. — wonderer1

Okay, but bringing a more informed perspective to reading the article requires actually reading the article.

Furthermore, my understanding of the sort of information processing that neural networks are good at, leads me to understand the importance of testing my intuitions. So I saw questioning your interpretation of the article as a good test of my intuitions which were based on merely skimming the article. — wonderer1

You tested them; it seems they failed.

Yeah, I've read the article now, and I still don't have the foggiest idea why you think Humphrey was suggesting what you think he was. — wonderer1

Then I don't understand how you are reading the sections I quoted for you recently, or the article as a whole. What would you say is the main point(s) of the article?

Whether I subconsciously picked up on it during my initial skim I have no idea, but when I read it through today I noted that Humphrey puts scare quotes around self when he first uses the phrase the self. That leads me to believe that Humphrey was only using the word self as a matter of convenience in conveying his idea to a lay audience, and also seems to me like a point against your interpretation. — wonderer1

If this is the basis for your argument against my reading - or for your reading - then you're putting a hell of a lot of weight on it. Since you have provided almost nothing else to support your "intuitions" against my reading, I think you may have missed the forest for this twig.

I think that what most people mean by "the self" includes not just qualia, but that which acts on the basis of qualia as well, and at the very least. That which acts on the basis of qualia is not itself qualia. — wonderer1

How does this relate to the article? How is it relevant?

I think the authors would likely agree with the statement that, "If there were no qualia there likely would be no self.", but that is a different statement.
— wonderer1

Firstly, that isn't a quote from the article. Secondly, how does your statement "if there were no qualia there likely would be no self" not imply that "qualia constitute the self"? I might be wrong about it, but it seems to me to be strongly implied by the article.
— Luke

1. I didn't suggest it was a quote from the article. — wonderer1

I know you didn't suggest it was a quote from the article; I was merely pointing out that it wasn't a quote from the article. I don't necessarily think the author would disagree with your statement, either, but I think your argument might be stronger if you used evidence from the article - the author's own words - instead of a statement you think the author might agree with.

2. I've explained that I think the 'self' is more than qualia, and I think the functionality of the self would be likely to break down without qualia to sustain its functionality. Not immediately, but given time. — wonderer1

Those are your opinions about the self. You seem to simply assume, without evidence, that the article agrees with your view of the self. But it remains to be shown that my reading is incorrect, and you have done very little to demonstrate that. Your intuition is not evidence.

You might consider that my reading of the article is correct and that you actually disagree with the article itself (including its view of 'the self').

Luke,

Since it seems like you are much more interested in point scoring than in understanding, I'm inclined to drop the discussion. However, if you want to present, what you believe to be a sound argument for your interpretation, I might be enticed to discuss it further.

Since it seems like you are much more interested in point scoring than in understanding, I'm inclined to drop the discussion. However, if you want to present, what you believe to be a sound argument for your interpretation, I might be enticed to discuss it further. — wonderer1

All you've done in this discussion is accuse me of misreading the article, based on the scantest of evidence, even though you only skimmed and did not bother to read it fully yourself. Despite not reading the entire article, you believed that you would have a "more relevantly informed perspective" based on your self-proclaimed "mutant super power" intuitions.

It's not a matter of point scoring; you've simply been unwilling and unable to support your baseless accusation regarding my reading of the content of the article. Therefore, I'm not interested in discussing it with you further.

So because we only care about aspirin when we have a headache then it follows that first person private sensations don't exist, or that if they do exist then they are the same for all people? — Michael

Yes, but it’s not an argument, it’s a shift in perspective. Philosophy wants something with certainty, universality, uniqueness, etc. apart from our fallible, limited human interactions, which the world doesn’t provide, so it creates objects and frameworks that only rely on knowledge and intellectual solutions. At times we do have personal experiences (like witnessing a train crash), which we can keep (private as hidden) to ourselves (until expressed), but our experience and feelings are not always unique. I’m stressed about money like you are. I don’t (always) have an individual experience in going to the store. The ideas of consciousness, sensation, appearance, reality, are all manufactured by philosophy, partly to feel like we are necessarily special, as I discussed above.

The ideas of consciousness, sensation, appearance, reality, are all manufactured by philosophy, partly to feel like we are necessarily special, as I discussed above. — Antony Nickles

What do you mean by saying that they're manufactured? Are you saying that they're a fiction? You need to prove that, not simply assert it – and so we're doing philosophy.

Are you saying that they're a fiction? — Michael

Well, in the way philosophy pictures them yes. I moved the discussion here because the article above provides some history of the parallel picture that neuroscience labors under. Philosophy has never liked being wrong so the fact that we can be (and that we are responsible for that) leads it to create the conclusion that we must not have direct access to the world (or we are ensured it), that we only see the “appearance” of something, or that our individual perspective is somehow partial or lacking or individual (my “sensation” or “perception”). That way we can have a problem to solve or a kind of knowledge or rationality to find so we will know what’s right, how to settle disputes with others, and we won’t be deceived or mistaken or judged. This is more of a story than an argument, but if there is a particularly egregious dismissal we could take that as a case study.

So what reason do we have to think human behavior in general could be as it is without consciousness? — wonderer1

Because of the causal closure of the physical

why wouldn't casual closure of the physical imply that consciousness is a consequence of the physical, rather than what you seem to be presenting - that consciousness is external and acausal?

Suppose miraculously I was able to produce an accurate account of every detail of the evolutionary path leading to humans. Would it then be unreasonable to conclude with, "So that's just the way evolution went?"

BTW, Do you think Chalmers is an evolution skeptic? — wonderer1

When philosophers like Chalmers ask questions like "Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel?" they don't really mean 'why' in the sense of "what evolutionary benefit has it?" They're looking for a 'how', as in "Explain how, exactly, that information processing (or whatever function) somehow produces/causes/is-identical-with consciousness?"

It would. But it leaves no evolutionary role for consciousness to play, which was @wonderer1's point.

EDIT: my own tentative view is that only consciousness is causal.

But it leaves no evolutionary role for consciousness to play — bert1

The idea that physical closure means there's no evolutionary role for consciousness is another great reason why there needs to be a better understanding of what emergence is and what it means.

It doesn't have to be either/or.

I heartily agree. EDIT: you may be interested in @apokrisis posts on the forum about complex systems and top-down causation. Is that the kind of thing you are thinking of?

It doesn't have to be either/or. — flannel jesus

Maybe. I think that would make a great topic for a thread. Does psychological causation compete with physical causation?

no, there's no competition, they're different layers of describing the same reality. Or at least, this is one way of understanding it that I'm partial to.

https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2016/09/08/consciousness-and-downward-causation/

This is, I think, a fairly well written article by a physicist on the idea.

Interesting article. It's extremely dualistic, in a way, isn't it? It seems to suggest a fairly radical disconnection between the two 'levels'. Is he saying that the levels exist in language alone, perhaps, and not physically? And nowhere is there an explanation of, say, how consciousness came to be, or even if he thinks consciousness is real.

EDIT:

This is a nice quote from the article:

I really do think that enormous confusion is caused in many areas — not just consciousness, but free will and even more purely physical phenomena — by the simple mistake of starting sentences in one language or layer of description (“I thought about summoning up the will power to resist that extra slice of pizza…”) but then ending them in a completely different vocabulary (“… but my atoms obeyed the laws of the Standard Model, so what could I do?”) — Sean Carroll

And nowhere is there an explanation of, say, how consciousness came to be, or even if he thinks consciousness is real. — bert1

He does think consciousness is real - he doesn't think it's downwardly casual. It's casual at it's own level of abstraction. He's not trying to explain what consciousness is exactly or how it comes to be, he's just outlining his view of why "physics is casually closed" doesn't have to mean "consciousness isn't real and doesn't do anything".

Instead, he's laying the ground work for a view where consciousness is real and does do things, at its own level of abstraction.

There's this intuition people have that if something isn't fundamental it's not real. That's a big part of this drive to make consciousness fundamental. I think he's building up a picture for consciousness to be non fundamental, and to be the emergent consequence of physics events, and for it to be emergently real anyway.

And I'm not entirely convinced by his exact formulation, but I think the mission is 100% correct, the mission to allow for non fundamental things to be real. I think human consciousness isn't fundamental, and I think human consciousness is real.

There's talk of weak emergence vs strong emergence - I call this class of views "middle emergence".

It's casual at it's own lever of abstraction. — flannel jesus

Oh, OK. Can you give an example of consciousness causing something in a way that doesn't tread on the toes of any physics?