In physics, we know of this problem as the measurement problem: when the measurement itself effects what is measured, taking a classic measurement won't do. For example quantum models are preferred from Newtonian models.The question is this: Did I let go of the pillow in exactly the way I did because all the constituents of my brain - whether we examine them as particles and physics, or molecules and chemistry, or structures and biology, or whatever - acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws? — Patterner
We do start from a courageous premiss that you are aware of what you are doing and you can decided when to throw the pillow. The basic problem comes when someone would have to forecast when you through the pillow with you hearing the forecast. That forecast might make you not to throw it or throw it another way you first intended. Hence the model itself has an effect on how you will act. How could an accurate forecast be made, when the forecast itself effects what it should model? Hopefully you see the problem is similar to the measurement having an effect on what is measured.Did I throw the pillow because all the constituents of my brain acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws? — Patterner
Unlimited determinism is still determinism. That's my point. Many say we can make choices within an entirely deterministic reality. My position is that those choices are equivalent to the glass breaking. Yes, glasses hitting floors can break in in gigantic number of different ways. But every glass that has ever actually hit a floor broke exactly as it did because that's the only way it could have. Because of the speed it was going when it hit, the spin, the exact location that first made contact, the material it and the floor were made of, and many other factors.Does this refute the idea that you let go of the pillow in exactly the way I did because all the constituents of my brain? Actually not. The determinism holds. But it shows that this determinism isn't at all a limit here. — ssu
And that just shows how meaningless the idea is. Because you have to make decisions. That determinism says that with probability 1 you make or abstain from making a decision has no value, because it doesn't give you any more information.If all is deterministic, then every decision I've ever made was exactly as it was because that's the only decision I could have made. — Patterner
But even if your awareness is an physical event, that's not the problem here. The problem is with the modelling when you have interaction. And obviously you have interaction when somebody is making a choice. If you have a choice to make, you obviously understand that there is a choice to make and you have to think about the alternate effects different actions would make. That's not extrapolation! The determinist model of you making a choice doesn't help you.But, despite the different levels of complexity, the only actual difference is that I am aware of what's going on, and the glass is not. and if the determinists are correct, my awareness is also only physical events, and it doesn't have any causal power. — Patterner
For the hard-core determinist, there's no difference between causes and "actions" performed by "agents". But of course this making the division between causes and actions does understand they have to thought of differently.Back when I was young and innocent, I read an article by Richard Taylor, a Brown University philosophy professor. Taylor’s view was that some phenomena have “causes” and can be described accordingly, whereas others – namely, “actions” performed by “agents” – are different. “Agents initiate action,” he argued, while causes and effects are links in a long chain which, in principle, can be traced back in time indefinitely. — Thales
The orthodox articulation of the debate requires either positing free will as a magical kind of cause that is causally determined and/or a gap in causality that allows this unique kind of event to occur. Neither is at all plausible.Which leaves gaps (junctions?) in the chain of causation for the exercise of personal willpower to choose (decide) the next step. — Gnomon
This is a promising approach, but nonetheless seems to leave our supposedly freely made decisions vulnerable to the apparently controlling force of determinism. It may not give me any information, but it will certainly influence the attitude of others to my decision, and may even influence my own attitude to my own decision.And that just shows how meaningless the idea is. Because you have to make decisions. That determinism says that with probability 1 you make or abstain from making a decision has no value, because it doesn't give you any more information. — ssu
I think it's more like to hinder me. (There's a classic argument against fatalism, that it tends to make us lazy, since the causally determined outcome will happen "whatever I do" or at least whatever I do will make no difference. I realize it's a muddle, but still...)The determinist model of you making a choice doesn't help you. — ssu
That's certainly true. The practical syllogism, which models rational decision-making about action, is quite different from the paradigm syllogism. Practice syllogism require values, desires &c and lead to action. Neither is true of the paradigm syllogism.For the hard-core determinist, there's no difference between causes and "actions" performed by "agents". But of course this making the division between causes and actions does understand they have to thought of differently. — ssu
Can you define "freedom"? Freedom from what?Freedom is not opposed to determinism; it requires it. — Ludwig V
Can you give me an example of a free action?We could not act freely if the causal network was not (reasonably) reliable. — Ludwig V
Your post brings a post on another site to mind.
https://kevinswatch.com/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?p=1098685#p1098685 — Patterner
For the hard-core determinist, there's no difference between causes and "actions" performed by "agents". — ssu
Yes. I'm aware that my "articulation" of a Causal Gap in Determinism is un-orthodox. But it's based on science, not magic. Beginning in the early 2000s, scientists began to study Complexity and Chaos seriously. The Santa Fe Institute was established specifically to bring together physicists & mathematicians, and a few philosophers, to learn about some of the Uncertainties in Nature that puzzled the early Quantum pioneers. Quantum Mechanics seemed to be missing a few gears. So, the Uncertainty Principle has been postulated as an opportunity for the exercise of FreeWill. In opposition, the Conjecture of SuperDeterminism*1 has been proposed, but as the link below notes, its argument seems circular.Which leaves gaps (junctions?) in the chain of causation for the exercise of personal willpower to choose (decide) the next step. — Gnomon
The orthodox articulation of the debate requires either positing free will as a magical kind of cause that is causally determined and/or a gap in causality that allows this unique kind of event to occur. Neither is at all plausible. — Ludwig V
But that's the incredible thing: there isn't the influence or a controlling force with determinism!This is a promising approach, but nonetheless seems to leave our supposedly freely made decisions vulnerable to the apparently controlling force of determinism. It may not give me any information, but it will certainly influence the attitude of others to my decision, and may even influence my own attitude to my own decision. — Ludwig V
I'll try to explain my point by making the following thought experiment.It may not give me any information, but it will certainly influence the attitude of others to my decision, and may even influence my own attitude to my own decision. — Ludwig V
I think this is more of a way of argumentation, just like the person who insists that he bases his views on scientific facts and science, makes the not so veiled accusation that others don't believe in science. Or then the person makes the point that a lot of our behaviour is taught, is similar to others and hence our "Free Will" isn't so free as we want to believe. But this in my view doesn't approach the philosophical side of the World views.There’s just something about determinism that seems odd to me. I keep coming back to asking what it is that determinists are doing when they argue. It seems as if they are trying to convince someone who believes in free will of the strength of their arguments – that a free willist will consider all the evidence and, in the end, choose to believe that determinism makes the most sense. But according to determinism, this is not what determinists are doing. — Thales
Determinists in this way can make huge leaps like first you were a child and then you learned and was taught by experience that molded you to be the way you are now. Yet notice just how radical these changes are: the way you think about a lot of things has changed, the way you interact with people has changed, a lot has changed since you were a toddler. Yet something like learning is still quite a black box in social sciences.Their arguments are the result of a chain of causes that go back to their births and social environments.
And this just seems odd to me. — Thales
Well, I guess if you believe a multiverse or single universe or that there's "Chance" and "fate" that has an effect on our lives while others don't, I think there's enough differences to define some to be determinists and some others as indeterminists. Especially if one believes that there's events without causes, then those who disagree would be (I think) determinists.Why is determinism called determinism? What is deterministic about it? — Patterner
Yes, and they are less than persuasive for that reason. However, I think that while fatalistic determinism is easy to confuse with causal determinism, it does not pose the same problems. (I'm assuming you mean by "fatalistic determinism" what I think you mean - the ancient form that did not appeal to science and causality, but to logic and metaphysics) Roughly, Laplace's demon is a version of fatalistic determinism and easier to refute on logical grounds than causal determinism.Most traditional arguments against Fatalistic Determinism are based on Morality. — Gnomon
If we think of it like that, we are making a mistake. The human mind is a product of Nature and part of it. Or, to put it another way, to think of Nature as something to exploit perpetuates the practices that have landed us with climate change. Worse than that, although we can and do exploit Nature in some ways, Nature also imposes itself on us - witness climate change and antibiotic resistance. It has to be a balance.It's a feature of Nature that the human mind may be able to exploit in order to impose its will on Nature. — Gnomon
Yes, I'm aware that there are many examples of systems and situations that reveal that the systems at work in the world are much more complex and much less predictable than our classical models have recognized. They do give us a basis for thinking that human life may be, in the end, not incompatible with scientific explanation. But they do not get us there, any more than simple randomness gets us there. I think that the research into self-constituting autonomous systems, feedback loops and ideas like Conway's Game of Life are much more to the point.Lorenz's equations have already been used to explain why the weather is unpredictable. Maybe, in time, they will also reveal why the human mind is unpredictable. — Gnomon
Well put. Though perhaps we might say that the causal network is sometimes a limit on what we can do, and sometimes an opportunity to achieve what we want to achieve. Which it is, depends on the context of what we value, what we want, what we need on different occasions. So our attitude to the fact (insofar as it is a fact, as opposed to an aspiration) of causal determinism depends on us, not on what the facts are.The determinism holds. But it shows that this determinism isn't at all a limit here. — ssu
Yes. I'm impressed by your articulation of this argument. It is very tempting to think that the causal network in our world imposes things on us; we forget that it also enables us to do the things that we want to do, or at least some of them. With respect to our values and desires, it is neutral.But that's the incredible thing: there isn't the influence or a controlling force with determinism! — ssu
Yes. This is essentially the argument against fatalistic or logical determinism, but chimes with the neutrality of the causal network.Now, does this deterministic view of there being your answer 1038, 1039 and 1050 limit what you can write? No. Could they be forecasted? Again no, this isn't simple extrapolation from what has become for. — ssu
I don't think that "Chance" or "fate" have an effect on our lives. "Chance" is just a basket into which we put events that we don't have an explanation for. "Fate" is another basket into which we put the things that actually happen, whatever the explanation may be."Chance" and "fate" that has an effect on our lives while others don't, — ssu
Yes, that is self-contradictory. But you don't seem to recognize that the importance of this. Insofar as we are rational, calculating (in the widest sense) animals, with goals and preferences, what we do needs to be explained in particular ways, which are not the same as the ways that we explain the way the world works. There are different, but related, language games here; our problem is to understand how they are related.they are trying to convince someone who believes in free will of the strength of their arguments – that a free willist will consider all the evidence and, in the end, choose to believe that determinism makes the most sense. — Thales
Like Augustine and most of Socrates' interlocutors, I can participate in normal life, but that doesn't mean I can give a definition. The language-games around actions are unbelievably complicated and very difficult to summarize. The same is not true of events.Can you define "freedom"? Freedom from what? — Patterner
Tempting. But it wouldn't be a clear case. Almost everything we do can be described as free from some perspectives and not free from others. I scratch my nose because it is itching. Free or not free? What about going go to work in the morning? or signing a mortgage contract to buy a house/car? or asking a question?Can you give me an example of a free action? — Patterner
I had an attack of realism, remembering that my car is pretty reliable, but does break down sometimes. Causal determinism is at work either way. The distinction depends on my perspective as a human being. Do we have the same perspective on eclipses? Perhaps, perhaps not.Also, by "reasonably reliable", do you mean the casual network is not always reliable? If that is what you mean, can you give an example of it not being reliable? — Patterner
The answer to those questions is yes. But the questions are asked in the context of the glass breaking and so lead us to neglect the conceptual difference between the glass breaking (an event) and my throwing the pillow (an action, normally).The question is this: Did I let go of the pillow in exactly the way I did because all the constituents of my brain - whether we examine them as particles and physics, or molecules and chemistry, or structures and biology, or whatever - acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws?
Did I throw the pillow because all the constituents of my brain acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws? — Patterner
So you are an epiphenomenalist?If the answer is Yes, then we are not choosing things any more than the glass is choosing to break exactly as it does, or the debris is choosing to come to rest exactly as it does after an avalanche. We merely have awareness of things that the glass and mountain lack. — Patterner
I think you missed the point of my post in favor of FreeWill for moral agents. Moral arguments carry no weight for scientists. But shouldn't they be indicative for philosophers? I wasn't presenting empirical evidence of freedom from determinism, but merely a suggestive analogy, to indicate that, in natural processes, Determinism is not absolute. So, why assume human choices are forbidden by the gapless Chain of Cause & Effect?Yes, and they are less than persuasive for that reason. . . .
Laplace's demon is a version of fatalistic determinism and easier to refute on logical grounds than causal determinism. — Ludwig V
Sorry if my term "exploit" offended your liberal sensibilities. I intended the word to be taken literally --- in the sense of manipulating Nature to derive some benefit to humanity --- but not politically. Everything artificial in the world "exploits" some feature of nature to give humans an advantage over animals. If humans hadn't "exploited" the natural phenomenon of fire, how would they survive the Ice Ages with no natural fur to keep them warm. Yes, the influence works both ways as give & take. But that's a whole other issue.It's a feature of Nature that the human mind may be able to exploit in order to impose its will on Nature. — Gnomon
If we think of it like that, we are making a mistake. The human mind is a product of Nature and part of it. Or, to put it another way, to think of Nature as something to exploit perpetuates the practices that have landed us with climate change. Worse than that, although we can and do exploit Nature in some ways, Nature also imposes itself on us - witness climate change and antibiotic resistance. It has to be a balance. — Ludwig V
Personally, I don't think human Life, or Culture, is incompatible with scientific explanation. We are just at the early stages of a science of Complexity & Chaos. Your examples of research into complex feedback & looping systems are along the same lines that the Santa Fe Institute is trying to make compatible with scientific methods. :cool:Lorenz's equations have already been used to explain why the weather is unpredictable. Maybe, in time, they will also reveal why the human mind is unpredictable. — Gnomon
Yes, I'm aware that there are many examples of systems and situations that reveal that the systems at work in the world are much more complex and much less predictable than our classical models have recognized. They do give us a basis for thinking that human life may be, in the end, not incompatible with scientific explanation. But they do not get us there, any more than simple randomness gets us there. I think that the research into self-constituting autonomous systems, feedback loops and ideas like Conway's Game of Life are much more to the point. — Ludwig V
Again, I was using weather complexity as a metaphor, from which to draw inferences about human exploitation of natural properties. I wasn't implying freewill in Natural phenomena, but in Cultural noumena, which is commonly assumed to result from collective human intentions & purposes & willpower. Here's just one of many examples of someone who thinks FreeWill is associated with the unpredictability of Complexity*2. Google "Emergence" and you will find many articles with similar associations. :smile:I don't think that unpredictability is a significant phenomenon here. Volcanoes and football matches, not to mention the weather, are all unpredictable. But no-one thinks that free will is involved. — Ludwig V
The causes of some events are more complicated than others. The causes of our simplest actions are probably more complicated than the causes of most events. Possibly any event. As I recently said, there are many variables, many kinds of variables, and all of the variables are interacting with at least some of the others. We don't have the ability to track that, much less predict future actions. We barely have the ability to predict future events. (Some people are amazing at pool.) Still, is it not all on the same spectrum?The language-games around actions are unbelievably complicated and very difficult to summarize. The same is not true of events — Ludwig V
You said, "We could not act freely..." What do you mean?Can you give me an example of a free action?"
— Patterner
Tempting. But it wouldn't be a clear case. Almost everything we do can be described as free from some perspectives and not free from others. — Ludwig V
Can you explain the conceptual difference?The question is this: Did I let go of the pillow in exactly the way I did because all the constituents of my brain - whether we examine them as particles and physics, or molecules and chemistry, or structures and biology, or whatever - acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws?
Did I throw the pillow because all the constituents of my brain acted in the only ways each of them could, all purely physical interactions driven by the physical laws?
— Patterner
The answer to those questions is yes. But the questions are asked in the context of the glass breaking and so lead us to neglect the conceptual difference between the glass breaking (an event) and my throwing the pillow (an action, normally). — Ludwig V
Can you tell me what the definition of our problem is if the answer is Yes?If the answer is Yes, then we are not choosing things any more than the glass is choosing to break exactly as it does, or the debris is choosing to come to rest exactly as it does after an avalanche. We merely have awareness of things that the glass and mountain lack.
— Patterner
So you are an epiphenomenalist?
I don't agree. If the answer is yes, that doesn't justify your conclusion. It defines our problem. If the answer is no, that also doesn't justify any conclusion. It also defines our problem. — Ludwig V
Exactly!Though perhaps we might say that the causal network is sometimes a limit on what we can do, and sometimes an opportunity to achieve what we want to achieve. Which it is, depends on the context of what we value, what we want, what we need on different occasions. So our attitude to the fact (insofar as it is a fact, as opposed to an aspiration) of causal determinism depends on us, not on what the facts are. — Ludwig V
And do notice that it's a limitation due to logic.Yes. This is essentially the argument against fatalistic or logical determinism, but chimes with the neutrality of the causal network. — Ludwig V
Our questions define the models and the reasoning what we use to get answers. That someone thinks that everything could be computed just like we compute the movements of planets makes an obvious mistake. Once we use probability theory or game theoretic models, we have already accepted that our models aren't exact and just give some glimpses of the true reality, but surely not everything.But you don't seem to recognize that the importance of this. Insofar as we are rational, calculating (in the widest sense) animals, with goals and preferences, what we do needs to be explained in particular ways, which are not the same as the ways that we explain the way the world works. There are different, but related, language games here; our problem is to understand how they are related. — Ludwig V
I don't think that there's anything wrong in your expression about determinism. This isn't a question about a definition of determinism, it's a problem of modelling determinism.I'm asking for a definition. I've been expressing what I take determinism to be. I tried to be as clear as I could here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/910043 — Patterner
I believe the idea is that all of our actions are determined by the progressions of arrangements of all the constituents of our brains. Mental states are either identical to, or entirely determined by, brain states. In theory, a more advanced technology could pinpoint all the constituents of our brains, see all the forces acting on them, and calculate future arrangements. Why can that not be logical?If a "fatalistic" determinist argues that this kind of determinism (where all of our reactions can be forecasted) is perhaps possible in the future (as we don't know what the future holds and what kind of technological/scientific advances there are), then one has simply to remind them that this science then simply can't be logical. — ssu
Yes, I understand. But why can't how a model takes itself into account be calculated? That's just more input fed into the algorithm.The crucial part here is that modelling the past there's no interaction and the model doesn't have to take itself into account. What has happened has happened. That you did make choices isn't relevant for the determinist model: your choosing to throw the pillow is just given. But you hopefully understand that it's different to model this when it hasn't happened, especially you know about the model before you have thrown it. Then a whole Pandora's box has been opened from the determinist view. — ssu
This question comes to the crucial point.Yes, I understand. But why can't how a model takes itself into account be calculated? That's just more input fed into the algorithm. — Patterner
Why is that? Whether I chose to write a comment or not, it is a decision. I have perceived what I perceived. It is all converted into bio-electric impulses, neurotransmitters, and what not. Then it all runs to whichever parts of my brain each thing runs to. Parts where memories are stored, parts where logic examines, etc., etc. Then things move towards a decision. Particles collide, neurons fire, structures do their job, action potentials are initiated, etc.You cannot write a comment that you don't write, even if obviously those kind of comments that you don't write do exist. — ssu
Yes, they limit us, but the also, at the same time, they give us opportunities.Our senses and our abilities are of course limits to us, but that actually is quite a different thing. — ssu
"From a contradiction, anything you like follows." Calling that strength is a bit counter-intuitive. But I'm not going to argue."The "strongest" system where everything is provable is with sytem where 0=1". — ssu
So you are saying that the world is deterministic, even though our models will never demonstrate that?And before he or she thinks that you are attacking the whole idea of determinism, it should be told that the issue in the limitations of modelling that determinism, not the determinism itself! — ssu
Yes. Physics doesn't have the conceptual apparatus to describe or even acknowledge choices. Ordinary life requires a whole different way of thinking.That you did make choices isn't relevant for the determinist model: your choosing to throw the pillow is just given. — ssu
Yes. Past and future are different, even if physics can't acknowledge the fact.But you hopefully understand that it's different to model this when it hasn't happened, especially you know about the model before you have thrown it. — ssu
This is what I'm trying to understand about where some of you - you two in particular, at the moment, but others who are not posting in this thread - stand. Is everything in this reality deterministic, and we just don't have the necessary information and intelligence to be able to calculate terribly much, particularly regarding human choices, about the future? Or are some aspects of this reality - notably, human choices - not deterministic? Understandable if anyone does not know which they think is the case.And before he or she thinks that you are attacking the whole idea of determinism, it should be told that the issue in the limitations of modelling that determinism, not the determinism itself!
— ssu
So you are saying that the world is deterministic, even though our models will never demonstrate that? — Ludwig V
I'm basically asking the same thing again. Does ordinary life require a whole different way of thinking in the same sense that we need to think of large numbers of air molecules as thermodynamics, because we simply can't perceive such a gargantuan number, much less calculate all the interactions that will take place between all of them within the space they occupy?That you did make choices isn't relevant for the determinist model: your choosing to throw the pillow is just given.
— ssu
Yes. Physics doesn't have the conceptual apparatus to describe or even acknowledge choices. Ordinary life requires a whole different way of thinking — Ludwig V
Good point! Until the advent of Quantum physics, scientists had no need for a "conceptual apparatus" of "choices". But the necessity for Observer choices --- in experimental set-up, and interpretation of evidence --- resulted in "a whole different way of thinking". For example, Multiverses and Many Worlds conjectures would never have occurred to classical physicists. The Uncertainty Principle has raised many questions & eyebrows : not least about the continuity of Cause & Effect in the physical world, and the role of mental Choices in material physics. :smile:Yes. Physics doesn't have the conceptual apparatus to describe or even acknowledge choices. Ordinary life requires a whole different way of thinking. — Ludwig V
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