First, what exactly do you mean by saying that intentionality is active at every level of organic life? — Janus

How is it not clear? That every organism acts intentionally (although not with the conscious self-awareness that characterises higher organisms.) And it re-introduces intentionality at a fundamental level, in contrast to the physicalist model, which posits that organic life is understandable in terms of the same laws which govern physical and chemical reactions. If there's anything 'transcendent' about it, it is simply that.

How to demonstrate that - it's more like a philosophical framework or metaphorical model, a way of thinking about life. We're all looking at the same data, but some frameworks or metaphors might be more consonant with the observations than others. The physicalist/materialist model is mechanistic, whereas this line of thinking recognises a basic distinction between the organic and the mechanistic.

Perhaps there was a good reason that Gotama refused to answer metaphysical questions; not just because he thought that such preoccupations would distract people from practice, but perhaps also because he realized that such question are inherently unanswerable. — Janus

But this question was probably never even considered by the Buddha. This is a question about science and scientific models. It is being actively explored by many scientists - the Third Way Evolution site has an index of scientists that are exploring these ideas.

I think the underlying philosophical rift is between the materialism pushed by the so-called 'ultra-darwinists', which sees everything as being explicable in terms of physical laws, and an emerging holistic model of life and mind. It's part of the overall decline of materialism as a model, which is occuring in many areas of science.

Is such a shift in models itself a scientific matter? Are the conflicts about the interpretations of physics scientific questions? I would say not - they're all concerned with questions of meaning and interpretation, and that definitely overflows the bounds of scientific observation. Philosophy of science (Kuhn et al) have been documenting that since the 1960's. Is that 'metaphysics'? In a way it is, but that doesn't mean it shouldn't be considered.

How is it not clear? That every organism acts intentionally (although not with the conscious self-awareness that characterises higher organisms.) — Wayfarer

It's not clear because you won't proffer a clear definition of intentionality which is different than acting "with the conscious self-awareness that characterizes higher organisms". Yes, "lower" organisms obviously respond to their environments, but I don't see how that equates to intentional behavior.
Just address that question or we will be unable to proceed.

Other than nothing you've written above addresses any of the questions i posed to you, so I find nothing else there to respond to.

lower" organisms obviously respond to their environments, but I don't see how that equates to intentional behavior.
Just address that question or we will be unable to proceed. — Janus

Organisms not only react to stimuli but often do so in ways that are adaptive and goal-directed, suggesting a form of intentionality. This is seen in behaviors that enhance survival and reproduction, such as finding food, avoiding predators, and seeking mates. These behaviors imply a level of agency and purposiveness that goes beyond the deterministic nature of physical laws.

Furthermore, the internal regulatory mechanisms of organisms, such as homeostasis, also exhibit intentional-like behavior. These systems maintain stability through feedback loops, dynamically adjusting to changes in the environment to sustain life. This regulatory process involves a form of self-organization and information processing that seems distinct from non-living physical processes.

Such adaptive, purposive behavior cannot be entirely reduced to physical interactions because it involves a level of complexity and coordination that physical laws alone do not account for. That suggests that the principles governing biological systems include emergent properties and processes that arise from, but are not reducible to, their physical and chemical constituents.

Those are the kinds of considerations that are behind Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature', although they're also addressed in diverse ways by the theorists listed on the Third Way website.

We're going to need your definition of "cause." — tim wood

That which produces an effect, where "effect" is the result or consequence of a cause. In other words, when something occurs as the result of, or consequence of another thing, that other thing is the cause.

Also you appear not to distinguish between purpose and purposeful. A screw in a machine has a purpose, but it would be a kind of animism to suppose it - the screw - to be purposeful. — tim wood

I don't understand the distinction you\re trying to make. If a thing has a purpose then obviously that thing is purposeful. A screw in a machine, was put there for a purpose. It has a purpose, therefore it very clearly is purposeful, "purposeful" meaning "having purpose". And this is not "animism".

And I would appreciate it if you would provide your distinction between function and telos. — tim wood

"Function" is the activity by which a thing fulfils its purpose. We can say that "function" is the means to the end, and "purpose" is the end. Both are subjects of teleology.

To me, function is what-it's-for, and if we're lucky, how it does it. — tim wood

Put it this way, "what-it-is-for" is its purpose. How-it-does-it is its function. Can you see how the purpose is the end, and the function is the means to the end? The goal, or end, (the purpose), is the object, or desired state, while the means (function) is the activity which is supposed to bring about the realization of that object,

Above you have telos being about relation and thus not being in the thing, the relation being "between" the thing and its purpose - not sure exactly what that means, or what you're trying to say. If telos is just another word for purpose, and if by purpose is meant function, then it should not be too difficult to note where the words are used beyond their sense. If telos is somehow the purposefulness - intention - of something able to have such a thing, then that is imho, the issue - what would be that thing. — tim wood

I didn't speak of "telos", I provided a definition of "teleology".

Eh? How does this work? How or why is efficient cause deterministic? — tim wood

I think the nature of efficient cause is irrelevant at this point, and a different subject altogether, so I'll leave this question.

..the materialism pushed by the so-called 'ultra-darwinists', which sees everything as being explicable in terms of physical laws... — Wayfarer

And, I might add, when it comes to the difficult question of what is at the bottom, the foundational cause, "physical laws" always fails in explanatory capacity. So, they end up falling back on chance, with concepts like random mutations, abiogenesis, symmetry-breaking, etc..

If a thing has a purpose then obviously that thing is purposeful. A screw in a machine, was put there for a purpose. It has a purpose, therefore it very clearly is purposeful, "purposeful" meaning "having purpose" — Metaphysician Undercover

Accordingly, the telos of a thing can never be intrinsic to the thing, as purpose is defined by the thing's relation to something else, for example its function in a larger whole. — Metaphysician Undercover

No word games, please! I am quite sure the screw itself possesses zero purpose.

I didn't speak of "telos", I provided a definition of "teleology". — Metaphysician Undercover

My bad. I thought telos would be what teleology was about; i.e., the -logy of the telos.

I think the nature of efficient cause is irrelevant at this point, and a different subject altogether, so I'll leave this question. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then why did you make this claim?

This restricts "cause" to efficient cause, making the world deterministic. — Metaphysician Undercover

And btw, I find this in Physics 2:3, "All causes, both proper and incidental, may be spoken of either as potential or as actual; e.g. the cause of a house being built is either 'house-builder' or 'house-builder building'."

As to our screw, no doubt a someone or someones intended it for something, which we can call its purpose. But that "its" cannot be used to attribute anything to the screw itself - being just language of convenience. But I think you do use and understand teleology to do just that, attribute to things and beings themselves that which they do not and cannot have. Which you're free to do, but you also insist on it as the way the world works, and it isn't. Or if I'm mistaken - always a possibility - please help me dispel my confusion.

Organisms not only react to stimuli but often do so in ways that are adaptive and goal-directed, suggesting a form of intentionality. This is seen in behaviors that enhance survival and reproduction, such as finding food, avoiding predators, and seeking mates. — Wayfarer

You're talking about "higher" organisms, and I've already agreed that some of those display purposive behavior. It seems to me you are stretching the meaning of intentional.

No word games, please! I am quite sure the screw itself possesses zero purpose. — tim wood

It seems you're the one playing word games, attempting to put an unnecessary restriction on the use of "purpose". Do you agree that "purpose" means "thing intended"? And do you not understand that there is something intended for the screw in relation to the machine that it is a part of? Therefore the screw has a purpose, and is purposeful.

If you are talking about some sort of inherent purpose, which would be intrinsic to the screw, I've already told you that purpose does not exist in that way. It exists in the thing's relation to something else. In this case, the screw has purpose in relation to the machine. Be careful in understanding this relation, because it is not invertible. Purpose exists in the relation of a part to a whole, and not in the relation of the whole to the part. We cannot say that the machine has purpose in relation to the screw.

As to our screw, no doubt a someone or someones intended it for something, which we can call its purpose. But that "its" cannot be used to attribute anything to the screw itself - being just language of convenience. — tim wood

You're very wrong here. The part of the whole, which is named "the screw", has a very particular purpose assigned to it, and only it. Therefore the purpose is attributable to that part, and it alone. It does not matter that the manufacturer chose one particular screw from millions of similar possible choices, the purpose is assigned to that particular one, through the actions which followed from that choice.

You can call this "language of convenience" if you want. But since it is the only way that we have to talk about the intention which is responsible, as cause, for that particular screw's position in the world, it is a way of speaking truth about the object's context within a larger environment. The screw was put there as part of an intentional act, and the purpose is in the part's relation to the whole, not the whole's relation to the part, therefore we attribute "purpose" to the part.

But I think you do use and understand teleology to do just that, attribute to things and beings themselves that which they do not and cannot have. — tim wood

It's very clear to me, that the screw, as a part, has purpose, in relation to the machine, as the whole. If you insist on denying the truth and reality of this predication "the screw has purpose", then how would you propose that we could proceed toward understanding the intention behind the relationship between the parts and the whole?

then how would you propose that we could proceed toward understanding the intention behind the relationship between the parts and the whole? — Metaphysician Undercover

This intention, and indeed "the whole," will you assay quick definitions? So far I agree with those you've given, because I think they're pretty good. And we can certainly start with them.

As to "purpose," we seem to disagree on how words may/should be used/understood. Maybe this? If a something itself have a purpose, then a) the purpose made completely clear by the something; and b) the something have a degree of freedom that would permit it freely to not fulfill the purpose.

Thus given a machine - a whole - the purpose of the screw can be worked out, its relation as part to whole. But given just a random screw, its purpose is indiscernible. And further, in its purpose being fulfilled, the screw has zero choice; that is, in terms of the purpose articulated, if the something itself is without choice, then the something in itself has no purpose. - And this pretty much what you have already defined.

As to intention, if there be such, then there must be (another) such that has it - presumably a being of some kind. And again I invoke freedom. If there be such a being, it must be free to not intend, its choice to intend being therefore a free choice. Of such beings, they either are or are not - this simpler than may seem at first. If it is, then there are applicable predicates: it is. If it is not, then no predicates apply, and it is not.

Freedom/choice important because without it, purpose dissolves into operation according to law. The engine maker doubtless has many intentions, and purposes many things for the parts of his engine, but the parts themselves (presumably) operate in accord with laws appropriate to them themselves.

Now to jump ahead into what I think the issue is. Does every free being have a purpose? Trivially yes, many. Ultimately, only as self-legislated. By "self-legislated" I mean arrived at by a process of reason. Absent which, the being has no (ultimate) purpose.

Such adaptive, purposive behavior cannot be entirely reduced to physical interactions because it involves a level of complexity and coordination that physical laws alone do not account for. That suggests that the principles governing biological systems include emergent properties and processes that arise from, but are not reducible to, their physical and chemical constituents. — Wayfarer

I have a question or two about this. By "reducible to" do you mean 'explainable in terms of' or 'has its origin in'? Do you count global or environmental conditions as physical interactions? Do you claim there is "something more" metaphysically speaking than the physical world with its global and local conditions and interactions? If you do want to claim that, then what could that "something more" be in your opinion?

This intention, and indeed "the whole," will you assay quick definitions? — tim wood

As Plato demonstrated in the Theaetetus, some words are best left undefined until after the appropriate meaning is worked out through the dialectical process. So I'll leave these definitions for now, and hope that we can work out the meaning of these through discourse.

Thus given a machine - a whole - the purpose of the screw can be worked out, its relation as part to whole. But given just a random screw, its purpose is indiscernible. And further, in its purpose being fulfilled, the screw has zero choice; that is, in terms of the purpose articulated, if the something itself is without choice, then the something in itself has no purpose. - And this pretty much what you have already defined. — tim wood

I agree that the random screw, in that description, has no purpose, that's what the predication "random" implies. As I said, purpose is a feature of a things relation to something else, and "random" implies without any order in those relations. In the example of the screw and the machine, it is the relation of part to whole which gives the screw purpose. In many cases it is in the relation of the means to the end which gives purpose. The end gives purpose to the means, but the end is not necessarily a "whole". We call the end an "object" as a goal, that is not exactly the same as a whole.

I do not understand the relation between choice and purpose which you are outlining. "A thing", whether it is an act which is the means to an end, or a physical object like the screw, is given purpose by an intentional agent, but this does not mean that the act itself (the means), or the thing itself (the screw) has choice. Choice, and the agent who chooses are independent from the purpose. That is why choice is "free" in the sense of freely willed. Purpose follows from the freely willed choice, it is not prior to it.

As to intention, if there be such, then there must be (another) such that has it - presumably a being of some kind. And again I invoke freedom. If there be such a being, it must be free to not intend, its choice to intend being therefore a free choice. Of such beings, they either are or are not - this simpler than may seem at first. If it is, then there are applicable predicates: it is. If it is not, then no predicates apply, and it is not. — tim wood

I cannot follow this dialectic. I don't see the relation between intention and being which you start with. Nor do I see the relation to freedom. And the rest seems right out of place.

Can we agree that "intention" is the cause of purpose? Wherever we find purpose we can conclude that there is intention as the cause of that purpose.

We know that human beings have intention, and their acts are known to have purpose. So every time we observe a human act which appears to be purposeful, we conclude that there is intention behind the act, as the cause of the purposeful act. The intent is not necessarily evident to us. Do you agree, that anytime we distinguish purpose, there must be intent behind the thing we observe as having purpose, like the screw in the machine? And do you agree that the intent is not necessarily the intent of a human being, there could be other sources of intent? Therefore we cannot associate intent with "being" as you propose. We do not have the evidence required to limit "intent" in that way.

Freedom/choice important because without it, purpose dissolves into operation according to law. The engine maker doubtless has many intentions, and purposes many things for the parts of his engine, but the parts themselves (presumably) operate in accord with laws appropriate to them themselves. — tim wood

Freedom/choice have a special relationship with intention, I agree. But I think we need to make one more step of separation now, to include the agent itself. The agent (not necessarily a being, as explained above) has freedom/choice, and the agent also has intention, but these two (freedom of choice, and intention) are distinct. They must be distinct because intention is toward a particular end, will freedom of choice is directed toward no particular end. So the agent has both, freedom to choose an end, and also already chosen ends, as intentions.

Now to jump ahead into what I think the issue is. Does every free being have a purpose? Trivially yes, many. Ultimately, only as self-legislated. By "self-legislated" I mean arrived at by a process of reason. Absent which, the being has no (ultimate) purpose. — tim wood

So, I suggest you try looking at things this way, tim. Let's consider an individual human being as an agent. This type off being has many wants, needs, and desires. It also has freedom of choice. As a manifestation of these two distinct features, desires, and freedom of choice, the being develops intentions, which are particular goals or objectives. Intentions are derived from a combination of desires and of freedom of choice. But the being is hindered by things which are impossible.

Let's start with the human being as a baby. The baby wants all sorts of things, and some, like walking and talking are immediately impossible, but the baby, through intention and will power can learn and earn the capacity to talk and walk. Other things, like flying, are recognized as more absolutely impossible, due to physical constraints. So the freedom of the human individual is restricted by physical constraints, though some may be overcome. However, there is also social constraints like laws, which restrict one's freedom in a different way.

Consider that the human person grows to respect these different constraints as different forms of impossibility. Now the adolescent is free from many social constraints, in many ways, not being constrained by many responsibilities that adults get into, like a chosen career, a mortgage, credit card debt, a family to support, etc.. So the adolescent has much freedom to chose, and formulate intentions in a wide variety of ways. The intentions, goals and objectives are the property of the individual, and the individual's actions have purpose relative to those intentions. This is principle #1, what the individual does, has purpose relative to the individual's intentions, and the individual has freedom to choose one's intentions (being influenced by various desires, wants, and needs, as well as impossibilities).

Principle #2 is that the individual has a desire or need for relations with others. This puts the person into the context of a part of a larger "whole". The larger whole being a family, a team, a business, company, or society in general. As a part of a larger whole, the person has purpose in that relation. Now, not only does the person's actions have purpose in relation to that person, but also the person has purpose in relation to this larger entity.

The person is intermediary now. One's actions have purpose in relation to the person, and the person has purpose in relation to the larger organization. When we say that human beings are "rational animals" it is implied that the person will prioritize the purpose one has in relation to the larger entity over the lower purpose one gives to one's actions through one's own intentions.

But this presents a significant problem. Strictly speaking, the person's actions have purpose relative to the person's intentions, and that's how we understand purpose, as relative to intention. So when we understand that the person has purpose relative to a larger organization, it is more proper to understand the purpose in relation to the intention of the larger organization. But how do we understand this intention? An entity such as a family, a team, a company or business, or society in general, is not the type of thing (a being for example) which we would think of as having intention. Because of this, the way that a person gets purpose from a higher organization is very perplexing.

I have a question or two about this. By "reducible to" do you mean 'explainable in terms of' or 'has its origin in'? Do you count global or environmental conditions as physical interactions? Do you claim there is "something more" metaphysically speaking than the physical world with its global and local conditions and interactions? If you do want to claim that, then what could that "something more" be in your opinion? — Janus

‘Physical reductionism’ is generally taken to mean ‘explainable in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry.’ It is the kind of attitude which says that living organisms are ‘nothing but’ colllections of atoms or ‘nothing but’ the vehicles by which genes propagate. In practical terms, the desired reduction base is something that can, at least in theory, be explained and predicted in those terms.

‘Global and environmental conditions’ were not, in times past, considered to be physical interactions, or considered as part of the reduction base. That is what might be called a holistic approach which is the opposite to reductionism.

The ‘law of physics’ are context-free. They don’t need to take into account environmental factors but rather describe the behaviour of ideal objects under specified conditions. This is what makes them universal - the behaviour of a body with specific physical attributes will predictably act in accordance with physical laws under said conditions - like, the apple will fall at a given rate, provided nobody catches it, or the wind doesn’t blow and alter its path, or it isn’t in zero-gravity environments.

The ‘something more’ that biology has to consider is precisely the environment and the constant interaction of organisms with each other and their environment. That is where ‘physicalist reductionism’ has been found wanting, and why biosemiotics and systems science have gained traction in biology: living beings are far more ‘language-like’ than ‘machine like’, right down to the most fundamental levels of cellular biology.

Accordingly, I think it’s a mistake to try and conceive of the ‘something more ‘ - the aspects of organisms that can’t be reduced to the chemical and physical - as any kind of ‘something’. That leads to the misconception of an elan vital or spooky ethereal substance - in other words it’s a reification. As you know, I’ve often commented that I think one of the consequences of Cartesian dualism is exactly that kind of reification, by treating mind as a ‘thinking thing’, more or less on a similar plane to physical things, but of a different kind.

Whereas the dynamic systems theory approach of e.g. Terrence Deacon and Alice Juarrrero and others speaks in terms of the interaction of ‘bottom-up’, physical reactions with ‘top-down’, causal constraints. Those latter kinds of factors are precisely what reductionism fails to consider.

See From Physical Causes to Organisms of Meaning, Steve Talbott.

I agree that the random screw, in that description, has no purpose, — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you haven't read. Because I did not say it had no purpose. I did say its purpose would be indiscernible, a whole other proposition.

In the example of the screw and the machine, it is the relation of part to whole which gives the screw purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only if we're being sloppy in the way of ordinary and noncritical language usage. Or are you suggesting purpose resides somehow in the engine and screw combined, you having already made clear it cannot be in either separately. My own view is that the purposes of both are inventions of a being capable of such.

it is in the relation of the means to the end — Metaphysician Undercover

all being the sole property of the being and nothing at all to either the screw or the engine

I do not understand the relation between choice and purpose — Metaphysician Undercover

No doubt, because I was not talking about choice and purpose, but aout choice and intention, here:

As to intention, if there be such, then there must be (another) such that has it - presumably a being of some kind. And again I invoke freedom. If there be such a being, it must be free to not intend, its choice to intend being therefore a free choice. — tim wood

Choice, and the agent who chooses are independent from the purpose. That is why choice is "free" in the sense of freely willed. Purpose follows from the freely willed choice, it is not prior to it. — Metaphysician Undercover

And here we're back in tune - I agree.

I cannot follow this dialectic. I don't see the relation between intention and being which you start with. Nor do I see the relation to freedom. And the rest seems right out of place. — Metaphysician Undercover

And just as quickly out of tune again. Beings, those that are able, have intentions; non-beings, not. An engine builder (presumably) has intentions; his tools and his materials, not. And if no element of freedom in his intentions, e.g., the freedom to not intend, then it's not intentions that he has.

I cannot follow this dialectic. — Metaphysician Undercover

Likely there are some adult English classes, maybe at night, you could take advantage of. Actually, I think you follow perfectly well, but don't want to admit it.

Can we agree that "intention" is the cause of purpose? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. I think so.

Wherever we find purpose we can conclude that there is intention as the cause of that purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. Intention, if intention is anywhere, is in the mind of the intender, and any purpose therefrom his purpose. The trouble is that we can suppose intention where there is none, and infer purpose wrongly.

Do you agree, that anytime we distinguish purpose, there must be intent behind the thing we observe as having purpose, like the screw in the machine? — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope, and neither should you. Yours a categorical statement, when at best it is contingent and speculative.

And do you agree that the intent is not necessarily the intent of a human being, — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think dogs or whales have human intent, nor humans doggy or whale intent. But human intent can only come from humans. That is, we can indeed limit intention to being, and to certain definite and distinct beings as well. And we have no evidence to extend that limit.

The agent (not necessarily a being, — Metaphysician Undercover

If not a being, and necessarily a particular being by type, human for human, eagle for eagle, etc., then what?

but the baby, through intention and will power can learn — Metaphysician Undercover

Intention? Will power? Learn? For babies I do not think any of these terms are either well or meaningfully defined. Certainly they have no explanatory value, except perhaps as a naming of convenience for a result for which there is no good account.
Your P#s 1 & 2 without objection.

Because of this, the way that a person gets purpose from a higher organization is very perplexing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe you could provide a clearer view of your perplexity? My own view is that an individual "gets purpose from a higher organization" through a process akin to consumption and digestion.

These posts becoming long and exhausting. We should try to keep it simple and short. Given how we have proceeded with purpose and intention, I wonder if you care to reconsider your definition of teleology, here:

Teleology is a way of studying things which looks at things in relation to purpose, reason for being. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is also worth mentioning:

Terrence Deacon's concept of "ententionality," introduced in "Incomplete Nature," seeks to describe the unique properties and attributes of organisms and their goal-directed behaviors, which he believes are inadequately explained by traditional physical and intentional frameworks. Ententionality combines "intentionality" with "entelechy" (Aristotle's term for realizing potential), emphasizing that organisms inherently pursue goals and maintain themselves through a dynamic process of self-organization and adaptation. This idea highlights the complex interplay between biological structures and functions that give rise to purposeful behavior and consciousness, suggesting that life inherently possesses a form of directedness that goes beyond mere mechanistic explanations. — ChatGPT

‘Physical reductionism’ is generally taken to mean ‘explainable in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry.’ It is the kind of attitude which says that living organisms are ‘nothing but’ colllections of atoms or ‘nothing but’ the vehicles by which genes propagate. In practical terms, the desired reduction base is something that can, at least in theory, be explained and predicted in those terms. — Wayfarer

You seem to be equivocating between 'explainable in terms of' and 'finds its origin in' (or as I should have added 'is constituted.by') That something is not explainable in physical terms does not entail that it is anything over and above its physical constitution, the relations between its parts and the global and local constraints it is subject to.

So, of course intentional behavior is not explainable in terms of physical reactions, because to say it is would be to deny the very conception of intentionality that is purported to be unexplained. But all that means is that there is a limit to what can be understood in mechanistic terms. To reject physicalism on this basis is to be working from and reacting to outmoded mechanistic conceptions of physicality. In other words, it is to be attacking a strawman.

‘Global and environmental conditions’ were not, in times past, considered to be physical interactions, or considered as part of the reduction base. That is what might be called a holistic approach which is the opposite to reductionism. — Wayfarer

Of course, but in times past global and environmental conditions were thought to be given by God or determined by karma or some imagined supernatural principle. Are you now appealing to those kinds of ideas, and if not, just what are you appealing to? What are you trying to imply beyond the well-accepted fact that not everything in human life or even nature can be understood in mechanistic terms. That's the problem, you never come out and say just what it is you are arguing for.

The ‘law of physics’ are context-free. They don’t need to take into account environmental factors but rather describe the behaviour of ideal objects under specified conditions. This is what makes them universal - the behaviour of a body with specific physical attributes will predictably act in accordance with physical laws under said conditions - like, the apple will fall at a given rate, provided nobody catches it, or the wind doesn’t blow and alter its path, or it isn’t in zero-gravity environments. — Wayfarer

We call them "laws of physics" or "laws of nature', but really, they are just generalized formulations of observed regularities, and in that sense, they are not context-free, not independent of our empirical observations. We don't really know whether they apply everywhere in this universe but given that they seem to accurately picture the nature of what is observed, and that they are underpinned by elegant mathematics, we assume that they are universal.

Accordingly, I think it’s a mistake to try and conceive of the ‘something more ‘- the aspects of organisms that can’t be reduced to the chemical and physical - as any kind of ‘something’. That leads to the misconception of an elan vital or spooky ethereal substance - in other words it’s a reification. As you know, I’ve often commented that I think one of the consequences of Cartesian dualism is exactly that kind of reification, by treating mind as a ‘thinking thing’, more or less on a similar plane to physical things, but of a different kind. — Wayfarer

If the mechanistically unexplainable aspects of nature are not "any kind of something" then they are not any kind of anything. In other words, all that is being shown by their (current) unexplainability is either the (current) limits of human understanding, or perhaps the permanent limits of human understanding, which might well make sense given that it seems reasonable to think that nature is non-dual, whereas human thought is intrinsically, inextricably dualistic.

That something is not explainable in physical terms does not entail that it is anything over and above its physical constitution, the relations between its parts and the global and local constraints it is subject to. — Janus

But such constraints are not considered in reductionism.

reject physicalism on this basis is to be working from and reacting to outmoded mechanistic conceptions of physicality. — Janus

Mechanistic materialism still prevails in or underlies many naturalistic accounts.

Of course, but in times past global and environmental conditions were thought to be given by God or determined by karma or some imagined supernatural principle. Are you now appealing to those kinds of ideas, and if not, just what are you appealing to? — Janus

I’m not ‘appealing to’ anything. The physicalist paradigm is just exactly that everything is ultimately reducible to the laws of physics. But it’s clear that these are abstractions that don’t describe the complexities of organic life.

That Talbot essay is really worth the effort.

Or are you suggesting purpose resides somehow in the engine and screw combined, you having already made clear it cannot be in either separately. — tim wood

Yes I've said this for a number of posts now, purpose is in the relation. In this example, the purpose of the part (the screw) is in its relation to the thing which it is a part of (the machine), which can be called "the whole". And I explained that this relationship is not invertible. Purpose is in the relationship of the part (screw) to the whole (machine), not in the relationship of the whole to the part. That is why we say "the screw has purpose", referencing the relation of the screw to the machine, not "the machine has purpose" in relation to the screw. The latter expression, "the machine has purpose" requires putting the machine into the context of a further relation.

My own view is that the purposes of both are inventions of a being capable of such... all being the sole property of the being and nothing at all to either the screw or the engine — tim wood

As I explained, purpose implies intention, therefore intentional creation is implied by any display of purpose. But it is clearly not the case that purpose is "the sole property of the being". If you look at the use of "purpose", in all cases it involves a relationship between things, and therefore cannot be the sole property of any being.

And here we're back in tune - I agree. — tim wood

How can you agree with this? I said the agent is independent from the purpose. But above, you say purpose is the sole property of the being. Don't these two contradict in your mind? If purpose can only be the property of the being, how can the being be independent from it? In other words, how could this property come to be in the being, if the being is independent from it and also it cannot exist independent from the being?

An engine builder (presumably) has intentions; his tools and his materials, not. And if no element of freedom in his intentions, e.g., the freedom to not intend, then it's not intentions that he has. — tim wood

This is contradictory as well. You are saying that an intentional being has the capacity to not-intend. However, to not-intend would contradict the premise of "intentional being". This is like saying that the intentional being could negate its own nature of being intentional, by intentionally not intending. But intentionally not intending would still be a case of intending. Therefore the capacity to not-intend contradicts "intentional being". This is like what they say about choosing not to choose. That's still a choice. And "choosing not to choose" is contradictory unless we separate the more specific from the more general, to give "choose" distinct references, or meanings. Therefore it's contradictory to say that the intentional being has the freedom not to intend.

Likely there are some adult English classes, maybe at night, you could take advantage of. Actually, I think you follow perfectly well, but don't want to admit it. — tim wood

To tell you the truth, I was being polite. I could only interpret what you said as contradictory. So instead of accusing you of contradiction, I was forgiving, and gave you the chance to reconsider, to express what you meant in a different, clearer way, in case the contradiction was unintentional. Since you simply reassert your contradictions I have no choice now but to tell you why I cannot understand. What you say is contradictory, and your contradiction appears intentional. That makes understanding impossible.

Nope, and neither should you. Yours a categorical statement, when at best it is contingent and speculative. — tim wood

You agreed that intention is the cause of purpose. Why is it that you cannot agree that when we see purpose, there is intention behind it? If you think that something else, other than intention might cause the purpose one observes, then you ought to disagree when I say that intention is the cause of purpose.

No. Intention, if intention is anywhere, is in the mind of the intender, and any purpose therefrom his purpose. The trouble is that we can suppose intention where there is none, and infer purpose wrongly. — tim wood

Wait, slow down, you're going off track and inverting things unnecessarily. You agreed that Intention is the cause of purpose. Then you said intention is in the mind of the intender, and I would agree to this. And because intention is located there, in the mind, it is only evident to oneself. My intention is only evident to me, and your intention is only evident to you Do we agree so far?

However, what you don't seem to accept, is that we find purpose in the world around us, like the screw has purpose in the machine. Further, since you accept that intention is the cause of purpose, you should see that whenever we find purpose in the world, we can infer intention as the cause of that purpose.

So, we do not "suppose intention" and then "infer purpose". We observe empirical evidence of purpose, as in the case of the screw in the machine, and from this empirical evidence we infer intention. We conclude that the machine was constructed intentional from the evidence of the purposeful relations of the parts to the whole, like the screw, as one such part The other way around, to suppose intention and then infer purpose would be pointlessly misleading, because we would not know when to assume intention, because it is hidden from us.

Since you agree with me, that this way is misleading, you ought to also agree that the other way is far more reliable. we observe purpose and infer intention. And this is because we can observe purpose, in the relations of things. We see it in the relation between the screw and the machine, for example.

I don't think dogs or whales have human intent, nor humans doggy or whale intent. But human intent can only come from humans. — tim wood

Of course, only human beings have human intent, that's tautological. To call it human intent is to say that a human being has it. However we find that other animals have intent. We can observe purpose in their actions and conclude that they have intent, in the way described above. But what would be the point of trying to distinguish human intent from the intent of other animals? Intent is very particular, specific to the individual. Your intentions are completely different from my intentions, as intentions vary substantially between one individual and another. So distinguishing "human intent" from "whale intent", would be at best completely insignificant, but most likely just arbitrary.

If not a being, and necessarily a particular being by type, human for human, eagle for eagle, etc., then what? — tim wood

I don't know what. That's the very problem I exposed at the end of the post. We really know so little about the nature of intention, that we cannot make any conclusions about what sort of subject is required for the predication of "having intention". We know from personal experience, that humans have intention, and we know from observation of purpose, that other creatures have intention, but we do not have anything to demonstrate to us the limits of intention, i.e. where it may and may not be.

Intention? Will power? Learn? For babies I do not think any of these terms are either well or meaningfully defined. Certainly they have no explanatory value, except perhaps as a naming of convenience for a result for which there is no good account. — tim wood

What!!? I am shocked and amazed at your naivety. You think "learn" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? You think "intention" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? You think "will power" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? I conclude, that in your mind the behaviour of babies is simply unexplainable.

Maybe you could provide a clearer view of your perplexity? My own view is that an individual "gets purpose from a higher organization" through a process akin to consumption and digestion. — tim wood

Do you see, that you agreed with me, that intention is the cause of purpose? You ought also agree therefore, that where there is purpose, there is intention as the cause of that purpose. Therefore purpose is not acquired through a process like consumption, it is given, caused, by the actions of an intentional agent. Think of the screw and its purpose in the machine. The intentional agent who manufactured the machine, gave the screw its purpose. So, if the individual human being has purpose in relation to a higher organization, such as a family, business, community, society, or humanity in general, where is the intentional agent which gives this purpose to the individual?

These posts becoming long and exhausting. We should try to keep it simple and short. Given how we have proceeded with purpose and intention, I wonder if you care to reconsider your definition of teleology, here: — tim wood

Why? That definition appears consistent with what i am saying, What would be the purpose of redefining at this point? We haven't agreed on anything very conclusive.

But such constraints are not considered in reductionism. — Wayfarer

I haven't been arguing for reductionism. Is there a third person in this conversation? I have been trying to persuade you to consider the possibility that there are different kinds or definitions of physicalism. One kind would consist in the claim that everything can be explained in terms of physics. I find that claim ridiculous, because everything obviously cannot be explained in terms of physics.

Another kind would consist in the claim that everything that exists, all entities, events, relations, processes and qualities are fundamentally physical insofar as they consist in energy flow and exchange. This leaves the question about abstractions, generalities—do they exist somehow apart from the energetic processes of thinking of or about them? If we think they do exist apart from the thinking of them, that is itself a thought which involves energy flow and exchange. Do we even really know what the question could mean?

Mechanistic materialism still prevails in or underlies many naturalistic accounts. — Wayfarer

Many or some? Do you know what is the percentage of contemporary naturalist accounts that are merely mechanistic, that deny the existence of emergent qualities which cannot be mechanistically explained?

The physicalist paradigm is just exactly that everything is ultimately reducible to the laws of physics. But it’s clear that these are abstractions that don’t describe the complexities of organic life. — Wayfarer

I've been trying to get you to see that it's not a case of the physicalist paradigm, but rather of a physicalist paradigm. I don't know why you are so worried about what I think is a minority position in today's world. As i see it a far bigger problem in today's world is materialism in the form of consumerism—the desire to acquire ever more and more possessions, the identification of the personal identity, of its worth, with material wealth.

One kind would consist in the claim that everything can be explained in terms of physics. I find that claim ridiculous, because everything obviously cannot be explained in terms of physics. — Janus

A recent survey of academic philosophers shows that slightly more than 50% ‘accept or lean towards’ physicalism, presumably they don’t. (Another survey shows that around 66% ‘lean towards’ atheism. So the majority of academic philosophers ‘lean towards’ physicalism and atheism. No surprises there.)

As i see it a far bigger problem in today's world is materialism in the form of consumerism—the desire to acquire ever more and more possessions, the identification of the personal identity, of its worth, with material wealth. — Janus

They’re plainly related. It’s logical for a social philosophy that recognises nothing other than the physical.

A recent survey of academic philosophers shows that slightly more than 50% ‘accept or lean towards’ physicalism, presumably they don’t. (Another survey shows that around 66% ‘lean towards’ atheism. So the majority of academic philosophers ‘lean towards’ physicalism and atheism. No surprises there.) — Wayfarer

That doesn't specify what kind of physicalism they lean towards. Atheism is a separate issue, I had thought you were an atheist, in the sense of lacking belief in God, yourself.

They’re plainly related. It’s logical for a social philosophy that recognises nothing other than the physical. — Wayfarer

Nonsense. The US, probably the most materialistic culture, has a high percentage of people who profess to be either religious or spiritual.

In U.S., 47% Identify as Religious, 33% as Spiritual from here

Indeed, but in my view much of the ‘Christianity’ that is professed by Americans is bogus, like the ‘prosperity gospel’ nonsense that proclaims that the faithful will be rewarded with material riches. So in that mindset, religion and materialism are combined, which I’m sure is not in keeping with the intent of the Gospels. A lot of American Christianity seems an earnest parody to me.

We’re loosing sight of the OP. The question was ‘what is purpose, how does it arise’. My argument is that in ‘modern’ vision of the Cosmos, described by classical physics and Galilean science, purpose can only be understood in terms of intentional agents or agencies. The laws that ‘govern’ the cosmos, and also evolution, are devoid of intentionality and purpose. So it was presumed that the Cosmos and everything in it arises as a consequence of the ‘accidental collocation of atoms’ (Bertrand Russell’s term.)

I’ve been trying to point to more recent ‘philosophies of biology’ e.g. Terrence Deacon, Alice Juarrero, Steve Talbott, which question that form of materialism. One of the grounds on which it is questioned is the intentional nature of all organic life, which displays behaviours that can’t be explained in bald reductionist terms. I agree that these are not materialist or physicalist but they’re also not typical, although they’re becoming influential. But I take the fact that they exist to be evidence of the waning of materialism, which is welcome. (It’s also interesting that Brentano’s work on ‘intentionality’ was the original inspiration for phenomenology which is similarly opposed to reductionism.)

I’ve been trying to point to more recent ‘philosophies of biology’ e.g. Terrence Deacon, Alice Juarrero, Steve Talbott, which question that form of materialism. — Wayfarer

I have read some Terrence Deacon many years ago now (I have his book Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter} and I take him to be as the second part of the title indicates a kind of physicalist. I don't remember him positing that anything beyond the physical world exists, any transcendent reality. The others I can't speak to.

The question is as to whether nature evolved in an unplanned way out of a primordial state of chaos or whether the world was created with a purpose in mind. If there is, as epigenetics seems to suggest, some feedback from an organism's experience of the internal and external environments, that doesn't equate to intentionality in my way of thinking. For me intentional means deliberate planned.

Animals are capable, to varying degrees, of intentional behavior because they are cognitive agents. For me, nature does not count as intentional unless it is either a cognitive agent or is directed by a cognitive agent.

Nonsense. The US, probably the most materialistic culture, has a high percentage of people who profess to be either religious or spiritual. — Janus

Yes, and more broadly the same is true for many people who identify with 'New Age' spirituality and Eastern religious ideas - even those who follow this or that guru. They remain resolutely obsessed with status, wealth and real estate. And having worked recently with a number of Thai Buddhists - the same materialism dominates.

It think it's pretty clear that spirituality and/or religion do not lead to less acquisitive worldviews, but often nestle comfortably alongside status seeking materialism. Nor do they lead to enhanced compassion or tolerance.

Of course many defenders of higher consciousness worldviews are likely to say that such people are not real, Buddhists, Hindus, Parsis, Sikhs, Christians, etc.

I don't remember him (Deacon) positing that anything beyond the physical world exists, any transcendent reality. — Janus

I started on Deacon in earnest in January this year but stalled at around chapters 5 or 6. I see him more as trying to extend the scope of naturalism beyond physical reductionism.

We’re loosing sight of the OP. The question was ‘what is purpose, how does it arise’. My argument is that in ‘modern’ vision of the Cosmos, described by classical physics and Galilean science, purpose can only be understood in terms of intentional agents or agencies. The laws that ‘govern’ the cosmos, and also evolution, are devoid of intentionality and purpose. So it was presumed that the Cosmos and everything in it arises as a consequence of the ‘accidental collocation of atoms’ (Bertrand Russell’s term.) — Wayfarer

Newton described his first law of motion as dependent on the Will of God. What this law describes is the continuity of existence, as time passes, inertia. Things will continue to be, into the future, exactly as they have been in the past, unless a force causes something to change. What this law does is remove the necessity for a cause of the continuity of existence as time passes (the cause which Newton called God's Will), by making it something that we take for granted.

Now, when we take this thing for granted (what is expressed by the first law), the continuity of existence as time passes, then a "cause" is required to change it. This effectively removes the need for a cause of the continuity of existence as time passes (God's Will), by taking it as granted, and replacing it with the need for a cause of any change to this continuity of existence.

Yes, and more broadly the same is true for many people who identify with 'New Age' spirituality and Eastern religious ideas - even those who follow this or that guru. They remain resolutely obsessed with status, wealth and real estate. And having worked with a number of Thai Buddhists - the same materialism dominates. — Tom Storm

Totally agree :100:

Of course many defenders of higher consciousness worldviews are likely to say that such people are not real, Buddhists, Hindus, Parsis, Sikhs, Christians, etc. — Tom Storm

True, and that was basically the response tendered by @Wayfarer. I think that there is definitely such a thing as "higher consciousness", and although the "higher" part suggests "otherworldliness", "afterlife" or "spiritual realm", it doesn't have to be wedded to that way of thinking, it can be thought of simply as an altered state—a heightened state of awareness and cognition.

:up:

Hello @Wayfarer,

They're all "just letters", right? What distinguishes that paragraph from the rest of the text on this page is that, absent the organisation imposed by language-using agents, it conveys no meaning.

isn't it more reasonable to say it is Atoms and matter having a living experience — Caerulea-Lawrence


But there's nothing in the theory of 'atoms and matter' which account for the nature of experience. That is the subject of the well-known David Chalmer's paper Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, a perennial topic on this forum, and which spawned an entire academic industry of 'consciousness studies'. — Wayfarer

Thanks for reading and commenting. I do not disagree with your point, for as I wrote in my middle paragraph of the same comment:

Isn't it therefore reasonable to say that what our minds do is exploring, understanding and parsing the inherent 'purpose' and 'meaning' in our bodies and from the world around us? Like small, hard to read text-files that we make a bigger and more complex story about? — Caerulea-Lawrence

Yes, we are language-using agents, but what are we reading? Yes, we can read letters, but we can also read landscapes, speed, color as well as faces (Many of us, and to varying degrees and to certain points). Moreover, we can also 'read' our own bodies.

The problem I see with saying that things convey "no meaning" is that you are adding 'organization' post-hoc. If you have a book, but you can't read, the letters there also don't convey any meaning to you, despite the book being both intentionally and purposefully written and bound. So, if you learned how to read, you would say "oh, this is meaningful". But the meaning was already inherent in the book, you only learned how to read.

Which I don't see clash with your argument at all. I'm not arguing that atoms and matter account for the nature of experience, but that treating atoms and matter as inconsequential to our understanding of purpose and meaning, seems arbitrary at best.

Yes, we are language-using agents, but what are we reading? Yes, we can read letters, but we can also read landscapes, speed, color as well as faces (Many of us, and to varying degrees and to certain points). Moreover, we can also 'read' our own bodies.

The problem I see with saying that things convey "no meaning" is that you are adding 'organization' post-hoc. If you have a book, but you can't read, the letters there also don't convey any meaning to you, despite the book being both intentionally and purposefully written and bound. So, if you learned how to read, you would say "oh, this is meaningful". But the meaning was already inherent in the book, you only learned how to read.

Which I don't see clash with your argument at all. I'm not arguing that atoms and matter account for the nature of experience, but that treating atoms and matter as inconsequential to our understanding of purpose and meaning, seems arbitrary at best. — Caerulea-Lawrence

I think that the is a very good approach, the differences, and similarities, of "purpose" and "meaning". Both are closely related to intention, but in different ways. And both, purpose and meaning, exist as relations, in the way I described earlier.

Suppose an author writes some material, a book or something. Communication such as this is done with purpose, as intentional, the author has goals in this act. So, from the perspective of the author, there is purpose to that communicative material, that writing. The reader however, does not access the author's intentions directly, and so does not put the material in a relationship with the author's intentions, to apprehend the author's purpose. That is why deception is possible. Instead, the reader puts the material into relations, or associations within one's own mind, to apprehend the meaning.

I suggest that this constitutes a significant difference between purpose and meaning. "Purpose" relates the observable actions, or things, which the artist is working with directly to a goal or end which the artist has in mind. This is best described as the first-person perspective, because only the author could ever know the true intentions, and therefore the purpose of the writing. "Meaning" on the other hand relates the observable actions, or things, which the artist has worked with (notice the necessity of the past tense here) to memories, habits, acquired rules and conventions, within the mind of the observer. "Meaning" is what the observer derives from the work.

So in the latter, despite the fact that we define "meaning" as "what is meant", "what is intended" by the author or artist, there is really no direct involvement with intention here at all. In this way "intention" is completely removed from "meaning", and the common understanding of "the meaning of that writing", is that there is some sort of objective way that the writing is supposed to be understood, based in some kind of rules, and "the meaning" therefore is totally independent from what the author intended, i.e. the author's purpose.

I have to admire your ability to write long, except that length can defeat its own purpose. I shall reply as best I can, largely summarily if I can pick up the threads.

I think you make an error in logic. You have purpose implying intentional creation. P => IC. And if in fact you have the P, then you have the IC - simple modus ponens. But you infer P; you don't have it; and thus you do not have IC.

We have a screw and the engine it's a part of. These things themselves entirely innocent of any intention, purpose, or creation, being just (presumably) pieces of metal. So also any relation, relation itself being just an idea. Are we in complete agreement on this? The hazard of the informal use of language being to anthropomorphize or otherwise animate these inanimate things. And as to intention, creation, purpose (IPC), these all from the beings that have them, by type. For human IPC, humans.

As to freedom of choice, I merely say that, it seems to me, creation involves discontinuity, from not-being to being. And freedom necessary because no freedom, no discontinuity, no becoming. Rather instead it - whatever it is - in some sense inevitable. Which I call operation according to law. As to human freedom, you seem to hold that there is no freedom to not choose - not choosing itself being a choice. And this in this context both trivial and vapid - and counter-productive. Unless at the ice-cream parlor, you being offered a choice between vanilla and strawberry and choosing neither, are pleased to pay your four dollars for an empty dish full of neither.

What!!? I am shocked and amazed at your naivety. You think "learn" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? You think "intention" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? You think "will power" has no explanatory value in the behaviour of babies? — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right. I hold the words "learn, intention, and will-power" in themselves have no explanatory value. Supposing that they do is the mark of the educator, who knowing better is usually trying to sell something to someone who doesn't, opposed to the teacher who knows and has learned, sometimes from brutal experience, that they don't.

So, if the individual human being has purpose in relation to a higher organization, such as a family, business, community, society, or humanity in general, where is the intentional agent which gives this purpose to the individual? — Metaphysician Undercover

Our caveat against reifying inferences in mind, I argue that organizational hierarchy does not mean a hierarchy of sources of intention. It can certainly mean a variety of sources of information that can inform intention. And the intention, coming from the individual, is usually in part the result of consumption and digestion of that information.

I think - maybe wrongly- that you're trying to pry open some gap to allow God into this. And no need to pry; you can have Him all day long and at night too as a matter of belief. But the facts and logic of the matter will not allow you to make Him also a fact of the matter. Meaning of course that for folks who try, they either have belief or self-delusion.

I think you make an error in logic. You have purpose implying intentional creation. P => IC. And if in fact you have the P, then you have the IC - simple modus ponens. But you infer P; you don't have it; and thus you do not have IC. — tim wood

This is not an issue of the validity of the logic, it is an issue of the truth or falsity of the premise. The premise year is a description, and any empirically supported premise suffers the same problem. There is a description, and the truth or falsity of the description must be judged. The judgement is always to some extent subjective, as is the description, the extent of which varies greatly depending on the type description.

We have a screw and the engine it's a part of. — tim wood

So, this premise needs to be judged for truth or falsity. First, we must judge, 'is that thing a screw?', 'is that thing an engine?'. Assuming we agree that the items indicated fulfil the criteria of those terms, we need to ask by what principle is one said to be " a part of" the other. I would say that "part" here implies a specific relation, meaning that one is a component of the other, such that the other is a larger item, having a number of such "parts". If we agree on something like this, we can also agree on the truth of that description.

These things themselves entirely innocent of any intention, purpose, or creation, being just (presumably) pieces of metal. So also any relation, relation itself being just an idea. Are we in complete agreement on this? — tim wood

No, we are not in agreement on this. By saying that one is a part of the other, you already include a relation. You want to deny my description, that the screw has purpose in relation to the engine, and replace it with your description, that the screw is a part in relation to the engine. Each description involves a relation between the screw and the engine, and neither description is more true than the other.

My description is just a little more detailed than yours. While you use the more general part/whole relation in your description, I proceed further in accuracy and precision in my description to say that the part has purpose. This is simple recognition that the thing you call "the engine" is also an artifice, therefore built with intention. This does not at all reduce the truth of the description. It is a simple fact that the thing you call "the engine", could also be truthfully called "the artifice". So, we simply have two different, yet both truthful descriptions of the very same thing. You say there is an engine and a screw is a part of the engine, I say there is an artifice which we call an engine, and the screw as part of that artifice has a purpose. You ought to be able to see that my description is just a more precise and accurate description of the items indicated, and the relations which constitute a part of the description.

As to freedom of choice, I merely say that, it seems to me, creation involves discontinuity, from not-being to being. And freedom necessary because no freedom, no discontinuity, no becoming. Rather instead it - whatever it is - in some sense inevitable. Which I call operation according to law. As to human freedom, you seem to hold that there is no freedom to not choose - not choosing itself being a choice. And this in this context both trivial and vapid - and counter-productive. Unless at the ice-cream parlor, you being offered a choice between vanilla and strawberry and choosing neither, are pleased to pay your four dollars for an empty dish full of neither. — tim wood

I'm going to drop this subject of freedom and choice. It's only relevant in a tangential way, and we do not need the long posts.

That's right. I hold the words "learn, intention, and will-power" in themselves have no explanatory value. — tim wood

Really? I find that highly unusual, even absurd. So, let's look at the above example. There's a thing called "the engine", and a thing called "the screw". Assume we know nothing about these things just their names. Now you say that the screw is a part of the engine. I say "the engine" is an artifice, a device intentionally built, and the screw has a purpose dictated by the creator's design. Do you honestly believe that my description provides no extra "explanatory value" over yours?

Come on now tim, does the difference between something produced intentionally, and something produced without intention have absolutely no significance to you? Have you never spent time in a court of law where intention provides great leverage with its explanatory value?

No, we are not in agreement on this. By saying that one is a part of the other, you already include a relation. You want to deny my description, that the screw has purpose in relation to the engine, and replace it with your description, that the screw is a part in relation to the engine. Each description involves a relation between the screw and the engine, and neither description is more true than the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confusing yourself with language. A relation is either an idea - or the expression of one - or a thing. I don't see how a screw can in any sense have an idea, nor how it can be one, and at the same time a screw. Nor do I see how an idea can be a thing. And the screw is a part of the engine not in virtue of any idea or relation, but on the simple fact that it is.

This is not an issue of the validity of the logic, — Metaphysician Undercover

Just the truth, then? Hmm, could be interesting - your criteium for truth being?

You ought to be able to see that my description is just a more precise and accurate description of the items indicated, and the relations which constitute a part of the description. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree on this section, but did you mean artifact instead of "artifice"?

That's right. I hold the words "learn, intention, and will-power" in themselves have no explanatory value.
— tim wood
Really? I find that highly unusual, even absurd. — Metaphysician Undercover

Great, what do they explain?

Come on now tim, does the difference between something produced intentionally, and something produced without intention have absolutely no significance to you? Have you never spent time in a court of law where intention provides great leverage with its explanatory value? — Metaphysician Undercover

On the basis of intention or the lack of it someone is guilty or innocent? Intention to what? And because you lodge meaning in the word, the word for you shall have to be sufficient. Well, guilty? Innocent? The words themselves just names - signposts - otherwise devoid of meaning. E.g., from the word "learn," what do you learn about learning? From the word "intention," what do you know of my, or anyone's intention(s)?