...the problem we find ourselves faced with when attempting to take an account of a)that which is not existentially contingent upon our awareness, b)that which is not existentially contingent upon language, and c)that which is not existentially contingent upon thought/belief...
Another sense could be the case of us correctly becoming aware of that which is not existentially contingent upon either thought/belief or language. That would be when truth is equivalent to reality, the case at hand, the way things are, etc. The problem with this use is that - if and when it is strictly adhered to - it cannot take account of what makes true statements so, without resorting to the above sense... — creativesoul
Well, on the assumption, which I make, that truth and true are different, I think truth is indifferent to true. If truth just is reality, etc., then that truth does not speak. It grounds; it warrants; it gives license for the expression of true propositions. But it provides nothing towards what makes true propositions true...
...it provides nothing towards what makes true propositions true - how could it? That requires correct judgment.
We agree on that much. The following portion is a bit ambiguous, so I'm not sure what you're actually saying... — creativesoul
...it provides nothing towards what makes true propositions true - how could it? That requires correct judgment. — timw
The term "that" in the last statement leaves me wondering what it is referring to. I'm unsure what it is exactly that you're claiming requires correct judgment.
Does providing something towards what makes true propositions true require correct judgment, or does what makes propositions true require correct judgment? — creativesoul
We're supposing truth is just reality. We select a sample of reality, a brick. In doing so non-critically we sidestep a lot of questions - problems - about how we know it's a brick, and what a brick is anyway, and so forth. I think it is correct in this context to ignore/suspend/bracket for the moment all of those questions. There's no law against coming back to them, but if we cannot get to reality or a sample of it, then we really cannot get anywhere.
Anyway, we have a brick, and we say, "This here is a brick." A proposition (p) we can here define as true (T). We can abbreviate a generalization as Tp.
We ought to stop here and think a bit. We have a brick and a Tp. What do they have to do with each other. On the specification that the brick is just a piece of reality, I feel comfortable saying that it - the brick itself - does not and cannot have anything to do with the Tp (or anything else). And what is the Tp? To begin with, it is just a p, a proposition. It could be true or false. If we have constructed it carefully, it is contingently either, but certainly one of them. What it is that settles the contingency? What settles it is the "that" referred to above, that I call an act of correct judgment.
What would incorrect judgment look like if reality(the brick itself) does not and cannot have anything to do with the Tp? — creativesoul
Its brickness just is; and it is its isness, its being-as-a-brick, that allows judgment to create a proposition with respect to its brickness. — tim wood
We're supposing truth is just reality. We select a sample of reality, a brick. In doing so non-critically we sidestep a lot of questions - problems - about how we know it's a brick, and what a brick is anyway, and so forth. I think it is correct in this context to ignore/suspend/bracket for the moment all of those questions. There's no law against coming back to them, but if we cannot get to reality or a sample of it, then we really cannot get anywhere. — tim wood
The difficulty with this perspective is that when you assume such a thing as "Its brickness ... its being-as-brick", it is implied within this assumption that there is a single correct, or objective definition of what it means to be a brick. If there is no such correct definition of "brick", then brickness is just a bunch of various different ideas, held by different people, and "that is not a brick", is true or false according to these various ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover
In the case where it is false (i.e., it is a brick), then it must be you have a complete specification, and consequently the proposition that affirms it, is true, grounded in the truth of, in this case, the brick itself.If there is no such correct definition of "brick", then brickness is just a bunch of various different ideas, held by different people, and "that is not a brick", is true or false according to these various ideas. — mu
I wrote about "sidestepping" with you in mind, MU. Two problems I have with your way of looking at this are 1) it seems you will never have truth, or really any gold-standard proposition about pretty much anything. If we accept or offer a definition, that's always equivocal. If we just say the heck with it and define it ourselves, then how do we know it's right. I acknowledge the point, but it has narrow application, and beyond that quickly becomes absurd. After all, its atomic structure is always whizzing around, therefore from moment to moment it's never the same brick - we cannot even give it a name. — tim wood
And 2), in our encounter with the brickness-of-(what we call)-the-brick we did not use any definitions at all. At the building supply store, for example, we might just as well have asked for a pallet of these. — tim wood
And all of this is why I mentioned some time previously the ideas of right focus and right magnification - right understanding. It's getting pretty clear that the absolute quality of true is a product solely of the criteria in force; and of truth, its exemplification in something outside of itself. Admittedly this surrenders any notion of absolutes or ultimates apart from application, but for the price it secures both truth and true. Did I just win? (Did you have a moment to look at the brief article referenced above?) — tim wood
For example, in the same way (not sense) we say a lemon is yellow, we are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1). — tim wood
It happens that "truth" also has meaning and significance with respect to "true." My point here is that this is a simply a different sense, not to be confused with truth as reality, a distinction not always maintained in this thread. This second truth (T2) appears to derive its meaning from how it employs T1. T2 differs from T1 is that T2 is T1 in use propositionally. — tim wood
Fair enough. I'd go further. (I think) we're starting with the hypotheses that there is a reality; reality is real; and we're content for the moment to let a brick informally represent what "reality" means. And that "truth" is a word that we define, for the moment, as naming a quality that reality has. For example, in the same way (not sense) we say a lemon is yellow, we are, for the moment, saying that reality is truth (let's call it T1). — tim wood
The assumption that there is a correct definition of brick is the assumption that someone else has made a correct judgement, someone has correctly judged what it means to be a brick. The attitude of confidence is the assumption that I have made the true judgement. So this is where we find truth, in the assumption that I have made the true judgement, not the assumption that I am following the judgement of someone else, because it is correct. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't understand this meaning of "truth". I don't see that "truth" is ever used in a sense which makes it equivalent to reality. "Truth" is related to "true", and "true" is related to "reality", but I don't see how you can relate "truth" directly to "reality" without going through the medium of "true". Is this what you're trying to do, relate "truth" directly to reality independent of "true"? — Metaphysician Undercover
If you think that there is such a thing as "truth as reality" (T2), then you need to justify this claim, and this justification will determine exactly how this "truth as reality" relates to "true", and if it is truly independent from "true". — Metaphysician Undercover
See, you have only hypothesized that there is a reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
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