Physical actions are indeed constrained by the limiting laws of physics. But meta-physical (mental) choices are not subject to physical laws --- perhaps only the laws of Logic. — Gnomon
One has to be careful about language here. . . .
The physical both constrains and enables what we do. — Ludwig V

Do you think I'm being fast & loose with my language here? In my thesis and my posts, I provide specific definitions of such terms as "physics" and "meta-physics", giving examples from the history of science & philosophy. For example, I specify that my use of the "meta-" term is Aristotelian, not Scholastic ; psychological, not religious. Are you uncomfortable with my use of "meta-physics" in reference to mental processes. Are Ideas subject to physical laws of gravity, or is there some other force that gives "weight" to opinions?

Is there some other "language" in my posts that give you pause? I haven't been indoctrinated in the legalistic "linguistic turn" in philosophy (Wittgenstein, etc). So my language is generally vernacular & informal, and may sometimes run afoul of "legal" usage. We tend to use physical metaphors to describe psychological concepts, but are the analogies intended to be taken literally & physically?

Of course, physics "constrains" what we do physically. But does it also limit what we think, and how we reason? How do physical limitations affect abstract ideas? Do you know how laws of physics could roboticize your beliefs & behaviors? Or is that just an unfounded Physicalist belief? :smile:

Metaphysics :
1. the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space.
2. abstract theory with no basis in reality.
___ Oxford dictionary
Note --- Which definition do you think applies to my use of the term? Are the "abstract concepts" listed above physical or meta-physical? Is Space a physical thing or an abstract idea about the extension of physical things? Is Being constrained by physics or ontology?

What material evidence to you have to support your belief that personal choice is illusory? — Gnomon

That's not what I said. I said there "is an illusion of freedom".

I'm a compatibilist, and deny the PAP (Principle of Alternative Possibilities) - IOW, whatever choice we make, we could not have made a different one. Each choice is the product of a person's memories, beliefs, dispositions, and impulses at the point in time the choice is made. When we examine a choice in hindsight, we think of alternatives we might have made - and this gives us the "illusion of freedom".

Still, I acknowledge that we are free from external control - so we are free in that (compatibilist) sense. So we are (in this sense) freely making the choices we make. The memories, beliefs, dispositions, and impulses are our own; they are part of what makes us the individual we are.

In fact then when Gnomon's idea is viewed as an ontological idea, that "Physical actions are indeed constrained by the limiting laws of physics. But meta-physical (mental) choices are not subject to physical laws --- perhaps only the laws of Logic", it can be argued that he is making the argument that there's something else than the physical. But has there to be a separation? — ssu

Aristotle intuitively made a distinction between physical and mental processes in the world. He divided his treatise of Phusis (nature) into an encyclopedia of observations by early scientists. Then in a separate (meta-) chapter, he summarizes some of the opinions of theoretical scientists (philosophers) to explain those facts. That "separation" was later formalized by others into categories of A> Physics : particular material objects and B> Metaphysics : general mental ideas (universal principles) about those objects.

Those Generalizations and Categorizations -- "something else" than material/temporal specimens -- are computed by Reason/Logic, which he regarded as a timeless power, capacity or force, accessible to philosophically-inclined humans. For non-rational animals though, there may be only observed things, and no inferred species of things. So, yes, for those who seek holistic Principles instead of isolated Instances, there has to be a separation. :smile:

Metaphysics :
The word 'metaphysics' was coined by an ancient editor of Aristotle's works, who simply used it for the books listed after those on physics. The physics books discussed things that change; the metaphysics books discussed things that don't change.
https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/blog/what-is-metaphysics/

What did Aristotle mean by reason? :
Perhaps, then, Aristotle means that scientific reason is distinguished by thinking about the necessary, unchanging principles of things, and also about the things which have these as their principles and causes.
https://academic.oup.com/book/4546/chapter-abstract/146639079?

I'm a compatibilist, and deny the PAP (Principle of Alternative Possibilities) - IOW, whatever choice we make, we could not have made a different one. Each choice is the product of a person's memories, beliefs, dispositions, and impulses at the point in time the choice is made. When we examine a choice in hindsight, we think of alternatives we might have made - and this gives us the "illusion of freedom".

Do you believe there is an element of randomness (or unpredictability) to the decision making process? Or does antecedent state A always lead to resultant state X, never Y.

What material evidence to you have to support your belief that personal choice is illusory? — Gnomon
That's not what I said. I said there "is an illusion of freedom". — Relativist

When you come to a fork in the road, do you stop and imagine taking the road less traveled, or do you start walking in the desired direction? In what sense is an actual choice an illusion? :smile:

Do you believe there is an element of randomness (or unpredictability) to the decision making process? Or does antecedent state A always lead to resultant state X, never Y. — LuckyR

The only true randomness in the world is quantum indeterminacy. It's possible there is some small degree of quantum indeterminacy involved, but I'm aware of no evidence to support it. So yes, I believe the antecedent state will necessarily result in the consequent state.

When you come to a fork in the road, do you stop and imagine taking the road less traveled, or do you start walking in the desired direction? In what sense is an actual choice an illusion? — Gnomon

The choice is not an illusion: we are actually making the choice - we have to actually go through the mental process to reach that choice.

The illusion is that of hindsight: that we could actually have made a different one. In actuality, we could have only made a different choice had there been something different within us (a different set of beliefs, disposltions, impulse...).

the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space. — Gnomon

This looks like a definition of philosophy, rather than a branch of philosophy.

Here's my problem:-

Do you see any relationship between physical freedom (mathematical value) and mental freedom*3 (metaphysical value)? :smile: — Gnomon

I don't understand the question. I could probably invent some sort of meaning for it, but I would have no idea whether that was in any way relevant.

But meta-physical (mental) choices are not subject to physical laws --- perhaps only the laws of Logic", it can be argued that he is making the argument that there's something else than the physical. — ssu

I don't understand what you are saying here.

Is there some other "language" in my posts that give you pause? I haven't been indoctrinated in the legalistic "linguistic turn" in philosophy (Wittgenstein, etc). So my language is generally vernacular & informal, and may sometimes run afoul of "legal" usage. — Gnomon

I suppose you are aware that "indoctrinated" and "legalistic" have presuppositions and overtones that anyone who had been indoctrinated into that legalistic turn would not accept? So why ask the question?

Are you uncomfortable with my use of "meta-physics" in reference to mental processes. Are Ideas subject to physical laws of gravity, or is there some other force that gives "weight" to opinions? — Gnomon

I don't understand what "meta-physical" means in that question. It doesn't conform in any obvious way with your definition.

We tend to use physical metaphors to describe psychological concepts, but are the analogies intended to be taken literally & physically? — Gnomon

Metaphors are not ever intended to be taken literally. I don't know what it would mean to take a metaphor physically. I don't know what it would be to take analogy literally or physically.

Are Ideas subject to physical laws of gravity, or is there some other force that gives "weight" to opinions? — Gnomon

Of course ideas are not subject to physical laws of gravity - they are not physical objects. If there is any force that gives weight to opinions, it is an appropriate kind of force, and then the concept of opinions having weight is no longer a metaphor.

How do physical limitations affect abstract ideas? — Gnomon

Good question. I've no idea what it means.

The physics books discussed things that change; the metaphysics books discussed things that don't change. — Gnomon

On this definition, if natural laws don't change, then they are not to be studied by physics. The definition must be incomplete.

There are different philosophical dialects, which enable different approaches to philosophy to articulate their ideas. I'm happy to spend some time and effort to decode what you say into something I can respond to, but I expect you to do the same for what I say.

The choice is not an illusion: we are actually making the choice - we have to actually go through the mental process to reach that choice. — Relativist

I agree that when we come to a fork in the road and take one rather than another, we are, under normal circumstances, making a choice. Sometimes, when we make choices, we weigh the options, thinking of benefits and costs and so forth. But I don't agree that we always go through any particular mental process when we do so.

I don't quite understand this. I could understand if you were talking about hypotheses. The journey from hypothesis (possibility) to theory (proven) is a long and tortuous one - blurred, if you like. But a model doesn't have a similar journey - unless there is a way in which a hypothesis can be a model or vice versa. Is that your point? — Ludwig V

Well, models can be for example simplified. In economics we can make the premis of ceteris paribus, all other things being similar, and then assume to model something from the economy. In reality hardly anything stays the same and our ceteris paribus -argument wouldn't be valid, if we were really making a model of everything in the economy. Economical models typically try to model a certain part of the whole economy or a certain phenomenon.

Are you saying that any theory that is incompatible with freedom (free will) is false on that ground alone? That's a good start. But many people speak as if determinism was true and we have to bear the consequences, yet seem to believe that determinism is an empirical claim. Even when there's empirical evidence against it, they don't give up on it. I think it has to be classified along with hinge and grammatical propositions, perhaps as a research programme. — Ludwig V

What I'm trying to say that there being a certain future simply doesn't limit in any way free will. If you respond to my argument here, it's going to be exactly made in one way (of course you can modify and rewrite your answer), but this fact doesn't limit you in any way how you respond to me.

Asking what's Real, as if there could be a single-non-context-dependent answer, is the metaphysical way and goes nowhere. — Ludwig V

Yes. Our questions themselves define just what our answers are. There's no ultimate answer, as there is no ultimate question. (Or it's 42, as in the Hitchhiker's guide to the Galaxy.)

Aristotle intuitively made a distinction between physical and mental processes in the world. — Gnomon

As we have a lot to thank Aristotle for his ground braking effort to understand the world, I think our scientific understanding has progressed from his time (starting with the scientific method etc). However I do agree that there's a lot we don't understand and have difficulties is grasping the link between the physical and what can be called processes. Strict materialism and physicalism simply leads people to make silly generalizations and to wrong conclusions.

That "separation" was later formalized by others into categories of A> Physics : particular material objects and B> Metaphysics : general mental ideas (universal principles) about those objects. — Gnomon

I didn't know that. I meant metaphysics as things before physics, like the nature of existence (and universal principles) and as the study of mind-independent features of reality. It's really hard to prove something with the scientific method of these kind of basic questions. Hence even if very important, it's not a field you can assume to have dramatic breakthroughs.

Those Generalizations and Categorizations -- "something else" than material/temporal specimens -- are computed by Reason/Logic, which he regarded as a timeless power, capacity or force, accessible to philosophically-inclined humans. For non-rational animals though, there may be only observed things, and no inferred species of things. So, yes, for those who seek holistic Principles instead of isolated Instances, there has to be a separation. :smile: — Gnomon

Well, I think that animals are also rational, so they don't have to be just "philosophically inclined" to have rational thoughts. That we just have and advance language and even the abiltiy to store it (written language) makes us quite different in my view, but still we are animals (even if smart ones).

For example, some mammal living in a herd in the Serengeti might have a mathematical system of counting as "no predators, one predator, two predators, three predators, many predators". It is totally rational and can be totally satisfactory for the animals. If there's more than three predators lurking around the around the herd, it's "Stampede time!" and the time to get the hell out of Dogde. Doesn't matter how much more there are than three, it's far too many. Yet if there's just three, one has to be able to count them: if suddenly there's just two, then one can be lurking in ambush behind you preparing to chew your ass off. So for example the ability to count things is important.

Now we can argue that a math system of counting of "zero, one, two, three, many" is illogical, because why stop there (what happened to four, five, six)? But for a mammal that eats, mates and tries to avoid predators a more advanced system with irrational numbers and imaginary numbers is useless.

But now I went away from the topic.
.

What I'm trying to say that there being a certain future simply doesn't limit in any way free will. — ssu

Yes, I hear you. One of the basic issues I have with determinism is understanding why people equate it with being forced to do things.

Strict materialism and physicalism simply leads people to make silly generalizations and to wrong conclusions. — ssu

Strict idealism, empiricism also lead to silly generalizations and wrong conclusions. I realise that we can't avoid generalizations, but I think we have to be pragmatic about them. There's a lot to be said for treating them as useful or not (so long as we assess that in context) or not, rather than true or not. But I wouldn't be dogmatic about that.

I meant metaphysics as things before physics, like the nature of existence (and universal principles) and as the study of mind-independent features of reality. — ssu

the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space. — Gnomon

... which demonstrates why metaphysics is so confusing. But I can see that there might be philosophy to be done with concepts; but then, I don't see how concepts can exist without language and I gather that some people regard a turn to linguistics as problematic. "Mind-independent features of reality" are more problematic, unless you just mean tables, trees and so forth. On the face of it, I would have thought that the empirical sciences are more likely to be useful than philosophy.

Yes, I hear you. One of the basic issues I have with determinism is understanding why people equate it with being forced to do things. — Ludwig V

Have you thought about the possibility of them not understanding the issues at hand well and having misconceptions?

Strict idealism, empiricism also lead to silly generalizations and wrong conclusions. — Ludwig V

Also, yes.

On the face of it, I would have thought that the empirical sciences are more likely to be useful than philosophy. — Ludwig V

That's the magic word: useful.

Yet that aside, ontological questions are important. To understand that the empirical sciences have a philosophical and hence also metaphysical foundation is extremely important. When these foundations are understood, you also understand the weaknesses and limitations of the empirical science, where it can get tangled up in basically ...nonsense. Modern science has huge problems of dealing with Qualia. Add a materialist / physicalist World-view with a staunch belief reductionism, and you will have problems.

Sometimes, when we make choices, we weigh the options, thinking of benefits and costs and so forth. But I don't agree that we always go through any particular mental process when we do so. — Ludwig V

Sure, but every choice was preceded by some sequence of one or more thoughts. Given that sequence, the resulting choice will follow.

I believe the antecedent state will necessarily result in the consequent state.

Fair enough, which is the standard Determinist view, I guess I'm not seeing the Compatibilism in your outlook, since by your own description there are no viable alternatives to the final outcome. I don't believe it is accurate when you use the term "choices" to describe impossible alternatives.

The illusion is that of hindsight: that we could actually have made a different one. — Relativist

As I was going back and forth between the two doors of Ben & Jerry's in the freezer section at the store today, picking up several and reading the description, considering if I was in the mood for something with peanut butter, or caramel, considering the marshmallow ice cream, etc., it certainly felt like I had a choice then, not merely in hindsight.

So yes, I believe the antecedent state will necessarily result in the consequent state. — Relativist

In actuality, we could have only made a different choice had there been something different within us (a different set of beliefs, disposltions, impulse...). — Relativist

Sure, but every choice was preceded by some sequence of one or more thoughts. Given that sequence, the resulting choice will follow. — Relativist

It seems to me that we could call the physical events that involve rock and snow being pulled down a mountain by gravity an avalanche, the physical events that involve air and water moving In a huge circular pattern a hurricane, and the physical events of bio-electric impulses moving through a brain a choice. They, and every other example we can make, are all entirely the result of the laws of physics that we are familiar with. Their settings and materials are different, but the difference between the setting/material of the human brain and any other setting/material is not more significant than three difference between any other two setting/materials.

Is that an accurate statement about your position?

As I was going back and forth between the two doors of Ben & Jerry's in the freezer section at the store today, picking up several and reading the description, considering if I was in the mood for something with peanut butter, or caramel, considering the marshmallow ice cream, etc., it certainly felt like I had a choice then, not merely in hindsight. — Patterner

You did have a choice. And you made one. I'm saying that the choice you made could not have differed. That's because something precipitated the choice. Even impulses must have some cause - unless you think they are truly random, or magic. I don't believe in magic, and the only true randomness in the world is quantum indeterminacy- and this doesn't seem to entail quantum mechanics.

Is that an accurate statement about your position? — Patterner

Essentially right, but it glosses over our agency. Hurricanes and avalanches don't involve agency. We have thoughts (series of brain states), and these thoughts can ultimately affect the world.

I'm not seeing the Compatibilism in your outlook, since by your own description there are no viable alternatives to the final outcome. — LuckyR

Compatibilists believe in a sort of free will that is consistent with determinism, therefore there is always only one possible way a decision process can come out (IOW, the principle of alternative possibilities is not met).

But we still consider our choices to be freely willed, because we actively make them, and it's as a consequence of our mental activity.

Perhaps I misunderstand your use of the words "choice" and "agency." What you describe still sounds like an avalanche. It's possible for a boulder to roll absolutely straight down a mountain, or to some degree to the left or right of straight down. Probably any given angle of descent has happened at one time or another in the past, and will again. But, every time a boulder has or will roll down a mountain, it can only follow one exact path. Rocks in its way, shaped and composed exactly as they are; changing incline; changing tilt on the other axis; texture and compactness of the soil; plants holding the soil together to different degrees in different places; moisture; air pressure; precipitation; etc. It's all far beyond our ability to calculate exactly where a boulder will land once it gets moving, even if we could freeze time whenever we wanted to and take measurements. But there is only one exact way it's going to fall and land.

It sounds to me that you're describing our choices the same way. Possibly more factors and/or types of factors, but the principle is identical. We can even say the specifics of the mountain's topography are memories of things like past rainfalls and landslides, which affect the boulder's path as surely as our chemically stored memories affect which path we take at the cusp of decision.

What are "choice" and "agency," and how do they change any of that? Every hurricane and avalanche affects the world. Sometimes in incalculably complex and powerful ways.

Agency denotes the capacity for intentional acts. Making choices is just what it says: choosing actions. Avalanches and hurricanes do not make choices and don't act intentionally. These require mental activity.

How is an act intentional if there is no option but to act, and in that exact way?

When you come to a fork in the road, do you stop and imagine taking the road less traveled, or do you start walking in the desired direction? In what sense is an actual choice an illusion? — Gnomon

The choice is not an illusion: we are actually making the choice - we have to actually go through the mental process to reach that choice.

The illusion is that of hindsight : that we could actually have made a different one. In actuality, we could have only made a different choice had there been something different within us (a different set of beliefs, disposltions, impulse...). — Relativist

If a single path suddenly & surprisingly branches into two paths, with completely different end-points, is that not a true philosophical dilemma? One end-point may be my original intended destination, and the other a different unintended destination : as in Robert Frost's Path Not Taken. But if I didn't know that alternative when I set out, my choice to change destinations would be a change of personal intention (goal selection). Was that new information also eternally destined to make the choice for me?

The "mental process" of choosing may be a change of intentions, based on new information. Or perhaps, in the case of the "road less traveled", merely the desire to experience something new, or unknown, or mysterious. In Physics, the well-traveled road might be the path of least resistance ; in which case, Nature would always "choose" that option. But humans are not so mechanical, and sometimes "choose" to take the more resistant path.

According to Pre-destination, even that desire for novelty is programmed into us by all-powerful Nature, or LaPlace's Demon. But what about the statistical uncertainties in natural processes? Are our intentional choices certain, or probabilistic? What about physical Relativity vs physical Absolutism? Was Einstein wrong to conclude that Newton's space & time were not as rigid as his calculations assumed? What if human choices are locally Causal, just as the Demon's determination is universally Causal?

An old saying is that "hindsight is 20/20"*1, implying that we see the meaning of events more clearly after they happened. But you seem to be saying that the meaning -- in this case the new destination -- was never a real option. Instead, the Destiny Demon had the foresight to force me to make an un-free Choice. As an omniscient Demon, if you had to choose between Fate & Freewill*2 for your little deluded choosers, which would you decide on, and why? :smile:


*1. Hindsight is the ability to understand and realize something about an event after it has happened, although you did not understand or realize it at the time.
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/hindsight

*2. Fate Vs Free Will :
Fate is a predetermined course of events. It’s what makes some people say things like “it was meant to be” or “it was written in the stars”. Free will, on the other hand, is your ability to make choices and control your own destiny. If you have free will then that means what happens with your life depends on what you do and how you live it. . . .
There are two different ways in which we can look at the idea of free will. On one hand, there’s the philosophical view that all our actions are pre-determined by events prior to them (Determinism). On the other hand, there’s the philosophical view that we have some control over what we do in life and how we behave (Compatibilism) – essentially saying ‘what if I could make my own decisions regardless of what happens before me?’
https://os.me/destiny-or-free-will-what-do-you-choose/

IN THE GARDEN OF FORKING PATHS, ALL ROADS LEAD TO ROME?

If a single path suddenly & surprisingly branches into two paths, with completely different end-points, is that not a true philosophical dilemma? One end-point may be my original intended destination, and the other a different unintended destination : as in Robert Frost's Path Not Taken. But if I didn't know that alternative when I set out, my choice to change destinations would be a change of personal intention (goal selection). Was that new information also eternally destined to make the choice for me? — Gnomon

We are frequently surprised because we aren't omniscient, not because there are indeteministic things occurring in the world. Intent does not entail a certainty of action, it entails an intent (at a point of time) to act a certain way.

In Physics, the well-traveled road might be the path of least resistance ; in which case, Nature would always "choose" that option. But humans are not so mechanical, and sometimes "choose" to take the more resistant path. — Gnomon

We aren't directly mechanical in the way mindless objects are, but that's because our minds mediate our activities. That occurs even if minds are purely a consequence of physical brain activity.

But what about the statistical uncertainties in natural processes? Are our intentional choices certain, or probabilistic? — Gnomon

The only true indeterminism (and true randomness) in the world is quantum uncertainty. Einstein never accepted that, but most modern physicists do.

This doesn't seem to be a factor in everyday life.

Intentional choices do not seem a product of quantum uncertainty. The development of an intent, seems to me to be consistent with determinism.

you seem to be saying that the meaning -- in this case the new destination -- was never a real option. — Gnomon

No. I'm saying the opposite: we actually make choices. We consider the options before us.

Envision making a decision (i.e. forming an intent) through a (mental) deliberative process. You consider some set of options, and weigh the pros and cons of those options (both objective and aesthetic). Maybe you google a few things to get more information. You settle on a particular choice.

That decision was entirely the product of your mental processes - you own it. Could you have made a different choice? Only if something had been different: e.g. you had considered more (or fewer) options; you had identified different consequences or weighed the differently, or perhaps your internet connection dropped - so googling was not possible. But this entails a different set of antecedent conditions. Given the actual set of conditions, you could only make the decision you actually made. (Setting aside the possibility of some quantum mechanical interaction that injects true uncertainty somewhere in the process).

How is an act intentional if there is no option but to act, and in that exact way? — Patterner

There ARE options. See my above reply to Gnomon (the bold part).

How is an act intentional if there is no option but to act, and in that exact way?
— Patterner
There ARE options. See my above reply to Gnomon (the bold part). — Relativist

I understand that there are options. But if I chose which path to take when I hiked down a mountain the same way a boulder chose which path to take when it rolled down the mountain - that is, because of physical events (since "minds are purely a consequence of physical brain activity") - and, despite there having been many different routes between top and bottom for each of us, I had no more ability to have taken a different route than the one I took than the boulder had, then "agency" and "intention" are simply feelings we have for the results of physical events that take place in our brains. We call the physical events that take place when an airplane moves through the air flight; the physical events that take place in green plants photosynthesis; the physical events that take place as it rains on a mountain erosion; the physical events that take place as the earth circles the sun orbiting; on and on. The airplane is not even aware that it is flying, much less have feelings about it. Same for the plant, the rain, and and the earth.

The boulder can take only a single path, given the physical characteristics of itself and the mountain.

Suppose your mind is immaterial, (at least partially) operating independently of the laws of nature. You have chosen a path down the mountain, but you might have taken a different path if you knew it to be more scenic, offering more shade, or if you knew a rattlesnake awaited you on your chosen path. You were, at all times, free to choose a route based on your knowledge, the aesthetic appeal, fears, and your skills. Do you agree this is different from the boulder?

Now suppose your mind is entirely the product of physical brain function. You have the exact same freedom to choose a route based on your knowledge, the aesthetic appeal, fears, and your skills. In both cases, these factors are the result of events in your life (e.g. the DNA that produced you, your studies, your physical conditioning and mountaineering skills). Why should the fundamental basis of these factors (physical vs immaterial) matter? I don't think it does. You have no more, and no less, freedom.

Strict materialism and physicalism simply leads people to make silly generalizations and to wrong conclusions. — ssu

Historically, Enlightenment era scientists & philosophers were forced into Materialist & Physicalist positions by the Catholic church's Spiritualist & Dogmatic positions & propaganda. Burning at the stake as punishment for Mental transgressions (unbelief or heretical belief) would tend to radicalize freethinkers. But, since then, the world has moved toward more liberal positions, that allow for broader worldviews.

So, by the 20th century, the hardline (strict) Physicalist position was no longer mandatory for philosophers. And the Quantum science departure from Classical Physics*1 opened the door for investigations of formerly taboo topics for science, such as : the Mind/Body problem (Mind over Matter), and Freewill*2. Hence, today, we have classical physics hardliners, who burn holistic heretics at the scornful sarcasm stake. :wink:


*1. Classical Physics versus Quantum Physics :
https://vixra.org/pdf/1408.0241v1.pdf

*2. Quantum Mechanics, the Mind-Body Problem and Negative Theology :
Philosophy addresses questions that probably can’t be solved, now or ever. Examples (and these are of course debatable, some philosophers and scientists insist that science can answer all questions worth asking): Why is there something rather than nothing? Does free will exist? How does matter make a mind? What does quantum mechanics mean?
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/quantum-mechanics-the-mind-body-problem-and-negative-theology/

I didn't know that. I meant metaphysics as things before physics, like the nature of existence (and universal principles) and as the study of mind-independent features of reality. It's really hard to prove something with the scientific method of these kind of basic questions. Hence even if very important, it's not a field you can assume to have dramatic breakthroughs. — ssu

The term "meta-physics" was applied by medieval scholars to certain aspects of Aristotle's ouvre (collected writings), that were of special interest to theologians*3. Literally, it referred to the later books, that discussed opinions & interpretations (philosophy) instead of observations & investigations (science). But metaphorically, "meta-" came to be associated with "above" in the sense of spiritually transcending the material world.

That's why I refer to OP topic -- Freewill vs Determinism -- as a holistic metaphysical question, not answerable by reductive scientific methods, as you said. However, modern philosophy still finds logical conjectures & conclusions unacceptable, unless supported with hard (empirical) evidence. Hence, the hardline position of Scientism. It's the transcendent implications of "meta-" that are offensive to immanent Materialism. :nerd:

*3. Metaphysics :
mid 16th century: representing medieval Latin metaphysica (neuter plural), based on Greek ta meta ta phusika ‘the things after the Physics’, referring to the sequence of Aristotle's works: the title came to denote the branch of study treated in the books, later interpreted as meaning ‘the science of things transcending what is physical or natural’.
___Oxford Languages : https://languages.oup.com/google-dictionary-en/

Well, I think that animals are also rational, so they don't have to be just "philosophically inclined" to have rational thoughts. That we just have and advance language and even the abiltiy to store it (written language) makes us quite different in my view, but still we are animals (even if smart ones). — ssu

I agree. But I was referring to the formalization of Reason & Logic that is characteristic of Philosophy in the Greek tradition. Mathematical Logic pervades all aspects of the world. But only humans have made Language & Logic into systems appropriate for online forum discussions. :cool:

Suppose your mind is immaterial, (at least partially) operating independently of the laws of nature. — Relativist

My mind being immaterial would not mean it, even partially, operates independent of the laws of nature. Since my mind is a natural thing, it would mean the immaterial is part of the laws of nature.

However, it would mean that my mind, at least partially, operates independently of the laws of physics that we have been able to discover and understand so far. (Let's just say we understand the laws of physics entirely, for the sake of an easier discussion.)

You have chosen a path down the mountain, but you might have taken a different path if you knew it to be more scenic, offering more shade, or if you knew a rattlesnake awaited you on your chosen path. You were, at all times, free to choose a route based on your knowledge, the aesthetic appeal, fears, and your skills. Do you agree this is different from the boulder? — Relativist

I certainly agree it's different from the boulder. Because, in this scenario (which I agree with) our minds are not nothing but an incredibly complex expression of the laws of physics.

Now suppose your mind is entirely the product of physical brain function. You have the exact same freedom to choose a route based on your knowledge, the aesthetic appeal, fears, and your skills. In both cases, these factors are the result of events in your life (e.g. the DNA that produced you, your studies, your physical conditioning and mountaineering skills). Why should the fundamental basis of these factors (physical vs immaterial) matter? I don't think it does. You have no more, and no less, freedom. — Relativist

In this scenario, there is nothing other than the laws of physics at work. The dominoes fall/the billiard balls bounce around. There is no possibility of anything happening that is not the result of those physical interactions, and the result can only be one exact thing. There is literally no possibility of any other outcome.

I'm not fond of strawberry ice cream. But if there's a dish of it on the table, and the dishes of chocolate, salted caramel, and vanilla ice cream are inside of unbreakable glass cases, then I'm going to choose the strawberry. Did I make a meaningful choice? Of course not. No choice is meaningful if I literally cannot choose otherwise, regardless of the reasons I can't.

In this scenario, there is nothing other than the laws of physics at work. — Patterner

But the mind's operation is functionally identical- it is no less autonomous. It's grounded in physics - but the decision process is the same.

Earlier in the thread, we discussed Peter Tse's physicalist account of mental causation. If something like this is correct, it means that the product of our thoughts truly has causal efficacy. We're not just going along for the ride (as you seem to be suggesting) we're driving.

Earlier in the thread, we discussed Peter Tse's physicalist account of mental causation. If something like this is correct, it means that the product of our thoughts truly has causal efficacy. We're not just going along for the ride (as you seem to be suggesting) we're driving. — Relativist

I missed the earlier discussion. But I Googled "Peter Tse's physicalist account of mental causation", and found the contrary argument below*1. We could argue the rational vs empirical merits of Physical vs Mental Causation forever. But Quantum Physics has contradicted the Classical Physics assumption*2 of Determinism (causal completeness) by revealing the role of Randomness in the chain of causation. For me, that's enough to allow me to believe that I am in command of my little jello-like bundle of cerebral Causation. My car is not a self-driving Tesla, it's a Myself-driven conveyance. :smile:

Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation :
The second reason to doubt Tse's account is the causal closure of physics, or the causal completeness of physics (CCP). If CCP is true, then no such thing as free will is possible because there is no sense in which there is any form of free action
https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/neural-basis-of-free-will-criterial-causation/

*2. Determinism is an unprovable metaphysical belief, just as FreeWill is. So I freely choose to believe that when I drive my car I am in command, not the laws of nature or sparking neurons. If I get to my chosen destination, that's enough evidence for me. And those CCP commies can't force me to believe otherwise. :joke: