It's 50 years since I read Kant, so I am horribly rusty. — Herg
I take (1) to be complete as it stands, and (2) to be entailed by (1). Because (1) is complete and is not dependent on (2) — Herg
I question your statement that "the separate principle that we must always treat everyone as an end... is not a commonly accepted moral principle," because that is in fact (1). — Herg
Whatever Kant meant by what he wrote, the emboldened rendering above is what I was aiming for — Herg
I'm sorry, I don't know what you are getting at in your second sentence here. Can you put it another way? — Herg
I don't see the EP as a subordinate end, and I apologise if I gave the impression that I did. It's rather the other way round: I see the EP (in my two-part formulation) as primary, and the hedonic calculus, if we need it all, as secondary. — Herg
In fact I am no longer sure whether we need the hedonic calculus. I am a hedonist, and so I think that treating people as ends must in the end be a matter of trying to give them more net pleasure: but I don't think this necessarily commits us to the traditional utilitarian hedonic calculus. But I must confess that I only recently stopped being a utilitarian, and my ideas in this area are still somewhat in flux. — Herg
To put it starkly, 'intend' is a verb whereas 'ideal' is a noun.
An intention of the end can be more or less essential depending on how it relates to my telos and my will; an intention of the means can be more or less essential depending on how it relates to my intended end, etc
I would say a means is NOT an intention; but means can be intentional. — Bob Ross
So if you intend to quench your thirst and you begin filling your glass at the faucet, you would say that you did not intend to fill your glass? Filling your glass is a means.
Colloquial we use "means" in two related senses: actual means and potential means.
Walking into the kitchen is an actual means, and quenching your thirst is an end, and both are intended. I was asking about the relation between the actual means and the foreseen effect, not the relation between the end and the actual means.
The problem is that you are falsely implying that A is an actual means to Q. I would rather say, "a foreseen effect of a chosen act is indirectly intentional."
Nevertheless, Q falls under the agent's intention because it is accepted as a known consequence of his action. But sticking with Brock's language, we can simply say that Q is indirectly intended.
We agree that Q is indirectly intended, but I would not say that he means to bring about Q, nor that he is required to achieve Q. I would not say the first because A is not an (actual) means to Q, and I would not say the second because it is not an accurate use of the word 'achieve'. I would say that he is required to accept Q, not achieve Q
Indirect intention does involve a kind of absence of intention. Involuntary manslaughter does work that way. Negligence is a form of indirect intention. The trolley lever-puller might be charged with involuntary manslaughter, but they would not be charged with murder.
So the first wall of your castle was the idea that a necessary condition indicates a means, and we have overcome that wall. The second wall is the idea that A is a means to Q, and I think we are close to overcoming that wall. The third wall is now in play, which is the idea that A is impermissible because Q is indirectly intended.
I think a moral compass is the most vital and important aspect of normative ethics--it is the kernel so to speak. Being a moral agent, in the sense of embodying what is good and not what is bad (by doing at least morally permissible and obligatory actions), is of central and paramount importance. Any theory that posits otherwise seems to be missing the point of normative ethics entirely (IMHO). — Bob Ross
This begs the question between us, which is whether killing Alan and Betty is an immoral act if it is the only way of saving the lives of Charles and Dora.What you are saying is that, under my view, saving Charles and Dora is less important than not doing immmoral acts; and that I certainly agree with (and I think so should you). — Bob Ross
How do you know which actions, on the one hand, are immoral, and which, on the other, are permissible or obligatory? You need to work that out first, and then that will tell you whether someone is a moral agent or not. So actions are more central to normative ethics than being a moral agent.I am a virtue ethicist, so I think a moral compass is the most vital and important aspect of normative ethics--it is the kernel so to speak. Being a moral agent, in the sense of embodying what is good and not what is bad (by doing at least morally permissible and obligatory actions), is of central and paramount importance. Any theory that posits otherwise seems to be missing the point of normative ethics entirely (IMHO). — Bob Ross
I think your third example is not necessarily correct. Suppose I sit next to a guy on a train and I see that he is listening to music on his headphones with his eyes shut. He's clearly enjoying the music, tapping his feet, smiling, and so on. I've had a shitty day, and I really want to talk to someone, I have left my phone in the office, and we are the only two people on the train, so he's the only person available. But if I interrupt the guy's listening, I am being selfish, so I decide to leave him alone. Eventually I get off the train. He's still listening with his eyes shut. We never interacted, I don't even know if he knew I was there, and yet I treated him as an end by not spoiling his enjoyment of the music.Then to expand, all of the following are examples of failing to treat others as ends (the first two are your own examples):
If you kill someone, then you are not treating them as an end.
If you let someone die when you could save them, the same is true.
If you sit down next to someone on the train without interacting with them, the same is true.
If you see a street performer and you do not pay attention to them, the same is true. — Leontiskos
That is where I disagree. And perhaps, if Kant understood his second formulation the way you understand it and not the way I understand it, I am disagreeing with Kant. But in the end I don't think that is what really matters..The second formulation is a limiting principle, primarily specifying how we cannot treat others. It is not a requirement about how we must positively treat each person at each moment of their existence. — Leontiskos
This begs the question between us, which is whether killing Alan and Betty is an immoral act if it is the only way of saving the lives of Charles and Dora.
How do you know which actions, on the one hand, are immoral, and which, on the other, are permissible or obligatory?
You need to work that out first, and then that will tell you whether someone is a moral agent or not. So actions are more central to normative ethics than being a moral agent.
But the moral compass is off if you think that, all other things being equal, you must sit idly by when you could save some people from dying
it is intention that most of all makes one a moral agent, not the act.
Interaction is not a necessary condition for treating someone as an end. — Herg
You have to be careful with what one is analyzing. Filling your glass is a means and an intention in your example here; and not in the sense you would like it to be (viz., that a means is itself an intention): the ‘entity’ is separately attributed both.
The intention is to quench one’s thirst.
The means towards that intention is filling up your glass.
The intention to quench one’s thirst requires another intention to fill up your glass.
Filling up your glass is a means, and it is intended (with an intention separate from the other intention, but closely connected).
This is not a gradient of intention: they are separate intentions (but closely related). — Bob Ross
I would be wary to call it potential vs. actual; because some means towards one’s intentions aren’t necessary “used”. — Bob Ross
Potential means for this do not relate to potential means for that; and potential means for this are means for this, but not necessary utilized (actualized) means towards this. — Bob Ross
The foreseen effect(s) are always intentional, because they, even if they are not means towards one’s intended end, are enveloped into the original intention as per accidens intentions. E.g., if I pull the the lever, which is a means towards my intention to save the five, knowing that it will also result in the effect of killing another person; then I am intending to kill that other person, per accidens, to achieve my, per se, intention of saving the five. — Bob Ross
E.g., if my intention is to get groceries and the only means of doing so is using my car, then my car is essential to actualizing the intention but unessential to the intention which I have (viz., if the car wasn’t essential towards my intentions,... — Bob Ross
I am not entirely understanding your critique for this part. Here’s a basic google definition: “have (a course of action) as one's purpose or objective; plan.”.
As far as I can tell, all I have to do to avoid this critique is refurbish my definition to “to have an ideal of which one is planning or trying to actualize”—now it is a verb, and is still closely connected to ideality.
If you are just noting that I was using ideal somewhat interchangeably with intention; then you are correct: that was a mistake on my end. — Bob Ross
Although I see your point, it could be an actual means towards Q; but the intention here (stipulated) is towards P; so A is not a means towards Q when working towards P. — Bob Ross
This “indirect intention” is what I mean by “per accidens intention”. — Bob Ross
This is just because “he means to” is being used vaguely: we have circled back to using “intention” vaguely. I would say, more precisely, that he per accidens intends Q (viz., he indirectly intends Q), and this is a form of intention—i.e., it is intentional. All we are disagreeing about is what kind or type of intention is at play. — Bob Ross
I think that any intentional killing of an innocent human being is immoral; whereas you seem to disagree with that in the case that it is “indirectly intended”. — Bob Ross
If a person intends to do P by way of A and they know A also results in Q; then they thereby intend Q. — Bob Ross
if a person intends to drive while texting and they know that there is a chance that they might be too distracted by it and kill someone, then they have not thereby intended to kill someone in the event that they do become too distracted and kill someone — Bob Ross
Is it always wrong to accidentally-intentionally kill innocent people? More precisely, is it always wrong to indirectly intend to kill innocent people? Is voluntary "manslaughter" always negligent? Those are the questions that need to be answered. — Leontiskos
Regarding this third wall, suppose there is an evil and it is morally impermissible to directly intend this evil. Does it follow that it is impermissible to indirectly intend this evil?
I think not. Take the matter of the especially bad car emissions due to a faulty exhaust system. Is it impermissible to directly intend those emissions? For example, to allow your car to idle for the sake of the emissions? I think so. Does it follow that it is impermissible to get groceries in the car, even when you know it will produce those emissions? No, I don't think so. — Leontiskos
What about child laborers in the supply chain of our favorite products (and other workers who work in awful and dangerous conditions)? We are obviously treating them as means, but what is the solution? — RogueAI
Nice....Interaction is not a necessary condition for treating someone as an end. If I give a donation to a charity that works to help people in Gaza or Ukraine, I am treating those people as ends, but it can't be said that I interact with them: I don't even know who they are. — Herg
Whatever Kant meant by what he wrote, the emboldened rendering above is what I was aiming for (except that I think all beings capable of pain and/or pleasure should be treated as ends, not just humans: "The question is not, Can they reason nor Can they talk, but, Can they suffer?" ). — Herg
thats what i was saying...kinda. Suffering part, particularly... (minus what was mentioned in your parenthesis-my opinion differs [good thing that is a non-factor) BUT nonetheless, progress is made.I might still just watch the 20 get hit. Depends how they beg I guess....thats so disturbing that I went there but am I surprised? Cant say I am. Am I enjoying myself? Not pleased to admit my truth but willing to accept the reality of it. — Kizzy
One simple solution would be to refuse to buy products from companies who use children in that way. — Leontiskos
The idea of killing vs letting die is a silly distinction, the value of our actions can only derive from their consequences. — Ourora Aureis
I think it's a crucial distinction, and also a more accurate representation of cause and effect. — Tzeentch
The discussion is about ethics, not legality. — Ourora Aureis
P2: We are not responsible for situations where people require help. — Ourora Aureis
I disagree with premise 2, it must be justified. — Ourora Aureis
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.