Hence why I cannot make sense of obligations (if something other than a command fictitiously phrased as a truth-apt proposition). I understand being told to do something, I understand either doing as I'm told or not, and I understand being punished if I don't do as I'm told. But that's it. I don't understand what else there can possibly be, or why something else is necessary, or what evidence there is of something else.

I mentioned Anscombe before, and so I'll quote more from her:

This word 'ought', having become a word of mere mesmeric force, could not, in the character of having that force, be inferred from anything whatever. It may be objected that it could be inferred from other "moral ought" sentences: but that cannot be true. The appearance that this is so is produced by the fact that we say "All men are φ" and "Socrates is a man" implies "Socrates is φ." But here "φ" is a dummy predicate. We mean that if you substitute a real predicate for "φ" the implication is valid. A real predicate is required; not just a word containing no intelligible thought: a word retaining the suggestion of force, and apt to have a strong psychological effect, but which no longer signifies a real concept.

Yes, but the naturalistic frame begs some sort of explanation for obligations, not claiming they "don't exist," which is clearly not the case. Likewise, for goods defined in terms of normative measure. It wouldn't make sense to say "Babe Ruth was good as baseball," has no truth value. Nor would it make sense to say "in chess the bishop can change what color square it is on," simply because it is physically possible for a player to violate the rules of chess and switch their bishop onto a new color with an illegal move.

And from a naturalistic frame explaining these simply in terms of "authority" or "sentiment" is likewise insufficient, since presumably human sentiment isn't springing forth uncaused into the world. It is either emergent from underlining processes or else reducible to them.

As for the "if... then" phrasing, this is just confusing things. In natural language if/then stands in for all sorts of entailment and implication, e.g. material, casual, etc.

Yes, but the naturalistic frame begs some sort of explanation for obligations, not claiming they "don't exist," which is clearly not the case. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why is it clearly not the case? Because we use the sentence "you ought not kill"? I think it's far simpler to just interpret this as the phrase "don't kill". You haven't actually explained what makes the former any different, you just reassert the claim that we ought (not) do things.

It wouldn't make sense to say "Babe Ruth was good as baseball," has no truth value. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't said that. I haven't mentioned anything about success at hitting a ball at all. I've only questioned the coherence of obligations.

Nor would it make sense to say "in chess the bishop can change what color square it is on," simply because it is physically possible for a player to violate the rules of chess and switch their bishop onto a new color with an illegal move. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't said anything to suggest otherwise. The rules tell you not to move the bishop to another colour. If you do then your opponent tells you to move it back, and then either you do or he declares victory.

As for the "if... then" phrasing, this is just confusing things. In natural language if/then stands in for all sorts of entailment and implication, e.g. material, casual, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

How is "if you are playing chess then don't move the bishop onto another colour" more problematic than "if you are playing chess then you ought not move the bishop onto another colour"?

an imaginary problem — Leontiskos

On analytic philosophy and thought experiments, a post I read elsewhere might be funny:

Why is it clearly not the case?

Because obligations are everywhere in human culture and they dictate a great deal of behavior. They show up everywhere, in economics, in law, in finance, in ethics, in dramas.

I can't tell what you mean by obligations being "incoherent." I presume that when your mechanic finishes working on your car and hands you receipt stating that you are obligated to pay him some amount you don't stand in front of him dumbfounded, unsure of what is being said to you, nor that your annual tax bill provokes complete puzzlement.

And obligations are clearly not the same thing as all imperative statements. "Watch out, those stairs are icy," is an imperative statement with no obligation. The terms of a loan, by contrast, will speak about obligations.

So I assume you mean something like: "there is no reason why people should honor obligations outside of individual preferences," or something to that effect. To claim that obligations don't exist and play no role in determining human behavior would be like claiming laws don't exist and don't determine human behavior. Even if they are reducible to something else, they certainly exist, and I think you'd be hard pressed to make a compelling argument that they reduce to "individual preferences," as some sort of unanalyzable primitive either.

Even if they are reducible to something else, they certainly exist, and I think you'd be hard pressed to make a compelling argument that they reduce to "individual preferences," as some sort of unanalyzable primitive either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What do you think laws reduce to?

Because obligations are everywhere in human culture and they dictate a great deal of behavior. They show up everywhere, in economics, in law, in finance, in ethics, in dramas. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Money, oaths of office, marriage, contracts, the possibility of perjury, internet trust certificates, banking, fiduciary responsibilities, the list goes on... All of society would collapse in about 0.2 seconds without obligations and promises. I wonder why it doesn't...

---

- Yes, thank you! I could not agree more. :lol:

Hume's claims about the skeptic also come to mind:

And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind... — David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, § xii, 128

I can't tell what you mean by obligations being "incoherent." I presume that when your mechanic finishes working on your car and hands you receipt stating that you are obligated to pay him some amount you don't stand in front of him dumbfounded, unsure of what is being said to you, nor that your annual tax bill provokes complete puzzlement. — Count Timothy von Icarus

He fixes my car in exchange for money. It's a trade we agree to. So what additional thing is this "obligation", and what further purpose does it serve?

And obligations are clearly not the same thing as all imperative statements. "Watch out, those stairs are icy," is an imperative statement with no obligation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is "do this" as a command and there is "do this" as advice. Something like "brush your teeth" can be one or the other depending on whether it's your mother telling you or your dentist. What additional thing is this "obligation", and what further purpose does it serve?

The terms of a loan, by contrast, will speak about obligations.

They can speak of whatever they want; it doesn't then follow that there are such things.

Loans are simple; the bank gives me money and I pay them back with interest, else I will be prosecuted. So what additional thing is this "obligation", and what further purpose does it serve?

So I assume you mean something like: "there is no reason why people should honor obligations outside of individual preferences," or something to that effect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I mean exactly what I have said very clearly. Here are two sentences:

1. You have an obligation to do this
2. Do this

I cannot understand (1) except as (2) treated as if it were a truth-apt proposition.

If (1) means something else, or something more, then please tell me. Nobody is ever explaining this. Whenever I ask someone to explain what an obligation is I am only ever told "obligations exist" or "you have an obligation to do this". Why is that? I suspect it's because Anscombe is correct; it's a word with force but no substance.

I don't really think reduction is a particularly helpful endeavour in most cases, particularly not when it comes to the social sciences or history. But for the person committed to reductive materialism it seems that "personal preference," cannot be were explanation stops. Why is personal preference what it is? Well here we are going to need to call in biology, psychology, economics, sociology, history, etc. People don't have the preferences they have for no reason at all.

The driving assumption behind reductive explanations seems to generally be smallism, the idea that any facts about large scale things must be reducible to facts about smaller parts (down to some "fundemental building block"). Prima facie, I see no reason to believe this is true. A sort of bigism seems just as plausible, everything being defined in terms of its relation to the whole. So I would tend to think of laws as being dependant on things like human biology, history, etc., without necessarily being fully explicable in terms of them. For one thing, laws themselves end up affecting history, sociology, psychology, etc. The influence is bidirectional.

Obligations are recognized in the cultures or institutions they are situated in. This is not true for "all imperative commands." "Lay down your arms and come out now," yelled by an enemy soldier comes with no socially/institutionally recognized obligation. No one would say someone is "a bad soldier," for not doing what the enemy tells them to do. Soldiers are not obligated to obey imperative commands from the enemy. The same is not true for orders given by soldier's commanders. All imperative commands do not involve duties or obligations.

People are generally not confused by this difference. The idea that "if I am going to be a priest, soldier, doctor, etc. I am expected to preform certain duties," is ubiquitous. This is not any different from any other normative good.

I think Hegel's thinking here is at least partially correct, one role of institutions is to objectify obligations and duties. Obligations and duties clearly can exist outside of institutionalization. For example, it is true that in his society Orestes had an obligation to try kill his father's murderers as a surviving male child, but there was no institution set up to concretize this obligation. By contrast paying taxes are an obligation that is formalized and objectified by institutions.

But for the person committed to reductive materialism it seems that "personal preference," cannot be were explanation stops. Why is personal preference what it is? Well here we are going to need to call in biology, psychology, economics, sociology, history, etc. People don't have the preferences they have for no reason at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

For a reductive materialist, the explanation would have to stop wherever physics says it stops. Particles? Waves? Somewhere in there.

The driving assumption behind reductive explanations seems to generally be smallism, the idea that any facts about large scale things must be reducible to facts about smaller parts — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's because of discomfort with the idea that parts of the universe are alive and conscious. Seems like voodoo. As Tobias mentioned, it's a minority view at this point.

For one thing, laws themselves end up affecting history, sociology, psychology, etc. The influence is bidirectional. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Does it interest you to ask what kind of thing a law is? You don't feel it must be reducible, you don't believe they're mental objects. What are they?

I'm still waiting on a reply to this. — Michael

In this context what is the difference between these two propositions?

1. He is more likely to fulfil his obligations
2. He is more likely to complete the contract

If they're the same then I have no objections, except to point out that the introduction of the term “obligation” is unnecessary, and evidently susceptible to misunderstanding.

If they're different then I need (1) explained, and to know why (2) is not a sufficient account. — Michael

A contract establishes an obligation, and therefore someone who is more likely to fulfill his obligations is more likely to fulfill his contracts. You are falsely assuming that promises and contracts do not involve obligations, and that obligations are an unnecessary add-on. See my post <here>.

The point about the contractor is that the reason you prefer the reliable contractor over the unreliable contractor has to do with obligations. It has to do with the fact that he is a man of his word, and when he says that he will do something he does it. You can dance around this all day, but in fact you do prefer reliable contractors to unreliable contractors, and the only reason you prefer them is because they honor their obligations. Yes, you want your house built on time, and therefore you want a contractor who honors his obligations. The one who enters a contract is simply not indifferent to the two outcomes of completion vs. legal settlement. The consequences of breaking a contract are a penalty, not merely a consequence.

The use of "I promise" over "I intend" is just to emphasise the strength of one's belief that it will happen. — Michael

See:

When our father says, "Yes, I intend for us to go on vacation next summer, and more than that, I promise you that we will go on vacation come hell or high water!," does the latter part of that sentence change nothing at all? As I have said in many ways, the sort of directing involved in promising extends over the temporal duration of the promise. We can "hold him to it." If summer is near and there is no sign of travel arrangements, we have a right to apply a pressure to our father in a way that we would not if he had not promised. — Leontiskos

The first difference between intending and promising, as Aquinas says, is that "by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another." A mere intention has no necessary relation to another.

As a further example, consider something like "I'll try to do this, but I can't promise that I will". This isn't me saying that I intend to but am not obligated to; it is me saying that I am not certain that I will. — Michael

I don't think trying is the same as intending.

Note that we have a number of different ideas from you. Intending that something will happen, believing that something will happen, and trying to make something happen. You say:

The use of "I promise" over "I intend" is just to emphasise the strength of one's belief that it will happen. — Michael

"I intend to marry that woman over there." "Do you believe it will happen?" "Yes, I believe it with all my heart."

On your account he has just promised to marry the woman, which is obviously false. It is false because it has no relation to another (i.e. it does not regard something that he is to do for another). It is also false because he has not bound himself.

"Honey, do you think we will ever get married?" "I fully intend to eventually." "So that's to say that you're not ready to propose?"

A man can tell a woman that he intends to marry her, and he can affirm his belief in this future act to the maximal degree, and yet not propose (promise) to marry her.* On your view this would not be possible.

* Technically a proposal is a mutual promise.

Again, you're not telling me what obligations are. You're just insisting that they exist. That's no explanation at all.

So I'll try to make this very simple. Please explain to me the difference between these two propositions:

1. According to the law I have an obligation to pay income tax
2. The legislature has passed a bill that says that I am to pay income tax

A contract establishes an obligation, and therefore someone who is more likely to fulfill his obligations is more likely to fulfill his contracts. — Leontiskos

A contract tells the party what he is to do, and therefore someone who does what the contract tells him to do is more likely to fulfil his contracts.

So, again, how is my phrasing different from yours?

Like Count Timothy von Icarus, you're not explaining what obligations are. You're just insisting that they exist. That's no explanation at all. As it stands, what they are hasn't been explained, what purpose they serve hasn't been explained, and what evidence there is for them hasn't been explained.

They just seem to be meaningless and superfluous.

A contract tells the party what he is to do, and therefore someone who does what the contract tells him to do is more likely to fulfil his contracts. — Michael

Oh really? A contract is like the sergeant who goes around commanding people what they are to do? This is in line with your first harebrained theory that obligations are commands. I hate being ordered around so I'll have to keep a keen eye out for this "contract" you speak of. :roll:

You are recasting the entire social sphere. Your "promises" and "contracts" are not real promises or contracts. Your "penalties" are not real penalties. Your "debts" ("owes") are not real debts — Leontiskos

I knew this discussion would be a joke from the start:

Dictionaries should solve it, but they won't for Michael. Michael will sooner deny every form of future accountability rather than abandon his strange [dogmatic] position. He will deny promises, oaths, contracts, marriages - you name it. The more reductio that is applied, the muddier he is willing to get. — Leontiskos

...but even so, that's enough for me.

As it stands, what they are hasn't been explained, what purpose they serve hasn't been explained, and what evidence there is for them hasn't been explained.

They just seem to be meaningless and superfluous. — Michael

As to what an obligation is: Obligation, from ob- (“to”) + ligare (“to bind”): the act or process of binding, hence limiting, hence determining, hence constraining possible future states of affair relative to relationship(s) between the psyches addressed—i.e., relative to the persisting interactions, both present and future, of the psyches in question (these persisting interactions being that which defines relationships (and not necessarily of a romantic kind)).

As to what their purpose is: To benefit either some or else all parties concerned. Issues of fairness and unfairness being at play here. E.g., the typical slave will consider their obligations to the slave-master unfair.

As to evidence for them: on equal par to evidence for interactions between different parties that persist over time.

Michael will sooner deny every form of future accountability rather than abandon his strange [dogmatic] position. — Leontiskos

I don't deny future accountability. I have repeatedly said that if I don't do as I'm told, whether it be by some authority figure or by the terms of a contract, then I will be penalised.

You are the one claiming that there is some additional thing involved – the "obligation" – which you refuse to make sense of.

I don't deny future accountability. I have repeatedly said that if I don't do as I'm told, whether it be by some authority figure or by the terms of a contract, then I will be penalised. — Michael

No, you think they will forcibly take some money from you. One is only penalized for having done something wrong, and in denying obligations you deny that you could ever have done anything wrong. Again:

You are recasting the entire social sphere. Your "promises" and "contracts" are not real promises or contracts. Your "penalties" are not real penalties. Your "debts" ("owes") are not real debts. — Leontiskos

Accountability also implies obligation, but you would redefine that word as well. You are redefining words left and right, and at some point this is nothing more than dishonesty.

Let's take 18 U.S. Code § 1111 - Murder as an example.

It starts by explaining what counts as murder:

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or children; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.

Any other murder is murder in the second degree.

It then describes how anyone found guilty of murder is to be punished:

Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,

Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life;

Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

Nothing in here implies or entails or requires anything else, e.g. "obligations", whatever they are.

It is just the case that if you murder then you will be executed or imprisoned. There is no need to imagine phantom abstract entities.

It is just the case that if you murder then you will be punished. — Michael

And by "punished" you presumably do not mean what every dictionary in the world says, because then we would be right back to the equivocation on "penalty."

If you break a contract you should say, "They think they are punishing or penalizing me, but really they are just taking away something that I value." To punish or penalize presupposes wrongdoing, and wrongdoing presupposes obligation. Without obligation there exists no penalization, only the mistaken impression of penalization.

It is just the case that if you murder then you will be punished. — Michael

Only if you're caught. Perfect crimes are never punished. Ergo ...

There is no need to imagine phantom abstract entities. — Michael

A "relationship" - which, as my previous post, can only obtain just in case there likewise occur one or more obligations between the parties concerned - is only a "phantom abstract entity"; what a worldview this must be like to live in.

And by "punished" you presumably do not mean what every dictionary in the world says, because then we would be right back to the equivocation on "penalty." — Leontiskos

I mean that I will be put in prison or executed. It's right there in the text of the law.

I mean that I will be put in prison or executed. — Michael

As I've said, taking away something you value is not punishment. If it was then the thief who stole your car has necessarily punished you.

As I've said, taking away something you value is not punishment. If it was then the thief who stole your car has necessarily punished you. — Leontiskos

It's a punishment because it was done in response to something I did. If the thief stole my car because I insulted him then it could be construed as punishment.

It's a punishment because it was done in response to something I did. — Michael

You're missing the word "wrong" at the very end of your sentence.

You left your garage door open. The thief stole your car (because of something you did). He did not punish you.

You're missing the word "wrong" at the very end of your sentence. — Leontiskos

Criminals have punished witnesses who testified against them in court. Was it wrong of the witnesses to testify against the criminal in court? What does "wrong" even mean?

Criminals have punished people who testified against them in court. Was it wrong of them to testify against the criminal in court? What does "wrong" even mean? — Michael

For something to be seen to be a punishment it must be seen to be in response to wrongdoing. So as I said:

If you break a contract you should say, "They think they are punishing or penalizing me, but really they are just taking away something that I value." — Leontiskos

Criminals have punished people who testified against them in court. — Michael

The mafia who does so may be punishing or else merely using negative conditioning. Negative conditioning does not require punishment, although that is more subtle.

This is all just meaningless word games, like when I asked you to explain the difference between "he is more likely to fulfil his obligations" and "he is more likely to complete the contract".

So I stand by what I have previously said. A sentence like "you ought not do this" is just a command (or, as someone else mentioned, advice) that is fictitiously phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition. Any attempts so far to show otherwise have amounted to nothing more than the bare assertion that "obligations exist".

I can only take the unwillingness of anyone to actually make sense of obligations as evidence that Anscombe was right.

Does it interest you to ask what kind of thing a law is? You don't feel it must be reducible, you don't believe they're mental objects. What are they?

I feel like the right word for things like laws, recessions, culture, etc. would be "incorporeal" as in "lacking a specific body." Recessions might be an easier example. Recessions clearly exist. They have effects. They aren't exclusively mental. The causal reach of the 2008 financial crisis was global. It led to a drastic change in green house gas emissions. It led to half completed homes in Florida, "roads to nowhere" in China, etc.

Likewise laws continue to exist regardless of whether anyone is thinking of them at any particular moment. It would seem weird to say they flit in and out of existence as they enter someone's mental awareness. "Japanese culture," would be the same way. It exists in mental awareness, in synapses, in artifacts of all sorts, etc.

I do think information theory gives us some good ways to think about how such substrate independent, incorporeal entites might exist.



Obligations are a norm or rule that dictates behavior. They can be based in one's role in society, caste, profession, etc. Some people will argue that there are obligations and duties incumbent on all human beings. That seems like a more open question. The question of "do police officers have specified duties," seems like a no brainer.

I've already given an example of why duties are not the same thing as imperative sentences. They also differ in that they are widely recognized. No one needs to say "hey you, police officer, stop that criminal from breaking into that jewelry store." Every adult in the community knows that a function of the police is to prevent theft and that it is the duty of police officers to prevent thefts if they are able to without undue risk.

I should add that obligations and duties help define and give content to social roles. If "a knight has a duty to protect women and children," is just the same thing as the imperative statement "protect women and children," who exactly is making this imperative statement here? How is it that every adult member of the community knows this imperative statement applies to knights and yet not one of them could point to an specific individual as having issued it?