Furthermore, regarding my previous post, it seems possible that there could be some things one can have in causality (think synchronicity or Bell's inequality locality and non-locality) that can't simply be modeled. — Shawn
How could truth be possible without a formally consistent and complete system to render it as such? — Shawn
I don't think we can have the cake and eat it too here. The way things seem is that the very notion of possibility within a system of physical laws gives rise to a logic that is modal. Modality might be a better term than contingent... — Shawn
It would be interesting to approach your question from the perspective of a counterfactual. What would a physics look like that could not be apprehended by any form of inferential or abductive reasoning? I don't think such questions are coherent, and there seems to be plenty of evidence attesting that everything in physics can be modeled. If it is indeed true that human logic can apprehend physics in a model or what have you (I think the right term, nowadays, is a "simulation"), then the circularity dissipates. — Shawn
By 'contingent' I mean something that might to cease to exist/be valid. If physical laws are something contingent and they at some point change, the criteria by which we consider an explanation 'coherent' change, if we take them as the foundation of logic. I don't think that is acceptable. — boundless
You seem to assume that physical reality can be literally 'mapped' in a conceptual model, i.e. it has a structure that can be literally 'translated' in a conceptual framework. I guess that if we assume that this is true then maybe we might think that logic has a 'physical basis' (although then one might ask why this is so... but this is another story for another time). — boundless
I disagree. By 'contingent' I mean something that might to cease to exist/be valid. If physical laws are something contingent and they at some point change, the criteria by which we consider an explanation 'coherent' change, if we take them as the foundation of logic. I don't think that is acceptable. — boundless
I'd like to point out that I view the very notion of having possibility within a system can only mean in terms of modal logic the necessity of determined states which are truth apt regarding causality. — Shawn
I hope this thread can go in such a direction. It seems plausible that the logic of causality can only be defined materially and temporarily. — Shawn
I'd like to address this again given that my previous response was just conjecture. What I want to point out is the ability for a system to change. This change is dictated by causality. To understand causality we have to regard nature as a unitary system evolving through time. So, with this said, what do you think "possibility" might mean? — Shawn
It seems to me that, according to you, we should infer logical principles by observing physical phenomena, which we assume that have regularities which can be 'translated faithfully' in a conceptual map.
Let's assume that it is indeed possible, in principle, to infer logical principles in this way.
But what does gaurantee us that, indeed, our inference is correct? On what grounds can we be sure that our inference is correct? — boundless
I'd like to address this again given that my previous response was just conjecture. What I want to point out is the ability for a system to change. This change is dictated by causality. To understand causality we have to regard nature as a unitary system evolving through time. So, with this said, what do you think "possibility" might mean? — Shawn
The concept is so vaguely understandable only based on the way we perceive change itself. I don't really have an answer as to these deep "why" questions about what makes change possible. — Shawn
Modal logic is supposedly grounded by processism. I think that's the best answer I can give. — Shawn
Why not ground logic in its practical consequences? Like science. — apokrisis
That way entailment and causality might start to look like they have something in common. — apokrisis
Because, e.g. in order to establish if something is useful you need to have criteria to establish that it is useful, i.e. coherent with the concept of 'useful'. — boundless
Also, practical consequences are empirical facts. — boundless
I think that they do have something in common. In order to formulate the concept of 'causality', I think you need entailment as a prerequisite. — boundless
What else leaves us satisfied but that something works. It achieves some goal. It is consistent with our aims. — apokrisis
We routinely apply this constraint to physics. What makes it impossible in logics? Especially given as we do it routinely. To the point that we think we know what has practical bite and what is verging on abstract nonsense. — apokrisis
Physics might not be that physical, just as logic ain’t that unphysical when you get down to it. It is a bit of a social construction to claim that logic is some free choice abstract from reality, or indeed an inhabitant of Platonia. — apokrisis
↪boundless Perhaps a sharper way to put it. If logic is meant to structure our thoughts and causality to structure the world, why should they not correspond in this way. Why not the pragmatic constraint that optimises the value of both? — apokrisis
The definition of pragmatic is found in the limit of inquiry. When further refinement is agreed to be pointless. A difference that would make no difference. — apokrisis
Every hates effective theory. But what if that is just the nature of both physics and logic? As we discover in our own good time. — apokrisis
In fact, some kind of intuition of logical principles might be innate. Maybe even animals. — boundless
But, on the other hand, even understanding the concept of 'usefulness' relies on understanding logic. What do you think? — boundless
Let's say that, indeed, logical principles are a 'reflection' of an intelligible structure of the world. How could one 'prove' this view? — boundless
But in order to accept a view or another, it might be needed to be shown that such a view is better than others (or a skeptical approach on the issue). — boundless
One that is neither stranded in realism or idealism but founded in a lived relation that humans have with their world. — apokrisis
Thus there is a ground. But it is neither something of the world or even of our minds. It is a propositional attitude that arose from a semiotic modelling relation with the world. It is neither a pure realism or a pure idealism. It is something that cognitively worked. A tool using hominid could structure its world with a hierarchical order. A grammatical sapiens could impose a further level of still more consciously-distancing narrative structure, — apokrisis
We hazard a guess, take the risk of assuming a belief, and then discover the pragmatic consequences of doing that. We systematically doubt what we have assumed until we reach a point that further doubt has become useless. Moot. A difference that no longer could make a difference in practice. — apokrisis
If the semiotic modelling relation has been working for life and mind since its biological beginning, and a semiosis founded in number is merely the latest instantiation of this natural story, then that would be a pretty grounded tale I would have thought. — apokrisis
Of course, we can guess, assume a belief, we can even speak of knowledge in some sense, but it's not certainty. Empirical knowledge doesn't seem to be able to give us certainty. Yet, logical necessity seems to demand it. — boundless
There's a rather awkward neologism I've heard several times of late, 'transjective — Wayfarer
you can see he talks about all the same stuff as me. Modelling relations, anticipatory models, enactive cognition. So sits pretty squarely in what has now become the mainstream paradigm of cognitive science. — apokrisis
Let's say that 'ontological idealism' means that fundamental reality is mental and every other kind of 'realities' are dependent on that ultimate reality. — boundless
I ask you this because, unless your view is a sort of 'panpsychism' it should be called 'realism' as defined above. — boundless
I am not saying that your view is wrong but IMO grounding logic in an uncertain knowledge doesn't seem a real 'grounding'. — boundless
If 'semiotic modelling' - I am wrong to call it 'mentation'? - has only been working since a certain point of this universe history, doesn't it lead us to an emergentist view? — boundless
BTW, are you familiar to the late Bohm views on 'active information'. I think that you would find them akin to yours. — boundless
Sort of the same. Everyone is feeling the same elephant once they get fed up enough with reductionism. — apokrisis
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