That's not my experience on TPF. Although the few zealots for philosophical materialistic Scientism may just be more vocal and quick to attack any Idealist ideas than those who are less doctrinaire. When I disagree with their 17th century classical physics worldview, I call them out directly. But I won't name them for you. Ironically, they are hard-pressed to come-up with a label for my own unorthodox worldview, for which I created my own label --- and it's not Idealism. Also, I don't think would limit his own worldview to any Idealist doctrine, although he seems to be favorably inclined toward Kastrup's Analytical Idealism.Scientism and materialism don't seem very popular on this site and I would be hard pressed to recall members here who identify this way. Can you name any?
People who find idealism dead wrong also include Christians, Muslims and other theists who are far from sympathetic to science or to materialism. — Tom Storm
No, the subtly denigrating term "moral crusade" --- implying a holy mission? --- characterization of 's posts, was yours, not mine. I said he was just doing Philosophy. Was Socrates on a "moral crusade" in Athens? If so, then maybe all of us petty philosophers should emulate his mission for reason. :smile:I said that Wayfarer does not present an unambiguous position. It looks like I misread you to be suggesting philosophy is commonly ambiguous, whereas I now see you were suggesting it has largely been a moral crusade. So, my bad for hasty reading. — Janus
But the self or subject is never an appearance — Mww
Transcendental ego, the self that is necessary in order for there to be a unified empirical self-consciousness. For Immanuel Kant, it synthesizes sensations according to the categories of the understanding. Nothing can be known of this self, because it is a condition, not an object, of knowledge. — Brittanica
There are six steps to transcendental apperception:
All experience is the succession of a variety of contents (pace Hume).
1. To be experienced at all, the successive data of experience must be combined or held together in a unity for consciousness.
2. Unity of experience therefore implies a unity of self.
3. The unity of self is as much an object of experience as anything is.
4. Therefore, experience both of the self and its objects rests on acts of synthesis that, because they are the conditions of any experience, are not themselves experienced.
6. These prior syntheses are made possible by the categories. Categories allow us to synthesize the self and the objects.
if only I were to understand how such reasoning comes about, my personal cognitive prejudices notwithstanding. — Mww
In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point of departure, for Husserl. Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one—one which, in Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, though, of course, Husserl believes the Kantian way of articulating the consciousness—world relation was itself distorted since it still postulated the thing in itself. — Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology, p144
The fact that the world is 'imperfect' is actually a good motivator for spiritual practice, I think. — boundless
I don't think ↪Wayfarer would limit his own worldview to any Idealist doctrine, although he seems to be favorably inclined toward Kastrup's Analytical Idealism. — Gnomon
The fact that the world is 'imperfect' is actually a good motivator for spiritual practice, I think. — boundless
For Spinozists, reality (Deus, sive naturans) is ineluctably immanent – the encompassing horizon that reason necessarily cannot encompass (i.e. explain, or transcend) – and exhausts all of our other rational ideas, concepts & categories. Absurdists might say "reality is the subject of transcendental despair" (i.e. void, anicca, dao, sunyata). Also, faith (i.e. "hope") isn't needed because in practice denying or ignoring reality tends to be hazardous. :smirk:Reality seems to have replaced God as a subject of transcendental hope. — Tom Storm
↪boundless On the contrary, with all due respect, perhaps the world (naively) seems "imperfect" to us only because each one of us is "imperfect" ... Philosophy can be a practice – "spiritual exercise" (Hadot) – for learning (again) to see the world as perfect and thereby, like Sisyphus, always striving to perfect our communities and ourselves (e.g. ethics-as-tikkun olam). — 180 Proof
Well, fwiw, I see no other way but to interpret Spinoza as both an immanentist and acosmist sub specie aeternitatis (though sub specie durationis also as a pandeist, which (for me) ontically relates him to that other great immanentist Epicurus).I actually interpret Spinoza as a sort of 'acosmist', so not sure I would call him an immanentist ... — boundless
for learning (again) to see the world as perfect and thereby, like Sisyphus, always striving to perfect our communities and ourselves (e.g. ethics-as-tikkun olam). — 180 Proof
Philosophy can be a practice – "spiritual exercise" (Hadot) — 180 Proof
For Hadot, famously, the means for the philosophical student to achieve the “complete reversal of our usual ways of looking at things” epitomized by the Sage were a series of spiritual exercises. These exercises encompassed all of those practices still associated with philosophical teaching and study: reading, listening, dialogue, inquiry, and research. However, they also included practices deliberately aimed at addressing the student’s larger way of life, and demanding daily or continuous repetition: practices of attention (prosoche), meditations (meletai), memorizations of dogmata, self-mastery (enkrateia), the therapy of the passions, the remembrance of good things, the accomplishment of duties, and the cultivation of indifference towards indifferent things (PWL 84). Hadot acknowledges his use of the term “spiritual exercises” may create anxieties, by associating philosophical practices more closely with religious devotion than typically done (Nussbaum 1996, 353-4; Cooper 2010). Hadot’s use of the adjective “spiritual” (or sometimes “existential”) indeed aims to capture how these practices, like devotional practices in the religious traditions (6a), are aimed at generating and reactivating a constant way of living and perceiving in prokopta, despite the distractions, temptations, and difficulties of life. For this reason, they call upon far more than “reason alone.” They also utilize rhetoric and imagination in order “to formulate the rule of life to ourselves in the most striking and concrete way” and aim to actively re-habituate bodily passions, impulses, and desires (as for instance, in Cynic or Stoic practices, abstinence is used to accustom followers to bear cold, heat, hunger, and other privations) (PWL 85). These practices were used in the ancient schools in the context of specific forms of interpersonal relationships: for example, the relationship between the student and a master, whose role it was to guide and assist the student in the examination of conscience, in identification and rectification of erroneous judgments and bad actions, and in the conduct of dialectical exchanges on established themes. — IEP
Well, fwiw, I see no other way but to interpret Spinoza as both an immanentist and acosmist sub specie aeternitatis (though sub specie durationis also as a pandeist, which (for me) ontically relates him to that other great immanentist Epicurus). — 180 Proof
The centrality of 'the subject' is fundamental to phenomenology…. — Wayfarer
(i.e. void, anicca, dao, sunyata) — 180 Proof
My contention is the relation of subject to experience, in which “subject of experience” makes no sense, under the assumption that “subject” here was meant to indicate a rational intelligence. — Mww
in Indian/Far eastern philosophy, many religious traditions developed a version of a 'two truths doctrine', the 'conventional truth' (what we might call 'consensual reality') and the 'ultimate truth' (only known by the 'liberated'). — boundless
I can't understand the distinction you're trying to make here. — Wayfarer
subject DOES NOT belong to experience, but is presupposed by it — Mww
What if the person is me? — Mww
Understandably, the Catholic Church labeled Immanentism as a heresy. Which may add to its appeal for anti-catholic Immanentists. What was the "element of transcendence" in his reality : Eternity/Infinity? How can you transcend Infinity? How are modes-of-being transcended?I can see why you can call Spinoza an 'immanentist'. But at the same time it is a peculiar form of immanentism where the 'true reality' has an element of transcendence. Not in the sense that 'Natura Naturans' is something 'separate' from the modes but 'sub specie aeternitatis' only God is real (at this level the modes in some sense 'disappear', are transcended). — boundless
We instinctively want to be in a positive state and be from pain/suffering/unease. Also, we have a natural instinct of survival. And yet, our own nature contradicts those innate insticts. That, I believe, leads to a perception of 'unfairness' in this world, which can itself bring pain (and we, by instict, seek distractions from it...). So, I think that the awareness of the 'unfairness or imperfection of the world' doesn't come from reflexion but it is pre-reflexive*. We feel this unfairness, so to speak because our fragility and our being liable to death contrast our instinct.
I think that the religious 'seeking' of an escape/liberation/salvation is therefore ingrained in us. — boundless
[the Buddha/prince:] "Promise me that my life will not end in death, that sickness will not impair my health, that age will not follow my youth, that misfortune will not destroy my prosperity."
"You are asking too much," replied the king. "Give up this idea. It is not well to act on a foolish impulse."
Solemn as Meru mountain, the prince said to his father:
"If you can not promise me these four things, do not hold me back, O father. When some one is trying to escape from a burning house, we should not hinder him. The day comes, inevitably, when we must leave this world, but what merits is there in a forced separation? A voluntary separation is far better. Death would carry me out of the world before I had reached my goal, before I had satisfied my ardor. The world is a prison: would that I could free those beings who are prisoners of desire! The world is a deep pit wherein wander the ignorant and the blind: would that I could light the lamp of knowledge, would that I could remove the film that hides the light of wisdom! The world has raised the wrong banner, it has raised the banner of pride: would that I could pull it down, would that I could tear to pieces the banner of pride! The world is troubled, the world is in a turmoil, the world is a wheel of fire: would that I could, with the true law, bring peace to all men!"
However (according to Spinoza), when the world is seen rigthly, Reality is seen as an 'undivided Whole', the only One Substance, God, in a way that is actually reminiscent of Parmenides IMO or indian advaita Vedanta — boundless
The problem, as Spinoza diagnoses, is that people normally desire “perishable things” which “can be reduced to these three headings: riches, honour, and sensual pleasure” . As these things are “perishable”, they cannot afford lasting happiness; in fact, they worsen our existential situation, since their acquisition more often than not requires compromising behaviour and their consumptions makes us even more dependent on perishable goods. “But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind with joy alone, unmixed with any sadness.” Thus, in his mature masterpiece, the Ethics, Spinoza finds lasting happiness only in the “intellectual love of God”, which is the mystical, non-dual vision of the single “Substance” underlying everything and everyone. The non-dual nature of this vision is clearly announced by Spinoza when he says that “[t]he mind’s intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself” (Ethics, Part 5, Prop. 36). Since, for Spinoza, God is the Whole that includes everything, it also includes your love for God, and thus God can be said to love Itself through you. — Critique of Pure Interest (Blog)
(source: https://suttacentral.net/kv1.6/en/aung-rhysdavids?lang=en&reference=none&highlight=false)Nibbāna does not abandon its state as Nibbāna—by this we mean Nibbāna is permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to change. And you ought to mean this, too, in the case of material-aggregate, if you say that the latter does not abandon its materiality.
I'm not very familiar with Parmenides or Advaita, so my own terminology would characterize the "two ways of seeing the world" as Holistic (Philosophy ; Idealism ; Holism ) or Particular (Science ; Physicalism ; Materialism). So, as an amateur philosopher, I try to view the world "as a whole". And IMHO the best summation of that worldview is the 1926 book by Biologist Jan Smuts : Holism and Evolution. It's intended to be a science book, but since it focuses on Wholes instead of Modes, it is basically a philosophy book. Are you familiar with that book, or the concept of Holism?As I interpret Spinoza, there are two ways of 'seeing' the 'world'. First, there is the usual perspective, 'sub specie temporis' which does not contemplate 'Reality' as a whole. This perspective, for Spinoza, has the unfortunate 'side effect' that it suggests that the 'modes' are actually distinct entities, substances.
However, when the world is seen rigthly, Reality is seen as an'undivided Whole', the only One Substance, God, in a way that is actually reminiscent of Parmenides IMO or indian advaita Vedanta. He says that the human mind is eternal, but only when seen as a mode, not a substance. It's a bit like saying that a particular ocean wave belongs to the whole history of the ocean, which is seen as a single undivided entity. — boundless
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