Scientism and materialism don't seem very popular on this site and I would be hard pressed to recall members here who identify this way. Can you name any?
People who find idealism dead wrong also include Christians, Muslims and other theists who are far from sympathetic to science or to materialism. — Tom Storm

That's not my experience on TPF. Although the few zealots for philosophical materialistic Scientism may just be more vocal and quick to attack any Idealist ideas than those who are less doctrinaire. When I disagree with their 17th century classical physics worldview, I call them out directly. But I won't name them for you. Ironically, they are hard-pressed to come-up with a label for my own unorthodox worldview, for which I created my own label --- and it's not Idealism. Also, I don't think would limit his own worldview to any Idealist doctrine, although he seems to be favorably inclined toward Kastrup's Analytical Idealism.

What Christians would find "dead wrong" about philosophical Idealism-in-general, and Analytical Idealism in particular, is the lack of specific Christian doctrinal elements*1. Also Kastrup's rejection of a literal interpretation of its mythology & symbology would be a deal breaker*2. Besides, Way's personal philosophy seems to be closer to secular Buddhism, which disavowed intervening gods in favor of self-help . My own personal worldview is closer to secular Deism, which for Christians is "not even wrong", because it relies on human Reason, instead of divine Revelation, to conclude the logical necessity for a First Cause of some kind, to avoid an infinite tower of turtles prior to the Big Bang. However, my worldview is completely compatible with Materialism (chemistry) and Physicalism (physics) in a scientific context, apart from Philosophy, the science of ideas (metaphysics). :smile:


*1. Philosophical Idealism and Christian Belief :
At the heart of the idealists’ discussion of God and the absolute, is the difficulty of defending the notion of a personal or relational Judaeo-Christian God with the absolute, which, as the purer Idealist philosophers of the day, Bradley and Bosanquet, pointed out, must be beyond our knowledge and fellowship.
https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/themelios/review/philosophical-idealism-and-christian-belief/

*2. Kastrup on Religion :
In my book, More Than Allegory, I have stated my views on religion: I think it is a valid and important part of human life that we neglect at our own peril. Religious mythology, although obviously not literally true, is symbolic of something that, while transcending our rational faculties, is integral and critical to being human.
https://www.bernardokastrup.com/2019/12/a-suggestion-for-church-reform.html

Christianity vs "false-teaching" Deism :
Deism teaches that all people can know and believe in a Supreme Being—the prime mover of all things—merely through the vehicle of reason. Historically, deists often held to a modified form of Christianity that emptied the faith of any supernatural elements while allowing its moral instruction to remain. Though it is more of a philosophical and religious set of ideals than an organized religion, deism offers an antisupernatural worldview as an alternative to Christian theism. . . . .
Scripture teaches the following:
The Supreme Being: There is only one true and living God, subsisting in three distinct persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.
https://www.ligonier.org/learn/articles/field-guide-on-false-teaching-deism
Note --- Modern Deism typically makes no assertions about the nature of the hypothetical First Cause.

I said that Wayfarer does not present an unambiguous position. It looks like I misread you to be suggesting philosophy is commonly ambiguous, whereas I now see you were suggesting it has largely been a moral crusade. So, my bad for hasty reading. — Janus

No, the subtly denigrating term "moral crusade" --- implying a holy mission? --- characterization of 's posts, was yours, not mine. I said he was just doing Philosophy. Was Socrates on a "moral crusade" in Athens? If so, then maybe all of us petty philosophers should emulate his mission for reason. :smile:


What is the moral crusade theory?
moral crusade A social movement which campaigns around a symbolic or moral issue such as alcohol or pornography. Classic sociological accounts of moral crusades include Joseph R. Gusfield's study of the Temperance Movement, Symbolic Crusade (1963), and Louis A. Zurcher et al. , Citizens for Decency (1976)
https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/moral-crusade

From the TPF Site Guidelines :
Types of posters who are not welcome here:
Evangelists: Those who must convince everyone that their religion, ideology, political persuasion, or philosophical theory is the only one worth having.

But the self or subject is never an appearance — Mww

Isn't this where the 'transcendental ego' and 'transcendental apperception' figures?

Transcendental ego, the self that is necessary in order for there to be a unified empirical self-consciousness. For Immanuel Kant, it synthesizes sensations according to the categories of the understanding. Nothing can be known of this self, because it is a condition, not an object, of knowledge. — Brittanica

As for transcendental apperception:

There are six steps to transcendental apperception:

All experience is the succession of a variety of contents (pace Hume).
1. To be experienced at all, the successive data of experience must be combined or held together in a unity for consciousness.
2. Unity of experience therefore implies a unity of self.
3. The unity of self is as much an object of experience as anything is.
4. Therefore, experience both of the self and its objects rests on acts of synthesis that, because they are the conditions of any experience, are not themselves experienced.
6. These prior syntheses are made possible by the categories. Categories allow us to synthesize the self and the objects.

///

if only I were to understand how such reasoning comes about, my personal cognitive prejudices notwithstanding. — Mww

The centrality of 'the subject' is fundamental to phenomenology:

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge, all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world, reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational, disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point of departure, for Husserl. Since consciousness is presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one—one which, in Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, though, of course, Husserl believes the Kantian way of articulating the consciousness—world relation was itself distorted since it still postulated the thing in itself. — Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology, p144

"Consciousness should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in the first place" pretty well sums up the whole point of the 'mind-created world' OP. I acknowledge at the outset, my approach is based on what I've learned from both phenomenology and non-dualism, and also from meditation.

The fact that the world is 'imperfect' is actually a good motivator for spiritual practice, I think. — boundless

:up:

I don't think ↪Wayfarer would limit his own worldview to any Idealist doctrine, although he seems to be favorably inclined toward Kastrup's Analytical Idealism. — Gnomon

Not least because he's current, and because he's part of the scene - he's debating and appearing on panel sessions etc. He gives voice to an idealist perspective, not that I worship the guy or anything, but his output is pretty impressive, in my view.

The fact that the world is 'imperfect' is actually a good motivator for spiritual practice, I think. — boundless

Just wanted to expand on this point. We instinctively want to be in a positive state and be from pain/suffering/unease. Also, we have a natural instinct of survival. And yet, our own nature contradicts those innate insticts. That, I believe, leads to a perception of 'unfairness' in this world, which can itself bring pain (and we, by instict, seek distractions from it...). So, I think that the awareness of the 'unfairness or imperfection of the world' doesn't come from reflexion but it is pre-reflexive*. We feel this unfairness, so to speak because our fragility and our being liable to death contrast our instinct.
I think that the religious 'seeking' of an escape/liberation/salvation is therefore ingrained in us.

So, yeah, I would say that the 'world as unfair' is a pre-reflexive awarenss which is rooted in our most central instincts. That's why, I think, the 'need of salvation/liberation' that is found in religions has been universal in all cultures. It can be elaborated upon in a religious doctrine or even seen as a paradoxical, delusional feeling that is maybe best to try to ignore in all possible ways. But it is IMO undeniably there and even if it is denied it remains in the background.
In fact, I believe that this feeling or this pre-reflexive awareness of the tragicality of our predicament is the main motivator for any kind of spiritual practice.

*I think that some 'spiritual' experiences are, indeed, experiences where there is a stronger-than-usual awareness of this paradox and this kind of experiences can IMO be the strong motivators for a 'drastic change' in both views and actions. I think that I had an experience of this sort in the summer of 2016 where I felt an anguished awareness of this paradoxical condition of living beings and I really felt it as something that indeed is of my concern. In my case, this experience caused a shift in views but not in actions.

Reality seems to have replaced God as a subject of transcendental hope. — Tom Storm

For Spinozists, reality (Deus, sive naturans) is ineluctably immanent – the encompassing horizon that reason necessarily cannot encompass (i.e. explain, or transcend) – and exhausts all of our other rational ideas, concepts & categories. Absurdists might say "reality is the subject of transcendental despair" (i.e. void, anicca, dao, sunyata). Also, faith (i.e. "hope") isn't needed because in practice denying or ignoring reality tends to be hazardous. :smirk:

On the contrary, with all due respect, perhaps the world (naively) seems "imperfect" to us only because each one of us is "imperfect" ... Philosophy can be a practice – "spiritual exercise" (Hadot) – for learning (again) to see the world as perfect and thereby, like Sisyphus, always striving to perfect our communities and ourselves (e.g. ethics-as-tikkun olam).

You have a poet's way with language. :pray:

↪boundless On the contrary, with all due respect, perhaps the world (naively) seems "imperfect" to us only because each one of us is "imperfect" ... Philosophy can be a practice – "spiritual exercise" (Hadot) – for learning (again) to see the world as perfect and thereby, like Sisyphus, always striving to perfect our communities and ourselves (e.g. ethics-as-tikkun olam). — 180 Proof

Yeah, I might have worded it badly...

For example, Spinoza himself distingueshed two ways of contemplating reality: sub specie temporis and sub specie aeternitatis. To 'transcend' pain and suffering, one must contemplate reality sub specie aeternitatis.

So, I guess that, yeah, I might erred in implying that the 'world is unfair' (after all, 'unfair' cannot be something that is applied to something insentient and that has no moral agency) in my previous post. I was, in fact, trying to verbalize the 'instinctual' reaction to the pre-reflexive or reflexive awareness (unfortunate? delusional? maybe 'enlightenly delusional'*?) of the paradoxical predicament in which we are.

So, yeah, the 'feeling' that the world is imperfect or unfair might well be understood, in some ways as a delusion. But is IMO still the starting point of even an immanentist 'solution' of this problem a la Spinoza, at least in some interpretations (although, I actually interpret Spinoza as a sort of 'acosmist', so not sure I would call him an immanentist in the literal sense of the term). But IMO it can be also the starting point of diverse philosophers like Epicurus and Pyrrho, who seeked and thought they found a solution of the human predicament. So I don't think that this anguished reaction is actually found only in religious/spiritual thinkers but it is a reaction, a 'splinter' that motivates one to actually find some kind of solution. Yes, I think that it is most explicit in religious concepts of 'liberation/salvation' but not entirely absent in skeptic or even 'fully secular' thinkers. After all, I think it is something that be vivdly felt by anyone.

*By 'enlightenly delusional' I mean an intuition that is wrong but it is the starting point for a 'more enlightned perspective', so to speak. To borrow a famous metaphor from Wittgenstein and a certain (inappropriate) liberty to decontestualize it, it is like a 'ladder' that is to be taken seriously IMO.

I actually interpret Spinoza as a sort of 'acosmist', so not sure I would call him an immanentist ... — boundless

Well, fwiw, I see no other way but to interpret Spinoza as both an immanentist and acosmist sub specie aeternitatis (though sub specie durationis also as a pandeist, which (for me) ontically relates him to that other great immanentist Epicurus).

for learning (again) to see the world as perfect and thereby, like Sisyphus, always striving to perfect our communities and ourselves (e.g. ethics-as-tikkun olam). — 180 Proof

Why Sisyphus? Sisyphus is an icon for futility and pointlessness. Sisyphus can’t strive for anything, only repeat the same pointless action forever.

‘In Greek mythology, Sisyphus was a denizen of Hades. According to the myth, Sisyphus was condemned to an eternal punishment in the Underworld (Hades) where he was forced to roll a massive boulder up a hill, only for it to roll back down each time he neared the top, compelling him to start over indefinitely. This punishment was given to him for his deceitfulness and trickery during his lifetime, which included cheating death twice.’

Philosophy can be a practice – "spiritual exercise" (Hadot) — 180 Proof

For Hadot, famously, the means for the philosophical student to achieve the “complete reversal of our usual ways of looking at things” epitomized by the Sage were a series of spiritual exercises. These exercises encompassed all of those practices still associated with philosophical teaching and study: reading, listening, dialogue, inquiry, and research. However, they also included practices deliberately aimed at addressing the student’s larger way of life, and demanding daily or continuous repetition: practices of attention (prosoche), meditations (meletai), memorizations of dogmata, self-mastery (enkrateia), the therapy of the passions, the remembrance of good things, the accomplishment of duties, and the cultivation of indifference towards indifferent things (PWL 84). Hadot acknowledges his use of the term “spiritual exercises” may create anxieties, by associating philosophical practices more closely with religious devotion than typically done (Nussbaum 1996, 353-4; Cooper 2010). Hadot’s use of the adjective “spiritual” (or sometimes “existential”) indeed aims to capture how these practices, like devotional practices in the religious traditions (6a), are aimed at generating and reactivating a constant way of living and perceiving in prokopta, despite the distractions, temptations, and difficulties of life. For this reason, they call upon far more than “reason alone.” They also utilize rhetoric and imagination in order “to formulate the rule of life to ourselves in the most striking and concrete way” and aim to actively re-habituate bodily passions, impulses, and desires (as for instance, in Cynic or Stoic practices, abstinence is used to accustom followers to bear cold, heat, hunger, and other privations) (PWL 85). These practices were used in the ancient schools in the context of specific forms of interpersonal relationships: for example, the relationship between the student and a master, whose role it was to guide and assist the student in the examination of conscience, in identification and rectification of erroneous judgments and bad actions, and in the conduct of dialectical exchanges on established themes. — IEP

Read Camus' anything but futilistic interpretation of Sisyphus (rolling 'the philosopher's stone' aka Life) – a mythic dramatization of Nietzsche's amor fati or eternal return of the same (Ja-sagen!) :fire:

studied Camus for the higher school certificate. The only thing I’ve ever read about Camus that made me warm to him was about his split with Sartre..

Anyway - other than the ref to Sisyphus I was going to agree.

Well, fwiw, I see no other way but to interpret Spinoza as both an immanentist and acosmist sub specie aeternitatis (though sub specie durationis also as a pandeist, which (for me) ontically relates him to that other great immanentist Epicurus). — 180 Proof

As an aside, now that I think about it, I realize that reading your posts (I think in the old forum?) convinced me that Spinoza was a kind of acosmist (I think it was you who compared Spinoza to Advaita Vedanta and used the wave/ocean analogy). So, kudos for that :up: and also for considering him a pandesit sub specie temporis (here he markedly differs I believe from Advaita Vedanta, where in the 'lower level' of truth, Advaita is theist I think...)!

I can see why you can call Spinoza an 'immanentist'. But at the same time it is a peculiar form of immanentism where the 'true reality' has an element of transcendence. Not in the sense that 'Natura Naturans' is something 'separate' from the modes but 'sub specie aeternitatis' only God is real (at this level the modes in some sense 'disappear', are transcended).

The centrality of 'the subject' is fundamental to phenomenology…. — Wayfarer

I never would question the centrality of the subject, irrespective of the discipline used to describe it.

My contention is the relation of subject to experience, in which “subject of experience” makes no sense, under the assumption that “subject” here was meant to indicate a rational intelligence.

(i.e. void, anicca, dao, sunyata) — 180 Proof

Since you mentioned these concepts, in Indian/Far eastern philosophy, many religious traditions developed a version of a 'two truths doctrine', the 'conventional truth' (what we might call 'consensual reality') and the 'ultimate truth' (only known by the 'liberated'). Of course, they differ in their conception of what these two truths are, even among the same religion there are many versions (it would be simply to long to view them...).

The difference between the two truths is epistemic, i.e. the 'conventional truth' arises from a distorted perspective we have on 'what is real', whereas the 'ultimate truth' is seen by those who transcended this deceptive - even if useful in most contests - perspective. So an 'epistemic transcendence' is needed to overcome suffering/pain (and in some versions this leads to an 'ontological transcendence', but I digress...)

But IMO even if what is required to overcome 'pain/suffering' is a radical 'epistemic transcendence' I think that, maybe initially, what motivates this kind of search is actually that anguished awareness that I mentioned before.

Spinoza's 'sub specie temporis' seems the perspective of 'conventional truth', whereas his 'sub specie aeternitatis' is the perspective that 'reveals' the ultimate.

But even among the greeks, we actually find some versions of the two truths (IMO among the presocratics, the Eleatics are the best example...)

What I find fascinating is that in Ancient Greece even those who actually held a more 'materialistic' view employed something similar. Democritus for instance seems to have developed a philosophy which is structurally similar: on the one hand, composite objects which are seen as a whole because our understanding is incomplete and on the other hand, atoms and the void which can be seen as the 'ultimate truth'.

But this is not surprising if philosophy was, in the ancient times was combined with a practice as Pierre Hadot said.

@Wayfarer

My contention is the relation of subject to experience, in which “subject of experience” makes no sense, under the assumption that “subject” here was meant to indicate a rational intelligence. — Mww

I can't understand the distinction you're trying to make here. Persons are subjects of experience, are they not? That you and I are both subjects who have experiences is hardly controversial is it?

in Indian/Far eastern philosophy, many religious traditions developed a version of a 'two truths doctrine', the 'conventional truth' (what we might call 'consensual reality') and the 'ultimate truth' (only known by the 'liberated'). — boundless

Quite true, but there's no conceptual equivalent to liberation (mokṣa, Nirvāṇa) in Western philosophy.

So something I'm seeing in working through these guys today is that it's math pretty much beyond my ability. Not that it's surprising that a formalization of Hegel's logic would require pretty complicated maths, but I know I can't really comment on the formalization -- but what is exciting about it is that in some sense the work has already been done, and so rather than guess-and-check there's something to build on that I didn't know about. Sweet!

I can't understand the distinction you're trying to make here. — Wayfarer

And I can’t understand the distinction that has been made for me.

Color of ball…
Size of box…
Meaning of phrase…
Intent of speaker….

…in all of those, there is a condition assigned to a representation. Doesn’t matter what the condition is, only the relation it has to that which is represented by it. Color, among other conditions, belongs to the representation of ball; size belongs to box, meaning belongs to phrase, intent belongs to speaker, ad infinitum…..

…..but subject DOES NOT belong to experience, but is presupposed by it. A ball is never presupposed by its color, or any condition which represents it, as opposed to that condition by which it was even possible in the first place.

Minutia: that which Everydayman ignores but with which the critical thinker amuses himself.

subject DOES NOT belong to experience, but is presupposed by it — Mww

Sure. But how does that bear on the common-sense observation that a person is the subject of experience? I mean, it is a grammatically correct expression. 'I believe you were involved in a serious traffic accident recently. That must have been a terrible experience.' So, this is something you can't say?

….the common-sense observation that a person is the subject of experience — Wayfarer

What if the person is me? Does common sense then say I am the subject of experience, or does it just say, I experience?

….’til tomorrow….

What if the person is me? — Mww

I can still refer to you as being a subject of experience. It's innate to language - 'the subject' is a fundamental component of English grammar. In grammatical terms, the subject in a sentence is the person, place, thing, or idea that is performing the action of the verb or being described by the verb. For example, in the sentence "I did that," 'I' is the subject who undertakes the action of doing. It also ties into the philosophical notion of the subject as the agent or experiencer in discussions about consciousness and experience. So, in both linguistic and philosophical contexts, the idea of 'the subject' as the one who acts or experiences is well established.

Ok. Thanks for your time.

I can see why you can call Spinoza an 'immanentist'. But at the same time it is a peculiar form of immanentism where the 'true reality' has an element of transcendence. Not in the sense that 'Natura Naturans' is something 'separate' from the modes but 'sub specie aeternitatis' only God is real (at this level the modes in some sense 'disappear', are transcended). — boundless

Understandably, the Catholic Church labeled Immanentism as a heresy. Which may add to its appeal for anti-catholic Immanentists. What was the "element of transcendence" in his reality : Eternity/Infinity? How can you transcend Infinity? How are modes-of-being transcended?

I'm not a Spinoza expert, but regarding unbounded space-time, he seemed to assume that the material world, and his Nature God, was Eternal & Infinite*1. So how would he deal with modern Cosmology, which says that the universe had a sudden & inexplicable beginning of Space-Time-Matter-Energy? Where or when was boundless Natura Naturans before the Bang?*2 :smile:


*1. Spinoza defined God as "a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence", and since "no cause or reason" can prevent such a being from existing, it must exist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baruch_Spinoza

*2. Eternity is a property that substance and modes have in common. Spinoza posits in E5p23 that “the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal.” Thus, men have both an indefinite existence or duration, and an eternal one.
https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28070/chapter-abstract/212085978?redirectedFrom=fulltext

We instinctively want to be in a positive state and be from pain/suffering/unease. Also, we have a natural instinct of survival. And yet, our own nature contradicts those innate insticts. That, I believe, leads to a perception of 'unfairness' in this world, which can itself bring pain (and we, by instict, seek distractions from it...). So, I think that the awareness of the 'unfairness or imperfection of the world' doesn't come from reflexion but it is pre-reflexive*. We feel this unfairness, so to speak because our fragility and our being liable to death contrast our instinct.
I think that the religious 'seeking' of an escape/liberation/salvation is therefore ingrained in us. — boundless

I was musing on the well-known saying of 'thinking outside the box'. As is common knowledge the origin of this expression is a cognitive test wherein the user has to connect five dots arranged in a square shape with a single unbroken line. The only solution is to extend the line 'outside the box', hence the expression. The intention is to test the aspirant's problem-solving skills.

So it occured to me that religion provides an analogous, 'outside the box' solution to the intrinsic suffering of existence. 'The box' in this analogy is 'the natural world', that is, the world that can be known by the natural senses (and their extensions in the form of scientific instruments.) In Christianity this ‘beyond’ takes the form of belief in the afterlife or the future Second Coming. In Hinduism and Buddhism, it is understood that over the course of lifetimes, the aspirant can be released from the cycle of re-birth.

It is of course true that a secular culture doesn't recognise any such possibility as matter of principle. Hence in this context any solution to the suffering of existence is ameliorative, through medical, economic, political and technological means to treat illness, inequality, and so on. Which, as far as natural life is concerned, is obviously hugely advantageous - none of us would want to go without these advantages and it is in this respect that secular culture has dramatically improved the quality of life for billions.

But from a philosophical perspective, as naturalism excludes the possibility of consequences in another life, then justice is only meaningful in the sense that it can be administered by society.There are no consequences possible beyond natural life. Secular philosophers such as John Rawls address this through the concept of fairness and equity. But it takes religion to provide a sense of cosmic justice.

As I interpret Spinoza, there are two ways of 'seeing' the 'world'. First, there is the usual perspective, 'sub specie temporis' which does not contemplate 'Reality' as a whole. This perspective, for Spinoza, has the unfortunate 'side effect' that it suggests that the 'modes' are actually distinct entities, substances.

However, when the world is seen rigthly, Reality is seen as an 'undivided Whole', the only One Substance, God, in a way that is actually reminiscent of Parmenides IMO or indian advaita Vedanta. He says that the human mind is eternal, but only when seen as a mode, not a substance. It's a bit like saying that a particular ocean wave belongs to the whole history of the ocean, which is seen as a single undivided entity.

I sort of agree but I would put it in a different way.

The 'box' refers to the condition of everyone that is not saved/liberated from death, pain, illnesses, cruelty etc - let's call all the negatives as 'evil'. This does not mean that the 'box' is wholly evil - at least not necessarily. In our natural world, for instance, there are pleasant states of course. But evil is an undeniable aspect of it.

Now, I think we could say that according to most religions we not only are in a 'box' but that we do not know its extension, its 'depth', so to speak. For instance, Buddhism teaches the doctrine of rebirth and all realms of rebirth are subject to at least death, even the most lofty ones (whereas the 'lower realms' are seen as pervaded by an evil greater or much, much greater than the 'human realm').

Clearly, the conception that one has of the 'box' clearly influences the conception of the 'outside the box' and the way of escaping the box. To continue with Buddhism*, not only one must escape of the 'human box', so to speak, but to be 'fully liberated' one must escape from the incredibly larger 'box' of the 'whole samsara', so to speak (but since human are seen as potentially being trapped in samsara forever, if not liberated at some point, the 'human condition/predicament' in Buddhism refers to the whole samsara).

On the other hand, Epicurean philosophy and its related practice was clearly influenced by the belief that death is an annihilation for all and while it can be said that annihilation is a negative for all, one at least does not have to be preoccupied with 'what might happen after death', in the Epicurean view. And not just that, but Epicurus clearly saw IMO pain as the 'box', so to speak, to which one might want to escape. So, coherently with his view of the 'human condition', he tried to find a way to minimize the pain, the 'evil'. I might say that this 'minimization' is actually an evidence that his solution is not really a 'true escape' from the 'evil'.
As I said, what I found interesting is that even ancient 'secular' perspectives on the human conditions actually had a way of 'dealing with' the human condition ('the box') that had spiritual overtones, so to speak. And despite being seen as a 'symbol' of hedonism, Epicirus was quite 'moderate' in it and in fact compared to many 'hedonists' today he was certainly not one.

Anyway, I think that the religious/spiritual search of liberation/salvation is actually one of the most impressive forms of human creativity ('thinking outside the box') and the more 'radical' the 'search' is the more 'creative' the searcher is, so to speak (this doesn't mean he/she is necessarily right, of course). That's why to all 'conventional purposes', say, the Buddha's choice of 'becoming homeless' was seen as a 'foolish choice'. Consider the buddhist Epic 'Buddhacarita':

[the Buddha/prince:] "Promise me that my life will not end in death, that sickness will not impair my health, that age will not follow my youth, that misfortune will not destroy my prosperity."

"You are asking too much," replied the king. "Give up this idea. It is not well to act on a foolish impulse."

Solemn as Meru mountain, the prince said to his father:

"If you can not promise me these four things, do not hold me back, O father. When some one is trying to escape from a burning house, we should not hinder him. The day comes, inevitably, when we must leave this world, but what merits is there in a forced separation? A voluntary separation is far better. Death would carry me out of the world before I had reached my goal, before I had satisfied my ardor. The world is a prison: would that I could free those beings who are prisoners of desire! The world is a deep pit wherein wander the ignorant and the blind: would that I could light the lamp of knowledge, would that I could remove the film that hides the light of wisdom! The world has raised the wrong banner, it has raised the banner of pride: would that I could pull it down, would that I could tear to pieces the banner of pride! The world is troubled, the world is in a turmoil, the world is a wheel of fire: would that I could, with the true law, bring peace to all men!"

(source: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Life_of_Buddha/Part_One/11._Siddhartha_is_Eager_to_Know_the_Great_Truths)

I would say that a strong amount of 'creative impulse' is present here.

Note that I used Buddhism as an example. I would say that an analogous 'argument' could be said in relation to other spiritual/religious schools (and subschools).

To return back to what I said earlier, the perception of the 'unfairness/imperfection' is the perception of being trapped in the 'box', which IMO also is itself a creative type of thinking.

*I personally think that 'Buddhism without rebirth' is nonsense. If nothing happens after death, I do not see why a person would actually have to choose Buddhism, why seeking the 'liberation from suffering' would be of paramount importance and so on. Of course one can make argument for Buddhist practice being still relevant, but IMO it would be completely arbitrary.

However (according to Spinoza), when the world is seen rigthly, Reality is seen as an 'undivided Whole', the only One Substance, God, in a way that is actually reminiscent of Parmenides IMO or indian advaita Vedanta — boundless

The problem, as Spinoza diagnoses, is that people normally desire “perishable things” which “can be reduced to these three headings: riches, honour, and sensual pleasure” . As these things are “perishable”, they cannot afford lasting happiness; in fact, they worsen our existential situation, since their acquisition more often than not requires compromising behaviour and their consumptions makes us even more dependent on perishable goods. “But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind with joy alone, unmixed with any sadness.” Thus, in his mature masterpiece, the Ethics, Spinoza finds lasting happiness only in the “intellectual love of God”, which is the mystical, non-dual vision of the single “Substance” underlying everything and everyone. The non-dual nature of this vision is clearly announced by Spinoza when he says that “[t]he mind’s intellectual love of God is the very love of God by which God loves himself” (Ethics, Part 5, Prop. 36). Since, for Spinoza, God is the Whole that includes everything, it also includes your love for God, and thus God can be said to love Itself through you. — Critique of Pure Interest (Blog)

:up:

Personally, I think that this kind of 'search for the eternal' is probably what differentiates a 'spiritual' than a 'secular' search. Of course, what the 'eternal' is, is something that is debated among traditions, even within them (is it a metaphysical Absolute that is the source of all things? some other kind of transcendence of transiency and suffering?). As your quote says, pursuing 'perishable' things worsens the situation (the dependency IMO might be rooted in a fear of losing them...maybe this is in turn based in a sub-conscious intuition of their transiency).

Anyway, despite some claims that I have read about 'early Theravada Buddhism' where some argued that Nibbana is never said to be 'permanent' or 'eternal', in the Kathavatthu, a book inclueded in the Abhidhamma in the Pali Canon (so quite early), one can found this quote:

Nibbāna does not abandon its state as Nibbāna—by this we mean Nibbāna is permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to change. And you ought to mean this, too, in the case of material-aggregate, if you say that the latter does not abandon its materiality.

(source: https://suttacentral.net/kv1.6/en/aung-rhysdavids?lang=en&reference=none&highlight=false)
curiously, the string of adjectives 'permanent...eternal...' is the same as that used by the 'eternalists' views criticized in the Buddhist scriptures

Of course, I am not proposing a 'perennialist' view here and I am not saying that the authors of the passage were 'eternalists'. But I would say that such a 'search for the eternal' is IMO compatible even with Theravada Buddhism, a tradition which is quite adamant in deny the existence of a 'true self'.

As I interpret Spinoza, there are two ways of 'seeing' the 'world'. First, there is the usual perspective, 'sub specie temporis' which does not contemplate 'Reality' as a whole. This perspective, for Spinoza, has the unfortunate 'side effect' that it suggests that the 'modes' are actually distinct entities, substances.

However, when the world is seen rigthly, Reality is seen as an'undivided Whole', the only One Substance, God, in a way that is actually reminiscent of Parmenides IMO or indian advaita Vedanta. He says that the human mind is eternal, but only when seen as a mode, not a substance. It's a bit like saying that a particular ocean wave belongs to the whole history of the ocean, which is seen as a single undivided entity. — boundless

I'm not very familiar with Parmenides or Advaita, so my own terminology would characterize the "two ways of seeing the world" as Holistic (Philosophy ; Idealism ; Holism ) or Particular (Science ; Physicalism ; Materialism). So, as an amateur philosopher, I try to view the world "as a whole". And IMHO the best summation of that worldview is the 1926 book by Biologist Jan Smuts : Holism and Evolution. It's intended to be a science book, but since it focuses on Wholes instead of Modes, it is basically a philosophy book. Are you familiar with that book, or the concept of Holism?

In my previous post, I asked you "I'm not a Spinoza expert, but regarding unbounded space-time, he seemed to assume that the material world, and his Nature God, was Eternal & Infinite*1. So how would he deal with modern Cosmology, which says that the universe had a sudden & inexplicable beginning of Space-Time-Matter-Energy? Where or when was boundless Natura Naturans before the Bang?" Do you have an opinion about Spinoza's opinion on that vexing modern question?

The typical Materialist/Physicalist answer has been some version of an infinite space-time Multiverse, with many re-starts or re-births : Godlike, except mindless. How else can we reconcile the circumstantial evidence for a particular space-time beginning, with the notion of Reality as an undivided and timeless whole? Personally, I think the key distinction is, as you noted, between single Substance or boundless Being or unmanifest Potential, and its many Modes or Instances or Things. But that sounds too close to traditional god-concepts for some of us. :smile:

PS___ For all practical purposes, I am in a space-time box. But, for philosophical purposes, I try to think outside the box.