The point is that all things in life are coerced, in that they take place within a coercive institution (birth). While the ice cream does not hold a gun to your head, it does hold a smaller consequence over you -- the pain of desiring, but not getting, ice cream. But it doesn't matter, because the desire for ice cream is itself a product of a coercive institution (birth). — The Great Whatever

Alright, so you have two options here: determinism where everything is coerced or libertarianism where there are uncaused causes. The former is consistent with our understanding of the world, and the latter is incoherent. It simply makes no sense for something to spontaneously occur, and it makes even less sense why we should think we are responsible fpr those decisions we make that are uncaused.

So, along come the soft determinists/compatibilists who try to allow for both free will and determinism, but they get hit with the objections from the hard determinists like you who insist that there's nothing special about internal causes versus external causes.

But, things hardly simplify when you bite the bullet and declare yourself a hard determinist who insists there is no free will. You sink into a world of nonsense under such a position. To say you are a hard determinist because the logic leads you to that is self delusion. The reason you think hard determinism is the truth is no different from why you think anything and that is because you are coerced into thinking it. All judgments rendered by you cannot be said to be the result of careful deliberation and consideration, but you must acknowledge that your statements are just barks and screeches with no particular meaning or purpose, but are just the things you are forced to do. That is to say, nothing makes sense under hard determinism and it's self contradictory to say that hard determinism is true based upon reason when the theory itself requires that you admit that your conclusions about hard determinism must be based upon random prior causes.

I tend toward the Kantian view that the existence of free will is a required assumption in order to understand the world. It's no difference from time and space in that regard, where the elimination of it leads to incoherence.

I think compatibilism is nonsense. This topic is not about its merits. Rather, I want to look a little at something compatibilists often claim -- that the important notion of free will is that we are not being coerced by anyone, not that we are metaphysically non-determined. I think this is plainly false, but whatever, let's look at the weaker version of free will. — The Great Whatever

(Note: I am quoting this from the OP, but I read the whole thread before responding)

It is unclear to me why your ideas about coercion ought to trouble compatibilists. The main debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism concern, precisely, the idea of the compatibility of free will and determinism. It is true that some compatibilists will differentiate among acts that are causally determined (in a world governed by deterministic laws) those that are, at the moment of deliberating or choosing, coerced from those that aren't coerced. What you are referring to as the "weaker version of free will" thus is the compatibilist version that identified free actions with actions that aren't coerced (even though they are causally determined). You are objecting that this weaker version is empty or near empty since the situation in which we assess alternatives is severely restricted, on your view, by the circumstances of our birth.

What is unclear though is whether you mean (1) to be making an argument from ultimate responsibility, or (2) rather wish to insist that the "weak" compatibilist freedom falls short from some stronger version that would be the only one, on your view, worth having or worthy of being called freedom at all.

On the first construal, you would be making an argument on the lines of Galen Strawson's "Basic Argument" for hard incompatibilism according to which an act can only be free if, not only is it uncoerced at the moment when it is chosen, but also, all the antecedent causal circumstances of the choice (including the character and states of mind of the agent) would also fall (directly or indirectly) under the responsibilty of the agent.

On the second construal, you would seem to be arguing for a conception of freedom according to which an act is freely chosen not just if the agent is free and responsible to chose among the options open to her (that is, the options that only are directly constrained by her own choice) but also if her range of options is unconstrained by anything. On that view, maybe she can't fly because she has been born a human being rather than a bird and hence doesn't have the ability to fly. Or, she wish that she would be able to live a life free of any suffering and human life isn't like that, and hence she isn't free.

Those two arguments are importantly different. The first one centers on the notion of ultimate responsibility -- which a libertarian incompatibilist may wish to salvage -- while the second one advocates for a notion of freedom that seems extravagant even from the point of view of most libertarians.

I would also wish to note that both incompatibilist and compatibilist libertarians can construe coerced act as free inasmuch as the source of the coercition has the form of a threat or incentive rather than a hard physical constraint. Hence there is a categorical difference between being constrained to remain in jail because of the thick walls and the lock on the door, and being constrained to remain on pain of being shot. In the later case, the prisoner may freely chose to remain in her cell because she values life more than "freedom". But that doesn't entail that her choice among the two alternatives wasn't free. Circumstances outside of her control merely restricted her options to two unpleasant ones; whereas in the first case, she doesn't have any option to get out, though she may still have an open range of options regarding how she is going to spend time in her cell.

Alright, so you have two options here: determinism where everything is coerced or libertarianism where there are uncaused causes. The former is consistent with our understanding of the world, and the latter is incoherent. It simply makes no sense for something to spontaneously occur, and it makes even less sense why we should think we are responsible fpr those decisions we make that are uncaused. — Hanover

Neither determinism nor libertarianism makes more sense than the other. But the point here is not a metaphysical one, but baser: even in the weaker sense of 'free will' as lack of coercion, nothing we do is free (i.e. uncoerced).

The reason you think hard determinism is the truth is no different from why you think anything and that is because you are coerced into thinking it. All judgments rendered by you cannot be said to be the result of careful deliberation and consideration, but you must acknowledge that your statements are just barks and screeches with no particular meaning or purpose, but are just the things you are forced to do. — Hanover

This does not follow. Whether an idea is right or not can be judged by its own internal coherence and explanatory merit. Whether it was coerced or determined or not makes no difference to the quality of an argument, nor does it make it 'meaningless.'

What is unclear though is whether you mean (1) to be making an argument from ultimate responsibility, or (2) rather wish to insist that the "weak" compatibilist freedom falls short from some stronger version that would be the only one, on your view, worth having or worthy of being called freedom at all. — Pierre-Normand

The point is that not even the weak version holds, so it does not matter what argument the compatibilist makes so long as the point is to defend some sort of freedom.

On the second construal, you would seem to be arguing for a conception of freedom according to which an act is freely chosen not just if the agent is free and responsible to chose among the options open to her (that is, the options that only are directly constrained by her own choice) but also if her range of options is unconstrained by anything. — Pierre-Normand

No, it doesn't have to be unconstrained by anything, but the circumstances of birth determine our possibilities so completely that there is no real difference between the 'freedom' of acting once born and the 'freedom' (by analogy) of giving someone your wallet 'freely' when they point a gun at you. Systematically coercive circumstances remove the possibility of free action; birth is such a circumstance.

the prisoner may freely chose to remain in her cell because she values life more than "freedom". — Pierre-Normand

That is not a free action, it is obviously coerced.

No, it doesn't have to be unconstrained by anything, but the circumstances of birth determine our possibilities so completely that there is no real difference between the 'freedom' of acting once born and the 'freedom' (by analogy) of giving someone your wallet 'freely' when they point a gun at you. Systematically coercive circumstances remove the possibility of free action; birth is such a circumstance. — The Great Whatever

You did not disambiguate in between the two possible interpretations of your argument that I highlighted. You have an heterodox view of coercion according to which it threatens the possibility for action to be free. Is this so because acts are "coerced", in your view, that we aren't "ultimately responsible" for, as hard incompatibilists such as G. Strawson argue -- such that we never have more than one genuinely open "option" before us at any given time -- or because the unchosen antecedent circumstances of our lives merely narrow the range of our options?

the prisoner may freely chose to remain in her cell because she values life more than "freedom".
— Pierre-Normand

That is not a free action, it is obviously coerced.

This also glosses over another distinction that I was making. In what sense is it coerced? Obviously, it answers to the ordinary language use of the term, but your own philosophical use of the term deviates significantly from the ordinary use. This case is arguably extreme, but it is an extreme along a spectrum. At the other end of the spectrum can be found cases such as one having to chose between chocolate or strawberry ice cream. Suppose after some reflection and hesitation, I settle for chocolate. Was my choice "coerced" by my antecedent preferences and prejudices? Maybe on your view of coercion it was. But then this would deviate from ordinary use. And if you wish to appeal to ordinary use to characterize the agent's choice to remain in jail rather than being shot as being coerced, then that still leaves much room for freedom in ordinary life where most choices are uncoerced like that.

Any discussion which begins with "I didn't ask to be born" is highly unlikely to profit anyone. Talk about suffering! Reading this sulky adolescent crap is a pain -- that's for sure. You have defined life as one long wrong involving undue amounts of suffering which is a result of your untimely, unfortunate, and unrequested birth.

No doubt the first words out of your mouth after you emerged from your mother's vagina, all covered with blood and gore, was "How could you do this to me?"

How many decades have you been in this snit about your unfortunate birth and wretched existence?

The issue of "free will vs. determinism" seems to me pointless--not because either side is so obvious, but how can we, in a world which might be deterministic or which might allow for free will, know whether our thoughts are determined or free? If there is ubiquitous determinism, then everything we might do or think is a result of predetermined causes. Why would a deterministic universe include the concept of free will?

In the end, does free will matter? We do what we do, never knowing for sure how we were moved to act. Sure, gun pointed at your head, "Your money or your life", we can pause to decide. Is this determinism or free will? Damned if I know -- but you don't know either. The discussion is a waste of time.

(Y) Right-o on the free will part, although I don't particularly agree with your assessment of the pessimism being discussed here.

You have an heterodox view of coercion according to which it threatens the possibility for action to be free. — Pierre-Normand

There is nothing heterodox about holding that coercion limits freedom or makes it impossible In fact if you denied this I would ask if you were joking, or assume you didn't know the meaning of the words.

Is this so because acts are "coerced", in your view, that we aren't "ultimately responsible" for, as hard incompatibilists such as G. Strawson argue -- such that we never have more than one genuinely open "option" before us at any given time -- or because the unchosen antecedent circumstances of our lives merely narrow the range of our options? — Pierre-Normand

I think that it is not a free action in a perfectly ordinary untheoretical way that any person understands, that has nothing to do with metaphysical determination: that is, it is clearly not free even if we grant the compatibilist (or the libertarian) everything they want about their metaphysical position. A coerced action isn't made freely, but forced.

In what sense is it coerced? — Pierre-Normand

In the sense that the prisoner is constrained against their will.

And if you wish to appeal to ordinary use to characterize the agent's choice to remain in jail rather than being shot as being coerced, then that still leaves much room for freedom in ordinary life where most choices are uncoerced like that. — Pierre-Normand

It does not, once you make the move, as I am doing, to considering birth, which on the ordinary use coerces individuals in much the same way (perhaps even more drastically) as imprisonment.

No doubt the first words out of your mouth after you emerged from your mother's vagina, all covered with blood and gore, was "How could you do this to me?" — Bitter Crank

Being familiar with the various drive and coercive practices that themselves govern the practice of giving birth, I know fairly well how parents could do this to their children. That does not justify it. It is not a random avoidable atrocity but a deeply ingrained system of cruelty.

Sure, gun pointed at your head, "Your money or your life", we can pause to decide. Is this determinism or free will? Damned if I know -- but you don't know either. The discussion is a waste of time. — Bitter Crank

You do not give up your money freely when someone points a gun to your head and demands it. To claim that one can 'never know' whether this is so is ludicrous.

It does not, once you make the move, as I am doing, to considering birth, which on the ordinary use coerces individuals in much the same way (perhaps even more drastically) as imprisonment. — The Great Whatever

It is still not remotely plausible to argue, on the basis of the ordinary usage of the word "coerced", for the idea that all our actions are coerced just because we haven't freely chosen to be born. You claim your view of coercion to be quite ordinary and uncontaminated by contentious metaphysical prejudice. But on the ordinary view, whether a practical choice, and the action that has issued from this choice, has been made freely or not -- and/or is or isn't coerced -- doesn't require that *everything* that led to the specific range of options that are open to the agent must have been in her control. Hence, on the ordinary view, whether or not the action performed by someone, seemingly under duress, is or isn't free, doesn't depend on the circumstances of that person's birth.

It is still unclear, since you've declined to argue for your point, and merely asserted that your view rests on the ordinary concept of coercion, whether your view depends on a requirement about ultimate responsibility or, rather, a requirement that genuine freedom must be freedom from any (involuntary) narrowing of the range of possibilities open to one. Maybe you have a third argument but you haven't stated it.

Your view of coerced action also seem to neglect an essential feature of the evaluation of action. You earlier dismissed the concept of responsibility, and this may symptomatic of a conceptual problem, it seems to me. The main reason why we don't hold someone who acted under duress accountable -- when we don't -- is because the circumstance of the duress marks the choice to disobey as unreasonable. It is always relative to some alternative, or range of alternatives, genuinely open to one, that we evaluate responsibility for actions. It is when someone acts irrationally, immorally (or illegally, etc.) in the face of reasonable alternatives that we condemn someone. We further require that the person who chose badly must have been aware of the existence of alternative (and better) options, or that she could be held accountable for her lack of awareness of them (e.g. in the case of negligence).

Hence, a compatibilist can argue that even though all actions are determined by antecedent "circumstances" (including the character and states of mind of the agent) her choice can be deemed free if it is rationally (or morally, etc.) appraisable in light of the range of opportunities that were open to her from the point of view of her practical deliberative circumstances, at the time when she was called to choose. The alternatives compared in the appraisal of the actions never are the actual action compared with the possibility for the agent not having been born. The fact that one was born without having had any say in the matter doesn't absolves one from the responsibility to choose among the alternatives that later become open to one.

Sure, gun pointed at your head, "Your money or your life", we can pause to decide. Is this determinism or free will? Damned if I know -- but you don't know either. The discussion is a waste of time.
— Bitter Crank

You do not give up your money freely when someone points a gun to your head and demands it. To claim that one can 'never know' whether this is so is ludicrous. — The Great Whatever

Oh, that was at least 50% flippant -- that's why I included the Jack Benny bit -- "I'm thinking it over."

The serious point: we can't know whether a behavior is determined or freely chosen. No matter what I claimed, or you claimed, the claim would be open to challenge.

"Deterministic factors forced me to eat the whole quart of Hagen Dazs ice cream." "I freely chose to eat the whole quart of Hagen Dazs ice cream." I can't finally be certain myself, you can't be certain as an observer, whether this dessert debauchery was freely chosen or whether I was compelled (by learned behavior, by insatiable hunger, by an unpleasant desire to make sure nobody else got so much as a spoon full).

But just because we can be sure, doesn't exclude determinism, it doesn't exclude free will. What it excludes is certainty that we can tell the difference.

For purposes of "justice", we make the assumption that the person found guilty of a crime voluntarily, of their own free will, decided to pull the trigger and kill the victim. The defense may suggest that the crime was determined (couldn't be a free choice) by insanity. During the sentencing phase the defense will bring out all sorts of relevant factors showing that determinism was in play from infancy foreword. The prosecution will stick with free will.

We reward scientists who make important discoveries with large prizes, and praise them for all the ideas they invented in their freely operating minds. We don't respond to a wonderful discovery by sneering at them. "Well, of course you discovered a new planet. With your very big telescope and large staff, you were practically forced to discover something. Congratulations, but no cigar."

We make these assumptions, because they "make sense". But we don't know, and that cuts both ways: Neither determinists nor free will advocates can claim proof in the area of human behavior.

Are we ever not coerced by anyone? A compatibilist will have to say, I suppose, that if coerced into a bad situation, say of being a slave, anything one does in that position within the confines of slavery is not really a free choice, in the same way that handing over our wallet is not a free choice with a gun pointed at us, because we are being coerced on pain of being killed, beaten, or whatever it might be. — The Great Whatever

You are still using the nonsensical libertarian version free will here. The compatibilist rejects this notion of free will. For the compatibilist, free will is about being the actor in a deterministic chain, without which events would be different. It's not about getting a good or pain free outcome.

So, for example, in the case of the gun being pointed at us, we have the choice, as we are the actor, of whether we ignore the command (and risk being shot) or follow the orders of the gunman (whether that be to hand over our wallet or press a button to partake in an act of genocide). In many cases, if not all, acts of free will our performed under the influence of coercion. It is still, however, our choice. We are still the actor who defines whether one things happens rather than another. One could say that compatibilism is the realisation that free will is concurrent, rather than mutually exclusive, with coercion. Free will is not whether one can do whatever they want without consequence. It is that one acts one way or another in a world where there are consequences.

The serious point: we can't know whether a behavior is determined or freely chosen. No matter what I claimed, or you claimed, the claim would be open to challenge. — Bitter Crank

That's a misstep. We know the behaviour was determined (the causal chain leading up to that point) and we know it was freely defined (nothing prior to that behaviour defined its presence). To ask whether the act was determined or freely defined doesn't make sense. It was both. Whether it is thought a "choice" or not will really come down to if you are talking about an act someone consciously plans or subconscious response, and exactly how you are considering choice in that context.

The serious point: we can't know whether a behavior is determined or freely chosen. No matter what I claimed, or you claimed, the claim would be open to challenge.

"Deterministic factors forced me to eat the whole quart of Hagen Dazs ice cream." "I freely chose to eat the whole quart of Hagen Dazs ice cream." I can't finally be certain myself, you can't be certain as an observer, whether this dessert debauchery was freely chosen or whether I was compelled (by learned behavior, by insatiable hunger, by an unpleasant desire to make sure nobody else got so much as a spoon full).

But just because we can be sure, doesn't exclude determinism, it doesn't exclude free will. What it excludes is certainty that we can tell the difference. — Bitter Crank

You are arguing that we can't know whether an action is free as soon as the claim regarding its motive is open to challenge, of if we can't be certain what the motive is. What kind of epistemology is at play here? Cartesian epistemology demands that knowledge be certain. But the ordinary concept of knowledge doesn't demand it. All empirical knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is uncertain. It still can be considered knowledge when it issues from a faculty that normally enables one to gather, fallibly, knowledge about the world.

For sure, there are cases where we are uncertain, misguided or clueless (or repressive, or self-delusional) regarding what motivates certain human actions. In some cases, for purpose of ascription of responsibility, the motive may be fuzzy or even irrelevant, because nothing much of significance hangs on the choice that has been made. There just isn't any point to evaluating it rationally or morally. In other cases the choice is significant (i.e. it is rationally or morally appraisable) and it can also be as certain as anything ever is what motivated someone to indulge in ice cream eating in spite of a dietary restriction. This may be a case where that person can't disown (and wouldn't even be tempted to disown) responsibility merely on the ground that the causal chain that underlies her gluttony extends further in the past. It's just irrelevant that it so extends, and the point regarding determinism just is orthogonal to the point about epistemology.

For purposes of "justice", we make the assumption that the person found guilty of a crime voluntarily, of their own free will, decided to pull the trigger and kill the victim. The defense may suggest that the crime was determined (couldn't be a free choice) by insanity. During the sentencing phase the defense will bring out all sorts of relevant factors showing that determinism was in play from infancy foreword. The prosecution will stick with free will.

I disagree that anyone (except maybe some philosophically inclined expert witnesses) assume that the accused acted freely rather than under the impetus of unconscious factors that absolve her from responsibility (and hence also undercut the ascription of free will, in the particular case under trial). The prosecution may be biased towards drawing this conclusion (on the basis of available evidence) while the defense may be biased towards drawing the contrary conclusion. But the regulative standards of the judicial process enjoins finding out whether the accused indeed acted freely, and culpably, or can be exculpated on ground of insanity (or rational incapacity). It's not two incompatible philosophical doctrines about free will that are put on trial, it is a human agent. It is an assumption made by both the prosecution and defense (and also, more importantly, by the judge or jury) that free will is possible but can be undercut in specific cases or circumstances by medical factors that fall outside of the scope of an agent's responsibility. In criminal cases, and many jurisdictions, certainty isn't required either, only evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution may be biased towards drawing this conclusion (in the face of evidence) while the defense may be biased towards drawing the contrary conclusion. But the regulative standards of the judicial process enjoins finding out whether the accused indeed acted freely, and culpably, or can be exculpated on ground of insanity (or rational incapacity). It's not two incompatible philosophical doctrines about free will that are put on trial, it is a human agent. — Pierre-Normand

I'd take my description a bit further. Free will is not even at stake here. These legal categories are measuring specific coercive factors on an agent, not whether their act was freely defined. The question is not whether anyone had a choice or not, but rather the circumstances of the choice and how it relates to legal and moral culpability. What we are trying to work out is not whether someone was free to choose otherwise. It is whether they chose in a certain way, so that we know how to respond to them and the risk they might pose in the future.

I'd take my description a bit further. Free will is not even at stake here. These legal categories are measuring specific coercive factors on an agent, not whether their act was freely defined. What it at stake here is not whether anyone had a choice or not, but rather the circumstances of the choice and how it relates to legal and moral culpability. What we are trying to work out is not whether someone was free to choose otherwise. It is whether they chose in a certain way so that we know how to respond to them and the risk they might pose in the future. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This rather sounds to me like an attempt to redefine, or salvage, traditional legal categories in the framework of an utilitarian conception of justice that aims to accommodate the metaphysical doctrine of causal determinism. This move is equally available to the hard incompatibilist since they also are determinists -- and, indeed, Sam Harris sometimes argues similarly, though he also sometimes argues, like Galen Strawson, for the medicalization of the "justice" system. What distinguishes the compatibilist from the hard determinist, thought, is her pretension to salvage the idea of free will, not explain it away, or attempt to retain it as a flawed concept that it is useful for us to (pretend to) believe in. Saying that it is practically on point, because socially useful, to sentence criminals because, though their actions are entirely governed by their circumstances, sentencing them has a useful effect on their subsequent behavior, is a move that also is available to the compatibilist precisely because she marks out those circumstances where sentencing, or the threat of sentencing, is effective as those in which actions constitute act of free will in the compatibilist sense.

On edit: Let me note, also, that Anthony Kenny argues, (in Frewill and Responsibility, Routledge, 1978,) for an interpretation of the concept of mens rea in criminal law that is also quasi-utilitarian and rests on a compatibilist view of free will. His interpretation also highlights the deterrence function of sentencing, but emphasizes particularly the deterrence effect on the public at large rather than its effect on potential recidivists who already have been caught. Awareness of the potential threat of sentencing is thus viewed as a sort of scaffolding to the flawed practical deliberation of agents who haven't quite internalized moral principles well enough to be motivated not to wrong their fellows merely on ground of the fact that doing so wrongs them (or society).

The serious point: we can't know whether a behavior is determined or freely chosen. No matter what I claimed, or you claimed, the claim would be open to challenge. — Bitter Crank

Yes we can. A coerced act is not freely chosen.

In many cases, if not all, acts of free will our performed under the influence of coercion. — TheWillowOfDarkness

A free act cannot be performed under coercion.

A free act cannot be performed under coercion. — The Great Whatever

In the sense of "free" that is at issue in most debates about free will, determinism and responsibility, coercion doesn't negate freedom. To say of an act that it was coerced just is to say that the agent likely wouldn't have been motivated to do it in the absence of the coercion, and that the coercitive circumstance exculpates the agent, that is, makes her action permissible and rational.

Rational and irrational actions both can be performed freely according to compatibilists and libertarians. It is precisely because there are (and only when there are) alternate possibilities for and agent to have acted irrationally, in the (external) circumstances where she actually acted rationally, and vice versa, that she is deemed responsible for her action, and that it is therefore qualified as free. One can be motivated to act irrationally, and do so. The main difference between the compatibilist and incompatibilist (i.e. libertarian) conceptions of freedom is that the former holds even free actions to be entirely determined by antecedent circumstances (including internal "circumstances" that pertain to the agents character and motivations), while the latter views the agent herself, rather than antecedent circumstances outside of the scope of her power of agency at the time of acting, as the source of her free action. Compatibilists tend to have a impersonal event-causative view of causality while libertarians are more prone to endorse an agent-causative view.

Are you arguing that we can't know whether an action is free as soon as the claim regarding its motive is open to challenge, of if we can't be certain what the motive is. What kind of epistemology is at play here? — Pierre-Normand

I believe we have free will and I believe that we can be subjected to coercion and be forced to act against what we wish to do. I believe that there are some impersonal (and no so impersonal) determinative factors that powerfully shape our behavior. This is the compatibilist position, as I understand it. I am not at all sure I can prove that I freely willed something, decided to perform an act without influence.

Will I buy Hunt Tomatoes or Del Monte Tomatoes? I might respond to one label more favorably than the other; I might have happy memories of one brand over the other; brand recognition might be better for one label than the other. Can I identify how any of these influences might have come into play? Perhaps; perhaps not. Suppose my metabolism, unbeknownst to me, requires more salt than the average person; based on this biologically determined feature, I might prefer the saltier tomato, without knowing what was driving the preference. If I was born colorblind (thanks to genetics), one label might not look much more appealing than the other one.

In fact, I prefer Del Monte. I choose their can over Hunt's, or some other brand's tomato. I make a freely willed choice, even if it is influenced, even if determinative factors are in play. Some people don't even like tomatoes. We were fed tomatoes a lot when I was growing up -- homed canned ones. Commercially canned tomatoes seemed special and exotic. I suppose that's why I prefer Del Monte -- it was the label on the cans that were available at the time.

I decided it would be good for my 70 year old brain to learn a language. I was influenced in this decision by reading articles in the New York Times (and elsewhere) on aging. What language should I learn? Had Spanish and I don't like the sound of the language. French or German, then? The part of the country I live in has lots of Germans and Scandinavians, and few French. I probably know more about some periods in Germany's history than France's. As far as the French and German people go, I have both positive and negative feelings about each, with maybe an edge of positive feelings for the Germans.

I decided to learn French. First, it fits into my long-term interest in the history of early English. English is a "Germanic language" but it isn't very German. The French donated far, far more words to English than the Germans did. Secondly, I thought French would be a bit easier to learn. Whether I learn it at all remains to be seen. I decided to buy Rosetta Stone. Nobody pointed a gun at my head and said "buy it or else". I was influenced by the fact that Rosetta Stone was 50% off at Barnes and Noble.

I don't think there were any coercive factors at play in this decision, either. Influences, yes; but not determinative or coercive ones.

It is probably a waste of time to try to convince TGW that life isn't continually coercing us to act, and that life isn't all suffering. I was trying to undercut his certainty that everything is pre-determined.

I just dozed off. I did not choose to fall asleep. A part of brain decided that a short-term shutdown would be a food idol fddd;;;;;;;;;;;d""""""""""""

Dozed off again. Not a choice. The choice would be to post this and go get a cup of tea, which is what I shall now do forthwith.

In the sense of "free" that is at issue in most debates about free will, determinism and responsibility, coercion doesn't negate freedom. — Pierre-Normand

As I mention in the OP, I'm specifically responding to a compatibilist claim that does think that coercion negates freedom, and defines the weak notion of freedom that may nonetheless be metaphysically determined as that which is uncoerced.

As I mention in the OP, I'm specifically responding to a compatibilist claim that does think that coercion negates freedom, and defines the weak notion of freedom that may nonetheless be metaphysically determined as that which is uncoerced. — The Great Whatever

Didn't we already go over that? You also say in the OP that "Unfortunately, life itself is such a coercive situation, since it is impossible to consent to being born, and all 'decisions' made while alive are within the context of that coercive establishment."

This seems to fallaciously slide from (1) the idea of being put against one's will in a situation in which one is restricted to chose among a range of options that is narrower that one might have wished to have been put into to (2) the quite different idea of being coerced to do something specific.

For instance, a prisoner is, in a sense, coerced into remaining in her jail. But then she might steal an apple from a fellow prisoner. Just because she might not have stolen the apple from her fellow prisoner if she had not been put in jail doesn't entail that she was coerced into stealing it. This gloss on the situation may or may not be reasonable depending on further assumptions. Was she malnourished (while the fellow prisoner was well fed) to a degree such that the stealing of the apple was reasonable? In that case, yes, her having been put in jail could be said to constitute circumstances that deprived her from the opportunity freely not to steal the apple, according the weak notion of freedom that you ascribe to the compatibilist.

But then, in slightly different circumstances, a different gloss on the situation would also agree with this compatibilist conception on freedom. This is the case where the prisoner had reasonable options, white still being constrained to staying in jail, other than to steal the apple. We imagine that she would still have preferred not to be jailed, and hence not to "have to" steal the apple, but she still isn't "coerced" to do it just on this ground alone. To pretend that she would thus be unfree (or coerced) not to steal the apple just because she would have done something else had she not been coerced to remain in jail (as she indeed was) is an unjustified inference, even when your weak conception of compatibilist freedom is the chosen measure of freedom.

...

I believe we have free will and I believe that we can be subjected to coercion and be forced to act against what we wish to do. I believe that there are some impersonal (and no so impersonal) determinative factors that powerfully shape our behavior. This is the compatibilist position, as I understand it. I am not at all sure I can prove that I freely willed something, decided to perform an act without influence. — Bitter Crank

This view of freedom that you ascribe to compatibilists can be contrasted with a specific libertarian construal of the principle of alternate possibilitities (PAP) according to which an act can only be free if there was a possibility, in the specific circumstances in which one acted, that one might have acted differently. That is, whenever one does A, one can only be said to have done so freely if one had the power, to refrain from doing it, or to do something else, in the exact same circumstances. Further, in this particular libertarian construal of the PAP, the circumstances at issue include the agent's character and states of mind as they were up to the moment of decision. Compatibilists are right, it seems to me, to reject this construal of freedom as too stringent. The PAP can nevertheless be salvaged by them through allowing that internal circumstances that make up the motivational state of the agent be allowed to vary in the alternative possibilities under consideration. So, on that view, one can be powerfully conditioned to chose to do A over B, proceed to do A, and still be free just because if one rether had (counterfactually) been conditioned to chose to do B over A, then one would have done B instead, in the same external circumstances.

I think this view of "powerful conditioning" is suspect and you are right to be skeptical of the possibility for one to rule out that one can know not to be under the influence of any such conditionings. You nevertheless accept the possibility of freedom in ordinary cases of (seemingly) free decision making. But this means that you are rejecting the strong libertarian construal of the PAP, as well you should. This rejection is consistent with a rather more moderate view of libertarian freedom -- which still contrasts with the compatibilist version sketched above -- and according to which conditioning circumstances that determine our preferences or desires aren't all freedom conferring (as the strong compatibilist would claim) or freedom negating (as the strong libertarian would claim) but are sources both of the makeup of our volitional character (which is partly constitutive of our free agency) and of specific cognitive dysfunction that can sometimes provide exculpation from some acts through diminishing our freedom.

Hence, although it may be difficult to assess whether someone acted freely on the basis of motives reasonably acted upon, or under the compulsion of desires that clouded her good judgment through no fault of her own, the crucial point is that this uncertainty doesn't concern the strength of the antecedent conditionings but rather their roles as either partly constitutive of practical rationality (and hence of freedom) or as providing impediments to its exercise. Further, in the case where "strong" conditionings are sources of impediment to the exercise of practical reason, it must still be decided whether, in the circumstances, the bad choices that resulted are or aren't excusable. This is highly context dependent. Only when their presence provides exculpation can we say that the action wasn't free.

I don't think you can be said to do anything freely if you're in jail.

I don't think you can be said to do anything freely if you're in jail. — The Great Whatever

Why? Is that meant as a philosophical thesis or a common sense truism? If the latter, then that would seem to depend on the nature of the jail. If you are hanging with all four limbs shackled to the wall of your cell then there isn't much you can do, let alone do it freely, indeed. In some other jails prisoners can work for money, socialize, and pursue an education. You would have to argue that even in those cases none of their actions are free before you are allowed to slide to the argument that human life is akin to a life sentence to jail, just because we don't chose to be born, and that, therefore, none or our actions are free.

I don't have two sets of beliefs, one for common sense truisms and one for philosophical theses. I just try to say what's true.

I don't think you can be said to do anything freely if you're in jail. — The Great Whatever

Anything? Are you free to breathe? Are you free to think? Are you free to eat, blink, shit, burp, crack your neck, and sleep?

Lots of liberties are restricted in jail. That's why it's meant as a punishment, or better yet as a way of removing harmful people from society so that their free expression of radical freedom does not impede others' free expression.

I don't have two sets of beliefs, one for common sense truisms and one for philosophical theses. I just try to say what's true. — The Great Whatever

So, in your view it is simply true that having been born is akin to having been jailed, and you are inferring from this allegedly true premise the conclusion that no human action is free. You should have said in the OP that you hold your premise to be beyond discussion and that you also are unwilling to address any challenge to the validity of your inference.

Are you free to breathe? — darthbarracuda

No; breathing is demanded by your physiological makeup. You literally breathe on pain of death.

Same with eating, blinking, shitting, and sleeping. All of these are clearly coercive as much as being robbed; the cost of not doing the is literally dying painfully.

Are you free to think? — darthbarracuda

Thinking is a little trickier, but generally when compatibilists talk about freedom they have in mind things more substantial and consequential than mere (disembodied?) thinking. Insofar as thinking implies action, you are obviously not free to think very much at all.

Lots of liberties are restricted in jail. That's why it's meant as a punishment, or better yet as a way of removing harmful people from society so that their free expression of radical freedom does not impede others' free expression. — darthbarracuda

That's exactly what I just said. I didn't think claiming that jailed people aren't free would be so controversial.

If I thought it was beyond discussion, I wouldn't be discussing it. What are you even talking about?