But that is exactly the case with Dan's perspective. Dan thinks laws, and the threat of punishment are restrictions. But these do not prevent one from carrying out those acts. — Metaphysician Undercover
impossible for a person to chose because they are not present to the person's mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
What do you mean by "not really" in this sentence? — Metaphysician Undercover
Some things chosen are impossible to achieve in actions due to physical restrictions — Metaphysician Undercover
This is a very real and absolute restriction, you simply cannot dig up information which has been forgotten. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore mentioning a further option brings that option into the realm of possibility, but existing habits still restrict one from choosing it. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think that is how habits work at all, but even if we imagine that it is, not realizing an option was available to you (generally) isn't a restriction on your freedom either. You are setting too high a bar for freedom. — Dan
I think you're somewhat glossing over the difference. The thread of enforcement creates a materially different scenario. You can - literally - have your freedom removed, rather than be unable to access it (for lack of a better way to delineate). I'm not saying this is the best take, but I think there's a difference here. — AmadeusD
Just because it didn't occur to you in the moment doesn't mean you aren't capable of having made that choice. — AmadeusD
Something as simple as having encountered a slightly different shade of green prior to making the decision might have put you in mind of the 'other' option/s. — AmadeusD
I think if you were to make your point as one about things you don't know then it could be run, but in it's current form its basically saying "it's in the shadows, so it can't be real" as regards these other options' availability. — AmadeusD
Yes, you very much can. There are entire therapies dedicated to this mechanism. Memories are very, very rarely actually lost. This is why I made the point earlier that, sure, if you didn't know the thing you couldn't drag it up even with the aid of environmental triggers. — AmadeusD
No, ideologies, biases, and prejudices do not restrict someone's freedom (generally). Religious faith may do so more often as there is often a threat of eternal damnation or something similar involved. Freedom is restricted by threats because the choice is coerced rather than free. If I point a gun at you and tell you to give me your wallet, your choice to do so isn't free, it is coerced. I have restricted your freedom to choose what to do with your wallet by forcing you to choose between giving it up and being shot. That is how coercion restricts choices, and the same thing is going on with laws. — Dan
For a clear example of how not knowing about an option does not restrict one's choices, let's consider how I might get to work tomorrow. Let's imagine that I am considering driving or walking, but I don't know that a bus route has opened up near my house and goes right by my work. My lack of knowledge about the bus route here doesn't make my choice less free. My freedom isn't restricted by the fact that I could have done things that I didn't know about or just didn't consider. I am still able to apply my rationality to the choice in question and make it freely. That there were other options I didn't consider is not a problem. — Dan
s. Do you think freedom is the capacity to do the impossible? That's what it seems like — Metaphysician Undercover
The possibility (threat) of me being locked up in jail if I steal Dan's car, in no way limits my freedom to choose to steal Dan's car. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes it does mean exactly that. — Metaphysician Undercover
then the person was not capable of making that choice. — Metaphysician Undercover
making a choice — Metaphysician Undercover
it's too late to alter the choice already made. — Metaphysician Undercover
You ought to see that it is logically impossible for a person to be capable of making a choice which does not come to one's mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore it is impossible that a person is capable of choosing an option which does not come to the one's mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
But we can only take into consideration what actually did happen. — Metaphysician Undercover
It was impossible for the person to choose that other option, when the choice was made, because that option was not present to the person's mind. The person's freedom to choose that option was therefore restricted. — Metaphysician Undercover
The other options are not "in the shadows", they are simply not present to the person's mind at the point in time when the decision is made. — Metaphysician Undercover
It doesn't even matter if it is possible to drag up the memory or not. What matters is whether the person actually does drag up those particular memories. — Metaphysician Undercover
restricts one's freedom of choice by leaving options concealed. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you not agree that prejudices, biases, and ideologies in general are real restrictions on one's freedom of choice? — Metaphysician Undercover
I literally scoffed. Take that as you will. These aren't facts. Not meaning to be rude - but there are no facts being discussed.I think that both of you are simply denying the facts because the facts are inconsistent with what you believe. — Metaphysician Undercover
Only threats that threaten to restrict/violate your freedom would be morally relevant. So "I will shoot you" clearly would, but "I won't be your friend anymore" wouldn't be, because someone else being your friend is their choice to make, not yours. — Dan
Yes. Yes it does. The only other option is to say that one is prisoner of their own moral outlook. Which would be weird, to say the least. — AmadeusD
Im unsure we're using these words in the same way, if this is your response.
"could have done otherwise" is the metric generally used, and the fact that you know something means it could have come to mind. There's not much more to that, in terms of what we're talking about. — AmadeusD
Otherwise, we are never free to choose anything, at any time. We are restricted by our current conscious access to whatever is in our minds and this changes drastically from moment-to-moment depending on environmental triggers (or lack of, i suppose). If you have a different metric you're using, please outline it. — AmadeusD
You seem to be using post-hoc "Well, it happened in way X therefore way Y wasn't possible" which is clearly wrong. If it's not that, i'll need some help. — AmadeusD
You're conflating post-choice with pre-choice. I doubt Dan intends (and I dont) to suggest one can retroactively change one's decision. You could override it, but you can't undo it. Obviously. — AmadeusD
Once a choice is made, you're not free to choose otherwise due to the law of identity — AmadeusD
You're just, for whatever reason, assuming that the example is one in which nothing brings the option to the subject's mind. I have been explicit that this isn't what I'm describing. — AmadeusD
No. It would be impossible to make a choice which was not consciously accessible at the time, say after a concussion. It is possible that anything could bring something not currently in ones waking consciousness. Again, your bar is way the hell too high. — AmadeusD
No. They are obstacles, I'd say, but not restrictions. Having no legs is a restriction on your choice of mobility. — AmadeusD
These aren't facts. Not meaning to be rude - but there are no facts being discussed. — AmadeusD
I would say that threats that don't involve threatening to restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way are not coercing a person in a morally relevant way. Threatening someone's property does involve threatening to violate/restrict someone's freedom in a morally relevant way, specifically their freedom over their property, so that would be coercive in a morally relevant way. — Dan
I don't think this is convoluted in the least. I think I have been fairly clear from the beginning that what is morally relevant is a person's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. If you keep that in mind in reading my responses, I think it will be clear what I mean. — Dan
I am not defining freedom by reference to what is morally relevant. I am defining what is morally relevant by reference to freedom. I'm not begging the question, you have just misunderstood what I said. — Dan
I mean, the type of freedom is quite a limited one already. It isn't the freedom to do anything that is to be protected, it is the freedom to make choices over what belongs to the person in question. If you want to steal my car and prevent you doing that, that hasn't violated your freedom in a morally relevant way (depending on how I do the preventing) because stealing my car was not your choice to make. — Dan
No, the principle I'm claiming is that my car, being my property, is something that belongs to me and not something that you get to make choices over, morally speaking. As I mentioned in the primer, the kind of freedom being protected here is specifically over those choices that belong to you. Whether or not to steal my car is not a choice that belongs to you, because it is [my car. — Dan
No, I am saying that only the freedom to make certain kinds of choices is morally valuable. Specifically, the choices over that which belongs to the person, their mind, their body, and their property. — Dan
I would say that threats that don't involve threatening to restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way are not coercing a person in a morally relevant way. Threatening someone's property does involve threatening to violate/restrict someone's freedom in a morally relevant way, specifically their freedom over their property, so that would be coercive in a morally relevant way. — Dan
I am saying that only a certain type of freedom is being used as the measure of value, specifically the freedom of persons over their own choices. Only this limited kind of freedom is what ought to be protected, rather than freedom of all kinds. — Dan
I didn't say that commiting an act of violence to prevent you stealing my car wouldn't violate/restrict your freedom. When I said "stop you from doing so" I wasn't implying that I was going to physically attack you. Commiting violence in such a circumstance would restrict/violate your freedom, though of course it may be justifiable to do so as long as it prevents greater violations of freedom. — Dan
We don't need to weigh your choice to steal my car against my choice to not have my car stolen, because one choice is the sort that should be protected morally and the other isn't. — Dan
Again, I am not defining "freedom" generally as only the kind I refer to here, but I am using "freedom" within the context of freedom consequentialism as a shorthand for "The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices". That is the thing that I am claiming is morally valuable, and I will sometimes say the freedom to make one's own choices to make that clear. I am using the word "freedom" because it seems like the most applicable of the available options, but if you have a better suggestion, I'd happily use that instead. — Dan
You have misunderstood. — Dan
It is true that I am claiming that a certain type of choice should be protected, specifically those choices that belong to the person or persons in question. I have discussed the reasons for this in the primer I provided and more deeply in the material referenced within. — Dan
The fact that you want the right to choose which of my choices ought to be protected indicates that you are interested in restricting my freedom rather than protecting it.Therefore the "freedom" perspective and the "consequentialist" perspective of moral virtue are inherently incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you say this is weird? I think it's not only reality, but obvious. Are you familiar with the concept of original sin? We are all prisoners of our moral outlook, that kind of goes without saying. — Metaphysician Undercover
The fact is that the other option did not come to mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
....This implies that the reason — Metaphysician Undercover
The person has lazy decision making habits which restrict one's freedom of choice — Metaphysician Undercover
There are restrictions to our decision making capacity, which our physical bodies force upon us — Metaphysician Undercover
when this is impossible for a person's mind to do anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover
To state it very clearly, in the terms of your example, I am saying that it was not possible for the person to choose Y, if Y was not present to the person's mind as an option at the time when the choice was made. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, our only point of disagreement seems to be that I say it was impossible for the person to have chosen Y at that time, because Y was not present in the person's mind, as an option, at the time when the decision was made. You seem to think that it is possible for a person to choose an option not present in the person's mind at the time of making the choice. I think that this is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
Then a choice is made. Do you see, that when the choice is made, the chooser cannot then proceed to weigh options not brought up, as if the choice wasn't yet made? — Metaphysician Undercover
(my comment: surely true).One cannot choose an option which is not in-mind at the moment the choice is made. — metaphysician undercover
if the person has not brought all the relevant information into the decision making process, then the decision making capacity of the person is impaired, restricted, by that failure to bring up the relevant information. — Metaphysician Undercover
the person did not, — Metaphysician Undercover
The person's freedom to choose from all the possibilities is restricted by not having all the possibilities present. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's my principle, my description, — Metaphysician Undercover
You are not distinguishing between the process of bringing options to mind, and the point in time when the decision is made. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's in the past, therefore it is impossible for it to be otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover
And, it is very important to distinguish between freedom to choose and freedom to act — Metaphysician Undercover
Once we get the facts sorted out we might be able to reasonably discuss the matter of opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover
What I am suggesting ought to be protected is not moral restraint, and you have again moved from "we don't need to protect people's choice to take others' choices away from them" to "we should only protect the choice to do what is right". These are not the same. — Dan
This is a retrospective fact, and I've been extremely clear to the point of feeling a bit silly that this isn't what's on the table right now. — AmadeusD
It seems to me you're putting the choice ahead of a set of possible choices thereby ipso facto making them unavailable because the choice is already made. — AmadeusD
The fact that you didn't think of it simply isn't something that makes it impossible. It makes it unlikely, at best. — AmadeusD
If the idea is that one's mind restricts one's mind I think there's more work to be done. — AmadeusD
What I've disagreed with is that one not having an option consciously in mind while weighing options makes that option impossible to be made. — AmadeusD
All of our language, reviewing the exchange, indicates this version of the problem. The choice to be made, not a choice already made. I have, again, tried to be excruciatingly clear about this. — AmadeusD
If all you're saying is that once a person has settled on (to make this easy...) 2 out of 10 options to deliberate about, then they are now precluded from choosing the other 8. This is for several reasons, but none of those reason are because it is impossible. — AmadeusD
So, it's possible I'm agreeing with you and feel as if some time was wasted talking about two separate issues imprecisely. But i've had fun. Having just skimmed the remaining in your post, forgive some glib replies - they run the same risks as the above. — AmadeusD
Impossibility just isn't int he discussion. — AmadeusD
Bingo bango bongo. Im unsure why you got through several hundred words from each of us before noting this clear distinction between what you're claiming and what actually is.. — AmadeusD
As I said, I'm the one who set the table. It appears like you want to replace it with your own setting — Metaphysician Undercover
I was not ever talking about the time prior to making the choice — Metaphysician Undercover
I was always talking about the time when the choice is made. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you, or do you not agree, that at the point in time time when the choice is made, it is impossible for you to have made a choice which you did not think of? — Metaphysician Undercover
Very clearly, the fact that the person did not think of the option at the time when the decision was made, makes it impossible that the person could have chosen that option at that time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps you misunderstood what you engaged with when you engaged me. — Metaphysician Undercover
I am saying that when the choice is made this causes other choices to be impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
the choice makes it impossible to choose otherwise, because the choice is an act which occurs in time, and when it is made it cannot be undone. — Metaphysician Undercover
It restricts your freedom because you exclude the other possibilities, by having chosen what you chose. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you agree that each time you make a choice, you are actually restricting your own freedom? — Metaphysician Undercover
It restricts your freedom because you exclude the other possibilities, by having chosen what you chose. — Metaphysician Undercover
By restricting choices it increases freedom, and by making choices it restricts freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover
adhering to the decision prevents you from reconsidering or choosing otherwise — Metaphysician Undercover
When a decision is made actions are carried out accordingly — Metaphysician Undercover
and this creates impossibility where prior to this was possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover
it seems you misapprehended the setting of the table, thinking it to be something other than it was. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, not choosing, rather than choosing, provides the most freedom, because every choice made restricts one's freedom with respect to that choice already made. And, since the measure of value is freedom, as you say, then the highest value is to not choose, because this provides the most freedom. And, not choosing is what enables deliberation and contemplation. This is consistent with Aristotelian virtue, which places contemplation as the highest activity. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't understand this difference, between protecting and promoting freedom. Bad habits are morally relevant, and habits guide our decisions when we do not take the time to deliberate. To protect one's freedom of choice requires that the person resists the formation of habits in one's thinking. To be inclined this way, i.e. to resist habitual thinking, requires that freedom be promoted, because choosing not to choose is an intentional skill requiring will power to develop, and the desire for freedom is the required intention. This is where consequentialism really fails us. It does not properly provide for the value of will power. — Metaphysician Undercover
I explained why the person's choice is restricted by habit. The habit prevents the person from properly considering other options. This is a very real and very strong restriction to one's freedom to choose. The most significant restriction to one's freedom of choice is a failure to consider all the possibilities. The person is free to choose any option, but literally cannot choose an option which doesn't come to mind. The best option may not come to mind, due to the person\s preexisting habits of thinking, so the person's freedom to choose that option is restricted accordingly.
And, back to the point we started with, making a choice restricts one's freedom in much the same way. The choice is made, and the person proceeds accordingly. Proceeding with the choice firmly decided restricts one's freedom to choose otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover
This isn't a restriction. I'm with Dan on this. A restriction would mean you are unable to do the thing. In this case, you're just misguided. Any instance where a further option is suggested to you leaves you open to considering it. Your personal habits only prevent you from bringing options up within yourself - and even then, not really. Habits are flimsy, mentally speaking, versus the ability to take on new information. — AmadeusD
If the choice has already been made, there's no discussion to be had. I think, in this sense, it's basically "I agree, but why did you bring this up then?" — AmadeusD
Obviously, yes. The choice has already been made. Any shred of time prior to the act of 'choice', i disagree. Anything can get in between the two. So, hopefully this answers both 'versions' relatively succinctly and clears up what I was apprehending vs what you were wanting to hear. — AmadeusD
This is a different issue, again. I'm not implying you've conflated, just that this is separate. My response here is essentially "Not until you act, but once the act takes place, that choice is made "in time" with no recourse". The freedom to re-choose, or change one's mind prior to acting is clearly available in essentially any situation where we're not considering some form of mind-reading. Again, this is only go to apply to certain types of decision, but this is at least a separate issue to the one we've come to terms on (as I see it). — AmadeusD
No. I don't think it's possible to choose otherwise (it seems you also?) therefore freedom isn't relevant. "Could have done otherwise" seems to be required for freedom in these types of contexts (choice, ethics etc..). Again. perhaps I'm missing something but this seems clearly a state-of-affairs about the direction of time and not a philosophical point about freedom or choice. Every single moment hat passes precludes us from altering the prior moment/s ad infinitum. Self-evident and uninteresting. — AmadeusD
Those are two distinct events, as far as I'm concerned (goes to the above, i guess!) which somewhat materially changes the implications made out in your comments. — AmadeusD
I agree that it is moral reasoning that is being used to determine what kind of freedom we should protect and what we shouldn't, though I'm not sure that is quite what you mean when you say "moral principles". Even if it were, it still wouldn't follow that what I'm suggesting we protect is moral restraint. — Dan
Also can I take it from you not answering that you didn't read the initial primer? Because that would really help to clear a lot of this up. — Dan
It seems like a lack of context produced a misunderstanding of what I was talking about. — Metaphysician Undercover
that act of making the choice. — Metaphysician Undercover
When I act — Metaphysician Undercover
because this actually contradicts what is meant by "acting by habit". — Metaphysician Undercover
making a choice restricts one's freedom to choose — Metaphysician Undercover
When the habit kicks in there is no time prior to the act of choice — Metaphysician Undercover
cannot say that the person's act is habitual, it is deliberate. — Metaphysician Undercover
this idea of a shred of time prior to the choice, is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover
You ask me "what's 2+2?", and I say "4". There's no deliberation on my part. Through some sort of reflex I apply the process I know will produce the answer. Then I state the answer. — Metaphysician Undercover
Because the habit is generally quite reliable, we often do not doubt it. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is a freedom related issue. At the time when the person is making the choice, the person has freedom to consider more options. At the time when the choice is made, the person does not have that freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover
herefore we can conclude that the act of judgement is an act which limits one's freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover
exists as a duration of time, but the habit limits that amount of time to the very minimum — Metaphysician Undercover
I mean, I would also be happy to say that I am protecting freedom to make certain types of choices, if that would be more agreeable to you linguistically. — Dan
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