The neurons of the central nervous system terminate in mechanical switches — apokrisis
he has a book to sell, a name to make. There is a social incentive for him to angle his story so as to attract the audience he does. — apokrisis
Who or what presses these buttons, and to what end? — Wayfarer
His account often mentions, and is compatible with, QBism, which is not the realist theory in the sense that you insist on. — Wayfarer
And that's a blatant ad hom, he's just a shabby opportunist. — Wayfarer
lumpen idealism. — apokrisis
It's a mistake to say that brains do anything - that is what is described in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience as the 'mereological fallacy', attributing to the part what only a whole is capable of. — Wayfarer
Is it a mistake to say that hearts pump blood? — hypericin
Not in the context of physiology and anatomy, but it’s not an apt comparison with cognition and judgement. It appeals to the supposed authority of neuroscience to make philosophical claims about the mind - very different thing to the circulation of blood. — Wayfarer
Nor was I aware there was a special authority required to make philosophical claims. Maybe we should be verifying everyone's philosopher cards here. — hypericin
People want to hold onto words like "agency" and "rationality" and "subjectivity" without analyzing what they mean because they fear it deconstructs their humanity. — Apustimelogist
The fact that it is information arising from the processing in a neural network which has inputs which are largely the outputs of sensory nerves. (E.g. the optic nerves for vision, the olfactory bulb for smell, whatever nerves carry signals away from the cochleas for hearing.)
And yet modern AI does such modelling, presumably without consciousness. I think what makes brains conscious is that they are general informational processors whose interface to the world is the result of the modelling of sensory information you are talking. To brains, as far as they/we are concerned, such models are the subjective plentitudes we experience, they/we are wired to interface with the world in this way. Just as computers run on symbolic logic, our wet "computers" "run" on sensory experiences: we perceive, feel, imagine, and think to ourselves, all of which are fundamentally sensorial. It is these and only these sensations, externally and internally derived, that we are aware of, every other brain process is unconscious to us.
And I see you as reflexively hanging on to something like scientism, the belief that philosophy must always defer to the white lab coat of scientific authority. — Wayfarer
To ‘deconstruct’ the mind is to analyse it in terms of something else, or of its constituent elements - the impossibility of which is precisely the point of Chalmer’s ‘facing up to the problem of consciousness’ article. — Wayfarer
the impossibility of which is precisely the point of Chalmer’s ‘facing up to the problem of consciousness’ article. — Wayfarer
Similarly, science cannot tell us anything about the fundamental "intrinsic nature" of things beyond experience. — Apustimelogist
there is an objective way the world is and the mind is embedded within that — Apustimelogist
These seem to run into each other quite violently... — AmadeusD
But neural networks run on PCs are not concious, right? So being a neural network and processing outputs and inputs isn't enough, even if these outputs come from the environment via photoreceptors, microphones, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus
So again the appeal to the data/organ being of a "sensory" sort seems to do all the explaining. Why is an eye a sensory organ but the camera on a self-driving car isn't? It seems to me that the difference is that the former involves sensation. But then it looks like all we have done is explain what has conciousness by appeal to a term that implies something is concious. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think its about the idea that there is an objective way the world is and the mind is embedded within that. — Apustimelogist
the evidence relating our minds to neurons and physics is overwhelming. — Apustimelogist
Similarly, science cannot tell us anything about the fundamental "intrinsic nature" of things beyond experience. — Apustimelogist
I don't need to know what is happening on the slopes of Mount Everest right now to believe there are some definite events happening on the slopes of Mount Everest right now. — Apustimelogist
I disagree. For instance, I don't need to know what is happening on the slopes of Mount Everest right now to believe there are some definite events happening on the slopes of Mount Everest right now. — Apustimelogist
there is an objective way the world is — Apustimelogist
science cannot tell us anything about the fundamental "intrinsic nature" of things beyond experience. — Apustimelogist
But is it? Who are the case studies for that view? I know of a clique of academic philosophers who are customarily associated with pretty hard-edged materialist theories of mind: they are P & P Churchland, a married couple who are both academics, Alex Rosenberg, and the late Daniel Dennett are frequently mentioned in this regard. — Wayfarer
I think its about the idea that there is an objective way the world is and the mind is embedded within that. — Apustimelogist
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