↪Tzeentch, right, don't forget to blame the victims for looking to democracy rights transparency freedom (handy, so as to maintain a narrative). — jorndoe

Kiev is not a victim. It made its choices, and carries the responsibility for the consequences. It chose poorly and is now paying the price.

That's geopolitics for you. This isn't your average lefty echo chamber where terms like 'victim blaming' are used non-facetiously.

Kiev is not a victim. It made its choices, and carries the responsibility for the consequences. It chose poorly and is now paying the price. — Tzeentch

Neither is Russia, you piece of pro-Russian propaganda.

this is a philosophy forum and people here make a sport out of trying to 'win arguments', and that's what you're doing, and it's worth no one's time. You're even wasting your own. — Tzeentch

In a philosophy forum, that's a more fair and humble sport than spinning pro-Russian propaganda with a smug posture of expertise in everything that matters in this discussion. And that's what you're doing.

Ukrainians apparently occupy around 300-400 sq miles of Russia. This is becoming quite the embarrassment.

Ukrainians apparently occupy around 300-400 sq miles of Russia. This is becoming quite the embarrassment. — RogueAI

Apparently there have been new incursions across the border, too. Russian officials are apparently worried about a similar attack into Belgorod, though I'd assume the russian defenders there are better prepared since they're already actively fighting in this sector.

Still no clear indication of any strategic goal on the ground. There's no apparent push towards Kursk, which makes sense since that's way too ambitious given that available forces are probably fairly limited.

Might still be as simple as forcing the russian military to flatten their own villages in order to dislodge the Ukrainians.

Are the Russians trembling now that Finland and Sweden joined NATO? Maybe the Kremlin circle is trembling, though it's of a different kind. — Aug 11, 2024

Learned indifference
^{— Kirill Martynov · Novaya Gazeta Europe · Jul 20, 2024}
(the original report, "We Have to Live Somehow" (Jul 8, 2024), by the Public Sociology Laboratory is in Russian)

Apparently, the Russians' concerns are different than the Kremlin circle's "existential threat". The new NATO joiners don't seem to have made much difference.

I'll venture to guess that the Kremlin's concern is simple enough or otherwise straightforward: Control over (parts of) Ukraine, backed by geo-political-power-military aspirations (perhaps with a sense of entitlement/ownership) — well, something along those lines. For example, they've more or less had free reins concerning Crimea, despite it being part of Ukraine. Attempts to change conditions on Ukraine's part or potential loss of control on the Kremlin's part could then elicit whatever response from the Kremlin, with little mind to legalities (or involved parties), and warring is a "natural solution" for them. Russia-wide, at least many are more likely to see the Ukrainians as old southwestern friends with cool vacation spots. Add, say, Putinian indignation with the EU for not swiftly extending cooperation without reservation. Putin's sentiment towards Ukrainian EU membership has gone here and there (the EU isn't military). Thus, in a way, since Ukraine is a sovereign country, the Kremlin's attitudes themselves were already on a collision course from early on.

At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities – I would like to emphasise this – began by building their statehood on the negation of everything that united us, trying to distort the mentality and historical memory of millions of people, of entire generations living in Ukraine. It is not surprising that Ukrainian society was faced with the rise of far-right nationalism, which rapidly developed into aggressive Russophobia and neo-Nazism. This resulted in the participation of Ukrainian nationalists and neo-Nazis in the terrorist groups in the North Caucasus and the increasingly loud territorial claims to Russia.

Meanwhile, the so-called civilised world, which our Western colleagues proclaimed themselves the only representatives of, prefers not to see this, as if this horror and genocide, which almost 4 million people are facing, do not exist. But they do exist and only because these people did not agree with the West-supported coup in Ukraine in 2014 and opposed the transition towards the Neanderthal and aggressive nationalism and neo-Nazism which have been elevated in Ukraine to the rank of national policy. They are fighting for their elementary right to live on their own land, to speak their own language, and to preserve their culture and traditions. — Address by the President of the Russian Federation · The Kremlin, Moscow · Feb 21, 2022

Kiev is not a victim. It made its choices, and carries the responsibility for the consequences. — Tzeentch

(Who's being bombed again?)
I guess, by such logic, Japan had Hiroshima and Nagasaki ☢ coming, some 79 years ago (with a difference of not being a land grab). "That’s geopolitics for you."
Anyway, I thought you blamed the US for it all.

I guess, by such logic, Japan had Hiroshima and Nagasaki ☢ coming, some 79 years ago (with a difference of not being a land grab). "That’s geopolitics for you." — jorndoe

There's an obvious distinction between a country and its government, and its civilian population. Countries and governments are not victims, since they are seldom innocent. Kiev made a calculated gamble and it didn't work out. It should not play the victim card but take responsibility for its failed foreign policy.

Anyway, I thought you blamed the US for it all. — jorndoe

Not for it all. Just for the lion's share.

, there are plenty of differences.
^{(Say, the US didn't try to do away with Nihongo, either.)}
So?

That's geopolitics for you. This isn't your average lefty echo chamber where terms like 'victim blaming' are used non-facetiously. — Tzeentch

Could an Istanbul Deal Have Brought Peace?
^{— Andreas Umland · Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies · Jun 24, 2024}

Japan during WW2 was a fascist menace. Of course they had it coming. That doesn't mean the nuclear bombing was justified, or that civilians weren't innocent/victims. The Japanese state/government clearly was not.

Not sure what point you believe you're making here.

Anyway, perhaps it's a good time to evaluate where this Ukrainian offensive is going.

Decisive results that could justify the expenditure of vast amounts of men and materiel so far seem nowhere to be found.

This lack of decisive results makes it difficult for analysts to determine what the intended goal of the operation may have been.

Possibilities include:
- 'Spreading the Russians thin', ergo a diversionary attack to relieve pressure of the Donetsk front.
- Gathering chips for negotiations
- Occupying the Kursk nuclear power plant
- PR / Propaganda purposes

Of these, I find the last two options to be the most plausible.

'Spreading the Russians thin' is questionable on several levels. First of, to spread the enemy one must also spread their own forces, which, given Ukraine's position on the battlefield, is not something they can afford. Furthermore, Russian gains in south-eastern Ukraine continue unabated.

In terms of Ukraine's negotiating position, this has probably done the opposite of strengthening it. There's virtually zero chance the Russians would even consider negotiations while the Ukrainians hold as much as a millimetre of Russian territory. Furthermore, it has given the Russians an excuse to tighten the thumbscrews and increase their war goals.


The Kursk nuclear power plant seems to be the only item of strategic value in the Kursk region which may justify an offensive. The direction at which the Ukrainians have advanced seems to imply this as its possible target. Even so, it's unclear what the plan would have been after capturing this power plant, since the chances of Ukraine holding onto it for long would have been virtually zero, unless they were prepared to use the nuclear plant as a form of blackmail.

Lastly, and perhaps most plausibly, this was another PR stunt, just like the previous Ukrainian offensive - to show both domestic and foreign audiences that the war is not yet lost.

Time will tell.


Regardless of intended goals, what are the actual consequences?

The offensive follows the modern pattern of defense-in-depth, in which the initial offensive drive is not stopped but instead allowed to penetrate until it has ran out of steam and given clues towards its intended direction. A lack of strategic significance of the Kursk region allows the Russians this option. Meanwhile, scouts, light infantry and tripwire forces focus on attriting the offensive's manoeuvre elements.

In other words, regardless of how media may try to spin this, this offensive seems to follow regular patterns of how modern armies deal with offensives. If this offensive came as a surprise, there was likely already contingency planning in place to limit the damage. It's even possible the Russians were aware that this offensive was coming. Alexander Mercouris claims an unnamed source spoke of an attack like this two weeks before it happened, though that remains uncorroborated.

This offensive does however provide the Russians with an opportunity to attrit the Ukrainian armies' manoeuvre elements that were previously held in reserve. Media reports suggest the Ukrainians indeed are suffering heavy losses in terms of manpower and materiel. That is not necessarily strange for an offensive, since they are almost always very costly affairs, but it's also precisely the reason why an offensive must achieve decisive results.


Much in line with the apparent balance of power, this offensive is unlikely to change anything in Ukraine's favor. In fact, it seems counterproductive on many levels: expending one's crack divisions and manoeuvre elements on a strategically irrelevant region while elsewhere the frontline is collapsing seems foolish.

But perhaps the main problem for Ukraine is that this offensive into Russia makes negotiations virtually impossible. This further undermines the Ukraine's/the West's credibility in peace negotiations, which has already been tarnished by the fiasco in early to mid 2022.

And personally, that's what I believe the goal of this operation was: to make peace impossible for the foreseeable future.

We must ask the age old question:"Cui bono?" and there is of course only one actor that desires perpetual war in Eastern Europe: the United States.

@ssu@SophistiCat there's an international arrest warrant out for a Ukrainian for the Nordstream sabotage.

Edit: correction, a European arrest warrant.

But it was the US which sabotaged the Nordstream, ask Tzeench if you dare to doubt!

, something to give a thought then? ^{(e.g. 2024jul9, 2024aug9, here, here, here)}


Nord-Stream-Sabotage: Ermittler suchen nach mutmaßlichem ukrainischen Täter
Nord Stream sabotage: Investigators search for suspected Ukrainian perpetrator
^{— Kurier · Aug 14, 2024}

Still doesn't answer which country was behind it. Makes Ukraine likely but would it do it without conferring with the US? Or is this still a non-state operation? We're not really any step closer to figuring out who's behind it, only just figured out who did it.

Several people, including some western military analysts have expressed concern that Ukraine is risking valuable assets in an attack with no apparent strategic goal.

However, the idea that the Ukrainian general staff, with two and a half years of experience in modern warfare, would plan a major offensive with no strategic goal seems rather fanciful.

I've recently listened to a German general who has quite convincingly argued that a "PR campaign" is not a military objective and the idea that the Ukrainian general staff would conduct a major offensive for PR reasons is absurd. Nor would any reasonable commander assume that their opponent is going to act exactly as they expected. Rather, it's reasonable to assume the Ukrainian general staff has a detailed plan for the offensive that includes specific military goals, and that they are aware of obvious risks.

Which goals those are is not public, but it should be noted that Kursk Oblast is not some purely domestic idyll, but rather a major staging ground for russian artillery and air forces.

Still doesn't answer which country was behind it. Makes Ukraine likely but would it do it without conferring with the US? Or is this still a non-state operation? We're not really any step closer to figuring out who's behind it, only just figured out who did it. — Benkei

If there's a court case, we should be pretty close to getting at least some detailed information about who did what and their connections. That probably won't go as far as directly establishing any government responsibility though.

The best argument for it being a non-state operation, as far as I'm concerned, is that it's just a really odd move. The only party it could have really been aimed at is the German government, but there was never any indication that the German government would significantly diverge from the European consensus.

↪neomac
↪jorndoe
Still doesn't answer which country was behind it. Makes Ukraine likely but would it do it without conferring with the US? Or is this still a non-state operation? We're not really any step closer to figuring out who's behind it, only just figured out who did it. — Benkei

Does it really matter? Those who believe that the Great Satan is the main responsible for it all, no matter what the “official” version is, won’t be shaken by recent news. On the other side, if the US (or other countries like the UK and Poland) actually supported Ukrainian sabotage of Nordstream or were complicit in hiding the truth, the operation may have been conceived and executed in such a way to grant Western institutional figures plausible deniability.
What I think it would be honest to acknowledge at this point is that Ukrainians have means and motivation to hit Russian infrastructures and other relevant targets outside Ukraine e.g. inside Russia, in the Black Sea, in Africa, in the Middle East without necessarily having the US consent given the problem of Russian red lines or even Ukrainian/Western moles.

It does matter. First off, Nordstream is a company owned by five energy companies, including Gazprom (51%) but the others were European. Classifying it as Russian infrastructure is incorrect.

Second, this will result in claims and for most people it will affect their willingness to support Ukraine. If the US was involved (and Poland) then the claims will go there and it will deteriorate trust for future operations.

It is interesting. I think it was the German authorities that made it.

I think Sweden actually stopped the investigations. Which I found quite telling.

I'm thinking more and more that this was a panic of the Biden administration or then really an Ukrainian effort. Or then both.

Of course now with Ukrainians holding a Russian city with the gas pipeline (and even earlier), Ukraine has had this dilemma: it's totally in their interest to attack key economic targets like the pipelines that Russia has, but that has quite a lot of international effects, also to those countries that support it. This is again the problem when Germany, for example, is aiding Ukraine but not part of the actual conflict.

Well, Germany has been quite clueless. At least Finland hasn't. Now when the border is closed and all trade has stopped, it's been really devastating for the border municipalities here in Finland. But there's no whining, on the contrary, people there say that earlier they were (and Finns in general) were too naive when it came to Putin's Russia.

They then thought that it was an ordinary country that would want to have good economic ties with it's neighbors and that there would be normal relations, just like Finland has with Sweden or Norway.

Well, Siberia teaches, as the saying goes.

↪neomac
It does matter. First off, Nordstream is a company owned by five energy companies, including Gazprom (51%) but the others were European. Classifying it as Russian infrastructure is incorrect. — Benkei

I welcome the clarification but it’s beside the point I was making. Notice that I didn’t write that Nordstream is Russian infrastructure, I just wrote “Russian infrastructures and other relevant targets outside Ukraine”, the point being that if Russia owns 51% of Nordstream, namely an infrastructure that is meant to bypass Ukraine, benefit Russian business, and to hook Germany with Russia’s gas supply, then Nordstream may still be relevant target for Ukraine to hit, even more so if the US protector has protested so much and so clearly about it.

Second, this will result in claims and for most people it will affect their willingness to support Ukraine. If the US was involved (and Poland) then the claims will go there and it will deteriorate trust for future operations. — Benkei

To me that sounds more plausible for Germany than for other European countries. However German officials’ declarations do not seem to support your views: “The results of the investigation into the explosions of the Nord Stream and Nord Stream-2 gas pipelines do not yet change Germany's commitment to providing further support to Ukraine, German government spokesperson Wolfgang Buechner has told a news briefing in Berlin. He noted that the investigation into the acts of sabotage against the gas pipelines was being carried out in accordance with the applicable legal procedure. The investigation will have no effect on whether Germany will continue to support Ukraine in the future and, if so, to what extent. As Buechner recalled, the Prosecutor General's Office is in charge of the investigation with a "criminal component" and it "has nothing to do with the fact that, as the German Chancellor has repeatedly said, Germany will support Ukraine as long as necessary.” (https://tass.com/world/1829177)
Anyways, my conjecture is that the risk of alienating Germany’s support was all too obvious to ignore by those who planned the sabotage and if institutional figures were involved it’s unlikely they went for it without suitable alibis. You may very well remember how many people Zelensky has fired from his own entourage (including domestic and foreign intelligence officials), so I do wonder if among those, there might be conspirators of the Nordstream sabotage. I wouldn’t even discount the possibility that powerful interest groups like the Ukrainian gas industry oligarchs (who can even own private militia) may have played a significant role in this sabotage.
BTW it is also claimed the Ukrainian saboteurs left from Rostock (in Germany) so what if they also got some support from within Germany?

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/nearly-200-000-russians-being-171513607.html
How long is Russia going to tolerate Ukraine occupying a chunk of their country?

I meant civil claims. Or do you think Gasunie, Engie, BASF and E.ON wil not be concerned with losing their investments? The standard of proof is also lower so we could see judgments against, for instance, Ukraine that would not reach the level of proof required for criminal cases but will imply guilt.

Ukraine is a sovereign country (and Crimea part of Ukraine), here here here 2024jul9 2024aug9 ...

That's geopolitics for you. This isn't your average lefty echo chamber where terms like 'victim blaming' are used non-facetiously. — Tzeentch

Japan had Hiroshima and Nagasaki ☢ coming?

There's an obvious distinction between a country and its government, and its civilian population. Countries and governments are not victims, since they are seldom innocent. Kiev made a calculated gamble and it didn't work out. It should not play the victim card but take responsibility for its failed foreign policy. — Tzeentch

Japan during WW2 was a fascist menace. Of course they had it coming. That doesn't mean the nuclear bombing was justified, or that civilians weren't innocent/victims. The Japanese state/government clearly was not.

Not sure what point you believe you're making here. — Tzeentch

Not geopolitics for you? (there's a question there)

Suspect. When it's the Kremlin, it's reduced to geopolitics, heck they're defending themselves (i.e. excused), and hardly otherwise mentioned ("invisible"), despite their bombing, shamming, etc. When the Ukrainians + supporters are fighting to take back parts of Ukraine, then it's another matter, be it evil US deep state theories, Kyiv to blame, ... And Hiroshima + Nagasaki ☢ 1945...not geopolitics for you?

in a way, since Ukraine is a sovereign country, the Kremlin's attitudes themselves were already on a collision course from early on — Aug 13, 2024

It's understandable what the Kremlin wants, and, understandably, it's not theirs to have. A middle ground deal — whatever is compatible with international law — seems hard to come by, from early on at that, and now animosity has (understandably) grown.

In acting so brazenly, Putin is in fact openly trying to upset the international order, replacing it not with some progressive vision of equality of nations, but with a return to a 19th century ideology where might – particularly his might – is right. — David Cameron · ‘High time for peace’, UN chief says, as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters third year · The UN · Feb 23, 2024

Regress.

, at least there are some concrete suspects, though they're long gone.

The country is bankrupt and in shambles. No one is going to be held to account for the coming hundred years. That's why it is the perfect patsy. It probably plays the part willingly in order to secure more aid.

Suspect. When it's the Kremlin, it's reduced to geopolitics, heck they're defending themselves (i.e. excused), and hardly otherwise mentioned ("invisible"), despite their bombing, shamming, etc. When the Ukrainians + supporters are fighting to take back parts of Ukraine, then it's another matter, be it evil US deep state theories, Kyiv to blame, ... And Hiroshima + Nagasaki ☢ 1945...not geopolitics for you? — jorndoe

If you believe I 'excuse' the Kremlin you're simply not reading my comments.

My continual point is that Washington and the Kremlin are two apples of the same shit tree.

Because you cannot handle the fact that I view Washington as the same type of cold-blooded, calculating reptile as the Kremlin, you, just like many others here, feel like you must go looking for inconsistencies where there are none.

It's all very snooze inducing. When you all are done coping and ready to make some real arguments let me know.

Do you remember this by the way?

US warned Ukraine not to sabotage Nord Stream after MIVD alert (June, 2023)

They're expecting us to believe it was the US that tried to stop Ukraine from sabotaging Nord Stream, when it obviously was the US that orchestrated the whole thing. (Having given us both their stated intent and a clear motive)

Supposedly Zaluzhny was in charge of the operation, and Zelensky was kept out of the loop.

How convenient, considering at the time of the article they were trying to replace Zaluzhny, which has now left the public arena - no accountability there.

No one in their right mind should believe this bullshit.

Whether the physical deed was done by US assets or Ukrainian assets is largely irrelevant. There's only one party that benefits from the sabotage - the United States, and all of this scapegoating of Ukraine is just 'plausible deniability' / false trail spin.

They're expecting us to believe it was the US that tried to stop Ukraine from sabotaging Nord Stream, when it obviously was the US that orchestrated the whole thing. (Having given us both their stated intent and a clear motive) — Tzeentch

There are two problems with this story.

One is that the German government permanently suspended the certification of the pipeline following the invasion, and there is no evidence this decision was ever about to be reversed. Certainly September 2022 is a very weird timing if you're supposedly worried about Russian gas supply to Europe. On 14th September, the German chancellor, after talks with Putin, stated that he saw no change in Russian attitude. On September 21, Putin announced partial mobilisation. On September 27, Russia announced the annexation of three Ukrainian Oblasts. So the conflict was deepening, and there was zero sign of any improvement in relations.

Edit: I wrongly remembered Nordstream 1 was not affected, but it was.

The second and arguably bigger problem is that Russia has already unilaterally reduced gas deliveries via Nord Stream 1, and completely stopped them on August 31.

Really the most salient thing about the attack on Nord Stream is that it's confusing. And this suggests that either it wasn't done for any of the obvious motives or that we're missing some relevant information.

Well, it is a genuine concern:

In the near future Russia will take possession of everything the US military and NATO shipped to Ukraine. (— Kim Dotcom · Aug 14, 2024)

I suppose, had Ukrainian support been more decisive, then the concern might not have been much of a factor later. Easy to say in retrospect. And sort of strategically prepared for by the Kremlin.

:up:

Wait, ↪Tzeentch, didn't the thread already establish that "Everyone bad"? — Dec 28, 2022

Not geopolitics for you? (there's a question there)
[...]
And Hiroshima + Nagasaki ☢ 1945...not geopolitics for you? — Aug 15, 2024

Nord Stream blowback
^{— Stuart Lau, Zoya Sheftalovich · POLITICO · Aug 15, 2024}
Ukrainian military officers came up with idea of blowing up Nord Stream pipeline 'during night of heavy boozing', ignored Zelensky's pleas not to go ahead, and set off blast that 'qualifies as attack on NATO', bombshell report claims
^{— David Averre · Daily Mail · Aug 15, 2024}

So apparently the WSJ has published a report, based on 4 anonymous military sources, that the plot to blow up Nord Stream 2 was hatched by some Ukrainian officers during a drunken celebration in may 2022 and initially received Zelensky's blessing. That blessing was later retracted, but allegedly General Zaluzhniy went ahead anyways.

"We got the idea while drunk" would certainly address the issue of motive, though why Zelensky would have given it the go-ahead and why Zaluzhniy would have felt compelled to go through with it against orders is less clear.

Conjecture a day after publication of facts? Call me sceptical but I would disregard it out of hand.

It does sound like the kind of story that sounds believable because it comes with a lot of situational details, but that doesn't actually make it more likely in statistical terms.

Really it just seems to shift the confusion from "what benefit does destroying an inactive and politically poisonous pipeline have?" to "why would the Ukrainian leadership decide to just blow up a pipeline on a whim?".