You can't. — AmadeusD

If you touch something with your hand, you reliably know it is on your hand, not your foot.

1. The above - pain signals are not apodictic indicators of anything; and — AmadeusD

No sense perception is. We have fallen back into solipsism.

2. An injured body part doesn't 'feel' anything. The perceiving mind does. — AmadeusD

Begging the question, aren't we?

I will restate the question: if the pain happens exclusively in the mind, how does a burn on your finger hurt your finger and not your foot?

There is nothing wrong with 'red' meaning both the experience of red and the usual cause of red, and that is what it means. Scientists — who don't even exist — don't determine language. Words can have more than one meaning, it is not mysterious.

If someone with normal color vision looks at a tomato in good light, the tomato will appear to have a distinctive property—a property that strawberries and cherries also appear to have, and which we call “red” in English. The problem of color realism is posed by the following two questions. First, do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have? Second, what is this property? (Byrne & Hilbert 2003: 3–4)

These questions are not answered by saying that we sometimes use the term "red light" to refer to 700nm light and that tomatoes and strawberries reflect 700nm light.

? — Lionino

By the way, for a previous discussion on this topic, there is this https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/879257 (it continues in the next page with javra)

First, do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?

The question is not well posed. What is the function of "appear" here? All those fruits have a property in common, otherwise we would not see something in common in them. And that property is the profile of the emission spectrum of whatever substance is optically predominant, for an outside looker, in that object. In the dark, the strawberry looks black, but strawberries are red.

• I see red.
• The light is red.
• Rubidium is red.

In each of these, 'red' may take on a different meaning.
An important distinction is that the Sun looks white, but it can be correctly said to be green.

All those fruits have a property in common, otherwise we would not see something in common in them. — Lionino

That does not follow, and nor does it follow that if they have a property in common then this common property is the property that they appear to have in common.

This problem isn't one that can be solved by a linguistic analysis of how the word "colour" is used; it requires scientific study of tomatoes, the human body, and phenomenal consciousness.

That does not follow — Michael

It does follow if we do not admit ex nihilo regularities. That is, as soon as we accept that everything has a cause, and that our senses at least sometimes are caused by outside objects, the commonality of some senses will have a cause in common — some would call this a universal, platonic or not.

It does follow if we do not admit ex nihilo regularities. That is, as soon as we accept that everything has a cause, and that our senses at least sometimes are caused by outside objects, the commonality of some senses will have a cause in common — some would call this a universal, platonic or not. — Lionino

No it doesn't. See for example the science and complexity of bitter taste:

Compounds that are perceived as bitter do not share a similar chemical structure.

I was talking metaphysics there, not biology.

Speaking of biology, there are many molecules that may bind to bitter taste receptors. One part ot the causal chain that typically gives us the perception of bitter taste is the binding to the respective receptor, whatever molecule binds to it. Being able to bind to the receptor is a common property of those molecules, and that ability breaks down to their molecular structure, they either have it or they don't.

Now, talking grammar. Of course, you will then say that no molecule is bitter, bitterness is a perception. That is correct, but that is because that is the only possible meaning that 'bitter' may take. However, that is not the case for colours, 'blue' may very well take on a physical meaning. It would be otherwise if 'binding to the bitter taste receptor' was a current, chemical usage of the word 'bitter', but it is not. What I am saying can be attested in dictionaries.

A converse example is that there are many molecules that may bind to hemoglobin, but only oxygen gas allows us to survive. Here, the binding molecule does matter.

Now, talking grammar. Of course, you will then say that no molecule is bitter, bitterness is a perception. That is correct, but that is because that is the only possible meaning that 'bitter' may take. However, that is not the case for colours, 'blue' may very well take on a physical meaning. It would be otherwise if 'binding to the bitter taste receptor' was a current, chemical usage of the word 'bitter', but it is not. What I am saying can be attested in dictionaries. — Lionino

The question "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?" is not answered by saying that the word "red" can refer to different things.

Speaking of biology, there are many molecules that may bind to bitter taste receptors. One part ot the causal chain that typically gives us the perception of bitter taste is the binding to the respective receptor, whatever molecule binds to it. Being able to bind to the receptor is a common property of those molecules, and that ability breaks down to their molecular structure, they either have it or they don't. — Lionino

This amounts to the claim that the property that all objects that appear to be bitter have in common is that they cause a bitter taste.

I'm fine with that, but it isn't taste realism (as the sister to colour realism).

If all you can say is that the property that all objects that appear to be red have in common is that they cause a red sensation then that amounts to colour eliminativism.

The question "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?" is not answered by saying that the word "red" can refer to different things. — Michael

Says who? I have replied before that the question is badly posed.

I think the answer that you want specifically is that they do not have the appearance, it is something constructed by our mind. The word that does the trick there is 'appear'.

I have replied before that the question is badly posed. — Lionino

I understand it just fine, as do I suspect most laymen, scientists, and philosophers of colour. Try reading the first section of the SEP article.

I understand it just fine — Michael

"Understanding it just fine" means you do not notice the ambiguity in the phrase.

scientists — Michael

There is no such thing as a "scientist".

Replying to the rest of the post. It was edited.

This amounts to the claim that the property that all objects that appear to be bitter have in common is that they cause a bitter taste. — Michael

The property they have in common is something in their chemical structure. That chemical structure is part of a causal chain to elicit bitterness.

If all you can say is that the property that all objects that appear to be red have in common is that they cause a red sensation then that amounts to colour eliminativism. — Michael

Some objects have a property which reflects red light, whether we are there to see it or not. We may call those objects red, even if these objects can only possibly exist in the dark, where they would appear black. Likewise, we may call the Sun green, even though it seems white to us.

There is a physical meaning of 'red', 'blue', 'green' that is used in physics.

There is a physical meaning of 'red', 'blue', 'green' that is used in physics. — Lionino

And that is not relevant to the question "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?".

This isn't a question about language use.

"do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?" — Michael

Let me rephrase that: "Do red objects have the private experience of red in them?"

Do you think it is a proper rephrasing? If so, it is a better one — understood by two people instead of just one.

The answer to the rephrased question is obviously not. Again, the trick word there is 'appear', that, if ignored, leads us to the same semantic ambiguity that shows up in this thread all the time.

if the pain happens exclusively in the mind, how does a burn on your finger hurt your finger and not your foot? — Lionino

I have directly answered this, here and elsewhere. If it is not landing, I apologise. But restating a question I have answered doesn't help me much.

You can't know. Your brain creates the illusion because it has to, for evolutionary reasons, to ensure you see to the injury - and is often wrong in quite obvious ways. The pain is not in the injured area. This isn't even a controversial take. It is how pain works, empirically. The idea that the pain is in the injured area suggests that it would hurt whether there was a mind or not. That is plainly dumber than a doornail. If this isn't your suggestion, you're not being sufficiently clear for me to response adequately, i don't think.

Yet we made symbols or writing systems to help them understand what is red. — javi2541997

Because the experience is not in the objects viewed. It is in the mind. This is why a Blind person can adequately assent to an audio symbolic representation of 'red'. And, to the degree they can, they are almost certainly wrong. We could never know, though.

If the best scientific description of an object places color as a brain construct, then we should deny the pen itself is red if we want to side with the educated community as opposed to those who've not truly considered the issue. — Hanover

:ok:

I will restate the question: if the pain happens exclusively in the mind, how does a burn on your finger hurt your finger and not your foot? — Lionino

If you cut off someone's foot, the person might still feel pain in what they believe to be their foot. This phantom pain is caused by the severed nerves that once traveled to the now missing body part and so the brain identifies the pain where it once was.

You can reliably stop the phantom pain by removing the person's brain. Without the brain, there is no pain because it is the brain that makes the pain.

Then there are other sorts of pains that you don't really identify as having a specific location, like the pain of a breakup. You don't say that your face is sad because your women done left you. Or maybe you do. I don't really know you all that well.

illusion — AmadeusD

And so what is this illusion? What is this idea that something is happening all the way down there instead of the idea that is happening all the way up here? How does it come to be?

Motorneurons.

There is a cause, and an effect. Contact with C-fibers at a sufficient level is the cause. Pain is the effect. They cannot be the same thing, right? So, we're off to a racing start.
Now, we already understand that pain signals travel through the body via the spinal cord to the brain, where the brain receives the data (think Chinese Room) and looks up the appropriate sensation to deploy to the perceiving mind. And, again, for some reason this isn't landing: it is often completely wrong in what it deploys, making it quite obvious pain is not in the effected area. It is caused by the affected area, but hte pain itself need not actually correlate with the injury. Or a part of the body at all, it seems.

There is no room here for a position other htan that pain is a sensation subsequent to an event in the area it is supposed to draw our attention to. Its almost regular failure to do so accurately is clear enough to me.

If you cut off someone's foot, the person might still feel pain in what they believe to be their foot. — Hanover

Of course.

You can reliably stop the phantom pain by removing the person's brain. Without the brain, there is no pain because it is the brain that makes the pain. — Hanover

Hopefully it was that simple. By removing the brain, which is where experience is located, and putting it in a vat, you split the brain away from the medula, which sends the pain impulses to the brain. So the brain feels no pain because you removed it from the rest of the body. Is the separation between the body (as opposed to the brain) and the pain so easily done then?

You don't say that your face is sad because your women done left you — Hanover

It is their loss, not mine, ok?

If Witt is correct, then the engagement in language games is inescapable. — Hanover

Quite right.

So, to the extent Michaelargues the pen is not red and you say it is, the dispute per Witt is over proper usage. Since our community of speakers does typically defer science to scientists, it is proper to argue the pen is not red based upon best scientific theory. — Hanover

Not quite right. A simple appeal to science would probably not appeal to Wittgenstein. The game in hand is that of making special provisions for pens which write with red ink.

But of course you grossly misrepresent the argument I've presented. I am again obliged to repeat that the physiological account is correct, but incomplete. I'm pointing to the absurdity of your "we should deny the pen itself is red". There are red pens.

And yes, I understand the special place you have for "itself". It's this infatuation that leads you into the scientistic view. You want to say that the pen is red but the pen itself is not red. I want to say that "the pen itself" is a nonsense.

"we should deny the pen itself is red". There are red pens. — Banno

You've done absolutely nothing to support this. You just assert it - maybe because you can't think past your visual field ;)

This seems consistent with what I have been arguing — Michael

Again, the physiology is correct, just incomplete.

You've done absolutely nothing to support this. — AmadeusD

If you wish to present a case that there are no red pens, be my guest.

If you wish to present a case that there are no red pens, be my guest. — Banno

I've not argued that. I've argued that 'red pens' are not 'Red'.

Perhaps you've twisted yourself up in the language hehe. Reference is tricky when you think things consist in their symbols.

I've argued that 'red pens' are not 'Red'. — AmadeusD

I'll leave you to it. For my part, I don't think you have understood something here. Try going into a shop and asking for the red pens that are not red and see how far you get.

Motorneurons. — AmadeusD

I think those are involved in the reflex, not in the perception of pain. Not important anyway.

Contact with C-fibers at a sufficient level is the cause. — AmadeusD

There are also A-fibers.

where the brain receives the data (think Chinese Room) and looks up the appropriate sensation to deploy to the perceiving mind — AmadeusD

So something happens in the brain, as a consequence of signals sent from the body, that equates to a mental feeling.
↓

It is caused by the affected area, but hte pain itself need not actually correlate with the injury. — AmadeusD

In other words, the body is a sufficient but not necessary condition of pain.

Since it is sufficient, there is the question: is experience spatially extended, or is it located at "a point in the pineal gland"?
This question is in fact extremely important for biology and (it may come off weirdly) politics: do worms — who lack a central nervous system but still react to stimulus — feel pain, and thus suffer?

The body, in conjunction with the brain, feels. Feeling X.

That body has been cut off, but the brain can still feel. Feeling Y.

Issue: feeling X and feeling Y feel the same, indistinguishable.

Example: the realest dream of a cow is indistinguishable from actually seeing a cow.

Question: how do we discriminate feeling X from feeling Y? Are they indeed exactly the same?

Consequence: can experience be located in different points, or is experience non-spatial?

Example: do I feel things in my finger and my brain/mind, or just my brain, which correlates, through induction, some sensations to some points in space?

Maybe that makes the problem more clear.

Try going into a shop and asking for the red pens that are not red and see how far you get. — Banno

Ironically, you've missed my point completely - and it was a linguistic one. Haha, i suppose. We'll see around this corner again, i'm sure :)

There is nothing wrong with 'red' meaning both the experience of red and the usual cause of red, and that is what it means. — Lionino

I think there is, but it's going on in this thread, not the world. My most recent reply to Banno (which he responded to in the quote above) points out this difference. It has been missed. Which is why, earlier, I was suggesting we do away with using the same term to refer to things that aren't in the same categories. No one, in every-day life, understands the difference of refering to Red, the colour, and referring to things as red-causing things.

So something happens in the brain, as a consequence of signals sent from the body, that equates to a mental feeling. — Lionino

I'd say this is right, though, im unsure how a neurophysiologist would respond lol.

In other words, the body is a sufficient but not necessary condition of pain. — Lionino

I think this is reversed. The body is not necessary. You can even feel bodily pain without hte body sending signals to the mind. That's how powerful the illusion can be. You may not even have the body part indicated by the pain.

do worms — who lack a central nervous system but still react to stimulus — feel pain, and thus suffer? — Lionino

My understanding is "no", but hten, are we also talking 'emotional' pain? I still think no, lol. But yes, interesting questions for sure.

just my brain, which correlates, through induction, some sensations to some points in space? — Lionino

This, imo. A fairly simple explanation can be gleaned here: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/neuroscience/sensation-of-pain

I think, as philosophers, we would do well not to tread on ground for which we are not quite prepared.