You can't. — AmadeusD
1. The above - pain signals are not apodictic indicators of anything; and — AmadeusD
2. An injured body part doesn't 'feel' anything. The perceiving mind does. — AmadeusD
If someone with normal color vision looks at a tomato in good light, the tomato will appear to have a distinctive property—a property that strawberries and cherries also appear to have, and which we call “red” in English. The problem of color realism is posed by the following two questions. First, do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have? Second, what is this property? (Byrne & Hilbert 2003: 3–4)
? — Lionino
First, do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?
All those fruits have a property in common, otherwise we would not see something in common in them. — Lionino
That does not follow — Michael
It does follow if we do not admit ex nihilo regularities. That is, as soon as we accept that everything has a cause, and that our senses at least sometimes are caused by outside objects, the commonality of some senses will have a cause in common — some would call this a universal, platonic or not. — Lionino
Compounds that are perceived as bitter do not share a similar chemical structure.
Now, talking grammar. Of course, you will then say that no molecule is bitter, bitterness is a perception. That is correct, but that is because that is the only possible meaning that 'bitter' may take. However, that is not the case for colours, 'blue' may very well take on a physical meaning. It would be otherwise if 'binding to the bitter taste receptor' was a current, chemical usage of the word 'bitter', but it is not. What I am saying can be attested in dictionaries. — Lionino
Speaking of biology, there are many molecules that may bind to bitter taste receptors. One part ot the causal chain that typically gives us the perception of bitter taste is the binding to the respective receptor, whatever molecule binds to it. Being able to bind to the receptor is a common property of those molecules, and that ability breaks down to their molecular structure, they either have it or they don't. — Lionino
The question "do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?" is not answered by saying that the word "red" can refer to different things. — Michael
This amounts to the claim that the property that all objects that appear to be bitter have in common is that they cause a bitter taste. — Michael
If all you can say is that the property that all objects that appear to be red have in common is that they cause a red sensation then that amounts to colour eliminativism. — Michael
There is a physical meaning of 'red', 'blue', 'green' that is used in physics. — Lionino
"do objects like tomatoes, strawberries and radishes really have the distinctive property that they do appear to have?" — Michael
if the pain happens exclusively in the mind, how does a burn on your finger hurt your finger and not your foot? — Lionino
Yet we made symbols or writing systems to help them understand what is red. — javi2541997
If the best scientific description of an object places color as a brain construct, then we should deny the pen itself is red if we want to side with the educated community as opposed to those who've not truly considered the issue. — Hanover
I will restate the question: if the pain happens exclusively in the mind, how does a burn on your finger hurt your finger and not your foot? — Lionino
If you cut off someone's foot, the person might still feel pain in what they believe to be their foot. — Hanover
You can reliably stop the phantom pain by removing the person's brain. Without the brain, there is no pain because it is the brain that makes the pain. — Hanover
You don't say that your face is sad because your women done left you — Hanover
Quite right.If Witt is correct, then the engagement in language games is inescapable. — Hanover
Not quite right. A simple appeal to science would probably not appeal to Wittgenstein. The game in hand is that of making special provisions for pens which write with red ink.So, to the extent Michaelargues the pen is not red and you say it is, the dispute per Witt is over proper usage. Since our community of speakers does typically defer science to scientists, it is proper to argue the pen is not red based upon best scientific theory. — Hanover
Motorneurons. — AmadeusD
Contact with C-fibers at a sufficient level is the cause. — AmadeusD
where the brain receives the data (think Chinese Room) and looks up the appropriate sensation to deploy to the perceiving mind — AmadeusD
It is caused by the affected area, but hte pain itself need not actually correlate with the injury. — AmadeusD
Try going into a shop and asking for the red pens that are not red and see how far you get. — Banno
There is nothing wrong with 'red' meaning both the experience of red and the usual cause of red, and that is what it means. — Lionino
So something happens in the brain, as a consequence of signals sent from the body, that equates to a mental feeling. — Lionino
In other words, the body is a sufficient but not necessary condition of pain. — Lionino
do worms — who lack a central nervous system but still react to stimulus — feel pain, and thus suffer? — Lionino
just my brain, which correlates, through induction, some sensations to some points in space? — Lionino
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