Again, these aren't facts about anything, other than that time proceeds unidirectionally and we cannot change an act that already occurred. — AmadeusD

So let's define "act" to make sure we agree. An act is a process, something being done, or happening, an action. As such, we can say that an act always occurs in time, it requires a period of time, such that there is an earlier part of the act, and a later part. "An act that already occurred" has both parts in the past. "An act occurring" has its earlier part in the past and its later part has not yet occurred. And, to some degree we can talk about future acts, having both parts not yet occurred.

We agree that an act already occurred cannot be changed. Do we also agree, that a future act is somewhat indeterminate, having not yet occurred, and subject to "possibility"? Can we agree that future acts are better known as possible acts? If so, this leaves "the act occurring" in a precarious place. The past part of the act occurring cannot be changed, but the future part exists as possibilities. A determinist would say that it's not only the past part which cannot be changed, but the past part determines the future part, and so the future part cannot be changed either. They claim a necessity here, known by cause and effect. However, you and I allow that the future part consists of possibility. But this gives us great difficulty to account for the observed reality that many acts appear to have a necessary relation between the past part and the future part. We call this causation, and this necessity allows us to make accurate predictions.

This is incoherent to me. Making a choice doesn't restrict one's freedom to choose in any sense other than that time moves in one direction. Freedom isn't in play. You already chose. There's no 'restriction'. It's plainly not open to you to make that same decision again. Restricting is both inadequate and inapt. The general fact that time moves in one direction restricts your choices to one's that operate in the same direction. But this isn't at all what you've tried to say.
I'm truly not understanding what lifting you think these ideas are doing? — AmadeusD

As you seem to be having problems with this idea, let's take it very slow. First, you seem to agree that time moving in one direction is a restriction of some sort. How can you say that this is a restriction but not a restriction on one's freedom? What does it restrict if not one's freedom? In any case, you seem to want to dismiss this type of "restriction" as irrelevant, and unimportant, when I see it as being the most important.

Put yourself in the middle of an act occurring, for example. The past part of that act cannot be changed. The future part exists as possibility. Further, the past part, since it cannot be changed, serves as a restriction on what is possible in the future part. To choose is to do something, make a judgement, and is therefore an act itself. What that act does, is selects from apprehended possibilities, as time passes, such that when this future part of the act, existing as possibilities, becomes past, and cannot be changed, the choice has had an effect. Notice, that this is not the past part determining the future part in the determinist way, it is the choice itself which has efficacy. Therefore, in the same way that anything in the past is a restriction, because the past cannot be changed, any choice which is made, since it is an act, has an effect on what comes to pass, and so it contributes to the restrictions of the past, in that same way.

The choice is no longer extant to be made. It is in the past. There is no consideration of Freedom. You would not say that my not having gills restricts my freedom to breathe underwater. I am simply unable to do so. Freedom isn't relevant. The present case is the same, as far as I see it. — AmadeusD

I cannot understand the sense of "freedom" you are ascribing to. If something is impossible for a person to do, then the person's "freedom" is restricted accordingly. If not having gills makes it impossible for you to breathe under water, then your freedom is restricted accordingly. Of course I would say that. And so, the reason why you do not have the freedom to breathe under water is that your freedom has been restricted by you not having gills. What does "freedom" mean to you? If it means the ability to do whatever is possible, then it must be restricted in some way, and that would be by what is impossible. The principal restriction on one's freedom, the most significant restriction to one's freedom, is that which we are "simply unable to do", for one reason or another. Why on earth would you say "freedom isn't relevant" here. Is it because you take such restrictions to your freedom for granted?

So, I believe there is significant disagreement between you and I on what is meant by "freedom of choice". You seem to think that even though the past is fixed and cannot be changed, and it poses significant restrictions on us, these restrictions are simply impossibilities, and these impossibilities have no relevance to our freedom of choice. In other words, all the arguments which determinists make about the past having causal influence over us, you dismiss as irrelevant. Because this is a very significant difference of opinion, and very important to the subject of how habits restrict our freedom, I don't think there is any point in proceeding to discuss "habits" until we sort this out.

I don't think that's a problem. I don't think we need to protect your freedom to go and stab people in the throat. In fact, I think we should restrict your ability to do that. That is very much a feature not a bug. — Dan

Sure, I agree with you. But what I also think, is that we cannot have a moral principle of protecting freedom. This is why I argued that moral consequentialism and the principle of protecting freedom are incompatible. I offered a solution recently, which was to understand freedom as something which transcends morality.

If you are with me so far, then we might take a step further to look at freedom itself, as something outside of, transcending, moral principles. That freedom truly transcends moral principles is evident from the fact that we can freely make choices with complete disrespect for any codes of ethics. However, because you are inclined to understand freedom as something which needs to be curtailed by moral restraint, I don't think you really want to consider freedom itself as something which ought to be protected. Notice, if we properly allow that freedom transcends moral principles, we cannot truthfully say that it ought or ought not be protected. Would you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover

Consider that freedom is logically prior to morality, as that which enables there to be such a thing as good or bad acts. This implies that freedom itself cannot be judged as good or bad, because it is the way that a person uses one's freedom which is what is judged in that way. Therefore we cannot say that freedom ought to be or ought not be protected, it is just something which is taken for granted by moral philosophers.

For example, consider that "many" is logically prior to number. It enables the idea that there is a number which can be assigned to any group which is many. However, we cannot assign a number to "many". In the same way, we cannot assign good or bad to "freedom", it simply enables the idea that acts can be classed as good or bad. So in the same way that "many" is an idea which is taken for granted by mathematicians, "freedom" is an idea which is taken for granted by moral philosophers.

I'm not really clear on what you are trying to solve. You haven't shown at all that protecting the kind of freedom that I am discussing is incompatible with consequentialism and the kind of freedom you think is incompatible with consequentialism isn't the kind I'm trying to protect. I don't think there is a problem there.

Each of these disagreements has an affect on how we individually understand freedom and its restrictions. — Metaphysician Undercover

The former seems certain, but I am unsure it will turn out we disagree about hte latter. The passing of time is absolute. There can be no disagreement if we're both accepting that it is a unidirectional 'force' and cannot be adjusted in any way whatsoever (particularly as regards changing it)

and I've explained how it is logically impossible to choose another option if the other option is not present to the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not think you have done this. I think you've explained the *empirical state in which it is highly unlikely one would consider 'other' options. Perhaps were seeing through a lot of daylight there.

You deny the necessity of the cause/effect relationship within a habit, which I assert. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmm..I deny this necessity in most scenarios - much more strongly here, and I think it is empirically incorrect to assert. Not philosophically. There is no such thing as a closed loop of thought which cannot be altered - something your position seems to suggest. The fact that habit obtains doesn't prevent it from being interrupted. It does not make any other course 'impossible', but improbable. Again, i see this to be an empirical wrong, not a philosophical one (*relates to the first response I've made above)

you dismiss — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not.

Your conception of freedom is, in my view, plainly wrong. Impossibility has nothing to do with freedom. Freedom only obtains when choices are available ("could have done otherwise"). The passing of time negates this, as it is a metaphysical barrier to choice at all. Time does not restrict freedom. It prevents choice. If you do not have gills, the 'choice' to breathe underwater is not open to you. Freedom doesn't enter the discussion on my view.

the self-evident is of the utmost importance, because it is used to form the base — Metaphysician Undercover

While I understand what you're saying here entirely, I don't think is a good point. If it's self-evident, stop labouring it. We're already in agreement. There's is no reason to invoke something we already agree with to support further assertions as they plainly cannot do so. This is my point. The passage of time is not an interesting factor in the assessment of Freedom. It is something in light of which we must consider Freedom. We have no choice. There is no discussion. It's not to do with with any denial - it is inapt.

It is therefore the most interesting to "us". — Metaphysician Undercover

Not to me, no. If this is the practical basis on which your argument relies (i.e, you posit the passage of time as a support for a lack of freedom to choose) we're at cross purposes and I wouldn't be able to understand what you're trying to say.

earlier part of the act, and a later part. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't really get on board with this. Technically I acknowledge it - there is a moment of time at the 'initiation' of an act, and then it;s 'completion' let's say. Noted. But, this does not, imo, make present anything knew. An act occurs in totality. You can't be half-way through an act and leave an act half-done. The entire act is carried out, regardless of the content and consequence. An act is whatever is done in a single action. And I would be extremely clear (at the very least for discussion purposes) that mental acts and physical acts need to be treated separately.

and subject to "possibility"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, we agree.

but the future part exists as possibilities — Metaphysician Undercover

As above, I cannot understand what you're trying to describe here.

They claim a necessity here — Metaphysician Undercover

I also agree this is roughly my understanding of how determinism treats choice - but its even dryer than your charitable account lol.

appear to have — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't do anything for me. It leads to no mental changes in my processing these ideas. "appear" to be means almost nothing without further investigation, and on further investigation, that "appearance" to me, is clearly heuristic and not 'actual'.

We call this causation, and this necessity allows us to make accurate predictions. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I note you're trying to teach egg-sucking here (lol, i'm not offended) constant conjunction does. Not necessity. There is not a logical relationship between the two, just a very, very close speculative expectation. Hume rears his head.

is a restriction of some sort — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not.

I see it as being the most important. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, understood. My first exposition of our difference in approach above should explain this discrepancy.

restriction but not a restriction on one's freedom? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand the question. It isn't a restriction. It's a fact of hte matter which prevents any choice being made in respect of it. Freedom requires available choices. Preclusion isn't a restriction on Freedom, it's a lack of ability to choose. Not a restriction on one's freedom to choose. This is a stark and incredibly important distinction that I think is lost here... (though, If i'm argued out of the position, perhaps not).

in the middle of an act occurring — Metaphysician Undercover

No idea what this could refer to. An act is a total action. You can't be in the middle of it other than retrospection (because you can denote the exact time the act took to carry out - in the act, there is no such distinction of time - but this supports my view) is my view.

Further, the past part, since it cannot be changed, serves as a restriction on what is possible in the future part. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, what (the heck) are you saying here? This makes no sense to me unless in retrospective speculation. It's uninteresting and does nothing for the conversation imo. There is no "past part" of an act while it is occurring (why is noted above - we're treading the same ground several times in all of these replies to one another).

If something is impossible for a person to do, then the person's "freedom" is restricted accordingly. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. The Freedom doesn't obtain. There is no Freedom to be restricted. Freedom requires that one could (in the case of restriction) otherwise have done so/done otherwise. When the option is empirically, metaphysically not open to you, invoking freedom is empty and meaningless.
I do not have my choice to breathe through gills restricted. I simply do not have freedom in that pursuit. It is not open to me. I could not possibly choose that option. Freedom (to do so) does not obtain, and cannot be restricted.

To choose is to do something — Metaphysician Undercover

No it plainly is not. To Choose is to adopt a mental disposition. To act pursuant to a choice is to 'do something' (though, this exact formulation of the distinction assumes the delineation between mental and physical acts mentioned above - if you reject that, fair enough).

Of course I would say that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, this explains a lot but I have to simply say I cannot grasp what you could possibly be thinking to get there. There is no freedom to act. Therefore, it cannot be restricted. It doesn't exist.

So, I believe there is significant disagreement between you and I on what is meant by "freedom of choice". — Metaphysician Undercover

For sure :P

You seem to think that even though the past is fixed and cannot be changed, and it poses significant restrictions on us, these restrictions are simply impossibilities, and these impossibilities have no relevance to our freedom of choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not what has been discussed. Restrictions on freedom can only obtain where a choice could be made. In the scenarios you've asked to address (ones where a choice in the past causes a current state of affairs - which you call a restriction to choose for no reason, as far as I can tell) one is unable to choose the thing you are using as an example of a restriction on freedom. But, given that you said you would call my not having a gills a restriction on my freedom to breathe underwater I can only conclude by saying;

I think it is pretty clear your version of Freedom is inapt, and unable to describe how humans actually choose and act in the real world. You cannot deliberate between choices you cannot obtain. Your position denies this, and I'm not willing to do so.

In other words, all the arguments which determinists make about the past having causal influence over us, you dismiss as irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, this is a complete and utter misrepresentation of what i'm saying. What I have said is 100% concordant with determinist thinking. It is just an oddity of that position.

I'm not really clear on what you are trying to solve. You haven't shown at all that protecting the kind of freedom that I am discussing is incompatible with consequentialism and the kind of freedom you think is incompatible with consequentialism isn't the kind I'm trying to protect. I don't think there is a problem there. — Dan

I don't think I'm trying to solve anything, just pointing out a problem with what you are doing. I believe that the phrase "the kind of freedom that I am discussing" is oxymoronic. To speak of "a kind of freedom" is to restrict freedom to a specific "kind". But "freedom" means unrestricted. Therefore your approach is incoherent. And you seem to be unwilling to acknowledge this.

Your conception of freedom is, in my view, plainly wrong. Impossibility has nothing to do with freedom. Freedom only obtains when choices are available ("could have done otherwise"). The passing of time negates this, as it is a metaphysical barrier to choice at all. Time does not restrict freedom. It prevents choice. If you do not have gills, the 'choice' to breathe underwater is not open to you. Freedom doesn't enter the discussion on my view. — AmadeusD

We are fundamentally opposed here. "Freedom" does not necessarily imply options, it means unrestricted. It is the rational mind which thinks, and in that activity it apprehends "options". When freedom appears as options, it has already been restricted being constrained to those options which the mind apprehends. Therefore "choices are available" is not how freedom actually exists, it is how it appears after it has already been constrained so as to appear as options.

You and I have a fundamental disagreement as to what "freedom" is, just like Dan and I have a similar disagreement. Dan wants to limit "freedom" to a specific "kind of freedom". But restricting "freedom" produces incoherency because freedom means unrestricted. Each of you wants to restrict "freedom" in your own way, so that it no longer means unrestricted, and I believe yours are both corrupted definitions. You are defining "freedom" as already restricted, and that is incoherent in relation to how we actually understand "freedom".

While I understand what you're saying here entirely, I don't think is a good point. If it's self-evident, stop labouring it. We're already in agreement. There's is no reason to invoke something we already agree with to support further assertions as they plainly cannot do so. This is my point. The passage of time is not an interesting factor in the assessment of Freedom. It is something in light of which we must consider Freedom. We have no choice. There is no discussion. It's not to do with with any denial - it is inapt. — AmadeusD

We agree on it, but you insist that this point which we agree on is irrelevant. I believe it is of the highest relevance. Therefore our agreement ends abruptly in disagreement. This disagreement. concerning the relevance of the point we agree on, is due to the fact that we have a fundamental disagreement as to what "freedom" is. Because of this fundamental disagreement about "freedom", I think the point is highly relevant to freedom, and you think it is not at all relevant.

I can't really get on board with this. Technically I acknowledge it - there is a moment of time at the 'initiation' of an act, and then it;s 'completion' let's say. Noted. But, this does not, imo, make present anything knew. An act occurs in totality. You can't be half-way through an act and leave an act half-done. The entire act is carried out, regardless of the content and consequence. An act is whatever is done in a single action. And I would be extremely clear (at the very least for discussion purposes) that mental acts and physical acts need to be treated separately. — AmadeusD

The problem here is that you simply refuse to acknowledge the relevance of the distinction between past and future. Therefore "the present", which is very often partway through an act ( as I am partway through the act of writing this post at the present time), is irrelevant to you. And you refuse to allow that it has any bearing on "freedom".

No idea what this could refer to. An act is a total action. You can't be in the middle of it other than retrospection (because you can denote the exact time the act took to carry out - in the act, there is no such distinction of time - but this supports my view) is my view. — AmadeusD

I can't grasp your denial. Have you never found yourself in the middle of doing something? If an act is "a total action" to you, doesn't this imply that all acts are in the past? But this is contrary to experience, which demonstrates to us that acts take place at the present.

No. The Freedom doesn't obtain. There is no Freedom to be restricted. Freedom requires that one could (in the case of restriction) otherwise have done so/done otherwise. When the option is empirically, metaphysically not open to you, invoking freedom is empty and meaningless.
I do not have my choice to breathe through gills restricted. I simply do not have freedom in that pursuit. It is not open to me. I could not possibly choose that option. Freedom (to do so) does not obtain, and cannot be restricted. — AmadeusD

Haha, you reject 'empirical fact' when I bring it up, with reference to Hume, now you employ it. Sorry Amadeus, I have no idea what you mean by "freedom" here. Freedom does not mean 'one could have done otherwise', it means 'one can do whatever one wants'. Why push "freedom" which is a property of the present, into the past? All you can do by pushing "freedom" into the past, is misrepresent it.

Your proposal is fundamentally incoherent. You say "I simply do not have freedom in that pursuit", and you pretend that this does not mean that your freedom is restrict in that respect. If not having freedom in that pursuit does not mean that your freedom is restricted in that way, then what does it mean? Suppose you simply do not have freedom in any pursuit. What "kind of freedom" would you have? Or maybe you have freedom in only one or two pursuits. Wouldn't you think that simply not having freedom in all those other pursuits constitutes a restriction to your freedom? The way you are using "freedom", like Dan, is simply incoherent.

No it plainly is not. To Choose is to adopt a mental disposition. — AmadeusD

As far as I know, mental activity is activity. Why deny it?

I think it is pretty clear your version of Freedom is inapt, and unable to describe how humans actually choose and act in the real world. — AmadeusD

I find that a joke, considering that the way you use "freedom" is simply incoherent. And, the fact that you refuse to recognize that acts are occurring at the present, instead of insisting that all acts are in the past. .

Talking of "kinds" of freedom is not oxymoronic at all. There is a huge literature on different types of freedom, and I think we can reasonably understand different freedom claims using Gerald Maccaullm's triadic relationship, that some agent X is free from some constraint Y to do or become some thing Z. When people talk about "freedom" they very often mean different things from one another, and specifying what kind you mean is very helpful in avoiding talking at cross purposes to one another. You seem to require that "freedom" only be used to refer to freedom of people from any constraints to do anything, but that is by no means the only sensible way the word can be used. Further, the discussion of how the word ought to be used is far less interesting than the moral discussion of what has value, what are responsibilities are, and how we ought to solve moral dilemmas.

Try looking at it this way. We begin with the idea that a free agent has freedom, where "freedom" is defined as "without restriction", no constraint. Then, when you say "that some agent X is free from some constraint Y to do or become some thing Z", you place the free agent within a context, or environment described as being "free from some constraint Y". The described context, or environment, is "without constraint Y". Notice, that the property described as "without constraint Y" is attributed to the environment, not to the agent or the agent's freedom.

Accordingly, constraints and restrictions are correctly understood as properties of the agent's environment, they are not properties of the free agent, or properties of the agent's freedom. It is simply incorrect to say that various different kinds of constraints constitute different "types of freedom", because the constraints are properties of the free agent's environment, not properties of the agent's freedom. To represent the constraint as a property of the agent, which is what is required in order to say that the agent has a specific "type of freedom", would necessarily negate (as contradictory) the primary premise of the "freedom" of the agent, that the agent is free, without restriction or constraint. Therefore the reason why it is incorrect to propose "types of freedom" is that it is self-contradicting.

Your appeal to authority doesn't really provide anything, if the philosopher referred to is making the same mistake. That's a common problem with appeals to authority in philosophy. However, if this is your preferred way to approach moral dilemmas and discussions of responsibilities and values, to start with a premise which is fundamentally incorrect as being self-contradicting, then you can proceed without me, because I think it would only create dilemmas, rather than solve them.

Yeah, that doesn't work.
First, we don't "start" with the idea of freedom being without any restriction or constraint. We "start" with a lot of different understandings of what people are free or should be free to do or be, and what they should be free from, and we make sense of that so we can have a sensible conversation.
Second, constraints and restrictions are not properly understood as only the properties of an agent's environment. One could make a freedom claim that people ought to be free from their habits. I wouldn't agree, but that would certainly be a "constraint" (in the sense that it is what you are claiming the person should be free from) that would not be a part of the person's environment, but of them.
Third, there is absolutely not any requirement for constraints to be a part of the agent in order for them to have a type of freedom. I'm not sure where you have got that assumption, but it clearly isn't true. It is entirely coherent to say that my freedom of movement is constrained by being kidnapped and locked in a the boot of a car.
Fourth, I haven't really made an appeal to authority, though I'll admit one might be inferred from what I said. I certainly don't mean to say that just because there is a large literature discussing something, that thing is worthy of discussion. However, it may be a literature you could benefit from examining, because I think you are mistaken about the issues you are raising regarding types of freedom.

We "start" with a lot of different understandings of what people are free or should be free to do or be, and what they should be free from, and we make sense of that so we can have a sensible conversation. — Dan

Then you have no objective definition of freedom, just a lot of different understandings. Conversation between people with a lot of different understandings inevitably produces misunderstanding, unless you have some objective principles to start with.

This is why I suggested to Amadeus, that we start with something which we both agree on as self-evident truth, the fact that the past cannot be changed. This would have provided us with a fundamental principle as a base determination of "impossible", which we could agree to as the most basic restriction to freedom. Instead, Amadeus insisted that this 'type of impossibility' is irrelevant to freedom. This is very similar to you insisting that only some 'types of freedom' are morally relevant.

Second, constraints and restrictions are not properly understood as only the properties of an agent's environment. — Dan

If you start with an objective definition of "freedom", and protect the concept of "a free agent", you will find that it is contradictory to say that constraints or restrictions belong to the agent, if the agent is truly free.

I totally agree, that a human being is not "free" in the absolute sense of "a free agent" as defined, but the objective ideal concept of "a free agent", being absolutely free, provides a definitional starting point to make judgements concerning the different types of restrictions. Notice that from this perspective, of starting from an objective definition of freedom, "type" belongs to the restrictions, not freedom itself.

Third, there is absolutely not any requirement for constraints to be a part of the agent in order for them to have a type of freedom. — Dan

You say it right there, for the agent "to have a type of freedom". "To have" means it is a property of the thing which has it. If the agent has one type of freedom, and not another type of freedom, as properties, then the restrictions which make the type of freedom this type instead of that type, are also property of the agent. For example, if a thing is red and not green, then the restrictions which make the thing this type of colour rather than that type, inhere within the thing, as property of the thing which has this colour rather than that colour. Likewise, if an agent has this type of freedom and not that type, then the restrictions which make it have this property rather than that property, inhere within the thing.

You are approaching the issue from a backward direction. Instead of assuming "a free agent", as a base "ideal", and then proceeding to look at the different types of restrictions which make a real living human agent's freedom less than ideal, you start with a less than ideal concept of "freedom", and wrongly call this a "type of freedom", when there is no real "type" here to be understood. This is because "type" properly belongs to the restrictions, and by assigning it to "freedom" instead, you have no principles to understand the true types of restrictions. You only have a whole lot of different understandings from different people about "different types of freedom" which are essentially arbitrary, with corresponding arbitrary restrictions. If instead, you started with a pure absolute freedom, as your objective ideal, then you could look at the true, real, natural and artificial restrictions, and understand their different types accordingly.

However, it may be a literature you could benefit from examining, because I think you are mistaken about the issues you are raising regarding types of freedom. — Dan

I already see right through the principles supporting that literature, to recognize the inherent contradiction underlying them, the mistake which I've pointed out to you. There would be no point in me reading it unless I wanted to decisively refute it. However, I'm fairly certain that it is upheld by people similar to you, who would not recognize the refutation when thy saw it. So that would be a much bigger waste of my time than what I am doing here

I'm not really sure what an "objective definition" would even be. The definitions of words are either explicitly stated within specific contexts (such as within a particular discipline, or even within a particular conversation) or they are determined by usage.

Is the fact that the past can't be changed self-evident? Even if it were, what does that have to do with anything?

I agree that saying some types of impossibility are not relevant to freedom is similar to saying that only some types of freedom are morally relevant, in the sense that both are reasonable things to have a discussion about.

To "have" something doesn't just mean to have it as a property. I have a red car, but a red car isn't a property of me. Also, even if I have a property, then the conditions that allow me to have that property do not have to be inherent in me. For example, I might have the property of iridescence, but only under specific lighting. The lighting conditions would be a restriction on my having that property, but they aren't a part of me.

You keep getting caught on the idea that "freedom" must mean freedom from all restrictions to do anything. It certainly can mean that, but it's a word, it can mean lots of things. For example, when I talk about a free, rational agent, I don't mean an agent who has complete freedom, or even an agent who has much freedom at all. In that case "free" refers to the agent having free will, which is different from freedom (one doesn't lose any free will if they are chained up and kept in a box, but they certainly lose a lot of freedom).

I don't start with a concept of freedom that is less than ideal. I start with one that is compatible with all free, rational agents being capable of being entirely free, which seems far more ideal than.

This supposed contradiction seems to be predicated on you not allowing people to use words differently from how you want them to be used.

I'm not really sure what an "objective definition" would even be. The definitions of words are either explicitly stated within specific contexts (such as within a particular discipline, or even within a particular conversation) or they are determined by usage. — Dan

"Freedom" is a noun, so we need to treat the word as if it refers to a thing, even if that supposed thing is an abstraction. In this case it is an abstraction, and that's why I referred to it as an ideal, it's like other ideals, "circle", "square", "triangle", etc.. When we recognize "freedom" as an ideal thing, an abstraction, then we see that in order to understand it and use it as a premise for logical proceeding, it needs a definition. That would be what I called the "objective definition". And I propose the very simple ideal definition, "without restriction".

What you appear to be doing is proceeding from the assumption of different "types of freedom" without a definition of "freedom" itself. To me, that's like talking about different types of triangles without a definition of "triangle" itself. See, if we did this, the meaning of "triangle" could vary, meaning something different in each different type of triangle being talked about. That's what I think happens when people talk about different "types of freedom", The meaning of "freedom" changes according to the proposed t type of freedom. It's not a matter of a different type of freedom, rather a matter of a different meaning for "freedom". This makes logical consistency and coherency impossible.

So what I've been trying to tell you is that if you took a good look at how "freedom" is used by most standard conventions, you'll see that it is similar to, and consistent with, what I propose, "without restriction". Furthermore, I think you'll also see, as I've been explaining, that the defined thing, that abstraction or ideal, is not the type of thing itself, which could be divided into types. Divisibility into types would imply that there are restrictions which inhere within the thing defined as "without restriction".

You keep getting caught on the idea that "freedom" must mean freedom from all restrictions to do anything. It certainly can mean that, but it's a word, it can mean lots of things. For example, when I talk about a free, rational agent, I don't mean an agent who has complete freedom, or even an agent who has much freedom at all. In that case "free" refers to the agent having free will, which is different from freedom (one doesn't lose any free will if they are chained up and kept in a box, but they certainly lose a lot of freedom). — Dan

Sure, "freedom" can have lots of different meanings, and that is evidence of the freedom which we have in using words. However, for coherency and consistency in logical proceedings it is imperative that we adhere to one definition, or else we allow ambiguity and equivocation to produce fallacy.

Is the fact that the past can't be changed self-evident? Even if it were, what does that have to do with anything? — Dan

That's what Amadeus suggested, that the past cannot be changed is self-evident. So I went along with it, as a principle or premise which we could agree on. What it has "to do with anything" is where we disagreed. I think that as what "cannot be changed" it forms the foundation for the concept "impossible", and this provides the basic principle of "restriction", which is what is contrary to "freedom" (by my definition). Amadeus would not agree, insisting that this sense of "impossible" is not at all related to "freedom", referring to something which one could never have freedom in relation to in the first place. So Amadeus takes the sense of "impossible" for granted, and since it is taken for granted it is not allowed to have any bearing on Amadeus' sense of "freedom".

However, I showed Amadeus how the past relates to the present and the future, in determinist principles, and as such has the greatest restriction on our freedom, by completely denying it. So this is another type of abstraction, ideal, the conceptual structure which relates all events in the world through cause and effect, saying that even future events are predetermined by past events. From this conceptual structure, the "impossible" which we associate with the past as "what cannot be changed", has the greatest possible relevance to "freedom", by completely denying the possibility of any freedom, all future events being predetermined by what cannot be changed. Amadeus simply dismissed such cause/effect relations with reference to Hume, but I pointed out that even if such relations are not real, our capacity to predict is real. Notice also that such a dismissal would incapacitate consequentialism.

To "have" something doesn't just mean to have it as a property. I have a red car, but a red car isn't a property of me. Also, even if I have a property, then the conditions that allow me to have that property do not have to be inherent in me. For example, I might have the property of iridescence, but only under specific lighting. The lighting conditions would be a restriction on my having that property, but they aren't a part of me. — Dan

Are you proposing that you "have freedom" in the same way that you "have a car"? Or are you just trying to produce ambiguity, confusion, and equivocation with this proposal for the meaning of "property"?

You keep getting caught on the idea that "freedom" must mean freedom from all restrictions to do anything. It certainly can mean that, but it's a word, it can mean lots of things. For example, when I talk about a free, rational agent, I don't mean an agent who has complete freedom, or even an agent who has much freedom at all. In that case "free" refers to the agent having free will, which is different from freedom (one doesn't lose any free will if they are chained up and kept in a box, but they certainly lose a lot of freedom). — Dan

I know, "freedom" can mean lots of things. But allowing "freedom" to mean many different things is not conducive to valid logic, or good philosophy. It is one thing to look at many different proposals for definition, then decide on one, as the method of Platonic dialectic, but if we don't ever decide on one, we don't ever make any progress.

Notice how this position you've taken, actually supports what I've been arguing, that not choosing, provides the most freedom. By not choosing a definition of "freedom", we can consider all the different ways "freedom" is used, and actually have all that freedom of choice, but once we choose a definition, we must adhere to it in the logical process which follows or else we equivocate, therefore we are restricted in that sense. If in the logical process our chosen definition of "freedom" is shown to produce a problem, as Plato demonstrates with "knowledge" in The Theaetetus, then we might be inclined to look for a better definition.

So, in your examples, "free" means the same thing for an agent with "free will", and also when that free agent has one's "freedom" constrained by chains. The agent with free will has specific restrictions on one's freedom implied by "will" (including the nature of time etc.). Also the agent has specific restrictions implied with "constrained by chains". These do not imply different meanings for "free", if "freedom" is the subject of our logical investigation, they imply different ways that freedom is restricted.

This supposed contradiction seems to be predicated on you not allowing people to use words differently from how you want them to be used. — Dan

It is not a matter of using specific words differently from how I want then to be used. It is a matter of consistency and coherency, so that we can proceed with logic, and avoid equivocation. So it is a matter of the overall way that words are used in general, which I am concerned with. I want "freedom" to be used in a way which supports valid logic, rather than equivocation. If you do not like my proposal for a definition of "freedom", then be my guest and propose your own. But for the reasons explained, we cannot proceed logically toward an understanding of freedom, when "freedom" means something different in the various different contexts, such that each different time "freedom" is used it refers to a different type of freedom (a different meaning of "freedom").

So long as people are being clear about what they mean, equivocation doesn't seem to come into it. I agree that freedom certainly has something to do with being unconstrained, but there are lots of types of freedom, lots of ways of being unconstrained from various things, that we might want to discuss. It seems that we could simply specify what we mean (which I have, numerous times) and then discuss whether that type of freedom is important or not, rather than getting hung up on linguistics.

I wouldn't say having freedom is quite the same as having a car, but I would also say that it isn't like having the quality of greenness.

No, in my examples, "free" can be used to two ways. To say that some agent is free to act in some way is using "free" to refer to the person having freedom to act in that way. To say that someone is a free, rational agent, is using "free" to mean that the agent has free will. By "freedom" I mean the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices. I offered to use a different word, but you offered "moral constraint" which is so far divorced from how either of those words are used as to be completely inappropriate.

Also, it doesn't support your position. Even on your account of freedom, which I think is not a good one, then not choosing a definition of the word would keep some options open to us, but others would be closed until we did.

I have clearly defined how I am using the word "freedom" and why I am using that word rather than another. If you think it would be more productive, we might use another word, or simply refer to the ability of free, rational, agents to understand and make their own choices. If you like, we can just use that term (the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices) in the future and move past the whole linguistic debate.

It seems that we could simply specify what we mean [...], rather than getting hung up on linguistics. — Dan

If this happened more often here, half of the discussions would never happen.

So long as people are being clear about what they mean, equivocation doesn't seem to come into it. I agree that freedom certainly has something to do with being unconstrained, but there are lots of types of freedom, lots of ways of being unconstrained from various things, that we might want to discuss. It seems that we could simply specify what we mean (which I have, numerous times) and then discuss whether that type of freedom is important or not, rather than getting hung up on linguistics. — Dan

Ambiguity, and the possibility of equivocation is only the tip of the iceberg. The problem is much more extensive. Suppose we identify a number of different types of freedom, and we agree that these are all types of freedom which ought to be protected. However, there is a possibility that having the freedom of one type may cause people to restrict other people's freedom of another type. This would be where the different types of freedom overlap. Sorting this out would require reference to higher principles, and then "freedom" would not be our principal value anymore, because all the various types of freedom would need to be restricted according to the higher principles.

Look at what Plato said about justice in The Republic, for example. After questioning all the different participants in the discussion, about the nature of justice, Socrates offered a sort of definition. Justice he said is having ones own place in society, to do one's own thing as determined by oneself (freedom), but not interfering with another in the other's position of doing one's own thing. Notice, that under this description, the members of society are not working together, as "parts" of a cohesive whole, working toward a common goal, or common good, each person is working on one's own goals or goods. This I think, is where we find "freedom", the person is allowed to choose one's own ends, one's own activities, and is not at all persuaded to work toward an ideological "common good", or the good of the community, the good of the state, or anything like that, but still may choose this freely. "Freedom" inherently involves the capacity to choose ones own goods, ends, objectives, or goals.

Now look at the other half of the proposal. a person ought not interfere with another's freedom to choose one's own goods, ends, objectives or goals. This implies that there is, inherent within the nature of "freedom", the potential for conflict. This cannot be avoided, one person's freedom will conflict with another's My contention is that identifying different types of freedom cannot remove this potential for conflict.

No, in my examples, "free" can be used to two ways. To say that some agent is free to act in some way is using "free" to refer to the person having freedom to act in that way. To say that someone is a free, rational agent, is using "free" to mean that the agent has free will. By "freedom" I mean the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices. I offered to use a different word, but you offered "moral constraint" which is so far divorced from how either of those words are used as to be completely inappropriate. — Dan

I perceive this passage to be faulty in a couple ways. To "be free to act in some way" is completely meaningless if not oxymoronic. Say we name a specific type of activity, as the specified "some way", and say that the agent is free to act in this way. This means that we allow this option. But the agent being free, may choose not to act in that way, but to act in a contrary way. In that sense, "to be free to act in that specific way" is completely meaningless, because the agent is also free to act in any way. And if we impose constraints to ensure that the person does not act in the contrary way, then the statement becomes oxymoronic. The person is not "free" to act in that way, but is constrained so as to act that way.

Furthermore, if we are all free rational agents, with the ability to make our own choices, as you say here, there will very clearly be conflict amongst us, as I pointed out already. So then you earlier defined one's "own choices" as choices concerning property which belongs to the person. Limiting freedom in this way still does not remove conflict because there would be conflicts concerning rights and actions in public spaces rather than concerning properties. You might insist that "rational agent" means one who reasons morally, but then you actually would be adopting "moral constraint" as a principle, not freedom.

I have clearly defined how I am using the word "freedom" and why I am using that word rather than another. — Dan

You really have not defined how you are using "freedom". Look, you define "free" like this: "To say that someone is a free, rational agent, is using "free" to mean that the agent has free will." When you say that agent has "free will" you predicate "free" of "will". But this doesn't say what "free" means. And when you define "freedom" you say: "By "freedom" I mean the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices." But this is clearly not how you use "freedom" when you talk about protecting freedom. You only want to protect certain types of choices, and you claim that this is protecting the person's freedom. Obviously, the "freedom" you claim to be desiring to protect is not "the ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices", but the ability to understand and make certain types of choices. That is why I said what you are trying to protect looks a lot more like moral restraint than freedom.

Why don't you just come around to admitting it. It is not "freedom" you are trying to protect, but moral restraint. Moral restraint is the means by which a person is said to freely make choices consistent with moral principles. It supposedly involves no restrictions to the person's freedom because the person supposedly chooses freely, the moral choice.

As I've pointed out already, your use of "freedom" appears to be self-contradicting. And, as I've shown above, the only way to make it not self-contradictory is to remove all meaning from it. So now I think I have the proper understanding of how you use that word. It's just a word that you like to throw around because it looks good, having positive connotations, but your use of it really shows that it has absolutely no meaning for you. You allow that "to will something" has meaning, but predicting "free" to the will does absolutely nothing. And, concerning the choices people do make you, only want to protect a certain type, so "freedom" as the ability of a rational agent to make one's own choices is not what you want to protect. So the "freedom" you claim to be protecting has no meaning either, being divorced from your definition.

Yes, I would agree that thinking that lots of different types of freedom should all be protected could easily lead to conflicts which might not be resolvable without reference to some other value. People tend not to do that though. Generally when we talk about different types of freedom, we are debating which one is really worth protecting or promoting. Certainly in my case I have advocated for protecting a specific type.

Again, you seem to be defining "free" in a very strange way. It seems entirely reasonable for the police for example to say of someone "you are free to leave". It is clear what this means: there are not restrictions being placed on you leaving. It doesn't require that it also be true that the person is free to go to the moon.

I defined own choices as concerning those things that belong to a person, their mind, their body, and their property. I agree that there could be some conflicts specifically with property and movement, but it isn't clear that there would be many. What conflicts in the public sphere are you concerned about? And I wouldn't insist that a moral agent is one who reasons morally, assuming that by "reasons morally" you mean something like "reasons in a morally good way".

Having free will definitely doesn't mean being free of will. I had assumed that you were familar with the term "free will", but I will clarify it for you if you like. There are a lot of ways one might define free will, and I suspect there are those who think my definition is claiming too much, but I would say that to have free will is to be able to act in ways that are caused wholly be the agent, not determined by preceding events or scripted responses, and not in-principle predictable ahead of time.

The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices is exactly how I use "freedom". I agree that I do only want to protect certain choices, specifically persons' own choices. The choices that belong to them. I am not being inconsistent at all.

You and I have a fundamental disagreement as to what "freedom" is — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this is a red herring on your part. We are clearly talking within a context. We are not randomly picking out versions of 'freedom'. We're talking about hte 'freedom to choose'. If a choice is literally not metaphysically possible, how could you apply a metric like 'freedom' to whether or not one chooses it? This seems to be practically nonsensical.

freedom means unrestricted — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely not. We have both made extremely clear why this is erroneous way to approach this issue. It makes it look (pretty heavily) as if you're wanting to define-out any version on which Dan and I are relying for our positions, instead of simply noting that they don't cohere and so we're probably talking at cross-purposes. I tried to solve this in my previous reply.. No matter.

You are defining "freedom" as already restricted, and that is incoherent in relation to how we actually understand "freedom". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it isn't. This is such a bizarre claim.

Because of this fundamental disagreement about "freedom", I think the point is highly relevant to freedom, and you think it is not at all relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I have noted, even on your conception of Freedom (or, from my POV, your restricted version) this doesn't hold any water whatsoever. If your version of 'Freedom' is 'unrestricted' then you are frollicking in the AI world. We are, in fact, metaphysically bound to accept the 'restrictions' of time on our ability to make choices. This removes possibility. It does not restrict freedom. It removes, entirely the possibility to chose anything at all. This last pair of sentences holds in both of our accounts. I have no idea how you think you're getting around this by simply saying "Freedom is unrestricted". Then again, you did agree that my not having gills "restricts my freedom" to breath underwater, so I may just need to walk away from this.

The problem here... — Metaphysician Undercover

This isn't a problem and the quote you've used to respond to aptly dispatches this objection.

Have you never found yourself in the middle of doing something? — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't quite understand what you're asking, based on the other content of the responses to this point. It seems you're wanting me to agree that a moment in time can be, in fact, a free-floating 'something' in pursuit of another free floating 'something' ad infinitum such that no act is ever complete because you're always acting (the other possibility, below my response to this).
Again, I have answered the objection within the quote you've used. An act is noted in totality. Either you made a cut (let's say into an apple) or you didn't. You didn't "halfway" cut through the apple. You either didn't get to it, or you cut exactly how deep you cut. You are never 'part way through' the act.
The other version you might be asking is "Doesn't your psychology pick out the timespans of acts as you carry them out?". The answer to this is "sometimes" and yet the previous objection holds. Just wanted to make sure I didn't ignore this.

But this is contrary to experience, which demonstrates to us that acts take place at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is actually direct, on-point support for what I've just responded with. Acts happen "in the present" and are not divided into "past" and "present" parts. That is correct, experience tells us this quite directly.

Haha, you reject 'empirical fact' when I bring it up, with reference to Hume, now you employ it — Metaphysician Undercover

I have a fairly big hunch you're making this part up.

Freedom does not mean 'one could have done otherwise', it means 'one can do whatever one wants'. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good grief. Okay, this will be my last reply because this is out the gate wrong.

You say "I simply do not have freedom in that pursuit", and you pretend that this does not mean that your freedom is restrict in that respect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because they are not coherent points to have made together. If Freedom does not obtain, it cannot be restricted. This is plain language now, come on.

then what does it mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

I means exactly what I've pointed out several times (beginning to think you're skimming these posts on your phone maybe?). Freedom does not obtain in that scenario. There is no freedom. It cannot be restricted. But, you seem to think that Freedom applies to things like "I want to be one of several Water Gods of a Triverse that doesn't exist". Hehe.

Wouldn't you think that simply not having freedom in all those other pursuits constitutes a restriction to your freedom? The way you are using "freedom", like Dan, is simply incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't. If you do not understand it, so be it. I really don't mean to sound rude in these posts, but its becoming obviously I do/will come across that way. I think you're being a bit obtuse.

I find that a joke, considering that the way you use "freedom" is simply incoherent. And, the fact that you refuse to recognize that acts are occurring at the present, instead of insisting that all acts are in the past. . — Metaphysician Undercover

This is both an incredibly bad reading of all that's been said, and a pretty good indicator you're not looking to understand.

So be it. Take care my friend :) I shall not engage this one further, I don't think.

Again, you seem to be defining "free" in a very strange way. It seems entirely reasonable for the police for example to say of someone "you are free to leave". It is clear what this means: there are not restrictions being placed on you leaving. It doesn't require that it also be true that the person is free to go to the moon. — Dan

Look at your statement "free to leave" means "no restriction being placed on you leaving". "Free" is interpreted as "no restrictions being placed on", "to leave" is interpreted as "you leaving". Remember my definition for freedom? It was "without restrictions, no constraint". Why would you think that if "freedom" is defined as without restriction or constraint, then "you are free to leave" which clearly means that no restrictions or constraints are being placed on you leaving, by that definition, would also mean "you are free to go to the moon"?

If someone said "you are free", that appears to imply an absolute sense of "free" and this would mean that you are not restricted or constrained at all. But statements like this are often dependent on context to derive the true meaning, and are also often metaphorical. No one would say "you are free", meaning that the person is capable of doing things beyond the natural constraints of the physical world, these restrictions are accepted as implied.

But in a philosophical inquiry we ought to be very clear about what we are saying, and leave nothing like that as taken for granted. So we might start with the most common definition of "freedom" as without restriction (as you seem to agree now), then proceed to clarify exactly how a human being is not free, what restrictions are in place, which makes a person less than free. First we have the natural restrictions, starting with the fact that we cannot change the past, then the restrictions of our physical bodies and the physical world around us, and also the artificial restrictions like laws and codes of ethics. All these various types of restrictions make a person less than free.

What conflicts in the public sphere are you concerned about? — Dan

There are a number I can think of. The right to speak is a matter of freedom over one's own body, but threats and hate speech need to be controlled. This problem extends into lying, deception, brainwashing, and some cases of preaching ideologies. Immoral use of language is a significant problem. A person's freedom to use one's body to communicate (to speak), conflicts another's freedom over one's own mind, and that's simply the basic nature of communication. It's very evident in children, as the mode of education. We can say that children don't really have freedom over their minds, because their minds must be constrained through education, but we still don't ever get to the point of having our minds free from the influence of others.

And the other categories can be seen to overlap negatively as well. Freedom to do what I want with my property can restrict your freedom to do what you want with your body, like if I hit you with my car, And problems like these are extensive.

Having free will definitely doesn't mean being free of will. I had assumed that you were familar with the term "free will", but I will clarify it for you if you like. There are a lot of ways one might define free will, and I suspect there are those who think my definition is claiming too much, but I would say that to have free will is to be able to act in ways that are caused wholly be the agent, not determined by preceding events or scripted responses, and not in-principle predictable ahead of time. — Dan

I couldn't understand this, so I looked at my posting and saw a typo. I didn't mean to say free is "predicted" of will, I meant it is "predicated" of will. So, what you say here is consistent with what I meant You would say that "free will" means that the will is not restricted in the way of determinism, so it is free in that way. When you say "to be able to act in ways that are caused wholly be the agent". you mean that the will is "free" (as in unrestricted), up to the point of the restrictions which are natural to "the agent" referred to. From my perspective then, those restrictions cannot be taken for granted, and must be understood as limiting or restricting the agent, so that it's freedom is qualified. "The will is free" uses "free" in the same type of qualified sense as "you are free to go". In this case freedom is qualified by the nature of the agent referred to as the free agent. A human being is restricted in natural ways (such as unable to change the past). But this is where habits may also enter the picture, as natural restrictions. And habits may come about from training as well, like when a child is educated.

The ability of free, rational agents to understand and make their own choices is exactly how I use "freedom". I agree that I do only want to protect certain choices, specifically persons' own choices. The choices that belong to them. I am not being inconsistent at all. — Dan

For a rational agent to constrain one's own choices such that one only makes choices which belongs to oneself, is not "freedom", but moral restraint. You can call it 'freedom", and define "freedom" in that way, but what you describe is better known as moral restraint. This would be the capacity to restrict one's choices to "choices that belong to them". Since you are explicitly wanting to protect the capacity to make certain choices, those which belong to the agent, and not wanting to protect the agent's freedom to make other choices, what you describe is moral restraint.

So be it. Take care my friend :) I shall not engage this one further, I don't think. — AmadeusD

This is the only part of your post worth replying to Amadeus. I think you've made a fine decision, something I can readily agree with you on.

In your last post you said "To "be free to act in some way" is completely meaningless if not oxymoronic. Say we name a specific type of activity, as the specified "some way", and say that the agent is free to act in this way. This means that we allow this option. But the agent being free, may choose not to act in that way, but to act in a contrary way. In that sense, "to be free to act in that specific way" is completely meaningless, because the agent is also free to act in any way."
It was this that I was taking issue with. Hence pointing out that being free to act in some specific way is a perfectly sensible thing to say, and doesn't require freedom to act in all possible contrary ways or that freedom be completely unrestrained by anything.

I agree that there are... some cases where we might need to constrain what someone is saying. Generally threats, fraud, and incitement to violence. Quite a lot of other things, like just deception generally or hate speech, needs no constraint as it doesn't restrict others freedom. Children are an interesting case because they aren't really persons yet. It's better to think of them as the same agent as their future self and so deserving of moral protection, but not currently able to understand most of their own choices so those choices need to be protected for them by guardians. A lot of these supposed problems aren't really problems though. There are some interesting conflicts, but the more obvious ones seem to amount to someone trying to put their property or themself in a place where they have no "right" to be (eg, their car on top of my foot) and the answer seems to be "no, you can't do that".

Without getting back into why habits aren't restrictions on the will, I'm not really sure what kind of restrictions you are concerned about. A person's free will is not diminished by being locked in a cell, so being unable to change the past just doesn't seem like a concern.

I mean, it really isn't. Moral restraint might well be what people ought to show in order to stick to only their own choices, but it isn't what is being protected. What is being protected is the ability of persons (free, rational agents) to make a certain kind of choice (those that belong to them). That isn't to say that all other choices ought to be restricted. There are lots of choices that I might want to make that don't need protecting, but also don't require prohibiting.

An alternative way of thinking about the kind of freedom that freedom consequentialism seeks to protect is that it is plausibly the same thing protected by some rights theories. Would conceptualizing it as a consequentialism of rights help you?

It was this that I was taking issue with. Hence pointing out that being free to act in some specific way is a perfectly sensible thing to say, and doesn't require freedom to act in all possible contrary ways or that freedom be completely unrestrained by anything. — Dan

What I meant is that it is meaningless without a definition of "free"'. If "free" is defined as unrestricted, then "you are free to leave" is meaningful, as you will be unrestricted in the act of leaving. But if we try to define free from the context of the statement "free to leave", then "to leave" is a restriction on the concept of freedom expressed. By that expression, freedom is allowing you only that one named act, "to leave". That is why I said this way of looking at things is oxymoronic. You are proposing "freedom" but only to do one specific thing.

If you insist, that this is what freedom is, this entity, capacity, or whatever, which allows you to leave, in that instance, and then proceed to propose different types of freedom, "free to run", free to hide", "free to speak", "free to choose" "free to go to the moon", etc., then "freedom" becomes totally meaningless, because you just name any activity and say that there is a different type of freedom which is designed to capacitate that specific activity. In reality though, this is not the way that we use "freedom". We use it to mean "unrestricted", and then we name the restrictions which are lifted in application

This is why I say your approach is backward. In real practise we name the types of restrictions which are applied to freedom, not the types of freedom. So "free to leave" names a specific restriction, that was placed on you leaving, and signifies a lifting of that restriction. This allows that all the other things which one is naturally free to do, or not do, are irrelevant and not mentioned. What happens in theory though, is that we name specific activities which we want to protect, as being allowed in a sort of unrestricted sense, and call those "freedoms" as if they are specific types of freedom. These are things like freedom of thought and belief, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of property ownership, etc..

In these cases, we name the type of restriction which we desire to to prevent, and in In doing this we create what in theory might be called "a type of freedom". But that's really just a simple name which represents a complex conceptual structure, intended to facilitate communication with those people uneducated in this type of complex conception. The name "freedom of speech" appears to represent a type of freedom, as do "freedom of belief", and "freedom of association", but that is not what is really the case in the conceptual structure which these words refer to. What is really meant if the theory states that "freedom of speech ought to be protected", or, "you ought to have the freedom of speech", is that restrictions against speaking should not be applied. Notice that what's really referred to is not one's freedom to speak, which is also one's freedom to be silent, and one's freedom to do whatever else is desired at that time, but the restrictions against speaking. What is referred to is that specific restriction. So "freedom of speech ought to be protected" says nothing about freedom itself, or any supposed "type of freedom", it says something about a specific type of restriction, the restriction against speaking, which it claims ought not be applied. This is the same way that "you are free to leave" refers to a specific restriction which is lifted, a restriction against you leaving, but it says nothing about the meaning of "free" or "freedom" or any "type of freedom". To know what "free" or "freedom" means in this context, we must refer to a definition, or a preconception.

I agree that there are... some cases where we might need to constrain what someone is saying. Generally threats, fraud, and incitement to violence. Quite a lot of other things, like just deception generally or hate speech, needs no constraint as it doesn't restrict others freedom. — Dan

But don't you think that hate speech incites violence? And don't you think that deception is a restriction on a person's free thinking. This is the issue I described, how communication in general, which extends from learning right through to general discussions about solving problems, restricts free thinking. How would you draw a line between threats (restricting one's freedom) and hate speech (not restricting), and how would you draw a line between fraud (restricting) and deception (not restricting)?

This is why I say that what is really the case is that all instances of influencing one's thinking through communication, from education right through to simple day to day conversation, are instances of restricting one's freedom of thought. Then we need to distinguish good restrictions from bad restrictions, and perhaps even indifferent restrictions. It makes no sense to say that the same type of communication, deception for example, in some instance restricts ones freedom, as fraud, but in other cases it does not, when what deception actually does to a person's free thinking is the same thing (some kind of causal change to a person's thinking) in each case. Instead we ought to look at under what conditions is deception (as a restriction to one's freedom) good (Plato's royal lie possibly?), under what conditions is it bad, and under what conditions is it amoral.

I believe that this is much more consistent with the reality of the situation. Restricting one's freedom of thought is what is done to a person throughout the person's life. It is most significant when the person is young, and the person slowly grows into a position where one is allowed more and more freedom of thought, but laws, bosses, and families, still impose significant restrictions.

Once we understand that having our freedom restricted, is a basic fact of life, then it is much easier to understand and accept all the aspects of society which actually restrict our freedom. That is why I suggested that we start with the basic restriction, that we cannot change the past, and also the restrictions which the past imposes on us through the laws of nature. When we start by taking these very significant restrictions for granted, such that they are not considered to be restrictions, instead of understanding the way that they restrict us, then we have no coherent approach toward understanding the way that restrictions actually work to restrict us.

To simply say restrictions are bad, and claim to protect freedom, then go through all the real restrictions classifying some as restrictions and others as not restrictions, because you want "freedom" to be good, and something to be protected, is to totally ignore the true human condition which is to be restricted. This "true human condition" of restricted is what I replied to Amadeus as represented in many religions as the result of original sin. Following from original sin is "knowledge", and knowledge restricts us in a new way which is completely different from the way that the past restricts us, as it contains a view toward the future, which we become respectful of. We can reject religion, as fundamentally outdated, and reject the representation which it gives us, but the true human condition, which is represented in that way, as fundamentally restricted, cannot be rejected, as Amadeus pointed out, it is self-evident.

Without getting back into why habits aren't restrictions on the will, I'm not really sure what kind of restrictions you are concerned about. A person's free will is not diminished by being locked in a cell, so being unable to change the past just doesn't seem like a concern. — Dan

The issue is what I was going through with Amadeus, was that the free will can choose to do what is physically impossible to do. That is a simple representation of "mistake". The "mistake" in its fundamental character is a misjudgement of the restrictions in the circumstances. If we do not class restrictions as restrictions, saying that they have no influence of one's "freedom" (in this odd sense of "freedom" you are proposing as deserving to be protected) then we do not have the principles required to avoid mistake. If you say that one's past (childhood experiences, habits, etc.) actually do restrict the person, but they just do not restrict one's freedom, then what principles can you propose to establish consistency? Is there one type of restriction which restricts freedom, and another type of restriction which restricts something else, something other than a person's freedom? What would be restricted by this type of restriction?

An alternative way of thinking about the kind of freedom that freedom consequentialism seeks to protect is that it is plausibly the same thing protected by some rights theories. Would conceptualizing it as a consequentialism of rights help you? — Dan

This might help. Representing what you call "freedom", as "rights" instead, would probably help me to explain to you that in your principles you are not at all proposing to protect freedom. A "right" is very different from "freedom".

No, in practice we both specify what people are or ought to be free to do or be and what restrictions they ought to be free from. Both are sensible ways of discussing what is meant by "freedom" in a specific context and what kind of freedom (or definition of freedom if you prefer) is valuable and which isn't.

No, I don't think deception is a restriction on free thinking... most of the time. As I've said, there are some cases where it is, such as fraud. But most of the time, no. And, for the same reason, education is not a restriction on freedom in the way you describe. Hate speech can indeed incite violence, and it is possible that in some circumstances there is an argument for restricting it, but it does not itself violate anyone's freedom, so restricting it is (if and when it is ever appropriate) a case of doing something bad to prevent something worse from happening.

You are ascribing motives to me that are unfair. I think the "restrictions" you are suggesting, such as education, simply aren't restrictions. It isn't a matter of not thinking they are because I want restrictions to be bad. It is a matter of not thinking they are because they aren't.

I'm not totally sure what you are talking about regarding childhood, but I will attempt to answer what appears to be the core question. Specifically, I would quite happily say that there are all sorts of things that restrict a person's choices, their "freedom" if you like, but don't restrict the kind of freedom I have identified as morally relevant. For example, my lack of a private plane "restricts" my choice to take my private plane when traveling. But this isn't a choice that belongs to me, so the fact it is "restricted" in this way isn't morally relevant.

No, a right is not very different from freedom. I think, properly understood, rights are ultimately about the kind of freedom I have been discussing. To have a right to something is to have a choice of whether to do that thing, or what to do with that thing. For example, a right to life entails a right to die, a right to speak entails a right to stay silent. I'm very happy have any future discussions without the language of rights. I should say now that doing so wouldn't quite be accurate, as I would say my theory aims to protect the thing at the core of rights theories, rather than rights themselves, and there is some baggage associated with rights that isn't applicable, such as rights being trumps and each right being kind of seperate from each other one, rather than a single underlying value as I would suggest. But, bearing that in mind, we can talk about freedom consequentialism as a consequentialism of rights from now on.

No, I don't think deception is a restriction on free thinking... most of the time. As I've said, there are some cases where it is, such as fraud. But most of the time, no. And, for the same reason, education is not a restriction on freedom in the way you describe. Hate speech can indeed incite violence, and it is possible that in some circumstances there is an argument for restricting it, but it does not itself violate anyone's freedom, so restricting it is (if and when it is ever appropriate) a case of doing something bad to prevent something worse from happening. — Dan

I don't understand how you can think that you could take a specific type of actiion, like deception for example, and say that most times it is not a restriction to freedom, but sometimes it is. If we take the act itself, which is to intentionally mislead a person, and we assume that in each case the deception is successful, how is it that sometimes misleading a person restricts one's freedom of choice, and sometimes it doesn't?

I believe you are not judging by consequences, because in each case the consequence is the same, the person is misled. Therefore you must be seeking to distinguish different types of the act itself, different types of deception. This means that there must be something within the intent of the deceiver, which makes the specific type of deception qualify as a restriction of freedom. You mentioned "fraud". Am I correct to assume that by "fraud" you mean when a person falsely represents oneself in an attempt to wrongly extract gain, financial, property, or whatever type of gain, from another. Is it this, the intent to attempt to take another's property, which constitutes a restriction of the other's freedom of choice?

If so, I do not understand how taking one's property restricts one's freedom. In actuality, owning property is itself a restriction to one's freedom, because the person is constrained to take extra measures to protect one's property from theft. It is commonly said that people are tied to their property, because owning property produces the responsibility of maintaining, servicing and taking care of that property. Ownership of property is actually a burden to one's freedom, as a weight to be carried.

It is for reasons like this, that I do not understand how you can take a specific type of act (deception in that example), and say that in some cases it restricts freedom and others it does not. This seems to me, to be a totally arbitrary distinction, not based in any real description of what it means to restrict a person's freedom. Can you give me such a description? Describe to me, what it means to you, to have your freedom of choice restricted.

I'm not totally sure what you are talking about regarding childhood, but I will attempt to answer what appears to be the core question. Specifically, I would quite happily say that there are all sorts of things that restrict a person's choices, their "freedom" if you like, but don't restrict the kind of freedom I have identified as morally relevant. For example, my lack of a private plane "restricts" my choice to take my private plane when traveling. But this isn't a choice that belongs to me, so the fact it is "restricted" in this way isn't morally relevant. — Dan

So, in explaining what it means to have "one's freedom of choice restricted", you fall back on this idea of "morally relevant", which seems incoherent to me. Notice, you allow that things which I call restrictions to one's freedom of choice (and this extends to all instances of deception, and even honest education) actually do restrict one's freedom, and you say you'd happily admit to this, but this type of restricting freedom is not in a "morally relevant" way.

This implies that the distinction you make is not a distinction between restricting one's freedom, and not restricting one's freedom, it's a distinction between restricting one's freedom in a morally relevant way, and restricting one's freedom in a way which is not morally relevant. The problem is that the name you attach, what you call these instances, "not restricting one's freedom", is not properly representative of what you believe, that these instance do restrict one's freedom, but not in a morally relevant way. And, when what you say does not properly represent what you believe, you leave yourself open to the charge of deception, yourself.

Keeping this in mind, take a look at your example. Your principle of discrimination is "a choice that belongs to me". Then all possible choices which you designate as not belonging to a person, if they are restricted from that person's freedom of choice, you insist that such a restriction is not morally relevant, and from this principle, you proceed to assert that this is not a restriction of one's freedom of choice. So, from my example, we can start with the fixedness of the past, and the forces expressed by the laws of nature, and I say that these are fundamental restrictions to one's freedom, while you claim that they are not restrictions because they are not morally relevant. And we can look at your example in the same way, not having a private plane restricts your freedom of choice to travel in your private plane, but you say that this is nor morally relevant because that choice does not belong to you, so you dismiss it as not a restriction to the "type of freedom" which you are concerned with.

Remember my objection though, the reason why I think this is incoherent, which you still haven't adequately cleared up for me. You could choose to steal a plane, then you would have a plane in your possession, and therefore the choice to travel in your private plane would belong to you. So it seems very clear to me, that the choice to travel in your private plane, when you do not have a private plane, if it inclines you to steal a plane, is very much "morally relevant", even if we can say that the "choice does not belong to you". And so it appears to me like your principle, by which you determine which choices are morally relevant, and which are not, upon which you base the distinction, and naming of, "restricting one's freedom" and "not restricting one's freedom", is fundamentally flawed, and incoherent. Choices which 'do not belong to you" are clearly morally relevant because they are the type of choices which incline one to do something bad.

No, a right is not very different from freedom. I think, properly understood, rights are ultimately about the kind of freedom I have been discussing. To have a right to something is to have a choice of whether to do that thing, or what to do with that thing. For example, a right to life entails a right to die, a right to speak entails a right to stay silent. I'm very happy have any future discussions without the language of rights. — Dan

This demonstrates very clearly the problem with your proposal of "a kind of freedom". To have a right to something is not to have a choice about that thing, it is to have your choice protected by legal principles. The thing is, we make choices about all sorts of things, and only some of those choices are protected by rights. So "rights" refers only to particular types of choices, and freedom of choice extends far beyond those choices which we have a right to make. Your proposal, to restrict the concept of "freedom of choice" to those choices which we have a right to make, is simply not representative of reality. It is a false proposition, and ought to be rejected as such. The following is that false proposition.
"to have a right to something is to have a choice of whether to do that thing, or what to do with that thing." See, people freely choose to do things which they have no right to do.

I should say now that doing so wouldn't quite be accurate, as I would say my theory aims to protect the thing at the core of rights theories, rather than rights themselves, and there is some baggage associated with rights that isn't applicable, such as rights being trumps and each right being kind of seperate from each other one, rather than a single underlying value as I would suggest. But, bearing that in mind, we can talk about freedom consequentialism as a consequentialism of rights from now on. — Dan

I still think you have things reversed. Freedom is logically prior to rights. Rights follow from freedom, and we only have rights because we have freedom. This means that freedom is fundamentally independent from rights, and not determined by rights. You can tie rights to freedom but you cannot tie freedom to rights.

In the case of deception, it's about what the person is being decieved about. Being able to "understand' one's choices is a fairly low bar to clear, but it can be affected by deception in some cases. Fraud isn't the only case but it's a simple one to explain. For example, might involve me agreeing to pay a large sum of money for a car that hasn't been driven many kilometers and is in good condition, but what is being delivered is a car that has driven a lot of kilometers and is being held together with blutack and hope. In such a case, you have not delivered on your agreement and have essentially stolen my money through fraud. If, however, you tell people that are an excellent guitar player so they will think you are cool, then you have not violated their freedom. The deception hasn't prevented them from making their own choices. Even if those choices involve you (such as whether they want to invite you to dinner). Another case might be misrepresenting a risk of something, such that a person is put at risk they didn't agree to. Or misrepresenting what might be involved in a medical procedure, such that a person has things done to them they have not consented to. Point being, there are ways you can violate freedom through deception, but most cases of simple lying will not do so.

I mean, I am not sure how to be more clear about this. I contend that a specific type of freedom should be protected, specfically that of persons over those choices that belong to them. By "morally relevant" I mean that the ability to understand and make such a choice (one that doesn't belong to you) does not have moral value. I don't mean that there is no moral content in the choice. And no, the choice to travel in the plane still wouldn't belong to you because the plane doesn't belong to you. What you do or don't have in your possession isn't at issue, what matters is what belongs to you, what choices you (for lack of a better phrase) have a right to make.

No, to have a right (a moral right anyway, which I assume is the kind we are talking about) to something is not about whether your choice is protected by legal principles. Women had a moral right to own property (assuming that people have such a right) in the same way as men before they were granted a legal right to do the same. It is very much one's moral rights I am concerned with, not their legal ones.

I am not sure what you think I have reversed. I am saying that I think the thing that rights theories ultimately protect is the type of freedom I am proposing is morally valuable. That is very much tying rights to freedom and not the other way around. I just thought that using the language of rights might be helpful as you seem to be having trouble with the language of freedom.

Being able to "understand' one's choices is a fairly low bar to clear, but it can be affected by deception in some cases. — Dan

This supposed "bar to clear" is extremely problematic. For the person who is "understanding", there is no difference between understanding and misunderstanding, it all appears like understanding. So, I "understand" my choice, but it later turns out that it really was a misunderstanding, due to deception. Then we can see that misunderstanding seeps into our thoughts in all sorts of different ways, in various aspects of thought, and various degrees. Therefore to "understand" one's own choice is not a practical bar at all, because within the various aspects which enter into any particular complex decision, there is likely to be some degree of misunderstanding.

This is where "habit" is very influential. When it becomes habitual, the misunderstanding passes as understanding without any further consideration, and the decision is immediate despite the presence of misunderstanding. The person believes oneself to "understand" one's own choices, but really misunderstands. That is a feature of the attitude known as certitude, and it allows misunderstanding to be abundant within one's own assumed understanding of one's own choices. On the other hand, the person who is of the skeptical mindset who is keenly aware of the possibility of misunderstanding, will deliberate, analyzing every aspect of the complex choice, to determine any possible spot where misunderstanding may lie hidden. That is why "habit" robs us of our freedom, by making misunderstanding appear to be understanding. So if you insist that to "understand" is the bar to freedom, then it is clear that habit restricts freedom in this way.

Your examples do not really serve the intended purpose. Decisions are in general, very complex, involving many aspects, so the effects of deception may be far reaching. If you make dinner for the supposed guitar player, isn't that fraud? What if you buy the person dinner, or buy tickets to their show? You seem to be trying to set a boundary which cannot be upheld. Deception is intentional, and if the intent is to take advantage of the other, then isn't that fraud? Some deception might be for entertainment, a joke or something, but don't you think that laying a trap for a person with the intent of laughing at them, is a case of restricting their freedom?

I mean, I am not sure how to be more clear about this. I contend that a specific type of freedom should be protected, specfically that of persons over those choices that belong to them. — Dan

And I don't know how to demonstrate more clearly, that your course here is deeply flawed. We cannot restrict the meaning of "freedom" to the point of having a specific "type of freedom" which is to be protected, because then it is not "freedom" at all which is being protected. "Freedom" means unrestricted. So all you are really doing is proposing a slew of restrictions which ought to be enforced, in order to produce the concept of "types of freedom". Then you use convoluted (and deceptive, as shown in the last post) language to make it appear like you are talking about "types of freedom" rather than what you are really talking about, types of restrictions.

It appears like the two of us are simply set in our own ways "determined" you might say, by our respective habits, to see things in a way opposed to how the other sees things. I could argue that you misunderstand, and that restricts your freedom, and you could argue that I misunderstand, but this sort of choice is extremely complex with abundant misunderstanding on both sides.

What you do or don't have in your possession isn't at issue, what matters is what belongs to you, what choices you (for lack of a better phrase) have a right to make. — Dan

This statement is very indicative of what I am arguing. By referring to the "choices you have a right to make", all you are really talking about is specific restrictions being applied to my freedom of choice. So the "right to make" this choice, and not that choice, is not at all a feature of my freedom of choice, it is a feature of a structured set of restrictions being applied to my freedom of choice.

(assuming that people have such a right) — Dan

This is an ontological proposition, to assume that rights have an ontological status independent from the human beings which determine those rights. That's a sort of platonic realism, which assumes independent existence of rights, known as "natural rights". But that ontology would need to be supported with principles and evidence.

I am not sure what you think I have reversed. — Dan

You have reversed the logical priority of "freedom" over restrictions, to make restrictions logically prior to "types of freedom". In reality, "restrictions" imply "freedom", as what is restricted, meaning that freedom is logically prior to restrictions. But you refuse to talk about "freedom" in the general sense, in its true definition of "unrestricted". Instead, you choose as your subject of discussion "types of freedom", which implies necessarily restrictions, such that restrictions are logically prior to "types of freedom".

From this reversal, it appears to you, like rights are what protects a person's freedom, the person's freedom existing only as types of freedom. But in reality, from the perspective of "freedom" in the general sense, meaning unrestricted, rights are what restrict one's freedom. So you do not tie rights to "freedom", as you claim, that is your deceptive proposition. You tie rights to "types of freedom". But "types of freedom" implies that one's freedom is already restricted.

So, as I've been saying, if we want to start with the assumption that one's freedom is already restricted, we need to look truthfully at the manner in which it is restricted. That is why I proposed that we look at the nature of time, and determine how temporal existence restricts one's freedom, to provide a foundation for that assumption.

Again, you are demanding more of "understanding" than I am. I am simply requiring that a person knows what choice they are making and what it means to make that choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it, not that they understand every aspect of that choice and everything that might lead from it. Also, the fact that someone might think they understand something and be wrong isn't problematic in the sense of causing a problem for my or other moral theories. People are wrong all the time, that's not really an issue.

No, it isn't fraud if you buy someone dinner because you think they can play guitar. It might be if you buy tickets to their show and their show doesn't exist. And no, laughing at someone you've tricked also isn't restricting their freedom (specifically, when I say not restricting their freedom here, I mean the specific type of freedom I have been advocating for). This isn't a vague or ill-considered distinction, it's fairly clear.

Yes, you can restrict the meaning of freedom to a specific type of freedom within a specific context. You're just wrong on that front. It is indeed a type of freedom, and I'm not sure how I could make my language much more clear. Without wishing to be rude, it does sometimes feel as though you are intentionally misunderstanding me.

I mean, you definitely do misunderstand, but it isn't a misunderstanding that restricts your freedom in this way. You are free to continue using your device to express your views whether or not those views stem from a misunderstanding.

It is the freedom to make certain choices that I am advocating for, I don't think I have ever been less than clear about that.

I mean, yeah I am very much assuming that all moral facts are true whether or not anyone knows them, including any "rights" that people have. I feel like I explained that before, certainly in my original primer. Have you been under the impression that I was taking some position other than moral realism and objectivism?

You keep talking about true definitions, but the definitions of words aren't terribly important. If you wish to call the thing I am promoting schmeedom, then that's fine. What is at issue is the ability of moral agents to exercise the things that make them moral agents in the first place (free will and rationality) over those choices that belong to them.

It is the freedom to make certain choices that I am advocating for, I don't think I have ever been less than clear about that. — Dan

I think we are at a standstill here. Neither of us will budge. I strongly believe that when you say "it is the freedom to make certain choices that I am advocating for", this is not any type of freedom at all. What you are saying is that one ought to be allowed to make this choice and that choice, but not any other choices. That is actually to tell people what choices they are allowed to make. To say that this is a type of freedom is nothing other than deception.

If you wish to call the thing I am promoting schmeedom, then that's fine. — Dan

Yes, I think that would be much better. The concept you are presenting as what you are advocating for is not freedom at all, so it's better if you choose another word for it. This would avail you in avoiding the charge of deception.

Should we leave it at that?

I'm not being deceptive, I'm simply using a term in a way you don't seem not to approve of. Also, to be clear, I'm not saying that people aren't allowed to make any choices that don't belong to them, simply that their ability to do so does not require protection.

I'm happy to leave it there though.

Also, to be clear, I'm not saying that people aren't allowed to make any choices that don't belong to them, simply that their ability to do so does not require protection. — Dan

Then it should be very clear to you, that you are not seeking to protect freedom of choice. Likewise, you are not seeking to protect freedom to act. Nor are you seeking to protect freedom to speak, freedom to assemble, or any other supposed "type of freedom", because some choices made within each of these categories might turn out not to "belong" to the person. What you are seeking to protect is the right of people to make certain types of choices.

To put this in context, you ought to be able to see now, that your op proposes a false dilemma. You are asking for a way to evaluate, or prioritize "freedom over different things", but you've already provided your own answer. Choices which "belong" to a person, in the most complete and absolute way, are of the highest value, while choices which do not belong to the person, in the most complete and absolute way, are of the least value. And all choices can be judged as to the degree that they truly "belong" to the person.

Further, if you replace "freedom" with "right" and acknowledge that what you are seeking to protect is rights rather than freedoms, the solution becomes even more obvious. In making a choice, the thing which the person has the most complete and absolute right to, is of the highest value, while the thing which one, in the most complete and absolute way, does not have a right to, is the least valuable. And every choice falls in between, and can be judged as to what degree the person has the right to make that choice.

Notice though, that this does not address the real problem of "freedom consequentialism, and that is that freedom and consequentialism are incompatible. Once you come to notice this, you might instead try to figure out how to make a value system based in rights compatible with a consequentialist value system. That problem is difficult enough, without even referencing freedom.

No, it is freedom of choice, rather than rights, as I've already explained many times. Yeah, I agree that it is very easy to resolve conflicts between choices that don't belong to someone and those that do, but this isn't the problem I outlined in the initial primer. I was concerned with how to weigh different amounts of freedom (over those choices that beong to people) against each other. For example, how many people's eyesight is worth one person's life if we are in a position to only save group or the other. This isn't resolved by what you suggest. Further, I'm not sure how you tell which choices people have a "more absolute right" to. If there was a clear and simple way of doing that, then that would go some way towards solving the problem (though it still wouldn't solve it completely as there is still the issue of how much of one (in terms of number but also in terms of duration and possibly even intensity) is worth how much of another. We might think that people have "more of a right" to live than to see, but that doesn't tell us how many of one is worth how many of the other.

Yeah, I agree that it is very easy to resolve conflicts between choices that don't belong to someone and those that do, but this isn't the problem I outlined in the initial primer. I was concerned with how to weigh different amounts of freedom (over those choices that beong to people) against each other. For example, how many people's eyesight is worth one person's life if we are in a position to only save group or the other. — Dan

If the choice truly "belongs" to the person, as you have been using this term, then the person is free to use whatever method of deciding which on wants to use. Therefore you cannot say objectively which is the better, or more highly valued choice, because that is a matter for the person who is in that particular situation, whom the choice actually "belongs to", to decide. In other words, if the choice truly belongs to the person, and the person is truly free to choose, then which choice is the correct choice is completely subjective, as being a conjunction of the person's freedom of choice, and the fact that the choice belongs to the person. If you tell the person that they must follow X hierarchical system in deciding, then the choice no longer belongs to the person, it belongs to you telling them what they must choose, and that's what I've been arguing is a restriction on the person's freedom of choice.

Further, I'm not sure how you tell which choices people have a "more absolute right" to. — Dan

That a choice "belongs" to a person is your principle. And I do not understand your need for it, nor do I accept it. But if you apply the principles whereby you determine whether a choice belongs to a person or not, you will find that in the various situations there is either strength or weakness in that "belonging". This will tell you whether the person has a more or less "absolute right" to make that choice.

We might think that people have "more of a right" to live than to see, but that doesn't tell us how many of one is worth how many of the other. — Dan

No, this is not a good analogy. We are talking about a person's right to make a specific choice. When you say that a certain choice does not belong to the person, so the person is not free to make that choice, I interpret it as the person does not have the right to make that choice. So when you take a look at some of the rights which exist, you'll see that some are more universally accepted, and are therefore higher than others. For instance, compare the right to live, to the right to speak freely, to the right to move freely around the globe. The first has almost no restriction (only the death sentence), the second has some restrictions, and the third has many restrictions. So the first is the highest freedom, having almost no restrictions, while the others are placed lower in the scale, depending on the strength of the right.

The issue isn't with determining which freedom of an individual that individual should value over any other. The issue is with deciding how to balance different people's freedom to do different things against each other. Such as the blindness vs death example given. I really think this discussion would go smoother if you read more of the primer I wrote to begin with.

I'm not sure what you mean by finding either strength or weakness in belonging or how we would find that. Also, I'm not sure why how often people's freedom is restricted would determine the extent to which that choice belongs to them.

I really think this discussion would go smoother if you read more of the primer I wrote to begin with. — Dan

I have made it through to the end of the primer now.

The issue is with deciding how to balance different people's freedom to do different things against each other. — Dan

I don't understand how this could be an issue. You have already claimed to restrict "freedom" to those choices which belong to the person. If the choice involves doing something "against" another, how could that choice belong to the person?

Perhaps I misunderstand, but a person making a decision must use one's own thoughts, therefore one's own principles (whether they are common principles or not), so a person can only make one's own choice, and if another influences that choice, we'd have to question whether the choice made, truly belongs to the person. So we really cannot balance one person's freedom in relation to another's because freedom only relates to choice which belong to oneself. Don't you think so?

I'm not sure what you mean by finding either strength or weakness in belonging or how we would find that. Also, I'm not sure why how often people's freedom is restricted would determine the extent to which that choice belongs to them. — Dan

The problem here is that you have introduced me to this concept, of a choice which "belongs" to a person. It is entirely new to me, and you have really not made it very clear. For example, what exactly are the criteria which determines that the choice belongs to the person? Because you haven't provided me with clear meaning on that concept, I'm sort of playing a guessing game as to what constitutes a choice that belongs to the person.