For sure, and there's a great deal to be said for clear and minimal ontological commitments. Analytic philosophy does some excellent work by taking predicate logic as a kind of model of good grammar for philosophers. Probably the things I'm worrying about in this OP only arise when one begins to question whether the world reflects these same commitments, and whether formalisms necessarily capture everything we want to say, philosophically.I think that making use of the grammar of first order logic helps here, in obliging us to take care as to what we mean by "exists". — Banno
it would apparently be completely against the spirit of this thread to bracket all questions about being and ontology. — Leontiskos
Perhaps Kimhi recognizes this, but the idea is that to recognize the notion of the true requires a second act of the intellect, a kind of back-folding of the intellect, or the trough and the crest of the selfsame wave of apprehension. — Leontiskos
‛I think p’ can be called a spontaneous self-clarification of p. I call it self-clarificatory because it brings out the content of consciousness without adding anything to it or determining anything about it. I call it spontaneous because the clarification is immediately available through the display of the judgment that p. — Kimhi
If by “bracket” you mean “declare them out of bounds when discussing predication,” then yes, there wouldn’t be much left to say about whether predication might reveal parallels between existence and truth. — J
But I think it’s fine to get clear on what the standard commitments are, and why they’re so useful. Particularly useful for those of us like me who hated actually doing logic. — J
“It’s the end of analytic philosophy as we know it, and I feel fine!”* — J
Part of what’s confusing in Kimhi is that he often uses ‛I think p’ to mean ‛I judge that p’, as you can see in the above passage. But of course ‛I judge that p’ is even closer to what you’re calling “the notion of the true,” and Kimhi is certainly pointing to a second act of the intellect which makes self-conscious what has been initially thought or judged. — J
The expression "p is true" says no more than "p" — RussellA
This is a little tricky. Doesn't it depend on exactly what we mean by "say 'p'"? — J
I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J
Given what you say, it is not clear to me whether Kimhi sees there to be any apprehension of being that is (metaphysically) prior to an apprehension of truth. Or in other words, does Kimhi see the fundamental "act of consciousness" as already bound up with truth? — Leontiskos
Well, as one of those who participated, I'd characterise the interaction differently. You were unable to set out clearly what it was you wanted to show....but everyone in the thread proved incapable of these metalogical distinctions. — Leontiskos
It's discourteous to mention without linking.I am of the opinion that Banno at least somewhat derailed your thread on QV by immediately shifting it away from Sider's ontological realism and towards pure logical formalisms which intentionally avoid questions of ontology. — Leontiskos
Formalism just obliges good grammar. It shows us how to set things out more clearly.obably the things I'm worrying about in this OP only arise when one begins to question whether the world reflects these same commitments, and whether formalisms necessarily capture everything we want to say, philosophically. — J
Formalism seeks clarity in otherwise opaque discourse. In this case, what is shown is that there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing. That seems a direct answer to the OP. (↪J?) — Banno
Typical statement: “The critical insight -- that any unity in consciousness is essentially self-consciousness of that unity -- is recognized to coincide with the insight that the consciousness of logical activity is inseparable from the capacity to manifest this activity in language.” — J
it seems what is needed is a thesis, or a series of theses, rather than a thread. — Banno
if the point is to show that Frege is mistaken, then it's somewhat closing the barn door after the horse has bolted.
So where does that leave us? — Banno
It seems to me that it adds nothing because it would be redundant. In making statements about things, you are implying that the things you talk about exist and that your statement is true. If not, then you are lying. When lying you don't say, "It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table." as it is already implied that what you are saying is true and that thalers and the table exists. This is why people are fooled by false statements because they assume that the statement is true without the liar having to actually declare it is true as part of the statement. To show whether or not your statement is true, we need to make an observation.That is, neither existence nor truth add anything, conceptually, to what they appear to be predicating ‛existence’ and ‛truth’ of. I can say “A hundred thalers exist” but this adds nothing to the concept ‛a hundred thalers’; I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J
Hmm. Not quite sure I get this. Can you refer us to some passages in the Tractatus? — J
TLP 4.0312 My fundamental idea is that the "logical constants" are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.
TLP 4.12 Propositions can represent the hole of reality, but they cannot represent what they have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it - logical form.
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world.
TLP 4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They display it.
TLP 4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said
He is clear that he opposes what he calls “psycho / logical dualism”: “a theory of judgment as involving a subjective act and a truth-evaluable content – the unity and complexity of which is external to the judging subject.” In short, he doesn’t accept the Fregean picture that assertoric force is separate from whatever semantic content will determine truth value. — J
But the “psycho / logical monism” that he does accept is (for me) very difficult to understand. I’ll take my best guess and say that, unlike Aquinas, Kimhi sees the “fundamental act of consciousness” as either affirmation or denial – what he calls a two-way capacity, borrowing from Aristotle. Propositions are affirmed or denied by acts of consciousness, not by predications – a kind of “full context principle.” — J
He also has this interesting observation, which harks back to the QV discussion, and to banno’s reminders here about logical form and ontological commitment: Kimhi calls Frege’s logic a functionalist logic, and says moreover that it’s extensionalist, “insofar as the truth-value of a proposition depends only on the extensional identity of its components and the manner of composition. Among other things, that means that logical principles are not about propositions (thoughts) but about what gets quantified.” (my italics) This is a pretty concise way of framing the problem. Because if you oppose this view of logic, as Kimhi does, then you seem to be saying that “propositions (thoughts)” can be the subject of logical thinking without committing to “what gets quantified,” which in turn would mean that existence can – would have to be – more than just “the value of a bound variable.” I dunno, maybe I’m reading too much into it, but that’s what it says to me. — J
In this case, what is shown is that there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing. That seems a direct answer to the OP. — Banno
I was curious to learn more about what philosophers have said concerning the parallels between "truth" and "existence" as predicates... — J
The classical solution was, roughly, that an extensional understanding of logic is preferable simply because it is simpler. — Banno
But there are intensional logics... — Banno
...there are no sentences that are not about some thing, and so not true sentences that are not about some thing — Banno
I'm sorry you can't see how it answers the OP. It is at least a beginning. HenceHow would this be an answer to the OP? — Leontiskos
J apparently can see how it addresses the OPIt's a direct answer, certainly. — J
...which is too general, too glib. I might reply, in kind, that all (true) sentences can be parsed into propositional logic. "p". Therefore all true sentences are "formulable within formalism"....whether all true sentences are formulable within formalism, and it seems a foregone conclusion that they are not. — Leontiskos
We have both existential quantification and ∃!. And we have Tarski and all the ensuing work. These are concerted efforts to explore the grammar of truth and existence. First order logic shows that quantification is not a first order predicate, free logic shows the implications of treating existence as a first order predicate. Tarski explicitly makes truth a second order predicate ranging over propositions. Claiming that there is no explicit predication of existence or truth in formal logic is ignorant.Given that there is no explicit predication of existence (or, I think, truth) within formal logics... — Leontiskos
There is no suggestion that we limit ourselves to formal logic. But you might benefit from making at least some use of it. It seems we are repeating the problem seen in other threads, where a lack of literacy in formal languages leads to an inability to set out the issues clearly....how could this question possibly be answered by limiting ourselves to formal logics? — Leontiskos
Neither of us, nor I suspect anyone else here, have the background in intensional logic (with an "s", not a "t") that is required. I'll just leave here the intuition that more recent developments in treating intensions as algorithms reinforce treating intension as use, and leave it at that....intentional logic would seem to be a topic that is relevant to the thread. — Leontiskos
...like in everyday language-use because we typically use language to inform others of some state of affairs in the world whether it be what is on the table or what is on this page.As this thread has shown, it's complicated. A great deal depends on whether the statement "There are a hundred thalers on the table" occurs in a context where it's reasonable to assume it's also being asserted. — J
...which you would be lying to yourself.Lying is not the only thing that could call this into question. I might be genuinely mistaken about the thalers, though of course I'd still be asserting it. — J
...which you would be referring to the scribbles on the page or the sounds coming from your mouth and not actually thalers on the table and would be just as redundant to say that "It is true that I am mentioning the statement" or pointing our something about it (like the statement exists on this page). In other words, it is redundant to make statements about things that we can already see for ourselves.Or I could be merely mentioning the statement, or pointing out something about it, or asking for a discussion of its semantic content. — J
In other words, the semantic content involves what you are actually talking about that others can observe for themselves to verify the truth, whether it be thalers on the table or scribbles on the screen. I would say that the difference between knowledge and belief is that knowledge is supported by both logic and observation while beliefs are only supported by one or the other.In such a case, the information/predicate that the statement is also true can be provided outside the context of an assertion, so that it isn't redundant. This all goes back to the basic Fregean question of whether we can "say" a proposition, or at least understand it, without asserting it, that is, separate semantics and truth-value from assertoric force. So I think my statement from the OP that you quote was too hasty. I should have written, "I can say 'It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table' but this adds nothing to the semantic content of the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’.
As to how we ascertain the truth of a statement, that's another story, and usually involves some combination of observation, as you say, and correct use of a language. The exact combination has been disputable and I'm sure will continue to be. — J
Can you say what the difference is between "representing" logical form and "mirroring" logical form? The example of the apple on the table suggests that, while "on" is undefinable without circularity, its logical form can nevertheless be shown through usage. That doesn't sound like the same issue -- or is it? — J
The question we are considering is whether all true sentences are formulable within formalism.
Within the literature, it seems to me that the words i) assertoric force, asserted, force, extrinsic and assertion seem to be synonyms for Frege's "reference" and the words ii) content, semantic, intrinsic and unasserted seem to be synonyms for Frege's "sense". — RussellA
I'm sorry you can't see how it answers the OP. It is at least a beginning. — Banno
Existence, at least as qualification, ranges over individuals, while truth ranges over propositions. The OP asks about the relation between existence and truth. — Banno
So generally, existence is not a first order predicate; nor is truth. — Banno
I might reply, in kind, that all (true) sentences can be parsed into propositional logic. "p". Therefore all true sentences are "formulable within formalism". — Banno
Claiming that there is no explicit predication of existence or truth in formal logic is ignorant. — Banno
This post will just rattle your cage. That is probably all that can be done until J can formulate a more explicit topic. — Banno
Thanks, this helps. "Representing" is describing in words, while "mirroring" is more like ostension or making a picture. I'm not satisfied with how this carries over into logical form
(is "on" really a logical connective?), but that can wait till another day. — J
The distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic terms was established in ancient Greek grammar. Words that designate self-sufficient entities (i.e., nouns or adjectives) were called categorematic, and those that do not stand by themselves were dubbed syncategorematic, (i.e., prepositions, logical connectives, etc.)
A syncategorematic expression does not add anything (whether content or form) to the sense of any proposition embedded in it. On Kimhi's account, the assertions "Not-p", "A thinks p", "p is true" and, last but not least, "p" itself, do not add anything whatsoever to the sense of "p". None of these expressions stands for a relation. In fact, none of them stands for anything. They all are syncategorematic expressions. That the assertion "p" is itself a syncategorematic unit becomes intelligible once it is realized that the propositional symbol "p" consists in a fact rather than a complex (100).
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