right, and that first choice was based on circumstances we didn't choose, a mind we didn't choose, a will we didn't choose - so was the choice that we chose, which was based on all those things we didn't choose and based on nothing at all that we did choose, a free choice or not?

Indeed. Choiceless, we come into being. (The creed of the American teenager. "I didn't ask to be born.")

Yes, by definition, the first choice was a free choice. If it's not free, it's not a choice. No more than the boulder chooses which path to take as it rolls down the mountain. But when did that choice takes place? At different ages, under different circumstances, for different people. People learn things, and come to understand things, at different ages.

The conditions from which my consciousness - I - emerged are not the same as the conditions from which your consciousness - you - emerged.

We start as the merging of the genetic material of egg and sperm. There are no choices being made at that point. It's all chemistry. Physical cause and effect.

As we grow, even before we're born, the body/brain develops/makes more connections/becomes more able to process information. And for a while, it's all mechanical. Stimulus and response.

At some point, I don't know the specific conditions, we emerge. Awareness.

Of course, many things about the conditions from which I emerge are the same as the conditions from which you emerge. We wouldn't both be people (I'm giving you the benefit of the doubt) without a lot of common grounds. But there are also many differences. Different genetics. Different people, with different voices and smells, raising us in different ways. Different foods. Different smells coming through our windows as we lay in our cribs. On and on. So, before we awakened, and began choosing, while we were simply reacting to stimuli, we reacted in different ways.

Certainly, all that groundwork plays a big role in our likes and dislikes, and our predispositions. Why do I have an overwhelming preference for Bach over Mozart? An extreme sweet tooth? Why am I heterosexual? Why is blue my favorite color? None of those things are choices.

But I can choose whether or not to listen to music at any given moment. If I choose to, I can choose whether or not to listen to Bach. If I do, I can choose from among his pieces. I did not listen to the Musical Offering on such-and-such a date and time because it was impossible for me to do anything other than exactly that.

I did not marry my wife because the progressions of arrangements of all the constituents of my brain, driven by the laws of physics, did not allow me to end our relationship before marriage.

But when did I make my first free choice? No earthly idea. Maybe something that an observer would have taken for a free choice was not, because I had not yet come to understanding.

Yes, by definition, the first choice was a free choice. If it's not free, it's not a choice. No more than the boulder chooses which path to take as it rolls down the mountain. But when did that choice takes place? At different ages, under different circumstances, for different people. People learn things, and come to understand things, at different ages — Patterner

So, they learn things. These experiences become causes. How does this learning create an exception to determinism?

Yes, by definition, the first choice was a free choice. If it's not free, it's not a choice — Patterner

The problem here is you define it as something free, then use the definition to justify that it is free. We can certainly take on your definition of choice - that it's not merely a situation where a perhaps considers two or more possibilites, but rather the past does not cause what they next do. Once we have that definition, what is the justification for saying that the previous moment's state didn't inevitably lead to the next moment's state?

So, before we awakened, and began choosing, — Patterner

Are there any changes in the mechanics that lead to this awakening and freedom? What's happening at the ontological level that freedom is now allowed and how do you know this is the case?

But I can choose whether or not to listen to music at any given moment. If I choose to, I can choose whether or not to listen to Bach. — Patterner

What motivates the choosing not to listen to Bach or the choosing to listen to Bach? Is it random? Uncaused?

But when did I make my first free choice? No earthly idea. — Patterner

What makes you think there was one? What specifically leads you to the conclusion 'those actions on my part were not chosen, all those when I was younger than X, but I can know/show that at least this one, when I was ten, for exampel, while not being the first was free'?

Yes, by definition, the first choice was a free choice. If it's not free, it's not a choice — Patterner

So you don't have to have chosen your motivations or your will, in order for a choice that your will chooses to be your choice. In other words, the whole "self-authorship" requirement some people have for free will, is not in fact a requirement you have for free will - someone can make a free choice with no self authorship at all.

Your first choice can be a choice, despite being the product of countless things you didn't choose, and 0 things you did choose - like you had no choice but to make that choice, right?

And please recall, the quote that opened this conversation between you and I was T Clark saying "if we don't determine our will, we don't have free will."

If your first choice is free, despite being based on a will you had no choice in creating or designing, then you're disagreeing with that quote from Mr Clark. You're saying we can make free choices even if we haven't determined one single iota of our will.

Our thoughts are us, although there is more than just than that' is worth thinking about in relation to the idea of free will. It is possible to identify with the flow of thought completely, that is the basis of uncritical belief. It may involve a sense of almost unconscious basis for action. The 'more than' our thoughts is ambiguous, but may involve being able to observe thoughts, analyse and reflect on them, which may be a basis for mental freedom or the development of free will. In that respect, philosophy may enable the art of cultivating free will.

Maybe this is not what you're looking for, but I would suggest one can maybe better and more clearly speak of what you are pointing to in terms of weak and strong wills, instead of in terms of free and unfree will.

As I think truely 'free will' is a logical impossibility as it leads to a kind of infinite regress (previous posts), what we really are pointing to is a will that isn't overly constrained by outside social forces, and/or a will that resolved some of its own inner tensions (strong will) and a will that is more influenced by outside social forces, and/or weakened or consumed by its own contradictions (weak will).

And in that quest, for a more unified unconstrained will, philosophy definitely can play a role I would say in resolving some of conflicts in values, and in inoculating oneself from social manipulation/propaganda/plain bad ideas that are floating around.

There is probably a continuum of strong and weak wills. This is likely based on the degree of strength which a person has learned. Also, it is possible to be weak in some areas but strong in other aspects. For example, a person may be strong in resisting violent impulses, but be weak in bingeing on chocolate.

The area of freedom of will is likely to be interconnected to the examination of values. In this respect, it is connected to the nature of 'the examined life', as opposed to robotic automatic functioning.

Compatanilism makes sense because it involves both the physical and mental aspects of agency. Dispenza looks at the way the neurochemistry involves the pleasurable aspects of behaviour. He suggests that this is what hinders change because we are addicted to the chemical aspects of certain patterns of behaviour and thinking.

What does one mean by "free will"?

As I think truely 'free will' is a logical impossibility as it leads to a kind of infinite regress (previous posts), what we really are pointing to is a will that isn't overly constrained by outside social forces, and/or a will that resolved some of its own inner tensions (strong will) and a will that is more influenced by outside social forces, and/or weakened or consumed by its own contradictions (weak will). — ChatteringMonkey

Does not "resolving its own inner tensions" involve limiting the amount of choices one has going forward vs being "consumed by contradictions" which would be having more choices, some of which are contradictory but are still options one could choose? Most people are equating freedom with choices. So the more choices, contradictory or not, is really just more freeom you can jave. Should I buy a new computer or not buy a new computer? I can't do both but both are options I can choose. By limiting contradictory options are you not limiting your options, and therefore your freedom?

There is probably a continuum of strong and weak wills. This is likely based on the degree of strength which a person has learned. Also, it is possible to be weak in some areas but strong in other aspects. For example, a person may be strong in resisting violent impulses, but be weak in bingeing on chocolate. — Jack Cummins

One might say that the person has a strong will to eat chocolate.

Does not "resolving its own inner tensions" involve limiting the amount of choices one has going forward vs being "consumed by contradictions" which would be having more choices, some of which are contradictory but are still options one could choose? Most people are equating freedom with choices. So the more choices, contradictory or not, is really just more freeom you can jave. Should I buy a new computer or not buy a new computer? I can't do both but both are options I can choose. By limiting contradictory options are you not limiting your options, and therefore your freedom? — Harry Hindu

You are resolving tensions in what you want, not in what you can or could do. So you still have the choices, you just don't want it anymore... so I would say no it doesn't limit your choices, it just give you a more clear idea of what you really want so you don't get pulled in all direction getting nowhere ultimately.

There is probably a continuum of strong and weak wills. This is likely based on the degree of strength which a person has learned. Also, it is possible to be weak in some areas but strong in other aspects. For example, a person may be strong in resisting violent impulses, but be weak in bingeing on chocolate. — Jack Cummins

It certainly is a continuum. And yes the idea is that you give up on/sublimate some desires or values that are contradictory with others that you do want to pursue more.

But some self-control I would presume would typically be part of that process, and that probably would include resisting both bingeing and violent impulses.

That sounds very plausible.

By extension, it seems to me that it's (in a sense) painful to be wrong, and it feels better to be right. This pushes us to irrationality.

Does he suggest strategy to avoid the pitfalls?

With the idea of a strong will to eat chocolate there may be conflict between the conscious and subconscious aspects of will. A person may enjoy chocolate but realise a need to not do so, especially for health reasons. This may create a complex dynamic and subconscious aspects, such as comfort, may be a stumbling block.

The other part of this may be where an intention or aspects of will fit in within the larger system of one's motivation and gratification. If one is trying to make change in one area of life a certain amount of stability in various other aspects may be important. That is because to deal with too much conflict and change at once may be too difficult.

The link which you provided on compatabilism is useful. That is because the idea has a history and I have found when reading about it that various authors use the idea differently.

The coexistence of the empirical aspects of neuroscience and the questions of philosophy may be complementary. One without the other may be insufficient. Many of the important thinkers were speculating about the nature of 'mind' and free will. In the understanding of consciousness there can be an opposite tendency to see neuroscience as replacing this. The philosophy of the question of the
hard problem of consciousness and free will do not go away and it may be possible to build bridges between the findings of neuroscience and the underlying philosophical ideas.

The strategy which Dispenza suggests for coping with conflicts of will is mental rehearsal. Personally, I do find that visualisation and imagining a situation in advance can be helpful for desired outcomes. It is far from absolute because life has so many unpredictable variables. However, imagining scenarios mentally is a potential way of preparation for affirmation of intent and will.

The 'more than' our thoughts is ambiguous, — Jack Cummins

As I noted in another post in this thread:

My thoughts (and feelings, memories, perceptions, and a bunch of other stuff) are me. — T Clark

The question of what 'I' is a big one in thinking, especially in relation to free will. In her volume on consciousness, Susan Blackmore thought that acknowledging perplexity was important.

With the idea of willing in the moment, there is the contrast with sustained will. In particular, a feeling of intent may arise in a situation or as an ongoing aspect of the establishment of goals. The momentary aspects of choice and the longer term ones may compete.

As far as where the will comes from it is likely to be complex, including nature and nurture as well as in connection with factors in the social environment. A person is a system within the context of larger systems. The individual is both acted upon and acts upon other systems. The elusive 'I' could be viewed as the narrative author weaving all this together in a personal context.

Doubts may be experienced so often by an individual. I certainly feel in a maze, or even a fog of confusion of possibilities on a frequent basis. That is often because it is difficult to see the larger picture, especially of the unknown future. What I like about Watson and Skinner's picture of rats iand mouses n mazes isn't the actual deterministic picture of behaviorism but the metaphor of the creatures within the maze.

Behaviorism certainly paints a picture of determinism. However, the later development of cognitive behavioral approaches may alter this. That is cognition plays a part in making sense of it all, including the mazes, even if there are not any easy solutions.

the hard problem of consciousness and free will [will] not go away — Jack Cummins

Well, imo, that's because both are pseudo-problems generated (mostly) by 'philosophical grammar' and not themselves scientific, or empirical, problems. Re: embodied metacognition (+ property dualism) contra disembodied "consciousness" or "will". :sparkle:

various authors use the idea differently

Many of the important thinkers were speculating

may be insufficient

So what? For the sake of this discussion, only what we – you and I – think about these topics is relevant no matter how informed we might be by other sources. Stop hedging and think things through for yourself. :chin:

The balance between reading others' ideas and usage of language alongside a unique personal or independent opinion is tricky, but important. It is possible to get lost in the labyrinth of thoughts of others, especially in thinking of the issue of free will. This is because it is a philosophy problem throughout history. Ultimately, each person arrives at a unique personal perspective through sifting through ideas in conjunction with experience of life. It is an issue which can be explored for a lifetime, and what matters most is how it contributes to living life with the greatest freedom.

Blah blah blah ... but what do YOU think, Jack, about the topic at issue?

I do believe in the existence of free will. It is not absolute because we are affected by so many variables outside of oneself. I may even go a stage beyond the position of free will as such. That is to say that one's conscious and subconscious will, apart from affecting one's actions can have a determining effect in leading to the circumstances which manifest in one's life. Intention is so powerful.

I figure Spinoza made short work of this. We deliberate between choices as means to achieve our ends. Whatever is making it possible for this to happen is not a copy of our nature.

If the agency we experience gives us no conception of what is happening, presuming a 'determinism' is not an argument against the reality of deliberation.

:up: Okay, sounds to me like compatibilism.

Someone who doesn't believe in free will would say that what we "want" to choose is also an illusion, determined by a set of factors. Personally I subscribe to the philosophy that free will is being able to react to changes in the environment, whether or not it's determined. I believe that is a different argument that the free will one.

This is useful for expressing that we do have the ability to react to those things unless our wants (or original environment) overpowers additional factors, in which case you could sometimes say a person lacks free will situationally.

So, they learn things. These experiences become causes. How does this learning create an exception to determinism? — Bylaw

Right? The Hard Problem of Consciousness. Of course, the HP isn't about an exception to determinism. More basic, it's about how the objective physical is accompanied by subjective experience. But if there are two non-physical things going on, I don't know why they couldn't be two aspects of the same thing.

The problem here is you define it as something free, then use the definition to justify that it is free. — Bylaw

The alternative is saying something is a choice, then saying it was the only possible outcome. That means that, although there are more variables, and more kinds of variables, going into the final choice I make than there are going into the final resting place of a boulder rolling down a mountain, it's all the same. Just physical things bouncing into each other, until the only possible resolution is reached. How can we say the boulder chose the spot in which it came to rest when the factors that went into the choice were gravity, density of materials, and the lay of the land? How can we say that I chose what music to listen to just because the factors that went into the choice included things like molecules called dopamine and serotonin, and records of past stimuli stored in arrangements of connections between neurons?

Are there any changes in the mechanics that lead to this awakening and freedom? — Bylaw

Not mechanics. Again, I'm thinking subjective experience and freedom from physical determinism are part of the same packages. It there was any hint of mechanics, Brian Greene would not write this in Until the End of Time:

And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? Particles can have mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), but all these qualities seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience. How then does a whirl of particles inside a head—which is all that a brain is—create impressions, sensations, and feelings? — Brian Greene

I'm not aware of any other scientist who contradicts him. Nobody is saying the charge of X, combined with the mass of Y, when surrounded by the flow of Z, all in a medium of a certain density causes consciousness. There is just an unspoken acceptance that, it just happens.

What's happening at the ontological level that freedom is now allowed — Bylaw

I don't know how many guesses there are about how this is happening. And I can't imagine a way to test any of them. Including the one I suspect is there cases, which is proto-consciousness. A property of matter. But, unlike things like charge, mass, and spin, it is a mental property, rather than a physical property.

and how do you know this is the case? — Bylaw

I don't. I believe it. I see no logic in the idea that conglomerates of particles that do nothing but bounce around according to the laws of physics have, for no reason, the feeling that they are something other than conglomerates of particles that do nothing but bounce around according to the laws of physics. If there was nothing but the physical and laws of physics, there's no reason that such conglomerates would have subjective experiences of any kind, much less the specific subjective experience that they are also something else.

But we do have this experience. And I believe the experience needs an explanation. I don't believe any number or mixture of physical building blocks can give rise to something that is not physical, so there must be something else.

What motivates the choosing not to listen to Bach or the choosing to listen to Bach? Is it random? Uncaused? — Bylaw

The very notion of listening to Bach can be caused by various things. Maybe I see his name in an article. Maybe I see the word "pass", and it makes me think passacaglia. Maybe I read about Mickey Mantle's 565-foot home run, and it makes me think of Bach's BWV 565. Or, more directly, I hear a snippet of hiss music. Whatever the specifics, specific arrangements of connections between neurons have been stimulated, and the records of certain past stimuli are brought to consciousness.

But choosing to listen or not, and choosing which piece to listen to if I choose to listen at all, are a different matter. They aren't just memories brought to the surfaces, unbidden. I don't choose the same way the arrangement of the pool balls after the break is chosen.

What makes you think there was one? What specifically leads you to the conclusion 'those actions on my part were not chosen, all those when I was younger than X, but I can know/show that at least this one, when I was ten, for exampel, while not being the first was free'? — Bylaw

It seems to me that the mind grows as the brain becomes more complex. Even if we aren't controlled by our memories, we use them when we make choices. I can choose between desserts I've never heard of, or between desserts that I have heard of, or some combination. But if I don't have memories of specific desserts, of even memory of what dessert is, because my brain has not yet become complex enough... We don't have memories back beyond a certain point in time, and weren't doing much in the way of thinking clearly or making choices, because we were not yet capable.

The alternative is saying something is a choice, then saying it was the only possible outcome — Patterner

That's one other alternative. Some people would say there is no choice, that it's illusiory, and want to avoid that word. But even those who do not take that position can say that the word choice refers to when we mull over two or more actions and have the subjective experience that it could have gone either way or any of the ways, when in fact it was always going to be the way it went. So, the word 'choice' is built on subjective experience.

It there was any hint of mechanics, Brian Greene would not write this in Until the End of Time: — Patterner

He's not, there, writing about free will.
Further Brian Greene could be wrong. Notice that you hinge the truth of free will on the fact that someone says something. Further...

I'm not aware of any other scientist who contradicts him. — Patterner

There are scientists who disagree with him.

A property of matter. But, unlike things like charge, mass, and spin, it is a mental property, rather than a physical property. — Patterner

So, mental properties can cause matter to do things and there is no causation in the other direction? And why is there free will in the non-physical? What don't processes in that substance cause the next processes/phenomena to happen? Is there no causation in the non-physical, yet it can cause things to happen in the physical?

I don't. I believe it. I see no logic in the idea that conglomerates of particles that do nothing but bounce around according to the laws of physics have, for no reason, the feeling that they are something other than conglomerates of particles that do nothing but bounce around according to the laws of physics. If there was nothing but the physical and laws of physics, there's no reason that such conglomerates would have subjective experiences of any kind, much less the specific subjective experience that they are also something else — Patterner

What do you think the physical is? It seems you think the physical is particles only. Is that true?

The very notion of listening to Bach can be caused by various things. Maybe I see his name in an article. Maybe I see the word "pass", and it makes me think passacaglia. Maybe I read about Mickey Mantle's 565-foot home run, and it makes me think of Bach's BWV 565. Or, more directly, I hear a snippet of hiss music. — Patterner

[are you Swedish?] In any case, so these physical causes are leading to your decision, it seems.

But choosing to listen or not, and choosing which piece to listen to if I choose to listen at all, are a different matter — Patterner

But what is making you decide: desire, interest, curiosity, preference? ARe you by any chance thinking that determinism means only causes external to the person lead to what the person does/chooses? That's not most people's idea of determinism.

It seems to me that the mind grows as the brain becomes more complex. — Patterner

So, changes in the physical lead to choice?

I can choose between desserts I've never heard of, or between desserts that I have heard of, or some combination. — Patterner

And what do you think motivates you to choose between two desserts that you've never tried? What is the motivation? Is your choice in that situation motivated or random?

You seem to be arguing here that it has nothing to do with memory, so it is free. But what motivates the choice?

Is it random? Is it motivated by desires and goals you have? why are these causes not determined causes in a causal chain? The physical vs. mental to me is a non-issue here. Determinism is the idea that each effect is caused by what went before and in turn is a cause. Doesn't matter if these are mental causes or physical causes or some others.

Something leads to your decision/choice. If you chose because of your desires, for example, well these were causes by prior mental states and external causes also. If the choice is not caused by what went before and not caused by you and what you are, it seems a pyrrhic 'freedom' and random.

The gap between what a person seeks in their intent and finding the means to reach that end is central to human agency. It is where human choice makes deliberate acts to bring about chosen ends consciously.

The coexistence of determinism and free will makes sense. I subscribe to a biopsychocial model of influence in life. Factors from genetics, socialisation and the environment have a determining role. The physical laws and the weather have a determining effect on thinking and behaviour. The variables always come together and interact.

Free will, as the deliberate art of innovation is more likely as an act of rebellion against pain and suffering. If one is comfortable and content there may be no need to make changes at all. In this respect, the existence of pain and discontent may break cycles of repetition. This may be evolutionary as ongoing evolution of human consciousness, with free will as the mover towards creativity on a personal and cultural level.

Generally I agree with what is said here, I would just like to point out my previous comment only claims that they can coexist, not that they do.

The interesting thing for me about this coexistence is that it makes determinism less powerful. It means that true determinism only exists if someone knows about our actions before we make them. Otherwise, it can just be concluded that even if you still think determinism exists in a universe with the coexistence, it is the weakest kind, given that we would have the free will to choose and the only way it is determined is by the factors that influence our choices.