Language games do not involve only words. They are locked into the world by what we do. So fortunately or unfortunately, you are not mere words. — Banno

What we do is "debate." What debating is how we use the term. Nothing more. Nothing less.

Hanover is ""Hanover" iff Hanover is "Hanover." What be Hanover without "Hanover"?

Silence!

We can agree that the statue is beautiful for you while I find it only curious. — Banno

Aesthetics starts with the way the world makes us feel. We're capable of discussing rules of aesthetics because we tend to feel the same about lines of grace and symmetry.

The reason our little notes on perception always center around red is that it's associated with a close to universal feeling: it's hot. Red comes from mind meeting world.

Red comes from mind meeting world. — frank

That's wise.

Are you OK?

The reason our little notes on perception always center around red is that it's associated with a close to universal feeling: it's hot. Red comes from mind meeting world. — frank

Another 'theory' is that we relate oranges and reds to ripe fruit. I have no idea how far this has been tested though. On the surface it seems like a reasonable assumption ... but they can be wrong of course.

The ball is red. — Banno

And stubbing one's toe is painful, but pain is still a sensation. We've been over this so many times. Your reasoning is a non sequitur.

We might talk about the ball as having a colour but that's a fiction...
— Michael

...The ball is red. — Banno

And stubbing one's toe is painful, but pain is still a sensation. — Michael

Sorry - is your claim now that pain is also a fiction? :chin:

Sorry - is your claim now that pain is also a fiction? :chin: — Banno

No, and nor is my claim that colour is a fiction. My claim is that pain and colour are sensations, and the fiction is that colour is not a sensation but a property of the ball.

And much like "stubbing one's toe is painful therefore pain is not a sensation" is a non sequitur, so too is "the ball is red therefore colour is not a sensation".

Yes it does, it exists, it is simply waiting there to be seen - It is not the creation of sight!

There is a reason why the word "naïve" is used to describe naïve realism. The person holding this view is like an ignorant child rejecting higher education. The attitude is that the knowledge which I have is adequate and sufficient for me to live comfortably, and I do not want this to change. The problem though is that the rejection of higher education requires justification and that's when the naïve realist gets emotional.

Are you OK? — Banno

Meh. So so.

My claim is that pain and colour are sensations, and the fiction is that colour is not a sensation but a property of the ball.

Is the world outside your head without color in your view?

Perhaps we would be able to numb the sensation of color like we could the sensation of pain, and see the world how it really looks.

When I see a red box falling on my foot causing me to feel pain, it would be as sensible to say that I see the colour red because the box is red as it would be to say that I feel pain because the box is in pain.

Perhaps we would be able to numb the sensation of color like we could the sensation of pain, and see the world how it really looks. — NOS4A2

Not sure what you mean by "how it really looks", just as I wouldn't be sure what you'd mean by "how it really smells" or "how it really tastes".

Is the world outside your head without color in your view? — NOS4A2

Yes, and without smell and taste and pain.

Not sure what you mean by "how it really looks", just as I wouldn't be sure what you'd mean by "how it really smells" or "how it really tastes".

I just mean seeing it without the sensation of color. What do you suppose it looks like?

I just mean seeing it without the sensation of color. What do you suppose it looks like? — NOS4A2

I don't even know what a colourless visual sensation could be, and so I think without colour sensations you'd just be blind.

You are not following what I've said. My point is only that perception is a mental construct. — Hanover

I would say that you are not following what you are doing, for your <post> in question is obviously not primarily about the thesis that perception is a mental construct. Instead of standing by your interpretation of Banno's claim and answering for it you've retreated back into your motte. I don't intend to keep chasing you back and forth.

I don't even know what a colourless visual sensation could be, and so I think without colour sensations you'd just be blind. — Michael

People with complete achromatopsia are not blind.

I was including black, white, and grey as colours. But if we're excluding them and NOS4A2 is asking what the world looks like to someone with complete achromatopsia, then it would look black, white and grey.

People with complete achromatopsia are not blind.

I wonder if someone with achromatopsia views the world more accurately given that it is without color.

Achromatopsia tends to come with other visual problems, so generally probably no.

Although if someone had complete achromatopsia without other visual problems, I suppose there would be special cases where there might be some advantage to achromatopsia. However, there's a lot of visual detail available to those with normal color vision that would not be available to someone with achromatopsia.

For example, is the grey of a ripe tomato distinguishable from the grey of an unripe tomato? I don't know, but it would surely be more difficult than distinguishing a red tomato from a green tomato.

We see color before language acquisition begins in earnest. Color is not borne through language. Calling colors by name is. Further differentiation between is. To even think that color is completely independent of the external world is mad in light of the relevant facts.

For example, is the grey of a ripe tomato distinguishable from the grey of an unripe tomato? I don't know, but it would surely be more difficult than distinguishing a red tomato from a green tomato. — wonderer1

Hmm. Hesperus and Phosphorous. Evening Star. Morning Star. Venus over time.

Those who see red and green as grey ARE picking between the same apples. The red apples look grey to some. So do the green ones. I agree that distinguishing between shades of grey could be more difficult than distinguishing between a red apple and a green one, unless you see red and green as grey. Then you are distinguishing between the same apples. The red apple is also grey.

The apple is ontologically objective. The color of it, not so much. The color of it causes the subjective color experience of the creature capable of having color experience. Color has to be meaningful to the candidate under consideration. This demands a theory of meaning that is capable of taking that into proper account.

Evolutionary progression is key. We have to be able to at least outline the color experience of language less creatures and ourselves alike and we must do so by acquiring understanding of how things become meaningful to language less creatures.

Those who see red and green as grey ARE picking between the same apples. — creativesoul

I'm not sure what you are saying here. I'm picturing a scenario where there are multiple different fruit, some of which would be seen as green (unripe) and others as red (ripe), by people with normal color vision. Unripe fruit aren't the same as ripe fruit, so I don't know what you mean by "the same" here.

As an aside, I decided to look up the spectral sensitivity of rod cells (which would be the only functional photoreceptive cells for someone with complete achromatopsia).



Because rod cells have little to no sensitivity to the red part of the spectrum, a red fruit would appear much darker shade of grey than a green fruit, to someone with complete achromatopsia.

Right. I'm just reinforcing the idea that red apples can also be grey apples for the appearance of color totally depends on both, the biological structures(biological machinery) of the observer as well as the physical properties of distal objects.

The red apples are the exact same apples as the grey ones, for the appearance of color is inherent in neither, the distal object nor the observer. Consider this: "That's a red apple" and "That's a grey apple" are both perfectly true when spoken by two people. All it takes is one with the condition you've put forth, and another more commonly/typically functioning individual asserting those claims while ostensively pointing at the exact same apple. The atypically sighted person would have to be informed that what they see is called "grey" by normally sighted individuals, but I've labored this point enough. Save that, and they may call it by the same color name.

There is no correct way to see color. There are typical ways. There are ways that most normally functioning adult humans see colors. Because the same objective physical properties combined with the same outside circumstances/conditions can result in the exact same objects appearing to be different colors to different people at the same time, from the same vantage point, we can know that color does not belong to objects and objects alone. The power to cause color experience in a creature so capable does.

I don't think anything I've claimed is incommensurate with our current scientific knowledge base. Although it may contradict some ancients who believed in things like ether, sensations, and what have you.

:up:

I knew an old finish guy who saw reds and greens in atypical fashion. I think he called himself 'colorblind'. Perfect color matches on additions to an existing jury box made from very old walnut that had been originally installed into a Federal courthouse before the turn of the 20th century. Amazing.

Uncle Harry.

I'm gullible. They all coulda been pullin my leg.

There is a reason why the word "naïve" is used to describe naïve realism. The person holding this view is like an ignorant child rejecting higher education. — Metaphysician Undercover

Like Aristotle? Putnam? Searle? McDowell? To ascribe child-like ignorance to those who defend naive realism is not so educated.

In the philosophy of perception, 'naive realism' is the name for the idea that the relation between observer and object is direct.

I still like the term naive realism. I think it is apt since it's not doing justice to any adequate theory of realism. An adequate theory of realism would have to treat the perceiver as a genuine agent, not an entirely passive recipient of a purely objective world in all its glory.

Hence, why I think critical realism and new realism are better positions since they're seeking a better understanding of what it even means for something to be real. A realist account of perception will have to consider what the agent themselves brings to the encounter in terms of subjectivity, context, history, affordance, cultural sediment etc.

In the philosophy of perception, 'naive realism' is the name for the idea that the relation between observer and object is direct. — jkop

What are you saying, that "direct realism" is better terminology? I suppose it's better because the word "direct" clearly exposes the faults. Obviously, there is a medium between the supposed "thing" which is seen, and the perception of it. People here are describing that medium in terms of wavelengths, so we might imagine that the visual aspect of "the real" consists of waves.

A realist account of perception will have to consider what the agent themselves brings to the encounter in terms of subjectivity, context, history, affordance, cultural sediment etc. — Bodhy

Yes, this is a much better starting point. Instead of thinking of the subject as being passively subjected to a world of activity, therefore producing an effect from that causation, it is much better to think of the agent as actively causing the world, as perceived. Then we can look at the way that the supposed external world of activity affects, or has an effect on, the perceived world which the agent creates for itself.