I would add that environment-organism isn't a master-slave relationship. Living things have been altering their environments since life started. A successful biosphere bends its surroundings to its needs. What humans have done to the land surface of the planet is a drastic case of something that's pretty typical for living things.

Yes, that's a good point. This is why dispensing with final causality in biology is so difficult. But final causality also goes off the rails when we decide that what constitutes "a being" is arbitrary. Then we end up with attempts to explain the telos of rocks, which have no organic unity and are more bundles of external causes (obviously, they do act in the way all mobile being acts, but not in the way animals do).

I think some of the more successful attempts to explain culture have followed on the doctrine of signs/semiotics, and the distinction between the umwelt and the human species-specific lebenswelt.

Yes, that's a good point. This is why dispensing with final causality in biology is so difficult. But final causality also goes off the rails when we decide that what constitutes "a being" is arbitrary. Then we end up with attempts to explain the telos of rocks, which have no organic unity and are more bundles of external causes (obviously, they do act in the way all mobile being acts, but not in the way animals do). — Count Timothy von Icarus

True. Final cause is built into the meaning of life. I think people who want to look at the whole scene more holistically are experimenting philosophically. As you say, at the borders it starts to become confusing.

I think some of the more successful attempts to explain culture have followed on the doctrine of signs/semiotics, and the distinction between the umwelt and the human species-specific lebenswelt. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Culture is fascinating to me. I came across a book by a structuralist once (can't remember the name now). But he was talking about German religion specialists who discovered that Native Americans have symbolism that echoes what we call gnosticism. So they concluded that the origin of these images must be back more than 10,000 years. The structuralist point was that if you're going to push it that far back, just admit that you don't know where it's coming from, and that it could be arising independently due to structure.

To Josh's point, the eye has evolved independently around 50 times. Maybe a thing that life keeps doing in response to light is somehow structural? By the way, are you German?

My interpretation of Wittgenstein and hinge propositions is that hinges are neither true nor false, i.e., hinges have a role similar to the rules of a game. — Sam26

Within the game, according to the rules, it is true that some things are allowed and others not.

One can use “true,” but note it’s not an epistemic use of the concept as justified true belief. — Sam26

It is justified within the system.

To Josh's point, the eye has evolved independently around 50 times

How is this to the point re the environment or the physics of subatomic particles as culture or normativity?

How is this to the point re the environment or the physics of subatomic particles as culture or normativity? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, it doesn't help with that point. :grin:

Ah, ok. I thought the entirety of your post had gone over my head. Not German by the way lol. Seems like something like convergent evolution, or even just "chance" would explain similar symbols being used in disparate parts of the world, but speculating about antediluvian, continent-spanning gnostic societies does seem like more fun. Lumeria and Atlantis are probably the common denominator.

Lumeria and Atlantis are probably the common denominator. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No doubt. :cool:

It is justified within the system. — Fooloso4

To say that hinges are justified in any epistemic sense is to miss the main thrust of OC. It would be to "...grant you [Moore] all the rest (OC 1)." Hinge propositions are not subject to verification or falsification (the doubt) within the system, they allow all our talk of epistemic justification and doubting to take root. In other words, they are the ungrounded linguistic framework that allows the door to swing (the door of epistemology). This is why justification ends with basic beliefs, and why it solves the infinite regress problem. They form the bedrock of how epistemic language gets off the ground in the first place.

They form the bedrock of how epistemic language gets off the ground in the first place. — Sam26

And maybe life itself leaps forward with unreasonable confidence.

And maybe life itself leaps forward with unreasonable confidence. — frank

It's not reasonable or unreasonable it just is the framework we have to work with.

It's not reasonable or unreasonable it just is the framework we have to work with. — Sam26

I think it's more like a leap in the dark.

It's not at all a leap in the dark, no more than accepting the Earth is more than 100 years old is a leap in the dark, or that I have hands is a leap in the dark.

To say that hinges are justified in any epistemic sense is to miss the main thrust of OC. It would be to "...grant you [Moore] all the rest (OC 1)." — Sam26

There is not a single agreed upon sense or meaning or assumptions that define the term 'epistemic', but I do not think we can deny that epistemology deals with the problem of knowledge. Clearly from beginning to end Wittgenstein was concerned with the problem of knowledge. It is one thing to claim that his epistemology in OC differs from more traditional views, but quite another to deny that it is epistemology. Annalisa Coliva and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock have edited a book titled "Hinge Epistemology"

Hinge propositions are not subject to verification or falsification (the doubt) within the system — Sam26

In OC Wittgenstein identifies one hinge proposition: 12x12=144. This propositions is true. 12x12 = any other number is false. If one doubts it, it can quickly and easily be demonstrated. If this cannot be proven then there can be no mathematical proofs.

Clearly, you haven't understood a thing I've said. I question your ability to interpret not only what I've communicated over and over again, but your ability to interpret OC. I find it a waste of my time trying to explain myself to you. You either don't take the time to read or you have a bottle of vodka next to you, maybe it's the latter. I don't know which.

In OC Wittgenstein identifies one hinge proposition: 12x12=144. This propositions is true. 12x12 = any other number is false. If one doubts it, it can quickly and easily be demonstrated. If this cannot be proven then there can be no mathematical proofs. — Fooloso4

To say that 12x12 =144 is a hinge proposition is to think of it as a rule for arriving at the product 144. The result of a calculation can be true or false but the rule for arriving at the result is neither true nor false. The rule merely stipulates the criterion for determining what would constitute the correct or incorrect answer.

Or, perhaps you are wrong!

Deleted. I decided that there is no benefit in responding to your churlishness.

To say that 12x12 =144 is a hinge proposition is to think of it as a rule for arriving at the product 144. — Joshs

Wittgenstein calls it a proposition not a rule. We follow rules. We do not follow propositions. Propositions are either true or false. Calling it a hinge does not change that.

That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

(OC 341)

That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

(OC 342)

If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

(OC 343).

It is not, as some would have it, that a hinge is neither true nor false, it is that its truth is not doubted.

The result of a calculation can be true or false but the rule for arriving at the result is neither true nor false. The rule merely stipulates the criterion for determining what would constitute the correct or incorrect answer. — Joshs

What is the rule for arriving at the answer? When we calculate correctly we arrive at the correct answer. Are there infinite rules for the infinite amount of numbers that can be multiplied? Does anyone know or follow these rules or do they calculate?

Key Themes of Thread:

1. Context and Purpose
• On Certainty is Wittgenstein’s response to G.E. Moore's papers Proof of an External World and A Defense of Common Sense.
• Wittgenstein challenges Moorean propositions (e.g. “Here is one hand”)
• As part of Wittgenstein’s critique he addresses skepticism and the nature of doubt

2. Hinge Propositions:
• Hinges are foundational beliefs that form the bedrock of our language games and knowledge claims
• They aren’t subject to traditional epistemological categories of justification and truth
• Examples include basic beliefs about having hands, the existence of objects, and other minds
• They are part of our inherited background or world picture
• There are a variety of different hinges, with some being more immutable than others


3. Knowledge and Certainty
• OC distinguishes between knowledge and subjective certainty (conviction)
• Moore’s claims are more akin to expressions of his convictions rather than knowledge claims
• Knowledge (JTB) requires truth, justification and the possibility of doubt
• Knowledge claims must be demonstrated rather than stated


4. Doubts Role
• Doubting is not always meaningful; some are logically excluded
• Doubt requires a framework and a context to make sense
• Universal doubting would undermine meaningful doubting
• Meaningful doubting must occur within a system where things are not doubted

5. Language games and Framework
• Certain propositions must be held fast within a language game (not questioned)
• Bedrock beliefs allow for the possibility of language and meaning
• Like the rules of chess, the pieces, and the board they provide the background for the game to be played

6. The Nature of Hinges
• They can be pre-linguistic or animal beliefs
• Hinges can be pre-linguistic rather than propositional
• They can change over time, although some are more permanent than others
• They can vary due to different systems of belief, though some core hinges are universal

7. Implications for Epistemology
• Challenges traditional epistemology that all beliefs within an epistemological framework require justification
• Some beliefs make justification possible
• Helps to understand the limits of knowledge and doubt
• Demonstrates how certainty is grounded in action rather than a specific theory

What might an outline of a theory of knowledge look like in my interpretation of OC?

A Layered Theory of Epistemic Foundations

1. Foundation Layer: Pre-linguistic beliefs or certainties
• Consists of pre-linguistic or animal beliefs or certainties
• Pre-linguistic beliefs are manifested through action
• E.g’s include special awareness, object permanence, and bodily awareness
• These form the foundations of what makes the language games of knowledge possible
• Not subject to claims of truth or falsity because they precede such concepts
2. Framework Layer: Hinge Beliefs
• Built on top of pre-linguistic beliefs
• This is the riverbed of our system of JTB
• Differing levels of stability
o Bedrock hinges (nearly immutable, e.g., physical objects exist
o Cultural hinges (can change over time)
o Local hinges (depend on contexts or practices)
• Not justified by evidence or reasons but shown through our practices
• Makes the language games of justification and doubt possible

3. Operational Layer
• Built on the foundation of hinge propositions
• Requires:
o Meaningful doubt
o Methods of justification
o Context within language games
• Subject to verification and falsification
• They can be taught and demonstrated

Key Principles:
1. The Doubt Principle
• The language game of doubt requires a stable framework
• Not everything can be doubted
• There must be practical consequences to doubt
• Doubt is necessary for knowledge claims

2. The Justification Principle
• Operates within language games
• Different language games require different forms of justification
• Justification ends with hinge propositions
• Justification cannot have an infinite regression

3. The Principle of Context
• Knowledge claims only make sense within the language games of epistemology
• Some propositions can be epistemological in one context and be a hinge in another

4. Principle of Practice
• Knowledge is demonstrated by practice and by our statements
• Actions are more fundamental than statements
• Learning involves the acquisition of explicit knowledge and implicit certainty
• Practice grounds theoretical knowledge

Methodological Implications:
1. Epistemology
• Understand how knowledge claims function in practice (language games)
• Examine the relationship between our actions and our certainties (beliefs)
• Study the many language games of justification across contexts
• Understand the importance of our background reality in knowledge

2. Scientific Knowledge
• Scientific methods rest on hinge certainties
• Paradigm shifts involve changes in hinges
• Understand the relationship between theory and observation

3. Everyday Knowledge
• Acknowledge the importance of practical knowledge
• Again, recognize the role of the inherited background
• Recognize the relationship between action and belief

This is a way of understanding knowledge within the context of some of Wittgenstein’s thinking in OC and the PI.

A lot more work needs to be done, but this is the beginning of how I think of epistemology using Wittgenstein as a catalyst for my thinking.

Well done!

:up:

+1. Succinct yet comprehensive.

:up:

Some insights into Wittgensteinian hinges and Godel’s incompleteness theorems.

Extended Theory: Foundations of Knowledge and Formal Systems

1. Parallel Foundations

A. In Epistemological Systems:
• Hinge beliefs serve as unquestioned beliefs
• Pre-linguistic beliefs ground our knowledge
• Pre-linguistic beliefs enable the practice of justification

B. In Formal Mathematical Systems:
• Godel’s unprovable propositions function like hinges
• Some mathematical truths must be taken as bedrock
• Some mathematical statements are necessary for system operation but unprovable within the system

2. The Foundation Principle
• All systems whether epistemic or formal require unprovable foundations (hinges)
• Unprovable statements are not weaknesses but necessary features
• Hinges do not limit systematic knowledge but are a requirement for all systems of knowledge
• The attempt to prove every statement within a system leads to the following:
o Infinite regress
o Circular reasoning
o Foundational assumptions (hinges/axioms)

3. Unified Understanding of the Limitations of Systems
• Epistemological systems are built on hinges
• Formal systems have unprovable but necessary truths
• Both systems require the following:
o Statements that cannot be justified within the system
o Statements that are necessary for the system to function
o Statements that must be accepted rather than proved

4. Knowledge Implications

A. Mathematical Knowledge:
• Some mathematical propositions must function as hinges
• These are not problems for the system but features of formal systems
• The unprovability of certain mathematical propositions in a formal system mirrors the role of hinges in epistemic systems

B. Scientific Knowledge:
• Foundational assumptions are necessary for a scientific system
• These function like mathematical axioms and epistemological hinges
• They are necessary to scientific progress

5. Practical Applications:

A. In Mathematics:
• Recognizing certain mathematical propositions as hinge like
• There are limits to formal proofs
• Recognizing the role of bedrock statements

6. Philosophical Implications

A. For Knowledge
• Knowledge doesn’t need complete proof
• Systems are reliable despite having unprovable elements
• Foundational elements and proofs have different functions

B. For Truth:
• What we accept as true can exist independent of provability
• Some truths must be simply believed without proof
• What we accept as true is not always provable

7. Integrating Epistemological and Formal Systems

A. Common Features:
• Unprovable foundations are necessary
• Accept starting points
• Seeing limitations as enabling features

B. Differences:
• Understanding the properties of foundational elements
• Different methods of verification
• Different types of knowledge acquired

Understanding this integration suggests the following:

1. The limits Godel discovered in formal systems coincide with the role of hinges in epistemology
2. Mathematical and JTB necessitate unprovable foundations
3. These are features of these systems, not problems to be solved
4. Having a clear understanding of these systems helps to better understand both domains

As far as I know, no one has made this connection, viz., between hinges and Godel's incompleteness theorem.

I’ve been thinking about expressing Wittgenstein’s hinges in terms of types.

For example…

1. Types of Hinges

• Pre-linguistic beliefs (shown in our actions)
1. Spatial awareness
2. Continuity of objects
3. Causal relationships

• Rule-based hinges
1. Rules of chess
2. Mathematical rules/axioms
3. Any defined practice

• Varied hinges
1. Physical facts (“This is my hand”)
2. Social conventions
3. Rules of language

• Chess example
1. The rules can be learned as statements
2. However, their role as hinges is learned from:
a) Accepting their use in practice
b) Their role as enablers of the game
c) Their status as foundational

• Wittgensteinian Insight
1. Hinges have a particular function
a) Foundational framework
b) Beyond doubt in practice
c) Necessary for activity (science, linguistics, games, epistemology, etc)
d) Must be accepted to participate in the activity

In Wittgenstein’s final work, OC, he grappled with the fundamental ideas of knowledge (JTB), certainty, doubt, truth, and others. This was in response to G.E. Moore’s claims about what we can know with certainty. This led to what many philosophers refer to as hinge propositions. Hinge propositions can be referred to in several ways including bedrock, foundational, or basic beliefs; however, no matter how you refer to them they raise important questions about the foundations of knowledge, i.e., our epistemological practices.

One issue (among others) that emerges with hinge propositions within epistemology is understanding their relationship to truth. Propositions traditionally are thought of as either true or false. It seems clear that Wittgenstein is separating the traditional view of what we mean by proposition, with a more nuanced view given Moore’s propositions. For example, “If true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true nor yet false (OC 205).” This suggests that what separates hinges from other propositions is their role, viz., that they are foundational or bedrock. This bedrock status is what separates them from traditional propositions. “I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry (OC 151).” The implication is that it is not justified or true because of evidence or reasons, but it is part of our method of inquiry that certain hinges (beliefs) stand fast. This is borne out in our forms of life. Our world picture comes before our talk of true and false. We inherit our background, it’s not a matter of it being true or false. The ground is what enables epistemological claims, which by definition include truth claims.
We can think of this as a kind of logic of precedence, i.e., before we can say anything we need a framework, shared practices, basic (subjective) certainties, and ways of judging. The ground is not yet true or false. In other words, hinges, which are the ground, are not true or false in this setting. This is simply the way I act, whether linguistically or otherwise.

We can think of the use of true in the same way we think of the use of know. For example, just as “know” can be used as an expression of JTB and as a conviction of what one believes, so the use of “true” can be used apart from its epistemological uses. This insight helps to explain Wittgenstein’s reference to the truth of 2+2=4. These basic mathematical statements, especially when functioning as hinges operate more like rules of practice, something akin to a rule of chess. They demonstrate how we operate with numbers rather than making truth claims. However, it depends on the language game or the context. Certainly, there are proper uses of “true” outside the context of epistemology, just as there are proper uses of “know” outside epistemology. The use of “know” has this dual nature, so too does the concept of “true.” The context of the language game is what drives the correct use.

Given that Wittgenstein never completed OC the term hinge proposition itself might be problematic. Alternative terms like bedrock beliefs, foundation beliefs, or basic beliefs might be better suited to capture their pre-propositional nature.

So, hinge propositions (bedrock beliefs) are outside our epistemological framework (JTB), which means that hinges aren't known in the epistemological sense, i.e., they are not justified and true. I say, "epistemological sense" because there are language games where using true about hinges can make sense. However, it's not an epistemological use. One can see this if, for example, we look at the rules of chess, which are hinges. There is no objective justification for saying that bishops move diagonally, i.e., there is no objective justification that leads me to the truth of the statement that bishops move diagonally. The rule is just an arbitrary backdrop or a matter of convention that we accept. Does this mean we can't use the word true about these rules, of course not. We accept them as true, but not epistemologically. For example, it's similar to the use of know that's not epistemological. Moore's use of "I know this is a hand," is the classic example, it's not an epistemological use in the context Moore is using it. His use of know is akin to a conviction, it's not epistemological. The word true can be used in the same way, as an expression of an inner certainty. Is it true that bishops move diagonally? In other words, is the statement "Bishops move diagonally" justified and true? No. It's a rule we accept that is foundational to the game. Are there instances where the "Bishops move diagonally" is justified and true? Yes. It depends on the context of the language game. People tend to conflate this distinction.

Let me explain this idea more simply:

Again, thinking about the rules of chess. When we assert that "bishops move diagonally," this isn't something we prove or justify, it's just a rule we accept to play the game. It's like saying "This is how we move the piece," how we act when we play the game. We can say that it's true that bishops move diagonally, but this is different from saying that it rained yesterday, which we can defend by looking at the weather records and other evidence.

Imagine trying to prove that you have hands in a context similar to Moore's example. It would seem ridiculous because it's not something we normally need to prove. The subjective certainty we have about our hands is very basic, it's like the chess rule - we start with it, we act with our hands and we play chess using the rules of chess. We don't prove these things.

The key point is that some things in life aren't things we know in the JTB sense. They are the foundation that lets us know in the epistemological (JTB) sense. In other words, you have to accept the rules of chess before you can play the game, and there are certain things you have to accept about the world before you can start making knowledge claims.

We often use words like true and know in different ways. When we say, "I know my name," we're not really offering a proof, we're just expressing a basic certainty. It's different from saying the Earth is the third planet from our Sun, which we can prove by observation. Much of the confusion stems from the different uses of these words (true and know), some are foundational (hinges), and others are not.

The Practicality of Understanding Hinges

Wittgenstein's hinge propositions (hereafter known as basic beliefs) from On Certainty offer profound insights into how everyday life connects with intellectual pursuits. The ideas contained in OC extend far beyond philosophical theory, reaching into reality on a practical level, namely, how we learn, know, and act in the world. One example of this is how we teach a child. We don't start by proving fundamental facts about reality - we show them how to interact with the world, which is closely connected with our forms of life. A child learns this is a hand not by proof, but by interacting with the world, non-linguistically or linguistically. This practical subjective certainty provides the foundation for later learning, especially the more advanced concepts of knowledge and doubt. We teach a child how to follow the rules of mathematics, we don't prove that 2+2=4. We show them how to count, and we show them how to interact in the world by using mathematics. They learn the basic beliefs of mathematics first. The certainty they acquire is through practice and participation in our forms of life. A child doesn't start by questioning these basic beliefs. For example, they don't question if a word refers to some thing, they start by learning the language games of the concepts. Questioning and doubting come later in the more advanced language games after the foundation has been put down.

Basic beliefs are why scientists don't question everything. There's a certain set of basic beliefs that stand fast in order for scientific investigation to proceed. A biologist doesn't question the existence of the microscope, they simply use the microscope. Basic beliefs make scientific investigations possible.

Wittgenstein's basic beliefs explain why there are cultural differences, viz., some cultures have different sets of basic beliefs. This is true even if some core basic beliefs are shared between cultures. This is also true of religious beliefs; each religion has its own basic beliefs within its religious system. This doesn't mean that all basic beliefs are equal, some are absolute (like there are other minds), and some change because they're challenged.

There are obvious implications for how we understand knowledge. Instead of seeing basic beliefs as requiring justification, we recognize that some certainties (basic beliefs) must stand fast in order for epistemological justification and truth claims to be possible in the first place.

These insights demonstrate that our relationship with reality isn't primarily theoretical but practical. This doesn't diminish philosophical inquiry; it just puts it in the proper light.