J. J. C. Smart on Sensations
  • A Son of Rosenthal
    26
    Smart argues that sensations are brain processes. More precisely, Smart argues that sensations are identical to brain processes. So, the expression 'the sensation (or after image, perception, etc.) of X' is replacable with 'the brain process of X', according to Smart. I think that his theory is plausible. What he suggests is that mental phenomena are identical to brain-physical phenomena. If we accept identity theory, then we can explain mental life in naturalistic ways. So, it's an attractive suggestion. I wonder how others think about it.
    A Son of Rosenthal Options
  • Rich
    3.2k
    A sensation it's a feeling of some sort. One would have to show that the brain is capable of feeling without resorting to anthropomorphism, a very tall order.

    I believe all we can say is that each of us are reporting, as a total, holistic human , similar sensations under similar circumstances.

    What I don't understand is why all the effort to squeeze a human into the brain?
    Rich Options
  • Forgottenticket
    215
    If that is so easily done why would eliminativism exist?
    Forgottenticket Options
  • Brian
    88
    ↪A Son of Rosenthal
    Smart argues that sensations are brain processes. More precisely, Smart argues that sensations are identical to brain processes. So, the expression 'the sensation (or after image, perception, etc.) of X' is replacable with 'the brain process of X', according to Smart. I think that his theory is plausible. What he suggests is that mental phenomena are identical to brain-physical phenomena. If we accept identity theory, then we can explain mental life in naturalistic ways. So, it's an attractive suggestion. I wonder how others think about it. — A Son of Rosenthal

    I find the main argument against this view, that mentality is multiply-realizable, rather plausible. It seems like life forms with very different structures than the human brain could conceivably have a mind, but Mind-Brain Identity Theory doesn't allow for that. Functionalism is probably the better theory.
    Brian Options
  • Arkady
    768
    I find the main argument against this view, that mentality is multiply-realizable, rather plausible. It seems like life forms with very different structures than the human brain could conceivably have a mind, but Mind-Brain Identity Theory doesn't allow for that. Functionalism is probably the better theory. — Brian
    I think that token identity could accommodate multiple realizability, but type identity less so. Based on the description of Smart's position summarized here I'm not entirely sure which one he subscribes to.
    Arkady Options
  • Brian
    88
    I think that token identity could accommodate multiple realizability, but type identity less so. Based on the description of Smart's position summarized here I'm not entirely sure which one he subscribes to. — Arkady

    Yeah that sounds somewhat more plausible to me. The notion would be that the mind just happens to be identical with the brain if its token identity, is that correct? I think some M-B Identity Theorists have been arguing this point.
    Brian Options
  • jorndoe
    3.6k
    Aren't Levine's explanatory gap / Chalmers' mind-body thing usually brought up to complain about this stuff?
    It's worth noting, though, that the partitions of such a gap do not contradict, which would be a stronger argument.
    jorndoe Options
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