Smart argues that sensations are brain processes. More precisely, Smart argues that sensations are identical to brain processes. So, the expression 'the sensation (or after image, perception, etc.) of X' is replacable with 'the brain process of X', according to Smart. I think that his theory is plausible. What he suggests is that mental phenomena are identical to brain-physical phenomena. If we accept identity theory, then we can explain mental life in naturalistic ways. So, it's an attractive suggestion. I wonder how others think about it. — A Son of Rosenthal
I think that token identity could accommodate multiple realizability, but type identity less so. Based on the description of Smart's position summarized here I'm not entirely sure which one he subscribes to.I find the main argument against this view, that mentality is multiply-realizable, rather plausible. It seems like life forms with very different structures than the human brain could conceivably have a mind, but Mind-Brain Identity Theory doesn't allow for that. Functionalism is probably the better theory. — Brian
I think that token identity could accommodate multiple realizability, but type identity less so. Based on the description of Smart's position summarized here I'm not entirely sure which one he subscribes to. — Arkady
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