It's genetics, not simply epigenetics. And don’t overlook the fact that not only are their brains not equipped for language, but neither are their vocal tracts, for which the h.sapiens anatomy is uniquely suited. — Wayfarer

There is no final decision about how information is transmitted from one generation to the next.

Memories passed down in our genes? Not exactly. But biologists have observed examples of learned behaviors and acquired responses being transmitted through several generations, contrary to the traditional rules of genetic inheritance. https://www.quantamagazine.org/inherited-learning-it-happens-but-how-is-uncertain-20191016/#:~:text=Memories%20passed%20down%20in%20our,traditional%20rules%20of%20genetic%20inheritance.

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We do know that dogs that became used to humans became domesticated and that a gene controls if a dog can or can not be domesticated. The dogs that interacted with humans developed and spread this gene. This is not just about DNA but also RNA.

RNA, is another macromolecule essential for all known forms of life. Like DNA, RNA is made up of nucleotides. Once thought to play ancillary roles, RNAs are now understood to be among a cell’s key regulatory players where they catalyze biological reactions, control and modulate gene expression, sensing and communicating responses to cellular signals, etc. https://cm.jefferson.edu/learn/dna-and-rna/#:~:text=There%20are%20two%20differences%20that,uracil%20while%20DNA%20contains%20thymine.

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Skills and Talents Influenced by Your Genes
Aptitude and talent in various fields, such as intelligence, creativity, and athleticism, are attributed to genetic factors. For example, drawing, playing an instrument, or dancing may come more naturally to some people than to others. Similarly, genetic factors can influence traits like analytical and critical thinking, communication, and research skills. Skills and Talents Influenced by Your Genes
https://seniorslifestylemag.com/featured/5-skills-and-talents-that-are-influenced-by-your-genes/#:~:text=For%20example%2C%20drawing%2C%20playing%20an,%2C%20communication%2C%20and%20research%20skills.

I think this is about the process of evolution and how close humans and apes are.

Rational thinking requires critical thinking and we would have an extremely short lifespan if all our awake time was also our critical thinking time. — Athena

Yet another criterion. The more requirements you add, the fewer entities may exercise a faculty that was once available to everything in possession of a cerebellum.
All thinking animals can act rationally, emotionally, instinctively or chaotically (when they're ill). I very much doubt that thought processes take different amounts of energy to perform.

What have clocks to do with rational thought? For 100,000 years of intelligent human development no clocks of any kind existed. Up until four hundred years ago, the entire population of North America was clock-free, and very possibly the healthier for it. — Vera Mont

Oh dear me! It was perhaps quixotic, but I was thinking about the argument about whether the dog knew it was 5 pm when the train arrived. I thought of Pavlov's dogs who knew it was feeding time when the bell rang, and of an ancient TV programme for very small children that tried to teach children to tell the time. They displayed a clock face and then announced to time displayed. It's not important, but I get irritated by people who say "but the dog has no concept of" and work to concede the lowest possible level of rationality to console themselves for admitting that an animal could have any concept at all. Not important.

I think we could make a good argument that human beings are not rational. The chatter that goes on their heads may be totally incorrect but without critical thinking, they may be willing to kill for what they believe is so. — Athena

Yes. At best partly and with training.

They (sc. ants) are not self-aware and reasoning how to build their homes or go about their chores or who the queen should be queen. — Athena

Yes. I thought about them and decided that they weren't. They just had a large collection of instincts, triggered, if I remember right, by what they are fed as larvae. An illustration of how irrational components can produce rational results. Not what the thread is about.

Rational decisions are those grounded on solid statistics and objective facts, resulting in the same choices as would be computed by a logical robot.

If you ask what makes us human, the answer will not be "rationality", but emotion. Ironical, don't you think?

Several Star Trek shows are about human judgment that is not based on rational thinking — Athena

Usually decisions that turn out to be wrong. "An alien machine you don't know what it does? Beam it aboard!"

and I don't think Star Trek fans are in favor of AI ruling over us.

Don't be so sure. Anyhow, it wouldn't rule - that's an ape thing. It would simply administer our resources and enforce our laws - both of which tasks humans have botched repeatedly and abominably.

It was perhaps quixotic, but I was thinking about the argument about whether the dog knew it was 5 pm when the train arrived. I thought of Pavlov's dogs who knew it was feeding time when the bell rang, — Ludwig V

All dogs know their feeding time, without any bells. Every living thing has time sense and arranges its feeding, resting and moving routines according to the time of day, and to time elapsed and to correspondence with some other event - like this is the time their preferred prey is most vulnerable; this is the time salmon come to spawn; this is the time to bury nuts for winter; this is the time lions don't come to the water.

Humans have it too, a biorhythm or something similar. When not freed from the economic day/week/year constraints, we each follow our own internal clock: wake up at roughly the same time every day; get hungry at regular intervals, have a period of three or four hours when we are most alert and capable, followed by a period when we drag a bit. There is some variation among individuals, but all humans are diurnal and seasonal. (Some humans may claim to be nocturnal, but it just means they stay awake longer past sunset and sleep later into the morning. Some humans are active at night for economic reasons - and it's not good for their health. It's difficult to sleep in the day and arrange leisure activities around a night shift. A few humans are active at night because it' the only time they have free of other people's demands.) That's the framework on which they constructed the artificial daily, weekly, monthly and annual schedules of regimented societies, because that's what works for the majority of human activities.

Good question. Isn't the issue that they do seem incompatible. We can express this in more than one way. They are different language games, different categories, different perspectives. At any rate, they seem incommensurable. Yet we know that a physical process can result in a logical conclusion. If it were not so, computers would not work. Indeed, if it were not so, calculation by pen and paper would not work, either. — Ludwig V

If they are incommensurable explanations, then it would seem to follow that they cannot exclude one another.

What makes the physical events within the machine into a calculation cannot be recognized as mathematical calculations unless we have arranged that representation. It is not the result of any physical properties or events within the machine independently of the context in which we interpret them. — Ludwig V

I agree with your analysis, but I don’t see how that affects the argument. In fact what you're saying here could easily be interpreted as a defence of Aristotelian form-matter dualism.

You seem confused — wonderer1

Not in the least.

Plantinga is not making an argument against physicalism. — wonderer1

Of course he is, insofar as naturalism is materialist or physicalist in orientation. What I've spelled out is why Plantinga argues that naturalism is an insufficient basis for belief. From his 1994 Naturalism Defeated .pdf:

"With me," Darwin said, "the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"

The same thought is put more explicitly by Patricia Churchland. She insists that the most important thing about the human brain is that it has evolved; this means, she says, that its principal function is to enable the organism to move appropriately: Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival — Plantinga, Naturalism Defeated

He's talking about beliefs and convictions - not about the ability to act in such a way as to enhance survival. Against what criteria do we judge beliefs or convictions to be true, as distinct from pragmatically useful? You will notice that evolutionary materialists, such as Dawkins/Dennett, will say outright that all of what us 'lumbering robots' think and do is in service of the 'selfish gene'. That is the kind of mentality he has in his sights. (I believe Dennett responded extensively to Plantinga, but I'm not going to pursue it further. )

That there exists in the human mind and indeed by natural instinct, some sense of Deity

I certainly have some form of that, though not exclusively Christian in orientation.

I will add, I don't pursue this line of argument as a 'proof of God' as I don't believe that it possible, my interest in it only extends to showing the inherent self-contradictions of reductive materialism, as by it's own reckoning, its activites are the consequences of 'a nervous system that enables the organism to succeed in the four F's', social organisms though we might be.

All true. So the question is, why would anyone say they don't have a concept of time? What's more, why don't we insist that human beings have the same concept of time? The hours and days are additional articulations of the sense of time we have from our biological clocks.
What has it do with rationality? Everything. If they have a concept of time in the same way that we do, that's at least a basis for rationality.

I agree with your analysis, but I don’t see how that affects the argument. In fact what you're saying here could easily be interpreted as a defence of Aristotelian form-matter dualism. — Wayfarer

Yes, I suppose it could be. I've always thought there is a good deal to be said for it - better than substance dualism and materialism, anyway.
On the issue about naturalism, I got turned off when I realized that natural was being interpreted as scientific. Thumbnail sketch - That idea entirely ignores the history and practice of science. Science looks to me to be something almost entirely artificial.

If they are incommensurable explanations, then it would seem to follow that they cannot exclude one another. — Janus

That's true. But neither can you seriously articulate the idea that mental states are determined by physical processes. The conceptual equipment used to describe physical process does not include any way to describe beliefs; equally the conceptual equipment (evidence, logic) does not include any way to describe purely physical processes. Incommensurability means no bridges, no translations. And yet, one feels that there must be some relationship.

On the issue about naturalism, I got turned off when I realized that natural was being interpreted as scientific. Thumbnail sketch - That idea entirely ignores the history and practice of science. Science looks to me to be something almost entirely artificial. — Ludwig V

I agree with you again! My objections are to that vein of popular philosophy which esteems science as the arbiter of reality. Of course many educated folk see through that but it is still a pervasive current of thought.

What has it do with rationality? Everything. If they have a concept of time in the same way that we do, that's at least a basis for rationality. — Ludwig V

I'm not so sure. If snails and spiders have it, it's more likely biological; no thought required. Where thinking comes in : level 1. association of a time of day or year with some event or activity (like: crocodiles are sluggish before sunrise, winter's coming soon) 2. taking certain specific time-dependent action (drink at the river while it's safe; start migration exercises) and 3. anticipation of time-related events (getting to the river before the elephants churn it up; making sure one's own fledglings are flight-capable) 4. arranging other necessary tasks not to conflict with time-related ones. (this is a little more complicated, depending on each species, but it still doesn't need a lot of intelligence.
In fact, timekeeping is one of the least remarkable things intelligent entities do.

And yet, one feels that there must be some relationship. — Ludwig V

I think it's just a case of looking at thinking from two perspectives. I certainly don't buy the argument that says that if thought is determined by neural activity, then thoughts could not rightly be said to have logical, as well as causal, connections with one another. It's merely an argument from incredulity.

I'm not so sure. If snails and spiders have it, it's more likely biological; no thought required. Where thinking comes in ..... In fact, timekeeping is one of the least remarkable things intelligent entities do. — Vera Mont

I don't disagree with you. There's a lot to think about here - questions that arise once one has established that dogs are rational. Does one draw a line further along the scale. Birds, yes. Snails and slugs, no. Insects, no. Fish? Maybe some. (Whales &c. yes, of course). Plants, no. The distinction between instinctive "actions" and rational one? Between autonomous actions - heart beating, digestion, sweating and voluntary actions, i.e. actions proper. These will be tricky, because there will be good reason for them even though those can't be the animal's reason. Likely it will only be serious nerds like me who will want to pursue those.
Philosophy of action is incredibly complicated.

I agree with you again! My objections are to that vein of popular philosophy which esteems science as the arbiter of reality. Of course many educated folk see through that but it is still a pervasive current of thought. — Wayfarer

There should be a name for the fallacy of thinking that, because one has a hammer, everything's a nail, or that a good place to look for your lost keys is under the lamp-post.

I think it's just a case of looking at thinking from two perspectives. I certainly don't buy the argument that says that if thought is determined by neural activity, then thoughts could not rightly be said to have logical, as well as causal, connections with one another. It's merely an argument from incredulity. — Janus

In one way "two perspectives" is a very encouraging metaphor. So it could be like looking at the front and back of a coin. My problem is that those two perspectives are within the same category, conceptual system, language-game. Thoughts, sounds, smells are not in the same category, conceptual system, language-game. Physics has no conceptual space for them - yet physics is utterly dependent on them. I'm very fond of the explanation in physics for a rainbow, which seems to cross our categories. Electrical discharge to lightening is another example. The last case suggests we should not say that an electrical discharge causes the lightening, but that the electrical discharge is the lightening. (This goes back to D.M. Armstrong. He suggested this as a materialist theory of the mind, which is a bit of a problem for me.) Then neural activity will not cause thoughts, but will be the thoughts - comparison with events inside the computer and calculating an equation. That's about as far as I've got with this.

I agree with your analysis, but I don’t see how that affects the argument. In fact what you're saying here could easily be interpreted as a defence of Aristotelian form-matter dualism. — Wayfarer

My objection to Aristotle is that the form/matter dualism works well enough in some contexts, such as the context in which we have designed a computer to carry out a calculation. But it doesn't follow that it will work in all contexts e.g. where there is no purpose or designer apparent. (Because I'm quite sure that not everything has a purpose, much less that everything fits into a single hierarchy of purposes.
Having said that, I must immediately disclaim any idea that this is actually an objection to Aristotle, because I haven't engaged with his texts anywhere near sufficiently to be confident that it really applies to him specifically (or anyone else).

Physics has no conceptual space for them - yet physics is utterly dependent on them. — Ludwig V

The study of physics is dependent on human senses, but I think we have little reason to say that physical processes in general are. Human senses and brain activity are certainly dependent on physical processes.

From one perspective we can say that thoughts are physical processes, presumably causally related to one another. From another perspective thoughts may not seem like physical processes at all. This reminds me of Sellar's "space of causes" and "space of reasons". The two ways of thinking do not seem to be possible to combine into a single discourse.

The study of physics is dependent on human senses, but I think we have little reason to say that physical processes in general are. Human senses and brain activity are certainly dependent on physical processes. — Janus

God forbid that we should even contemplate the possibility that the sun's burning should be dependent on our senses. That's pure Berkeley!
But it is perfectly true that the study of physics is dependent on human senses. That's what I meant to say.

From one perspective we can say that thoughts are physical processes, presumably causally related to one another. From another perspective thoughts may not seem like physical processes at all. This reminds me of Sellar's "space of causes" and "space of reasons". The two ways of thinking do not seem to be possible to combine into a single discourse. — Janus

... and yet, here we are, doing exactly that. Not well, but at least trying to work it out.

There should be a name for the fallacy of thinking that, because one has a hammer, everything's a nail, or that a good place to look for your lost keys is under the lamp-post. — Ludwig V

There is. It’s called ‘scientism’.

Human senses and brain activity are certainly dependent on physical processes. — Janus

By some process yet to be understood…..

There is. It’s called ‘scientism’. — Wayfarer

:rofl:

As if the practice is uncommon among philosophers in general.

By some process yet to be understood….. — Wayfarer

Neural processes are fairly well understood. The difficulty is with explaining how physical processes can give rise to consciously experienced feelings. I don't believe the question is answerable because it comes from trying to combine two incommensurable accounts. So the "hard problem" is based on an incoherent question.

God forbid that we should even contemplate the possibility that the sun's burning should be dependent on our senses. That's pure Berkeley!
But it is perfectly true that the study of physics is dependent on human senses. That's what I meant to say. — Ludwig V

:up:

... and yet, here we are, doing exactly that. Not well, but at least trying to work it out. — Ludwig V

Here we are talking about doing it. I don't believe we've made even the first step, and I see no reason to believe we ever will for the reason I gave in my response to Wayfer above.

I don't believe the question is answerable because it comes from trying to combine two incommensurable accounts. So the "hard problem" is based on an incoherent question. — Janus

No, it asks a very good question which draws attention to the incoherence of physicalism and the inability of it to explain the process which you say is ‘fairly well understood.’

No, it asks a very good question which draws attention to the incoherence of physicalism and the inability of it to explain the process which you say is ‘fairly well understood.’ — Wayfarer

I haven't said that the factor or mechanism or whatever you might want to call it in the neural processes that gives rise to conscious self-awareness is well understood. I would say it never will be because consciousness cannot be directly observed, and because the kinds of explanations we have for intentional behavior are given in terms of reasons, not causes, and the two kinds of explanations cannot be unified into a single paradigm.

It's a pure prejudice on your part that says that because we can give explanations in terms of reason that physicalism or strong emergentism must be false. It's merely an argument from incredulity.

Physicalism cannot explain subjective feelings obviously, but it doesn't follow that it is false, merely that it is limited in its scope. There is no reason to believe that we should be able to explain or understand everything. The fact that we cannot does not indicate that there must be a transcendent realm or a divine mystery. That is just wishful thinking.

There is. It’s called ‘scientism’. — Wayfarer

That's not quite what I had in mind. I was thinking of the way that so many economists think that everything is economics. Ai Wei Wei, apparently, once observed "Everything is Art, Everything is Politics." Other people think that everything is religion.

As if the practice is uncommon among philosophers in general. — wonderer1

Well, it's commonest among philosophers in the 20th century English-speaking tradition, which at first set out to abolish philosophy (or at least metaphysics) in favour of science. Phenomenonlogy specifically sets itself up to exclude science from philosophy (bracketing, epoche). Then there's the Indian and Chinese traditions.

Many technologists - not philosophers - think that climate change will be "solved" by more technology - as if more of what got you into trouble is likely to get you out of it. But they still want to build nuclear power stations (to help with climate change) even though their only solution to the problem of nuclear waste is to bury it - for 100,000 years! That's a prime example.

Here we are talking about doing it. I don't believe we've made even the first step, and I see no reason to believe we ever will for the reason I gave in my response to Wayfer above. — Janus

Don't you think that recognizing the problem is the first step? What we need to do next is to map it - understand it. Then we'll have to wait and see. I'm expecting radical conceptual developments. A new Kuhnian paradigm.

the factor or mechanism or whatever you might want to call it in the neural processes that gives rise to conscious self-awareness is well understood. — Janus

One step that may be useful is to escape from "gives rise to" or "causes". It leads to dualist hankerings, which won't help at all. I'm thinking of some locution like "is" as in "Rainbows are effect of sunlight on raindrops" or "Thunder and lightening are an electrical discharge". So brain processes join rationally explicable behaviour as symptoms or criteria for consciousness - following Wittgenstein's analysis of "pain". (D.M. Armstrong used this as a basis for a materialism, but I don't think that follows.)
Or we could look carefully at how psychologists address the problem - mainly by ignoring it, which is like a fingernail on a blackboard to philosophers like me, but nonetheless produces some interesting "phenomena"

That's not quite what I had in mind. I was thinking of the way that so many economists think that everything is economics. Ai Wei Wei, apparently, once observed "Everything is Art, Everything is Politics." Other people think that everything is religion. — Ludwig V

It sounds very close to what I had in mind. Anyway - I'm sure you would agree that a large part of philosophy is learning to look at your spectacles instead of just through them.

I'm expecting radical conceptual developments. A new Kuhnian paradigm. — Ludwig V

I think the outlines are beginning to emerge. Don't forget, the publication of Chalmer's book Towards a Theory of Consciousness, and the paper on the facing up to the problem of consciousness, virtually initiated the whole new sub-discipline of 'consciousness studies', which is at the intersection of phenomenology, psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. The bi-annual Arizona conference on the science of consciousness has been held ever since, co-chaired by Chalmers.

I think the outlines are beginning to emerge. Don't forget, the publication of Chalmer's book Towards a Theory of Consciousness, and the paper on the facing up to the problem of consciousness, virtually initiated the whole new sub-discipline of 'consciousness studies', which is at the intersection of phenomenology, psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. The bi-annual Arizona conference on the theme has been held ever since, co-chaired by Chalmers. — Wayfarer

Quite so. All part of the process. Although putting Chalmers in charge makes me nervous. But then, no-one's impartial here.

Well, his 'hard problem' paper was the watershed moment. And don't loose sight of the fact that he was a bronze medallist at the Mathematics Olympiad before he got into philosophy. He's really rather a clever cookie. See the interview here, he grew up in my neighbourhood.

Well, his 'hard problem' paper was the watershed moment. And don't loose sight of the fact that he was a bronze medallist at the Mathematics Olympiad before he got into philosophy. He's really rather a clever cookie. See the interview here, he grew up in my neighbourhood. — Wayfarer

In some ways, it was. It gave people a focus, just as Nagel's bat did. I never doubted that he is a clever cookie. Doesn't mean he's right. I'm not bothered about what he did before philosophy. It is a bit ambivalent, though. I try to listen carefully to physicists when they are talking about physics and mathematicians when they are talking about mathematics. But not necessarily when they are talking about Dualism.

The interview needs some reading. But I will put it on my list. Thank you. BTW, I'm still getting my head round Nagel. An off-the-cuff response based on a skim-read seemed inappropriate.

Sure, totally get that. It’s a very meaty essay.

See the interview here, he grew up in my neighbourhood. — Wayfarer

Thanks to reading that, I've realized that Chalmers and I share a philosophical perspective.

...the natural bush environment is gorgeous.

Thomas Nagel has an interesting essay I often refer to — Wayfarer

Thanks for sending me the link to this. I realize that everything has moved on in the last three days. But I hope my comments may nevertheless be of interest.

The heart of his argument is the re-evaluation of evolutionary theory. There have been various statements of it in this thread, but I shall quote from this article.

The evolutionary explanation itself is something we arrive at, in part, by the use of reason to support evolutionary theory in general and also this particular application of it. Hence it does not supply a reason-independent justification of reason, and, although it grounds reason in facts independent of reason, this grounding is not accepted by us independently of our reason. — p. 5, apparently quoted from Nozick's 'The Nature of Rationality'.

Nagel goes on to say that

..our finding something self-evident is no guarantee that it is necessarily true, or true at all -- since the disposition to find it self-evident could have been an evolutionary adaptation to its being only approximately, and contingently true.
The proposal is supposed to be an explanation of reason but not a justification of it. Those facts are not supposed to provide us with grounds for accepting the validity or reliability of reason — p. 5

So far, so good.

Now comes his mis-step, in which, so far as I can see, he contradicts what he has just said - continuing from the last quotation:-

... what is it It supposed to provide? It seems to be a proposal of a possible naturalistic explanation of the existence of reason that would, if it were true, make our reliance on reason "objectively" true.... — p. 5

There's no explanation of where this "proposal" came from, nor any account of why anyone would think that such an explanation would justify relying on reason. I wish he had recognized what evolutionary theory does and doesn't justify. But he moves gradually from the relatively harmless point that evolution would settle for pragmatic heuristics as opposed to valid arguments, that is, he ends up equating reason with any old natural process, and that's a mistake.

Reason is whatever we find we have to use in order to understand anything. And if we try to understand it merely as a natural (biological or psychological) phenomenon, the result will be an account incompatible with our use of it and with the understanding of it that we have in using it. For I cannot trust a natural (sc. evolved) process unless I can see why it is reliable, any more than I can trust a mechanical algorithm unless I can see why it is reliable. — p. 10

A natural process is specified irrespective of its trustworthiness and so the question whether it is reliable can be formulated. But an algorithm is a set of mathematical instructions or rules that will help to calculate an answer to a problem: One can ask of a set of mathematical instructions whether it will help to calculate the answer to a problem. But one cannot ask of an algorithm whether it will help to calculate the answer to a problem; the question whether that particular set of instructions is reliable has already been asked and answered. That's why one cannot ask of reason whether it will deliver the truth; that question has already been asked of potential arguments and answered.

If one supposes that human beings have a "rational faculty" - i.e. an ability to reason, - the question of evolution is what contribution such a faculty might make to survival - the question whether we are able to garner information about the world has already been asked and answered. This question does require a justification of reason, not as such, but as something that needs to be explained in the context of evolution. The justification of reason as a practice in its own right is a quite different project, and if that is his point, he is right.

I think that Nagel's critique does not distinguish clearly enough between the two issues. The possibility of evolution settling for something that is "only approximately, and contingently, true" (p. 5), which is a perfectly rational pragmatic practice, is meant to undermine the idea "that our rational capacity was the product of natural selection". But this misses the point. The fact that we have a rational capacity demands an evolutionary account.

The only recourse I have to understand this is wildly speculative. Nagel doesn't even mention Wittgenstein. Yet it is, I believe, common knowledge that Wittgenstein's approach to justifying reason grounds it in our human way of life, our practices, our language-games. If one accepts that, the idea of evolution presents itself as a way of deepening his gestural account and explaining why our way of life and practices are what they are.

But if one accepts Wittgenstein's "This is what I do" as the bedrock of justification, evolution is not required to provide any further justification for rationality. It is asking and answering a different question. On the other hand, if one rejects Wittgenstein's "groundless grounds", evolution may seem to provide another layer to the infinite regress of justification. For myself, I don't see that another layer is required, and would probably argue that evolution doesn't provide it anyway, but that's another matter.

For the record, I don't think that the "refutation" of evolutionary theory is his real business here. He is using that question in pursuit of bigger game, and makes that clear in his final paragraph.

Once we enter the world for our temporary stay in it, there is no alternative but to try to decide what to believe and how to live, and the only way to do that is to try to decide what is the case and what is right. Even if we distance ourselves from some of our thoughts and impulses, and regard them from outside, the process of trying to place ourselves in the world leads to thoughts that we cannot think of as merely "ours". If we think at all, we must think of ourselves, individually and collectively, as submitting to the order of reasons rather than creating it. — p. 10

This is a substantial and even important idea, irrespective of any bickering about evolution. It is helpful to read this passage in the light of his remarks about Pierce at the beginning of the essay.
I would like to comment, however, that our first business when we enter the world is not to ask that, or any other, question but to undergo the years of training required before we are capable of asking questions. By which time, we will have learnt a good deal about what is the case and what is right.

Thanks, by far the most considered response to that essay by any of those I've mentioned it to.

There's no explanation of where this "proposal" came from, nor any account of why anyone would think that such an explanation would justify relying on reason. I wish he had recognized what evolutionary theory does and doesn't justify. — Ludwig V

He's discussing Robert Nozick's The Nature of Rationality. (I now notice that the posted version has lost some of the formatting to distinguish passages from his book, for which I apologise.) He says that this book sets out to provide a 'naturalised epistemology', that is, to ground knowledge in the facts of natural science, and in particular, evolutionary theory. He's saying that Nozick's argument is that the facts of evolutionary biology are sufficient to 'ground reason':

It (i.e. Nozick's book) seems to be a proposal of a possible naturalistic explanation of the existence of reason that would, if it were true, make our reliance on reason “objectively” reasonable--that is, a reliable way of getting at the truth.

So throughout this passage, he's presenting Nozick's proposal as an example of a naturalised epistemology based on evolutionary biology.

(Naturalized epistemology seeks to understand knowledge, belief, and justification using methods and insights from the natural sciences, particularly psychology, evolutionary biology, and cognitive science, rather than relying solely on a priori philosophical analysis. It treats epistemology as a branch of empirical science, where the processes of acquiring knowledge are studied as natural phenomena. It was notably advanced by W.V.O. Quine in his influential essay "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969). In it, he argued that traditional epistemology's quest for a foundation of knowledge is misguided and that instead, epistemology should be concerned with how humans, as natural beings, actually acquire and justify beliefs. Quine suggested replacing traditional epistemology with a psychological study of how we come to believe what we do. Nozick is writing in this vein, and Nagel is using this book as a foil for a general criticism of naturalised epistemology.)

So he's questioning Nozick's account, asking:

But is the (evolutionary) hypothesis really compatible with continued confidence in reason as a source of knowledge about the non-apparent character of the world? In itself, I believe an evolutionary story tells against such confidence. Without something more, the idea that our rational capacity was the product of natural selection would render reasoning far less trustworthy than Nozick suggests, beyond its original “coping” functions. There would be no reason to trust its results in mathematics and science, for example. — Nagel, p5

The 'something more' is a reason that carries its own authority, which need not and should not be grounded in something else. Note the resemblance to this earlier quote:

Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F's: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. . . . . Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism's way of life and enhances the organism's chances of survival — Plantinga, Naturalism Defeated

Plenty of animals get along just fine without mathematics and science. So appealing to evolutionary principles in support of reason actually has rather the contrary effect of undermining it, rather than strengthening it.

The justification of reason as a practice in its own right is a quite different project, and if that is his point, he (Nagel) is right. — Ludwig V

Well, that I take to be his point. Basically I read the argument as saying, to rely on scientific or evolutionary justifications for reason, is to undermine the sovereignty of reason. And why? Because it points to factors outside reason itself to ground reason:

The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. — p6

The fact that we have a rational capacity demands an evolutionary account. — Ludwig V

I don't know that it does. I agree that we certainly did evolve along the lines shown by the paleontological evidence, but I question how useful it is to rationalise the capacity to reason and speak in those terms.

Other than those points, mostly in agreement with the rest of the analysis, particularly the conclusion.