A rebuttal of Nozick's Entitlement Theory - fruits of labour

Benkei

In his book "Anarchy, State, and Utopia," Nozick presents his entitlement theory, which outlines his libertarian framework for property rights and distribution. Nozick's entitlement theory consists of three main principles regarding the acquisition, transfer, and rectification of holdings. He argues that individuals are entitled to their holdings (including the fruits of their labor) if they were acquired justly, either through original acquisition or voluntary transfer.

I wish to focus on a specific issue within the entitlement theory considering entitlement to the fruits of a person's labour. I will consider this self-evident where we labour for ourselves, leaving aside the moral question whether morally one sound work for themselves or for others.

In challenging the idea that we're entitled to the fruits of our labour (e.g. income), I want to look beyond the standard rebuttals that emphasize public goods and social contract obligations, which are contested and come with a lot of political baggage. While those points have merit, I don’t think fully capture the more fundamental moral issues related to what I'll call worth, need and just production in the entitlement to income. If we critically assess these moral considerations, the argument that individuals have a moral right to their income becomes untenable.

Worth
A key assumption in the libertarian view, particularly that of Robert Nozick, is that individuals have a right to the fruits of their labor, assuming they acquire those fruits through just means (voluntary exchange, fair contracts, etc.). However, the labor market doesn’t determine worth in any moral sense—it merely assigns value based on economic factors like demand, supply, and efficiency.

The fact that a person is paid a certain amount does not mean that they deserve that amount in a moral sense. As Elizabeth Anderson argues in her critiques of market-based justice, the market rewards people for satisfying preferences, regardless of whether these preferences are just or ethical. For example, a hedge fund manager might earn significantly more than a nurse, not because they are more deserving in a moral sense, but because of the structure of the market. The income we earn in the market often reflects arbitrary factors such as luck, social capital, and inherited advantage, none of which justify a moral right to that income.

Even where we're not considering different types of labour but within the same type of labour, I might not be the best person to do the work and therefore less deserving. Or perhaps not deserving of the amount paid if the quality of my production lacks compared to others, even if the market accepts the price I set. By being paid income I divert income from people who might be more deserving of it than I am.

This raises a question: If income does not reflect moral worth of the labourer, how can one claim a moral right to it?

Need
In discussing need, it’s essential to consider the ethical implications of labor contracts. When a person is hiring someone for labor, there’s an implicit moral obligation to consider not just contractual agreements but also the needs of potential workers. In an ideal ethical framework, all things being equal, an employer should prioritize hiring the individual who is most in need of income. This approach underscores a moral responsibility to address inequalities and support those who may be struggling. Therefore, in making hiring decisions, an ethical employer should consider the potential worker's situation and how their choice may affect that person’s life.

This raises a critical question for the argument that we are entitled to our income: if we acknowledge the importance of need in labor contracts, then it follows that income should not be viewed as an absolute right. If individuals are hired based on their needs, the resultant income is not merely a reward for their labor but also a response to their vulnerability.

Just Production
Even the process of income generation itself raises moral questions. Just because income is acquired through market mechanisms doesn’t mean it’s justly earned. Market exchanges often ignore ethical considerations about how the wealth or income is produced. Is the production process fair and just? Are workers adequately compensated? Are the environmental and social impacts of the work accounted for?

For example, a company that profits from exploitative labor practices or environmental degradation may pay its executives enormous salaries. Can those individuals claim a moral right to their income, when the production process itself is unjust?

Conclusion: The Moral Limits of Enttitlement to Income
When we center the discussion on worth, need and just production it becomes clear that individuals do not have an unqualified moral right to all of their income. Market outcomes, contractual agreements, and economic success do not inherently reflect moral entitlements. Rather, they are contingent on broader social, ethical, and political contexts. Worth is often arbitrary, need is ignored, and production is more often than not exploitative and unjust.

In light of these factors, a moral right to income cannot be reasonably held. Instead, it is merely a legal right.

tim wood

a moral right to income cannot be reasonably held. — Benkei

Would you accept a change to, "a moral right to all income of any kind or amount cannot be reasonably held"? If I labor in my small garden I should like to suppose I have a defendable right to at least some of that produce - sharing of course with the local rabbits.

I like sushi

In light of these factors, a moral right to income cannot be reasonably held. Instead, it is merely a legal right. — Benkei

Underneath are you suggesting that what is legal should be moral rather than just? Or that what is just is not moral? Or something else entirely?

Benkei

↪tim wood

I've considered it but probably not. At least, not because you produced it but if you produce ethically and nobody has greater need (a starving child perhaps?), then yes.

Just to point out, I'm not aiming necessarily to have a functional and practical rule how to make these choices, merely to waylay the notion of moral entitlement to income merely because you did the work (moral right would require additional justification).

↪I like sushi

I'm suggesting laws can change. The larger political point probabyl is that we have a lot more political room to decide what we should do with income and other means of wealth production.

I like sushi

I'm suggesting laws can change. — Benkei

They can and do. No need to suggest this.

I find the issue becomes more or less about what an individual can do and what others believe they should do. If it comes down to one side or the other I side with not imposing collective or individual wills on others.

jgill

I find the issue becomes more or less about what an individual can do and what others believe they should do — I like sushi

Two men are friends over a long period of time. #one has a regular job that provides a decent retirement plan. #two is artistic but has little interest in planning financially for the future. At retirement age #one retires on his pension. #two then asks #one to share his pension with him. #one refuses.

Did #one make the right moral choice? (this actually happened)

Benkei

↪I like sushi

And yet many think people have a moral right to all their income and wealth and some even go so far as to say taxation is theft but when it isn't then what does that say about tax, redistribution, compensation, indemnities etc. and many other rights that people currently hold inviolable?

Again, I'm not offering a practical moral theory here, I'm arguing some basic assumptions that are shared widely, also outside of libertarian thought, with regards to some legal rights are wrong.

T Clark

↪Benkei

What a great post. Here are some thoughts - rather piecemeal and off the cuff rather than comprehensive.

How much of the answer to this question depends on the existence of income as money rather than what is produced - material or agricultural? Money separates and abstracts the labor from the product. Of course, a sharecropper or slave gives some or all of what is produced to the landowner and even farmers who are landowners themselves pay taxes.

For example, a hedge fund manager might earn significantly more than a nurse, not because they are more deserving in a moral sense, but because of the structure of the market. — Benkei

Although there is need to address the fact that CEOs often have an income that is hundreds of times what their workers make, there is also the issue of risk. The willingness to take on risk has value that has to be compensated. Beyond willingness, there also has to be ability, which often depends more on wealth than income.

Even where we're not considering different types of labour but within the same type of labour, I might not be the best person to do the work and therefore less deserving. Or perhaps not deserving of the amount paid if the quality of my production lacks compared to others, even if the market accepts the price I set. By being paid income I divert income from people who might be more deserving of it than I am. — Benkei

I see this as a fraught issue. It makes sense that more trained, experienced, and competent people should be paid more than people who are less so, but so called "meritocracy" without more or less rigid job definition will generally lead to socially disadvantaged people, e.g. racial minorities and women, being paid less. Beyond that, it leads directly to those from historically privileged groups becoming even more privileged, but I guess that is outside the scope of this discussion.

This raises a critical question for the argument that we are entitled to our income: if we acknowledge the importance of need in labor contracts, then it follows that income should not be viewed as an absolute right. If individuals are hired based on their needs, the resultant income is not merely a reward for their labor but also a response to their vulnerability. — Benkei

This makes sense from an ethical perspective. As I see it, a good society should ensure a decent life to all it's members willing to participate. I think that would be hard to implement. I guess minimum wages are an attempt to get at the issue. Beyond that, the only practical solution I can think of is a universal basic income, which can separate work from income completely. I guess that's also outside the scope of this discussion.

Is the production process fair and just? Are workers adequately compensated? Are the environmental and social impacts of the work accounted for?

For example, a company that profits from exploitative labor practices or environmental degradation may pay its executives enormous salaries. Can those individuals claim a moral right to their income, when the production process itself is unjust? — Benkei

Solution - costs of production and prices should include social and environmental costs as well as those for labor, materials, and processing and transportation. Again, easier said than done.

When we center the discussion on worth, need and just production it becomes clear that individuals do not have an unqualified moral right to all of their income. — Benkei

As I noted previously, risk should also be considered.

In light of these factors, a moral right to income cannot be reasonably held. Instead, it is merely a legal right. — Benkei

The problem is enforcement. There have to be legal rights to enforce moral ones.

tim wood

merely to waylay the notion of moral entitlement to income merely because you did the work (moral right would require additional justification). — Benkei

The genus of right is claim, the species distinguished as being in some sense absolute - hoping here to avoid any tangents on "absolute."

Question: can there be a right that is not either directly or indirectly a moral right? It seems to me that all rights are at least in some part moral.

So what is moral? To be moral is to be a good both in and for itself and beyond itself.
A moral right, then, would be a claim, absolute in a relevant sense, to a good that is both good itself and beyond itself. A doughnut, then, being good but probably not good in any long term sense, but an apple being both a good and a good beyond itself.

And here I detect a difference in our understandings: I hold moral rights to be universal and always present - even if subject to discussion as to details. And you appear to hold them as somehow an optional add-on. As if morality stored in that tent over there, and maybe we go get some and maybe we don't and just pass on by.

In my thinking is Kant and his imperatives, in particular that if imperatives collide, then for that purpose the better is chosen and the lesser falls away. This resolving issues between conflicting "absolute" moral rights.

My argument, then, is that I have a moral right to possession of what I earn, both for the immediate good, to me and mine, and also for the greater good of all enjoying the same right. This not an absolute claim to all and everything I earn, because there are conflicting obligations we all have as members of communities that also have to be met.

I like sushi

↪Benkei

I think it is pretty obvious that what is legal is not necessarily just. I have read Nozick's partially only atm so perhaps I will see what you are talking about exactly if you give page references maybe? From my perspective I am worried you are applying the idea of 'morals' where they simply do not map directly onto what you are considering. I may well be wrong in this assumption though.

I like sushi

↪jgill

I have no idea given I have no idea about the nuances of this specific situation.

In general though, it depends on whether they felt like they made the correct moral choice. I would also ask whether the person asking made the right moral choice too in asking and in not planning ahead.

What is your point? What do you think?

Benkei

↪jgill

Different issue I think. Let's assume both had a right to their income and this is the end result then this is not a matter of a moral right to income but a question perhaps of solidarity.

unenlightened

I point out that real estate is treated very differently to creative rights.

One can certainly assign copyrights and patents on a voluntary basis to another, but these rights have an expiry date. Fortunately, you do not have to pay my ancestors for their invention of the wheel.

I suggest that real estate should have a similar expiry date of say, the purchaser's life plus 50 years, or thereabouts. It does not seem right to me that the Duke of Westminster owns half of London just because his male ancestor 1,000 years back was William the Conqueror's bestie.

Benkei

↪I like sushi

Your remarks remain vague so perhaps I'm not simply understanding you properly.

Nozick's idea is a basic and usually unchallenged assumption for many economic pundits that argue in favour of specific policies, which are often expressed through law. If the assumption is incorrect, many of those specific policies lack a rational basis. This changes the discussion because it's mostly argued along the lines of collectivism vs. individualism, which resemble more political intiutions. At least, I've not really seen collectivists and individualism meet in some kind of Aufhebung. As far as I know, this specific line of criticism has not been previously expressed.

Benkei

↪T Clark

Glad you liked it! To be honest, it's been awhile since I've really put an effort in something other than current politics. Actual philosophy takes time.

How much of the answer to this question depends on the existence of income as money rather than what is produced - material or agricultural? Money separates and abstracts the labor from the product. Of course, a sharecropper or slave gives some or all of what is produced to the landowner and even farmers who are landowners themselves pay taxes. — T Clark

I don't think it is dependent on it. Cash is what we know so easiest to imagine. Also why for brevity's sake I moved from "fruits of labour" to income but I'm talking about any "fruit" really.

Although there is need to address the fact that CEOs often have an income that is hundreds of times what their workers make, there is also the issue of risk. The willingness to take on risk has value that has to be compensated. Beyond willingness, there also has to be ability, which often depends more on wealth than income. — T Clark

Fair point. I assume you mean shareholders then, since the CEO usually isn't invested until after his golden parachute and bonuses. :wink: I think risk is secondary though. In an ideal, ethical world, a shareholder will only invest in ethical business. When that is clear, we can value risk.

On a tangential but related point, the perpetual gains of a shareholder is another process I'm not ethically comfortable with. Capital markets primarily put borrowers and lenders together, and while the interest is "variable", shareholders don't take additional risk compared to a bank providing a private loan. In fact, I think it's lower because selling shares is a whole lot easier than selling private loans to a third party thereby having additional options available to reduce losses. But in return, he gets perpetual rights to dividend and the value of his "property" increases as value is added through the "fruits of labour" of employees. It feels like double-dipping if you compare it with a regular loan; which just gives right to the notional amount and whatever interest was agreed for a specified time frame (or if perpetual with an option to repay the notional amount). Put differently, shareholder returns are much higher and persist for longer than they should if we consider the basic function of capital is just another type of loan. But I digress; just take away that I'm not a fan of the perpetual nature of companies.

I see this as a fraught issue. It makes sense that more trained, experienced, and competent people should be paid more than people who are less so, but so called "meritocracy" without more or less rigid job definition will generally lead to socially disadvantaged people, e.g. racial minorities and women, being paid less. Beyond that, it leads directly to those from historically privileged groups becoming even more privileged, but I guess that is outside the scope of this discussion. — T Clark

A good addition! I'm not sure how this could be added because it's a further moral argument why some people have no moral claim to their income. I think it's suggestive of social justice and the way I set up my criticism is that is at this point blind to such considerations.

This makes sense from an ethical perspective. As I see it, a good society should ensure a decent life to all it's members willing to participate. I think that would be hard to implement. I guess minimum wages are an attempt to get at the issue. Beyond that, the only practical solution I can think of is a universal basic income, which can separate work from income completely. I guess that's also outside the scope of this discussion. — T Clark

It's not out of scope but yes, I haven't gotten as far to think about actual policy implementations. I merely want to waylay a foundational point of Nozick's entitlement theory which is widely shared in broader society as a given. Disproving it, should open up different avenues of discussion instead of acceptance of a status quo that doesn't give us moral outcomes.

The problem is enforcement. There have to be legal rights to enforce moral ones. — T Clark

Don't be so practical man! First things first. :yum:

Benkei

Question: can there be a right that is not either directly or indirectly a moral right? It seems to me that all rights are at least in some part moral. — tim wood

A license to sell drugs, financial products or therapy seem to be rights that are independent of moral rights but instead agreement on how things should be regulated in order to protect higher norms (consumer protection for instance).

And you appear to hold them as somehow an optional add-on. As if morality stored in that tent over there, and maybe we go get some and maybe we don't and just pass on by. — tim wood

What part of what I wrote makes you say this when I'm only discussing one specific presumed moral right?

My argument, then, is that I have a moral right to possession of what I earn, both for the immediate good, to me and mine, and also for the greater good of all enjoying the same right. This not an absolute claim to all and everything I earn, because there are conflicting obligations we all have as members of communities that also have to be met. — tim wood

I don't think you have such a moral right for the reasons I set out. All things being equal, except you are not homeless and starving, should you get the job or a homeless person? The market doesn't care, which is why you have homeless and starving people in all market-driven economies even when there's more than enough wealth available for this not to be the case.

Where is morality found when societies accept ludicrous riches and abject poverty at the same time?

jgill

What is your point? What do you think? — I like sushi

Different issue I think — Benkei

Yes, not quite what the OP is all about. This is an example of the sort of legal issue that might ensue upon the death of the wage earner, in which a will is contested, or the allocation of part of a pension payment plan upon retirement. Normally, marriage would be involved.

In this case there have been no legal issues raised. As to whether the wage earner here was morally entitled to the money he received, I don't see why not.

When I ask myself if the money I earned while working was "appropriate", I can only say it was determined by the standards society adopted in a competitive environment. There was no absolute moral factor invoked.

Benkei

There was no absolute moral factor invoked. — jgill

True but Nozick does invoke morals and it underpins beliefs held in wider society that to most are a self-evident truth. Nobody questions if they have a right to their income, it is sufficient that they did the work. There's a contract after all. Etc. Etc. "The standards society adopted" are largely unexamined. It is a card house of assumptions and I'm challenging a specific one.

I like sushi

↪Benkei

This assumes people have 'rights' - also a legal matter. True enough there is certainly a 'moral' factor involved here in regards to the establishment of rights being, at its core, about protecting people from harms in some fashion or another.

here's a contract after all. Etc. Etc. "The standards society adopted" are largely unexamined. — Benkei

By Nozick? I have read Chapters 1 & 2 so I am unsure why you are suggesting these standards are largely unexamined? Also in Chapter 10 (which I have also read fairly thoroughly) how and why society adopt certain standards are looked at here too. For instance, in the three utopian positions: 'Imperialistic,' 'Missionary,' and 'Existential'.

Maybe Chapter 3 does not cover what bothers you thoroughly enough. It woudl be helpful if you can pinpoint where in the Chapter he falls short. I will read that Chapter now. I have been meaning to get back to the book and read every page so this is a good enough excuse to do so now :) Thanks

Benkei

By Nozick? I have read Chapters 1 & 2 so I am unsure why you are suggesting these standards are largely unexamined? Also in Chapter 10 (which I have also read fairly thoroughly) how and why society adopt certain standards are looked at here too. For instance, in the three utopian positions: 'Imperialistic,' 'Missionary,' and 'Existential'.

Maybe Chapter 3 does not cover what bothers you thoroughly enough. It woudl be helpful if you can pinpoint where in the Chapter he falls short. I will read that Chapter now. I have been meaning to get back to the book and read every page so this is a good enough excuse to do so now :) Thanks — I like sushi

No, I meant not examined by larger society. Nozick obviously did examine it, although as you've surmised I think he misses the point. But some ideas are so entrenched in society; deregulation is better for markets, privatisation is better, companies are more efficient than governments etc., that they aren't really examined anymore even when there's plenty of historic data disproving a lot these assumptions. I think the automatic reflex assuming what we earn through labour is morally ours is such an unexamined idea. Which is weird, because there's plenty of criticsm of Nozick's idea but they don't really get the attention they deserve outside of philosophy.

Historically, criticisms of Nozick's idea can be categorised as follows: it fails to account for historical injustices, the social nature of labor, the complexities of inequalities, and the moral dimensions of desert and justice.

By the way, I read Nozick 20 years ago along with Rawls "A Theory of Justice". So when you've read it, you'll be more knowledgeable than me for sure.

What I think I'm trying to add to existing criticisms is the following:

By framing "worth" as central to justice in labor and distribution, I emphasize the importance of evaluating individuals' contributions beyond mere economic output. This perspective can be seen as an re-emphasis of theAristotlean idea of justice as giving people what they deserve based on their virtues or contributions, especially when we connect it to modern concerns about meritocracy, inequality, and ethical labor practices.

Positioning need as a central ethical criterion in hiring and labor contracts adds a layer of moral responsibility that goes beyond traditional economic considerations. This can be seen as a contribution if it’s used to advocate for specific policies or business practices that prioritize those most in need but of course Marx and Rawls both addressed need as well.

Combining just production with worth and need might create an ethical framework that could be used to critique current market practices. And I think in a sense I'm still stuck in the individual objective here but including the social justice aspect @T Clark mentioned might enrich it further. Which I was thinking about since his post and I'm going to have a stab at.

Social Justice and Worth
To address this, we could broaden the concept of worth to include potential worth. This means recognizing that individuals from socially disadvantaged groups may not have had the same opportunities to demonstrate their worth due to systemic barriers. Therefore, affirmative action or equal opportunity initiatives would be justified to help these individuals reach their potential. This adjustment reframes worth not just as a reflection of past contributions but as a recognition of untapped potential, especially in underrepresented groups.

Social Justice and Need
Need can be expanded to include contextual need—the recognition that social disadvantages often create long-term, less visible needs. For example, a person from a marginalized community may not appear to be in acute need but may suffer from a lack of educational opportunities, social capital, or access to networks. Addressing these deeper, systemic needs through targeted interventions (such as scholarships, mentorship programs, or community-based initiatives) ensures that the framework is sensitive to the hidden dimensions of social disadvantage.

Social Justice and Just Production
Just production can be expanded to include inclusive production, which explicitly aims to involve and empower socially disadvantaged groups. This could mean adopting hiring practices that prioritize diversity, ensuring that supply chains are free from discrimination, and promoting workplace cultures that are inclusive and supportive of all employees. Inclusive production ensures that social justice is embedded in the very process of creating goods and services, not just in their distribution.

Or something like that but this deviates from the original point of the OP: a rebuttal of the entitlement theory.

A rebuttal of Nozick's Entitlement Theory - fruits of labour

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