You are correct. It had slipped my mind when I was skimming the text again.

:cool:

I will let Cephalus speak in my defense:

For mark my words, Socrates,” said he, “once someone begins to think he is about to die, fears and concerns occur to him about issues that had not occurred to him previously. For the stories told about people in Hades, that someone who has acted unjustly whilst here must pay a penalty when he arrives there, stories that were laughable before then, torment his soul at that stage, for fear they might be true. (330d-e)

Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally, or again, depart to that other world in fear because some sacrifices are still owed to a god, or some money to another person.

(331b)

Cephalus has been freed from eros,

a raving and savage slave master

(329c)

but has not escaped the fear of death.

He is, by all appearances, a gentleman. To the extent that he is just, he credits his wealth. The gentleman is not at fault for not being a philosopher, but the philosopher’s understanding and practice of justice differs significantly. The philosopher's being just does not depend on wealth, and because he is just he does not fear death.

Maybe part of my good impression of Cephalus is that we know what the wealthy and powerful will do to Socrates, but here's Cephalus who says, "Socrates! So glad you're here. I wish you'd come see me more often." And when he has to go see to the sacrifice (meant to mention that, as @Amity did), he encourages Socrates to carry on the conversation with the young folks, so not evidently concerned they'll be corrupted.

Sure, but even with all that there's the suggestion of complacency, especially when you take his son's conversation into account too. Thrasymachus is the antagonist; Cephalus & Son are merely too thoughtless to produce any defence against him — not that they're bad guys themselves.

He is, by all appearances, a gentleman. To the extent that he is just, he credits his wealth. — Fooloso4

And his good character. He says that wealth is not enough.

Quite how your post relates to the OP, though, I am struggling to understand, because you don't actually say (except to suggest that the question of attribution is secondary, and the bit about P's appeal to authority). — Jamal

You quote the text:

SOCRATES: So if someone tells us it is just to give to each what he is owed, and understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and benefit his friends, the one who says it is not wise. I mean, what he says is not true. For it has become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone. — 335e

(emphasis added)

Who does "the one who said it" refer to? As I read it, what is at issue is the distinction between what is said and what is meant or understood. Socrates says that the poets speak in riddles. (322b) We do not know what Simonides said or did not say, and so cannot comment on what he meant. But whether or not he said this, the question remains as to how we are to understand it.

You say:

In other words, since the definition is false it cannot have originated from a wise person, and since Simonides et al were wise, it follows that it did not originate from them. — Jamal

We cannot too quickly conclude that either Simonides is not wise or if wise did not say this. It may be our own wisdom or lack of wisdom that is being called into question.

You go on to say:

On the surface, Socrates, not content with having refuted the definition, is rather facilely associating it with real injustice, and we get the feeling that he has just made it up. In doing so he is probably suggesting that the definition is merely the biased opinion of self-serving rulers. — Jamal

I think it is a conventional opinion, one shared by conventional men such as Cephalus and Polemarchus. Socrates questions the the conventional understanding. It is, however, the starting point.

Now, at this point in the Republic, the problem with poets has not yet come up — Jamal

But it has been brought up! Cephalus opinions about such things as justice are shaped by the poets. Consider how frequently the poets are appealed to.

Since nobody in the conversation seems to know for sure where the definition originated, and since Socrates is well aware of this and does not even pretend that he knows for sure himself, he could be intentionally associating the poets with tyrants and injustice without actually saying so. — Jamal

This connection requires textual support. Again, I see the question of origination as secondary to how it is to be understood. The truth or falsity of what is said does not depend on who might have first said it.

And his good character. He says that wealth is not enough. — Jamal

Agreed, wealth is not enough, but we should not understate the importance it has for Cephalus. As he says:

Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally,

He himself brings into question how just he would have been if he were not wealthy.. But, of course, as I am sure he knows, it is not sufficient. There are plenty of wealthy people who do intentionally cheat and deceive people.

The other thing he cites is fear of punishment in death. Something that he never took seriously when he was younger. As far as I know we do not know anything about him prior to his old age. We do not know to what extent fear of death might have changed his behavior.

We cannot too quickly conclude that either Simonides is not wise or if wise did not say this. It may be our own wisdom or lack of wisdom that is being called into question. — Fooloso4

Your point is broadly good, but Socrates does on the surface mean to show that Simonides and other wise men could not have --- or at least probably did not --- say it. That this doesn't matter relative to how we are to understand Socrates in the way you explain is fine as far as it goes, but in the OP I took things in a different direction with a view to uncovering a possible covert criticism.

But it has been brought up! Cephalus opinions about such things as justice are shaped by the poets. Consider how frequently the poets are appealed to. — Fooloso4

Yes, Cephalus quotes Pindar. I just meant that poetry as a problem has not explicitly been brought up by Socrates. He does this later.

The other thing he cites is fear of punishment in death. Something that he never took seriously when he was younger. As far as I know we do not know anything about him prior to his old age. We do not know to what extent fear of death might have changed his behavior. — Fooloso4

It's not quite clear, but it's also possible that he is not confessing to his own fears, but is referring to those of the masses:

CEPHALUS: What I have to say probably would not persuade the masses. But you are well aware, Socrates, that when someone thinks his end is near, he becomes frightened and concerned about things he did not fear before. It is then that the stories told about Hades, that a person who has been unjust here must pay the penalty there—stories he used to make fun of—twist his soul this way and that for fear they are true. And whether because of the weakness of old age, or because he is now closer to what happens in Hades and has a clearer view of it, or whatever it is, he is filled with foreboding and fear, and begins to calculate and consider whether he has been unjust to anyone. If he finds many injustices in his life, he often even awakes from sleep in terror, as children do, and lives in anticipation of evils to come. But someone who knows he has not been unjust has sweet good hope as his constant companion [...] — 330d

Cephalus might be suggesting here that unlike many of the masses, he is not "filled with foreboding and fear," because he has not found many injustices in his life. But either way is fine with me; it seems likely that he is familiar with such feelings. In any case there is little indication from the text that he has led an unjust life, and it doesn't matter; what matters is that even if he hasn't, he has not been just in the way that Socrates likes, i.e., able to account for it rationally. This makes him at the very least a useless example to set against Thrasymachus, or a useless partner in an argument against nihilism and cynicism.

This connection requires textual support. Again, I see the question of origination as secondary to how it is to be understood. The truth or falsity of what is said does not depend on who might have first said it. — Fooloso4

I agree with the second and third sentences here. I was attempting to identify a literary foreshadowing or a literary easter egg. I probably need to break that down, but to me it jumps off the page (if you look at it right).

The criticism that damages my interpretation the most is my own: Simonides is not the only wise man mentioned, and the others were not poets.

Now, at this point in the Republic, the problem with poets has not yet come up
— Jamal

But it has been brought up! Cephalus opinions about such things as justice are shaped by the poets. Consider how frequently the poets are appealed to. — Fooloso4

Earlier, I referenced the powerful influence of poets. Perhaps understanding poetry as historical narrative in its social and personal context is preferable to taking part in the rhetorical argumentation of philosophers which often lead to no conclusion. Although interested and encouraging, Cephalus has other priorities.

He provides us with an example of the importance of poetry in the lives of Ancient Greeks. Their focus on the spiritual and Gods. Distinct from the rational but that doesn't mean he is irrational, or 'useless' in the Dialogue, just unwilling to take that particular path.

It is not the case that he leaves the debate the moment he gets a difficult question. He engages with Socrates up to the point where he agrees but then he must leave to attend to religious matters.
He talks of old age in the wisest of terms and uses poets as support. Sophocles, 329c. — Amity

He is thinking ahead to his death and how to please the Gods.
He uses Pindar 331a to talk about the 'ledger of his life' — Amity

he could be intentionally associating the poets with tyrants and injustice without actually saying so — Jamal

Your point is broadly good, but Socrates does on the surface mean to show that Simonides and other wise men could not have --- or at least probably did not --- say it. — Jamal

This is truncated. What is at issue is how what he is purported to have said is to be understood. If it is misunderstood this does not mean the a wise man could not have said it, but that what the wise man said is not understood.

Socrates says:

Then when Simonides says that giving back what is owed is just, he is not referring to this sort of thing but to something else.

(332a)

After purposing a possible answer he follows it with:

Is this what Simonides means, according to you?

(332b)

What we might regard as wise is not independent of us. If we are not wise can we adequately judge who or what is?

in the OP I took things. in a different direction with a view to uncovering a possible covert criticism. — Jamal

Yes, that is understood. But the criticism is quite overt. The larger issue at stake is the relationship between philosophy and poetry. What Socrates will later call the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry. (607b)

To suggest that Socrates is covertly claiming that the poets are tyrannical seems to overstate the case.

Socrates' goes on to say:

.. let’s declare that if someone is able to put forward an argument as to why there should be poetry and imitation, whose aim is pleasure, in a well-regulated city, we would gladly receive these back again, because we realise that we are still charmed by them.

(607c)

The argument would have to show that poetry and imitation which aims at something other than pleasure does have a place in a well-regulated city. What we should not miss is that this is precisely what Socrates himself does. He makes full use of poetry and imitation, only the aim is not simply pleasure. The cave, for example, is:

an image of our nature in its education and want of education.

(Republic 514a)

The image of the cave and the images on the cave wall originate with the poets. The education they provide goes far beyond pleasure.

Cephalus might be suggesting here that unlike many of the masses, he is not "filled with foreboding and fear," because he has not found many injustices in his life. — Jamal

Perhaps, but there is a big difference between not having acted unjustly and being unaware that one has acted unjustly. In any case, it seems he believes the poets regarding such things.

I've done some thinking and now I have a slightly different angle. I see that while I started out with a good intuition, it went a bit wrong on its way to conceptual crystallization. @Fooloso4's comments are more relevant than they seemed.

In a nutshell, I think Socrates is saying to Polemarchus something like, "when you repeat that saying, you might as well be quoting one of these bad guys." And that's even if it was in fact said by Simonides. Thus the emphasis is on an independent understanding of the saying rather than who said it, and Socrates is neutral about its factual origin.

This does still mean that his comments in praise of Simonides and the sages are ironic, but it's an irony that is more complex than I thought.

SOCRATES: Well, now, it is not easy to disagree with Simonides, since he is a wise and godlike man — 331e5

SOCRATES: You and I will fight as partners, then, against anyone who tells us that Simonides, Bias, Pittacus, or any of our other wise and blessedly happy men said this. — 335e7

If it's true that Socrates is neutral as to who originated the saying, that it's our understanding of the saying itself that matters, then of course he is open to the possibility that Simonides did in fact say it. This would make the above comments ironic, not exactly because he is sneakily associating Simonides with the injustice of tyrants while saying the opposite, but because he continues to praise Simonides, pretending to believe that he could not have been wrong, while in fact he is neutral as to the wisdom of the real Simonides. It's an exaggerated concession to his reputation, in other words, paying lip service. What matters is to question our reliance on all cultural authorities, including Simonides.

So the targets are people like Polemarchus who ascribe erroneous notions of justice to wise people, something Socrates gets across bluntly by ascribing them instead to bad guys; and generally those who rely on cultural authorities, whether these authorities are poets or sages, without having thought about them deeply.


I came across another interesting interpretation in a paper entitled "Socrates on Poetry and the Wisdom of Simonides." The idea is that Plato is not interested in Simonides as a historical figure but is rather making him stand as his ideal poet. This is in contrast to Homer, who by this point in the the conversation with Polemarchus has already been mentioned dismissively:

It seems, then, that a just person has turned out to be a kind of thief. You probably got that idea from Homer. — 334a9

But Homer is later replaced, as not deserving of Socrates' defence, while Simonides is elevated:

You and I will fight as partners, then, against anyone who tells us that Simonides, Bias, Pittacus, or any of our other wise and blessedly happy men said this. — 335e7

Again, the crucial thing is that the real Simonides is unimportant. The new element is that because of this he can function as a blank canvas onto which Plato can project his ideal poet, in contrast with Homer, who is problematic. This is quite compelling, and it's actually sort of compatible with the first interpretation, although it does bring the ascription of irony into question (or it would make it an even more complex kind of irony). It doesn't matter what the real Simonides might have said, but it does matter what Homer said, because Homer loomed so large in the culture, and comes in for direct criticism later in the Republic.


Notes
Futter, Dylan. (2021). SOCRATES ON POETRY AND THE WISDOM OF SIMONIDES. Akroterion. 65

Here is the problem in Socrates own words:

For the offspring of the painter’s skill stand before us like living creatures, but if you ask them a question, they are very solemnly silent. And the same goes for written words. You might assume that they are speaking with some degree of intelligence, but if you wish to learn from them and you ask them a question about what they are saying, they just point to one thing and it is always the same.

(Phaedrus 275d)

... poets who cannot be questioned about the topic they are speaking of. And when the majority of people quote them in discussions, some say the poet means one thing while others say he means something else, and they end up discussing matters they are unable to resolve.

(Protagoras 347e)

:up:

I've done some thinking and now I have a slightly different angle. I see that while I started out with a good intuition, it went a bit wrong on its way to conceptual crystallization. — Jamal

I'm curious. Does that mean your focus has now turned away from the 'literary easter egg'? Or what?

t's probably an eccentric focus. It's a bit like a literary easter egg.
Another way of saying this is that my focus is more important from a literary than from a philosophical point of view. — Jamal

I was intrigued by your novel and extraordinary approach to discussing Plato's Republic, Book1.
However, I was concerned that any Easter Egg Hunt would narrow the reading. Hidden treats are sometimes not as delicious as we might hope for. Too many can ruin the appetite for the main meal.
I suppose, though, they capture interest and imagination...and that can lead to deeper exploration.

I searched for 'literary easter egg' with regards to Plato. And found this podcast and transcript.
You need to scroll down to find the passage starting:

Besides the meticulous care with which every sentence of this work is crafted, the book is also full of what we might call Easter eggs. You know how certain movies have these little cool features that the director likes to hide throughout the film, and then die-hard fans will watch the movie dozens of times to find them all?... — The Hunt for Justice - Plato's Republic I

He gives examples but I'm not sure if that is what you had in mind.

The whole transcript, with its informal but informed style, is worth a read.
The philosophy behind it is to make the Classics accessible.

The Classics shouldn't be just for people lucky enough to go to certain schools. Everyone should be able to know about the ideas and events that inspired the founders of this republic. Let's declassify the classics.

The host of the podcast, Lantern Jack, holds a PhD in ancient philosophy from Princeton University.

I'm curious. Does that mean your focus has now turned away from the 'literary easter egg'? — Amity

I think so, because the idea of a literary Easter egg doesn't do justice (no pun intended) to the kind of subtlety that Plato is using. What we have now is literary subtlety in the service of a philosophical theme, rather than a hidden criticism.

I searched for 'literary easter egg' with regards to Plato. And found this podcast and transcript. — Amity

Cool. I'm not surprised that others have had the same idea.

Well, the Republic is full of such Easter eggs. They are hard for us to spot, but audiences in Plato’s day would have been able to. Just to give you one example, again on the very first page. When Polemarchus and Adeimantus and company run into Socrates and Glaucon, Polemarchus makes a joke. He says, “Hey Socrates, do you see how numerous we are compared to you two? You better do as we say and come to my house.”

In other words, he’s making a joke about factionalism. During times of social harmony, such jokes may be funny. But to Plato’s audiences, this is a very dark joke. Because his audience knew, as we discussed last time, that Polemarchus himself, would later become the victim of the kind of factionalism he now makes light of. Plato’s audience would also know that this road from the Piraeus back to Athens is where, decades later, the Thirty Tyrants would be overthrown in a battle (the Battle of Munychia in 403 BC) and their leaders killed.

In response to Polemarchus’ joke, Socrates says, “What if we persuade you to let us go?” To which Polemarchus jests again, saying, “Can you persuade someone who refuses to listen?”

Again, it’s easy to read past this stuff and not think much of it. But how brilliant is this setup? That one question alone, sums up the essence of factional division. How do you persuade someone who refuses to listen? Not only does this Easter egg build up a dark sense of irony, it also subtly broaches the topic of factionalism, which will figure prominently throughout the entire dialogue. There are little Easter eggs like this all over the Republic, and unfortunately we don’t have time to go through them — The Hunt for Justice - Plato's Republic I

Yeah this is good stuff. I didn't think primarily of factionalism so much as power vs persuasion, irrational vs rational, etc., but it's a good example.

In which case, maybe literary Easter eggs is the right concept after all.

I didn't think primarily of factionalism so much as power vs persuasion, irrational vs rational, etc., but it's a good example. — Jamal

No, neither did I but it makes sense when you think about it. The factions of dissenting groups within a bigger organisation. The power struggles of poets v philosophers. Political justice within different societal structures. The tripartite mind. The rational part (philosophers) must rule, according to Plato.

@Fooloso4 made the point earlier:

There are several themes that are developed at the beginning of the dialogue including the questions of persuasion and inheritance. We need to take a step back.

Socrates asks Polemarchus :

Could we not persuade you that you should let us leave?
(327e)

The question of persuasion and its means is of central importance. On the one hand, it is behind both the arguments of Thrasymachus and the other sophists as well as those of Socrates and the philosophers, and, on the other, of the poet’s stories of men and gods. The stories of the poets are an inherited means of persuasion manifest as belief. From an early age children are told the poet’s stories. — Fooloso4

[emphasis added]

The question:'How do you persuade those who refuse to listen?' - still relevant after all these years...
Divide and Rule. Where is the justice? Who are the 'just'?

:up:

Your introduction of how well the eggs can be understood through time prompted me to think about how different a book the Inferno by Dante was for the generations closest to it.

Your introduction of how well the eggs can be understood through time prompted me to think about how different a book the Inferno by Dante was for the generations closest to it. — Paine

Yes, the transcript above pulled me in. [The Hunt for Justice - Plato's Republic I ]
As have you! I think I now want to explore Dante...perhaps later and elsewhere. :sparkle:

The idea of a 'knowing' audience who would immediately recognise any 'easter eggs' made me think of 'intertextuality'. The way that all texts can use other texts either explicitly or implicitly to capture or enrapture the audience.

It's about recognising or understanding a reference - that 'Aha!' moment which brings more meaning to the reading or visual. It can widen the personal and cultural experience. There is also the challenge of keeping alert. Being and becoming aware of what is going on at various levels.

I am now more aware of how Plato uses the cultural elements of that time to connect with his audience.
His means of persuasion. Particular themes or messages are emphasised by drawing on existing texts.

We already touched on Cephalus and Plato's insertion of Sophocles and Pindar:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/936223

I remain a bit confused by this:

The crucial thing is that the real Simonides is unimportant. The new element is that because of this he can function as a blank canvas onto which Plato can project his ideal poet, in contrast with Homer, who is problematic. This is quite compelling, and it's actually sort of compatible with the first interpretation, although it does bring the ascription of irony into question (or it would make it an even more complex kind of irony). It doesn't matter what the real Simonides might have said, but it does matter what Homer said, because Homer loomed so large in the culture, and comes in for direct criticism later in the Republic. [...]

So the targets are people like Polemarchus who ascribe erroneous notions of justice to wise people, something Socrates gets across bluntly by ascribing them instead to bad guys; and generally those who rely on cultural authorities, whether these authorities are poets or sages, without having thought about them deeply.

I came across another interesting interpretation in a paper entitled "Socrates on Poetry and the Wisdom of Simonides." The idea is that Plato is not interested in Simonides as a historical figure but is rather making him stand as his ideal poet. This is in contrast to Homer, who by this point in the the conversation with Polemarchus has already been mentioned dismissively: — Jamal

You've mixed up the order of the paragraphs, which is important. Maybe that's why you're confused :grin:

You've mixed up the order of the paragraphs, which is important. Maybe that's why you're confused — Jamal

Have I? Oh dear :yikes:
That's what comes of not paying attention and reading carefully, I suppose.

I think it is the idea of Simonides as an 'ideal poet' in contrast with Homer that I don't understand.

and also this:

So the targets are people like Polemarchus who ascribe erroneous notions of justice to wise people, something Socrates gets across bluntly by ascribing them instead to bad guys; and generally those who rely on cultural authorities, whether these authorities are poets or sages, without having thought about them deeply. — Jamal

[emphasis added]

Perhaps, I need to return to the passage...

I think it is the idea of Simonides as an 'ideal poet' in contrast with Homer that I don't understand. — Amity

Cool. The first and third paragraphs in the mixed up quotation are about that. Here they are in order, with the quotations from the Republic removed:

I came across another interesting interpretation in a paper entitled "Socrates on Poetry and the Wisdom of Simonides." The idea is that Plato is not interested in Simonides as a historical figure but is rather making him stand as his ideal poet. This is in contrast to Homer, who by this point in the the conversation with Polemarchus has already been mentioned dismissively

[...]

Again, the crucial thing is that the real Simonides is unimportant. The new element is that because of this he can function as a blank canvas onto which Plato can project his ideal poet, in contrast with Homer, who is problematic. This is quite compelling, and it's actually sort of compatible with the first interpretation, although it does bring the ascription of irony into question (or it would make it an even more complex kind of irony). It doesn't matter what the real Simonides might have said, but it does matter what Homer said, because Homer loomed so large in the culture, and comes in for direct criticism later in the Republic.

This is the alternative, or further developed, interpretation that I mentioned in my post, which I got from this:

Futter, Dylan. (2021). SOCRATES ON POETRY AND THE WISDOM OF SIMONIDES. Akroterion. 65

So it's not my idea and I'm not committed to it, although I do find it quite persuasive. If you're particularly interested in it have a look at that paper, otherwise I wouldn't worry about it.

:up: Thanks again :smile:

Again, the crucial thing is that the real Simonides is unimportant. The new element is that because of this he can function as a blank canvas onto which Plato can project his ideal poet, in contrast with Homer, who is problematic.

Simonides does not function as a blank canvas. Quite the opposite. He was too well known and influential to be treated this way. In the Protagoras Socrates says he has studied a particular ode of Simonides closely . (339b) The theme is a good or bad man and the significance of circumstances in his being the one or the other. There is an obvious parallel to Socrates discussion with Cephalus and another saying of Simonides.

Protagoras, the famous sophist, tells Socrates that Simonides like Homer and Hesiod concealed his skill as sophist in his poetry. (316d) By putting the sophists and poets together, the "ancient quarrel between the philosophy and poetry" is extended to include the quarrel between the philosopher and the sophist. What the poets and sophists have in common is a rhetorical or persuasive way of speaking whose strength can be separated from the logos.

Protagoras later says:

... a most significant part of a man’s education is proficiency in relation to poetry. This consists of being able to ... give an account of them when questioned. (338e-339a)

[Added: And again turns to Simonides.]

What the poet says requires giving an account, one which includes both explication and a defense of its soundness if it is to be accepted. (339c)