For mark my words, Socrates,” said he, “once someone begins to think he is about to die, fears and concerns occur to him about issues that had not occurred to him previously. For the stories told about people in Hades, that someone who has acted unjustly whilst here must pay a penalty when he arrives there, stories that were laughable before then, torment his soul at that stage, for fear they might be true. (330d-e)
(331b)Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally, or again, depart to that other world in fear because some sacrifices are still owed to a god, or some money to another person.
(329c)a raving and savage slave master
Quite how your post relates to the OP, though, I am struggling to understand, because you don't actually say (except to suggest that the question of attribution is secondary, and the bit about P's appeal to authority). — Jamal
(emphasis added)SOCRATES: So if someone tells us it is just to give to each what he is owed, and understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and benefit his friends, the one who says it is not wise. I mean, what he says is not true. For it has become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone. — 335e
In other words, since the definition is false it cannot have originated from a wise person, and since Simonides et al were wise, it follows that it did not originate from them. — Jamal
On the surface, Socrates, not content with having refuted the definition, is rather facilely associating it with real injustice, and we get the feeling that he has just made it up. In doing so he is probably suggesting that the definition is merely the biased opinion of self-serving rulers. — Jamal
Now, at this point in the Republic, the problem with poets has not yet come up — Jamal
Since nobody in the conversation seems to know for sure where the definition originated, and since Socrates is well aware of this and does not even pretend that he knows for sure himself, he could be intentionally associating the poets with tyrants and injustice without actually saying so. — Jamal
And his good character. He says that wealth is not enough. — Jamal
Indeed, the possession of wealth has a major role to play in ensuring that one does not cheat or deceive someone intentionally,
We cannot too quickly conclude that either Simonides is not wise or if wise did not say this. It may be our own wisdom or lack of wisdom that is being called into question. — Fooloso4
But it has been brought up! Cephalus opinions about such things as justice are shaped by the poets. Consider how frequently the poets are appealed to. — Fooloso4
The other thing he cites is fear of punishment in death. Something that he never took seriously when he was younger. As far as I know we do not know anything about him prior to his old age. We do not know to what extent fear of death might have changed his behavior. — Fooloso4
CEPHALUS: What I have to say probably would not persuade the masses. But you are well aware, Socrates, that when someone thinks his end is near, he becomes frightened and concerned about things he did not fear before. It is then that the stories told about Hades, that a person who has been unjust here must pay the penalty there—stories he used to make fun of—twist his soul this way and that for fear they are true. And whether because of the weakness of old age, or because he is now closer to what happens in Hades and has a clearer view of it, or whatever it is, he is filled with foreboding and fear, and begins to calculate and consider whether he has been unjust to anyone. If he finds many injustices in his life, he often even awakes from sleep in terror, as children do, and lives in anticipation of evils to come. But someone who knows he has not been unjust has sweet good hope as his constant companion [...] — 330d
This connection requires textual support. Again, I see the question of origination as secondary to how it is to be understood. The truth or falsity of what is said does not depend on who might have first said it. — Fooloso4
Now, at this point in the Republic, the problem with poets has not yet come up
— Jamal
But it has been brought up! Cephalus opinions about such things as justice are shaped by the poets. Consider how frequently the poets are appealed to. — Fooloso4
It is not the case that he leaves the debate the moment he gets a difficult question. He engages with Socrates up to the point where he agrees but then he must leave to attend to religious matters.
He talks of old age in the wisest of terms and uses poets as support. Sophocles, 329c. — Amity
He is thinking ahead to his death and how to please the Gods.
He uses Pindar 331a to talk about the 'ledger of his life' — Amity
he could be intentionally associating the poets with tyrants and injustice without actually saying so — Jamal
Your point is broadly good, but Socrates does on the surface mean to show that Simonides and other wise men could not have --- or at least probably did not --- say it. — Jamal
(332a)Then when Simonides says that giving back what is owed is just, he is not referring to this sort of thing but to something else.
(332b)Is this what Simonides means, according to you?
in the OP I took things. in a different direction with a view to uncovering a possible covert criticism. — Jamal
(607c).. let’s declare that if someone is able to put forward an argument as to why there should be poetry and imitation, whose aim is pleasure, in a well-regulated city, we would gladly receive these back again, because we realise that we are still charmed by them.
(Republic 514a)an image of our nature in its education and want of education.
Cephalus might be suggesting here that unlike many of the masses, he is not "filled with foreboding and fear," because he has not found many injustices in his life. — Jamal
SOCRATES: Well, now, it is not easy to disagree with Simonides, since he is a wise and godlike man — 331e5
SOCRATES: You and I will fight as partners, then, against anyone who tells us that Simonides, Bias, Pittacus, or any of our other wise and blessedly happy men said this. — 335e7
It seems, then, that a just person has turned out to be a kind of thief. You probably got that idea from Homer. — 334a9
You and I will fight as partners, then, against anyone who tells us that Simonides, Bias, Pittacus, or any of our other wise and blessedly happy men said this. — 335e7
(Phaedrus 275d)For the offspring of the painter’s skill stand before us like living creatures, but if you ask them a question, they are very solemnly silent. And the same goes for written words. You might assume that they are speaking with some degree of intelligence, but if you wish to learn from them and you ask them a question about what they are saying, they just point to one thing and it is always the same.
(Protagoras 347e)... poets who cannot be questioned about the topic they are speaking of. And when the majority of people quote them in discussions, some say the poet means one thing while others say he means something else, and they end up discussing matters they are unable to resolve.
I've done some thinking and now I have a slightly different angle. I see that while I started out with a good intuition, it went a bit wrong on its way to conceptual crystallization. — Jamal
t's probably an eccentric focus. It's a bit like a literary easter egg.
Another way of saying this is that my focus is more important from a literary than from a philosophical point of view. — Jamal
Besides the meticulous care with which every sentence of this work is crafted, the book is also full of what we might call Easter eggs. You know how certain movies have these little cool features that the director likes to hide throughout the film, and then die-hard fans will watch the movie dozens of times to find them all?... — The Hunt for Justice - Plato's Republic I
The Classics shouldn't be just for people lucky enough to go to certain schools. Everyone should be able to know about the ideas and events that inspired the founders of this republic. Let's declassify the classics.
The host of the podcast, Lantern Jack, holds a PhD in ancient philosophy from Princeton University.
I'm curious. Does that mean your focus has now turned away from the 'literary easter egg'? — Amity
I searched for 'literary easter egg' with regards to Plato. And found this podcast and transcript. — Amity
Well, the Republic is full of such Easter eggs. They are hard for us to spot, but audiences in Plato’s day would have been able to. Just to give you one example, again on the very first page. When Polemarchus and Adeimantus and company run into Socrates and Glaucon, Polemarchus makes a joke. He says, “Hey Socrates, do you see how numerous we are compared to you two? You better do as we say and come to my house.”
In other words, he’s making a joke about factionalism. During times of social harmony, such jokes may be funny. But to Plato’s audiences, this is a very dark joke. Because his audience knew, as we discussed last time, that Polemarchus himself, would later become the victim of the kind of factionalism he now makes light of. Plato’s audience would also know that this road from the Piraeus back to Athens is where, decades later, the Thirty Tyrants would be overthrown in a battle (the Battle of Munychia in 403 BC) and their leaders killed.
In response to Polemarchus’ joke, Socrates says, “What if we persuade you to let us go?” To which Polemarchus jests again, saying, “Can you persuade someone who refuses to listen?”
Again, it’s easy to read past this stuff and not think much of it. But how brilliant is this setup? That one question alone, sums up the essence of factional division. How do you persuade someone who refuses to listen? Not only does this Easter egg build up a dark sense of irony, it also subtly broaches the topic of factionalism, which will figure prominently throughout the entire dialogue. There are little Easter eggs like this all over the Republic, and unfortunately we don’t have time to go through them — The Hunt for Justice - Plato's Republic I
I didn't think primarily of factionalism so much as power vs persuasion, irrational vs rational, etc., but it's a good example. — Jamal
[emphasis added]There are several themes that are developed at the beginning of the dialogue including the questions of persuasion and inheritance. We need to take a step back.
Socrates asks Polemarchus :
Could we not persuade you that you should let us leave?
(327e)
The question of persuasion and its means is of central importance. On the one hand, it is behind both the arguments of Thrasymachus and the other sophists as well as those of Socrates and the philosophers, and, on the other, of the poet’s stories of men and gods. The stories of the poets are an inherited means of persuasion manifest as belief. From an early age children are told the poet’s stories. — Fooloso4
Your introduction of how well the eggs can be understood through time prompted me to think about how different a book the Inferno by Dante was for the generations closest to it. — Paine
The crucial thing is that the real Simonides is unimportant. The new element is that because of this he can function as a blank canvas onto which Plato can project his ideal poet, in contrast with Homer, who is problematic. This is quite compelling, and it's actually sort of compatible with the first interpretation, although it does bring the ascription of irony into question (or it would make it an even more complex kind of irony). It doesn't matter what the real Simonides might have said, but it does matter what Homer said, because Homer loomed so large in the culture, and comes in for direct criticism later in the Republic. [...]
So the targets are people like Polemarchus who ascribe erroneous notions of justice to wise people, something Socrates gets across bluntly by ascribing them instead to bad guys; and generally those who rely on cultural authorities, whether these authorities are poets or sages, without having thought about them deeply.
I came across another interesting interpretation in a paper entitled "Socrates on Poetry and the Wisdom of Simonides." The idea is that Plato is not interested in Simonides as a historical figure but is rather making him stand as his ideal poet. This is in contrast to Homer, who by this point in the the conversation with Polemarchus has already been mentioned dismissively: — Jamal
You've mixed up the order of the paragraphs, which is important. Maybe that's why you're confused — Jamal
[emphasis added]So the targets are people like Polemarchus who ascribe erroneous notions of justice to wise people, something Socrates gets across bluntly by ascribing them instead to bad guys; and generally those who rely on cultural authorities, whether these authorities are poets or sages, without having thought about them deeply. — Jamal
I think it is the idea of Simonides as an 'ideal poet' in contrast with Homer that I don't understand. — Amity
I came across another interesting interpretation in a paper entitled "Socrates on Poetry and the Wisdom of Simonides." The idea is that Plato is not interested in Simonides as a historical figure but is rather making him stand as his ideal poet. This is in contrast to Homer, who by this point in the the conversation with Polemarchus has already been mentioned dismissively
[...]
Again, the crucial thing is that the real Simonides is unimportant. The new element is that because of this he can function as a blank canvas onto which Plato can project his ideal poet, in contrast with Homer, who is problematic. This is quite compelling, and it's actually sort of compatible with the first interpretation, although it does bring the ascription of irony into question (or it would make it an even more complex kind of irony). It doesn't matter what the real Simonides might have said, but it does matter what Homer said, because Homer loomed so large in the culture, and comes in for direct criticism later in the Republic.
Again, the crucial thing is that the real Simonides is unimportant. The new element is that because of this he can function as a blank canvas onto which Plato can project his ideal poet, in contrast with Homer, who is problematic.
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.