The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism

Baden

Physicalism in relation to methodological naturalism seems to me like an empty suitcase taken on a plane. The scientific method (the plane) gets you somewhere but the metaphysical baggage of physicalism appears to be an unnecessary and unhelpful accoutrement.

I suppose physicalism draws much of its respectability from its ostensible position as the most central philosophical framework for scientific inquiry, and I’m not denying it is. But I think that can be problematised by pointing out that while physicalism does provide a background context that is inviting towards scientific inquiry, none of the successes of science required physicalism– the scientific method and its accompanying tools being enough to do the job.

So, wherein lies the attraction of physicalism for scientists? The majority associate themselves with the doctrine, but why? Why not simply maintain metaphysical agnosticism? Is it simply because, as above, physicalism resonates with the idea of scientific inquiry? Is it just an honorary badge to display anti-idealist credentials? Do scientists generally even know or care what they’re committed to?

I’ll try to justify below my view of physicalism as weak on several fronts.

(I note, of course, there are many varieties of physicalism, some more plausible than others, some more friendly to the notion of free will than others etc. As with most metaphysical theories, divisions and nuances proliferate so that you get a spectrum that is very distinct from an alternate theory on one end and bleeds into it on the other. I’ll try to stick with criticizing what I see as fairly common central tenets of physicalism with the understanding that the critique might be more appropriate for some versions than others.)

My central criticism is not that physicalism is wrong—it's unfalsifiable, but that it has no real explanatory power, and generally tells us nothing about the nature of reality, often merely redefining its central concept, the physical, such that it becomes vague enough to encompass within its scope everything, from consciousness to quarks as either physical or supervening thereon, and does not even unambiguously rule out rival theories like panpsychism, but can be flexible enough to subsume them. As such, it may be that it is not only unnecessary, but also in a way detrimental to the progress and standing of methodological naturalism as expressed through the scientific method.

Three central tenets of the argument are:

1. Methodological naturalism neither entails nor requires physicalism.
2. Physicalism is unscientific.
3. Physicalism’s close association with methodological naturalism and the confusion there engendered risks denigrating the latter.

1. Methodological naturalism neither entails nor requires physicalism

Methodological naturalism presents us with the most efficient framework of discovering practical truths that we know. This is evident from the rapid and transformative scientific progress that has occurred due to the deployment of the scientific method. Its justification as a method rests on its results rather than any metaphysical presumptions.

2. Physicalism is unscientific.
The core metaphysical assumptions of most metaphysically naturalist / physicalist positions may be summarized as follows:

A. All known and all potentially knowable phenomena can be considered physical [Edited to properly distinguish vs materialism]
B. The universe is deterministic. [Correction: Only applies to some versions of physicalism, not most]
C. The universe is comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding.

None of these are falsifiable. They can better be described as articles of faith consistent with the observable universe, but not derivable from it.

This might seem obvious, but I'm not convinced it is to all physicalists.

3. Physicalism’s close association with methodological naturalism and the confusion there engendered risks denigrating the latter.

Methodological naturalism stands as a respectable framework for the employment of the scientific method. It has nothing necessarily to say about whether the universe contains supernatural elements or not, only that it may be investigated as if it were entirely natural.

But the metaphysical naturalism of the physicalist posits that as the universe must behave in a law-like manner, i.e. in a way which is replicable and predictive (in principle if not in practice), anything we encounter in the universe that does not seem to behave so, must despite appearances, ultimately do so by virtue of its very existence.

The consequences of this apparent circularity are somewhat jarring. Physicalism does not really do away with the supernatural, but must presume there is some, in principle, discoverable law to account for it, and simply redefine it as natural as necessary. So God is in (as a possibility) and not only is a non-capricious deist-type god in, but as physicalists subsume human agency, will, and consciousness under the rubric of the physical, there seems no unambiguous theoretical barrier to a capricious personal God either. There seems to be (for many versions of physicalism at least) no theoretical barrier to anything. We are back to the empty suitcase, which is not only empty but on the inside infinitely vast and infinitely accommodating.

So…
...Can we not apply Occam’s razor, rid ourselves of physicalism, remain metaphysically agnostic, and follow the scientific method where it leads? Leave the empty suitcase behind and go where the plane takes us? What is the real barrier to doing so?

schopenhauer1

So…
...Can we not apply Occam’s razor, rid ourselves of physicalism, remain metaphysically agnostic, and follow the scientific method where it leads? Leave the empty suitcase behind and go where the plane takes us? What is the real barrier to doing so? — Baden

Metaphysics, in my view, provides "aesthetic frameworks" rather than definitive answers. For example, a physicist proposing the "many worlds" hypothesis to address quantum problems would have a vastly different metaphysical outlook than someone who believes in only one universe. This brings us to the question: "What is physical?" Is space-time physical? If the many worlds exist, are they physical? The term “physical” starts losing clarity if it encompasses everything.

Still, I believe we can distinguish between physical and non-material realities. Physical reality consists of things we can observe, measure, and interact with directly. Physicalism is most useful when it suggests that reality is, in principle, measurable. What lies beyond measurement—whether events, objects, or processes—is hidden, as object-oriented ontology suggests.

There are major problems with physicalism, though:

Philosophy of Mind: Describing the brain's workings (mapping the terrain) is not the same as understanding conscious experience (the terrain itself). If you call that "physical," you're offering no new insight.

Supernatural phenomena: Some suggest a pantheistic view, where all possible forms and arrangements of reality are "God" or part of a process theology. But at this point, it’s just a matter of semantics over what we call metaphysical realities.

Baden

↪schopenhauer1

I'll get back to you on this. I've discovered after writing the OP that Chomsky made a somewhat similar critique. An available paper discussing his view for those interested: https://teorievedy.flu.cas.cz/index.php/tv/article/download/271/293

I've only read a bit of it. It's rather late where I'm at.

Leontiskos

Physicalism in relation to methodological naturalism seems to me like an empty suitcase taken on a plane. — Baden

This is a great OP. I need to chew on it a bit more, but one aspect of this is the question of how metaphysics relates to science. Awhile back I was reading parts of Thomas Nagel's The Last Word with @J, and I came to realize that Nagel is interested in this question particularly as it relates to theism. I haven't yet read the last chapter of that book, but @Wayfarer links to publicly available copies of it here and here. That chapter is called, "Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion."

3. Physicalism’s close association with methodological naturalism and the confusion there engendered risks denigrating the latter. — Baden

If I am following, the idea is that physicalism, as a form of metaphysical naturalism, imposes metaphysical commitments that methodological naturalism should be free of. These commitments are somewhat tendentious, and given the way that physicalism is bound up with methodological naturalism, methodological naturalism becomes burdened with a kind of guilt by association.

I think that's all correct, but I lean towards disagreeing with this claim:

[Methodological naturalism's] justification as a method rests on its results rather than any metaphysical presumptions. — Baden

I do see methodological naturalism being presented as justified based on results, but it is an open question whether the success of modern science is independent of metaphysical presuppositions.

The other question is whether a robust methodology can perdure independent of metaphysical presuppositions.

T Clark

But I think that can be problematised by pointing out that while physicalism does provide a background context that is inviting towards scientific inquiry, none of the successes of science required physicalism– the scientific method and its accompanying tools being enough to do the job. — Baden

Method will get you only so far. Once we've collected it we have to process it, validate it, interpret it, and fit it into existing or new theories. Does methodological naturalism tell us how to do that? Can it be done without physicalism? I'm not saying it can't, but I'm not sure.

So, wherein lies the attraction of physicalism for scientists? The majority associate themselves with the doctrine, but why? Why not simply maintain metaphysical agnosticism? Is it simply because, as above, physicalism resonates with the idea of scientific inquiry? Is it just an honorary badge to display anti-idealist credentials? Do scientists generally even know or care what they’re committed to? — Baden

This is all metaphysics, which I don't think many scientists care about or are aware of. They, along with most people here on the forum, think that the underlying basis of their understanding of reality is self-evident and eternal.

My central criticism is not that physicalism is wrong—it's unfalsifiable — Baden

Yes, it's unfalsifiable, you know, metaphysics and stuff. This is true of the isms you've discussed in OP and all those we discuss every day here on the forum.

2. Physicalism is unscientific.
The core metaphysical assumptions of most metaphysically naturalist / physicalist positions may be summarized as follows:

A. There is only one substance, that substance is physical and that substance encompasses all known and all potentially knowable phenomena
B. The universe is deterministic.
C. The universe is comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding. — Baden

To keep it simple, I want to talk about physics here, not all science. Isn't it true that physicalist questions are the only ones physics is capable of answering? As we move up the hierarchies of scale, then maybe it makes sense to talk about non-physicalist answers, e.g. what is the nature of the mind. We have a lot of arguments about that here on the forum, e.g. every consciousness discussion ever. This is the place in the discussion where reductionism raises it's ugly head.

The consequences of this apparent circularity are somewhat jarring. Physicalism does not really do away with the supernatural, but must presume there is some, in principle, discoverable law to account for it, and simply redefine it as natural as necessary. — Baden

It seems to have worked so far.

↪Baden

This is a really useful context for exploring physicalism, thanks for posting. One question to start with: We all have an idea what physicalism is, but as you point out, there are many varieties, some more stringent than others. Your three criticisms of the central tenets suggest a good-enough definition of how you’re using “physicalism,” but I’d like to get clearer on exactly how you think of it.

In particular, it’s a crucial point whether physicalism has to declare by fiat that anything that exists or happens has a lawlike physical basis, thus in effect relabeling what most of us would call “non-physical” in ordinary circumstances. @Leontiskos mentioned Nagel’s The Last Word, and as usual Nagel puts it well: “I [want to] interpret the concept of ‛physics’ restrictively enough so that the laws of physics by themselves will not explain the presence of . . . thinking beings in the space of natural possibilities. Of course, if ‛physics’ just means the most fundamental scientific theory about everything, then it will include any such laws if they exist.” If that’s all physicalism amounts to, then you’re right, it adds nothing conceptually.

As we move up the hierarchies of scale, then maybe it makes sense to talk about non-physicalist answers, e.g. what is the nature of the mind. — T Clark

Here’s a fourth, related criticism I would add to your three: Understandably, when we think of physicalism, we think of something connected with the physical sciences, where it has indeed largely “worked so far.” But physicalism is not physics, and the real challenge for physicalism is to explain the lawlike behaviors, if there are such, of the entities studied in psychology, sociology, history, literature – in short, the human sciences. To say that physicalism has worked here would be news to a historian. And if you responded by telling her that her discipline did not produce objective facts and theories, was in short not scientific, she would laugh at you, I hope. My point is that there is a gargantuan explanatory gap between the sorts of things that chemistry can explain and the sorts of things that political science or economics can explain. We can wave our hands and say that “someday” we’ll have a quark-level explanation of the law of supply and demand, but 1) no one believes this, really; 2) it wouldn’t explain what needs explaining; and 3) again, this is something that has definitely not worked so far.

So in order to defend physicalism, I think a philosopher has to argue for why physicalism is not reductive in the sense just described. And this runs the risk of starting the relabeling process, with entities like “nations” construed as somehow “just physical” because we can devise theories that are lawlike to explain their behavior.

Wayfarer

Methodological naturalism stands as a respectable framework for the employment of the scientific method. It has nothing necessarily to say about whether the universe contains supernatural elements or not, only that it may be investigated as if it were entirely natural. — Baden

That's the nub of the issue - methodological naturalism is taken to be a metaphysics, which it actually is not. This is how science comes to be seen as the umpire of what is real, and anything not demonstrable in scientific terms is dismissed. In liberal cultures, we do of course enjoy freedom of conscience, meaning that we can entertain any ideas we like, but if they can't be validated scientifically in some way, then they're essentially subjective or social in nature.

What is the real barrier to doing so? — Baden

I posted an OP about five years ago on the Blind Spot of Science linked to an Aeon essay by Evan Thompson, Adam Frank and Marcello Gleiser on that topic (now a book). They draw on phenomenology to critique the prevailing naturalism, which prioritizes objective, measurable phenomena while 'bracketing out' the subjects who make the measurements and generate the theories. The authors argue that minds, emotions, and cognitive functionality - including decisions about what is worth studying! - are fundamental to our engagement with the world and cannot be fully explained in objective terms, as they've been omitted from the initial methodological step. By overlooking lived experience, science omits a foundational aspect of reality, leading to an incomplete understanding of the universe and our place in it.

So the real barrier is cultural and social. Modern science - that is, science since Galileo - pre-determines certain parameters, foremost of which is that the object of analysis be objectively measurable and empirically intelligible, which is what is generally meant by the umbrella term 'physical'.

Evan Thompson and his co-authors are part of a real sea change in Western cuture that are questioning this. David Chalmers is another. So too John Vervaeke. Something in common to all of them is self-awareness, which has been forced on science by various compelling factors. All of which in some real sense, is a return to the Socratic origins of the Western philosophical tradition, and the commandment, 'know thyself'.

Leontiskos

That's the nub of the issue - methodological naturalism is taken to be a metaphysics, which it actually is not. — Wayfarer

Yes, but it is worth asking whether a methodology as culturally significant as methodological naturalism can ever be prevented from spawning its own metaphysics (even on the questionable assumption that methodological naturalism was born metaphysics-free). I think it would require an enormous amount of energy to prevent methodological naturalism from hardening into a metaphysics, culturally speaking. On this account physicalism is just the most prominent metaphysics that methodological naturalism has gestated.

Wayfarer

...the questionable assumption that methodological naturalism was born metaphysics-free — Leontiskos

You can trace the lineage of metaphysical naturalism through the Scholastic tradition in books such as Burtt's 'Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science'. I think it's indisputable that the founders of early modern science - Galileo, Descartes and Newton being the most prominent - all sought to disentangle science from scholastic metaphysics. (In Galileo's case it was crucial, as Aristotle's physics was thoroughly archaic and joined at the hip with Ptolmaic cosmology.) The main point being that the Enlightenment project was to pursue 'natural philosophy' on the basis of what was empirically observable. There was a clause in the foundation documents of the Royal Society that fellows are to avoid 'consideration of metaphysics' as this was deemed 'the province of the Churchmen' which made it politically fraught in those days of religiously-motivated wars. Combine that with Descartes' division of mind and matter, and the roots of physicalist naturalism are pretty clear, I would have thought.

Of course, Newton himself, and to an extent Galileo, observed a kind of deism, acknowledging the Divine Intellect as the source of the Universe, but which was now seen as a kind of self-running machine, from which God was generally absent.

noAxioms

2. Physicalism is unscientific.
The core metaphysical assumptions of most metaphysically naturalist / physicalist positions may be summarized as follows:

A. There is only one substance, that substance is physical and that substance encompasses all known and all potentially knowable phenomena
B. The universe is deterministic.
C. The universe is comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding. — Baden

(A) sounds like materialism. Physicalism doesn't really say that. I mean, what is this substance?
(B) is untrue. There are plenty of valid scientific interpretations that are non-deterministic, notably Copenhagen interpretation of QM.
I will essentially agree with (C) since I think that is a reasonable summary on its own.

Methodological naturalism ... has nothing necessarily to say about whether the universe contains supernatural elements or not, only that it may be investigated as if it were entirely natural. — Baden

OK, it's a methodology, not a premise. Scientific investigation proceeds as if there is nothing supernatural. If this is wrong, then science will presumable hit a wall at some point.
But then you treat it like it is a theory with this:

But the metaphysical naturalism of the physicalist posits that ...

It proceeds as if.. Saying 'posit' makes it sound like naturalism itself.

must behave in a law-like manner, i.e. in a way which is replicable and predictive — Baden

Sort of. QM behavior is not, for instance, something predictive, except as a mathematical statement of probability, which quantum theory predicts very accurately.

As for things not yet explained by discovered laws, yes, the methodology presumes there are ultimately some such laws. A good example is the unified field theory, which thus far has proven illusive.
A bad example is consciousness, which shows no signs of not being a function of the currently known laws. An interesting example would be a physically explainable deity that deliberately in some way brought about what we often refer to as 'the universe'. I mean, just about all the conjecture about what's on the 'other side' of the big bang pretty much discards the classical laws as we know them.

Modern science - that is, science since Galileo - pre-determines certain parameters, foremost of which is that the object of analysis be objectively measurable and empirically intelligible — Wayfarer

That came up in the other topic, especially when taking observer selection biases into account. Any observation is necessarily biased by this, and cannot be objective.

T Clark

the real challenge for physicalism is to explain the lawlike behaviors, if there are such, of the entities studied in psychology, sociology, history, literature – in short, the human sciences. — J

That's why I mentioned reductionism. For many in the physical sciences, the disciplines you listed can ultimately be reduced to physics. That's not how I see it.

And if you responded by telling her that her discipline did not produce objective facts and theories, was in short not scientific, she would laugh at you, — J

It's not clear to me that, when we get to that level of organization, we are still dealing with phenomena that are deterministic and comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding.

So in order to defend physicalism, I think a philosopher has to argue for why physicalism is not reductive in the sense just described. — J

I would guess that most people who agree with the physicalist approach also agree that a reductionist approach is also correct. I think the argument could be made that they are the same thing.

[edit] in last paragraph changed “is not also correct” “to is also correct.”

T Clark

an Aeon essay by Evan Thompson, Adam Frank and Marcello Gleiser — Wayfarer

I don't remember participating in the discussion five years ago. This time I read the essay you linked. I was disappointed to see it was the same argument you and I go back and forth with every month or so. First off, any philosophical discussion that brings in quantum mechanics is immediately suspect. They trotted out the old QM interpretation that reality is dependent on observation while ignoring the fact that those interpretations are unfalsifiable. Their other prime example was the hard problem of consciousness.

My biggest gripe is that there are good arguments for the involvement of us humans in the establishment of reality, but they ignored them.

Wayfarer

There are plenty of valid scientific interpretations that are non-deterministic, notably Copenhagen interpretation of QM. — noAxioms

The 'Copenhagen interpretation' is not a scientific theory per se. It comprises philosophical reflections on what can and can't be said on the implications of quantum physics.

there are good arguments for the involvement of us humans in the establishment of reality, — T Clark

Such as?

Leontiskos

↪Wayfarer

- It would be interesting to know when and where the idea of "methodological naturalism" was historically born.

Wayfarer

↪Leontiskos

Surely methodological naturalism - the setting aside of purportedly supernatural or occult explanations - was one of the hallmarks of the emergence of modern science proper, wasn't it? I think that book I mentioned, Metaphysical Origins of Modern Science, E A Burtt, is relevant:

Published in 1924, Burtt's work explores how the shift to a scientific worldview in the 17th century was underpinned by (often unstated) metaphysical assumptions. He argues that the major figures of the Scientific Revolution—such as Galileo, Descartes, and Newton—operated within a novel metaphysical framework that emphasized the mechanistic view of nature, displacing older Aristotelian and theological cosmologies.

Burtt’s book is especially insightful in showing how modern science was not merely the result of empirical discoveries but was also driven by philosophical commitments. These commitments included the belief in a mathematically structured universe and the idea that nature operates according to impersonal, mechanistic laws—concepts central to metaphysical naturalism.

Burtt emphasizes that the scientific revolution didn’t eliminate metaphysics but rather replaced one set of metaphysical assumptions with another. Burtt’s analysis makes it clear that scientific progress was bound up with this broader transformation in how reality was conceived. It’s a classic in the history and philosophy of science, often cited for its depth in tracing how metaphysical ideas shaped the development of modern scientific thought.

I think it's regarded as a little outdated nowadays but still covers some valuable ground.

Leontiskos

E A Burtt, is relevant: — Wayfarer

Sure, but when I read that I see a great deal about metaphysical naturalism and nothing at all about methodological naturalism.

I am wondering if the empty suitcase is actually methodological naturalism. Who needs it? Not the naturalist. He has as much need of methodological naturalism as a Saudi Arabian Muslim needs methodological Sharia. Not the non-naturalist. For her methodological naturalism is irrational. If methodological naturalism is superfluous for the naturalist and irrational for the non-naturalist, then it looks like an empty suitcase or an outward badge of honor. Probably it is part of the pact of classical liberalism, a kind of compromise.

What about the Original Post? Perhaps "methodological naturalism" is doublespeak for soft metaphysical naturalism, and physicalism really does deviate insofar as it is a form of hard metaphysical naturalism. On that view the problem is not that physicalism is metaphysical, but rather that it is too confident, too far out over its skies. The underlying issue is the difficulty or impossibility of adopting a thoroughgoing epistemological methodology without also adopting some form of metaphysical commitment.

Wayfarer

I am wondering if the empty suitcase is actually methodological naturalism. Who needs it? Not the naturalist. — Leontiskos

I don't think anyone needs to say they're a methodological naturalist. It's basically an assumption, an implicit principle of natural science. For the natural scientist, most often, and aside from some borderline subject areas like psychosomatic medicine or parapsychology, all naturalism means is a commitment to the kinds of explanations that can be subject to third-party scrutiny and empirical validation. Where methodological naturalism needs to be made explicit is when it appears in the guise of a metaphysic - which happens most often in the attempt to subject philosophical problems to scientific scrutiny. To scientism, in other words. That's when it becomes metaphysical, as distinct from methodological, naturalism.

Michael

↪Baden

You seem to be talking about Hempel's dilemma? If the physical is defined just as whatever is explained by our current scientific theories then physicalism is false because our current scientific theories do not explain everything. If the physical is defined just as whatever is explained by some future scientific theory that does explain everything then physicalism is circular.

But then the same can be said of methodological naturalism. What does it mean to be natural or supernatural?

schopenhauer1

psychosomatic — Wayfarer

What do you suppose this can be characterized as? For example, superstitions that manifest in physical realities for that person as if they are real- but to that person, they are real?

Wayfarer

↪schopenhauer1

Don’t want to go there. I was just trying to think of some ‘edge cases’ where there might be actual metaphysical considerations.

schopenhauer1

Don’t want to go there. I was just trying to think of some ‘edge cases’ where there might be actual metaphysical considerations. — Wayfarer

I thought it interesting. I’m not sure id characterize it as metaphysical, certainly a case of “mental affects/effects reality”. Beliefs shouldn’t create such distortions/delusions in reality, but they do. X action shouldn’t lead to Y deluded distortion, but it does. Generally we think of chemicals doing this, like drugs, not beliefs. The physical causes the mental change. Of course, this can just be more proof that mental beliefs are physical events whereby the x delusions are simply unhealthily potentatiated neural pathways with physiological centers that simulate the same feeling as if it was a physical cause.

I would guess that most people who agree with the physicalist approach also agree that a reductionist approach is also correct. I think the argument could be made that they are the same thing. — T Clark

And that would be stringent or hardcore physicalism. But I'm trying to be fair to physicalism as a more general thesis (one I don't agree with, but it deserves a hearing). I have a number of friends who would, if pressed, probably deny that there's anything out there except the physical world. But nor would they claim that you can use the fundamental entities of physics to explain macro-phenomena like economic behavior. Are they simply refusing to accept the consequences of their physicalism? Not necessarily. We can construct a sort of "best we can do right now" position that would go: "Sure, we have loads of unanswered questions about how physical realities interact, and how they can be causally effective. But at the end of the (scientific) day, I'm betting that the answers will still fail to reveal anything beyond the physical. We have to wait and see, but my money is on physicalism."

I think that sort of physicalism is much harder to argue against.

schopenhauer1

Where methodological naturalism needs to be made explicit is when it appears in the guise of a metaphysic - which happens most often in the attempt to subject philosophical problems to scientific scrutiny. To scientism, in other words. That's when it becomes metaphysical, as distinct from methodological, naturalism. — Wayfarer

What is the difference between "scientism" and let's say something like a "pansemiosis"? Would scientism not add any more than what is gleaned from the scientific theories/conclusions? Pansemiosis (like the totalizing ones that someone like apokrisis advocates for), add a non-scientific addition- a mechanism that connects all the disparate things in a connective tissue. It isn't "physical" but some sort of logical structure that transcends the physical but totalizes it. These kind of theories aren't based on "physicalism", but neither do they seem to rely on/point to anything related to "mental" let alone "supernatural". Where do those theories fall then? I wouldn't say it's "scientism". That is to say, it would seem like "scientism" itself would never even come to the level of philosophy. It would simply be repeating the conclusions of science. Philosophy would have to take that and structure it into something more than these conclusions. The instant you try to do such a thing, you have to answer metaphysical questions (e.g.'What is the nature of X") the instant this is answered, you have a metaphysics beyond the scientific conclusions. Presumably, this would no longer be "scientism". Or perhaps, scientism is more about fooling oneself. One doesn't realize that one's metaphysical beliefs are in fact metaphysical.

Baden

The term “physical” starts losing clarity if it encompasses everything. — schopenhauer1

Yes.

Still, I believe we can distinguish between physical and non-material realities. Physical reality consists of things we can observe, measure, and interact with directly. Physicalism is most useful when it suggests that reality is, in principle, measurable. — schopenhauer1

Methodological naturalism says behave as if it were and get on with it. Physicalism seems like a vacuous piece of extra metaphysical naturalist baggage in that context.

I do see methodological naturalism being presented as justified based on results, but it is an open question whether the success of modern science is independent of metaphysical presuppositions.

The other question is whether a robust methodology can perdure independent of metaphysical presuppositions. — Leontiskos

Can it be done without physicalism? — T Clark

This is where I wonder if a certain logic to the situation is obscured. Is there something practical to the suitcase I can't see? What is the minimum we should need to get on with science optimally? Methodological natualism seems to be the answer to me. But I am open to reasons why more might be needed.

(A) sounds like materialism. Physicalism doesn't really say that. I mean, what is this substance? — noAxioms

Yes, that was poorly phrased. I've edited it.

(B) is untrue. There are plenty of valid scientific interpretations that are non-deterministic, notably Copenhagen interpretation of QM. — noAxioms

I had this under the rubric of "most". Changed to "some" to avoid being misleading.

Many thanks for identifying those issues.

OK, it's a methodology, not a premise. Scientific investigation proceeds as if there is nothing supernatural. If this is wrong, then science will presumable hit a wall at some point.
But then you treat it like it is a theory with this:
But the metaphysical naturalism of the physicalist posits that ...
It proceeds as if.. Saying 'posit' makes it sound like naturalism itself. — noAxioms

The first "it" I've bolded in your quote is methodological naturalism. The second one is metaphysical naturalism. You seem to be talking as if you think I was referring to the same thing. But the difference is crucial as it's roughly where I think the dividing line against unnecessary metaphysical assumption (the suitcase) comes into play.

schopenhauer1

Methodological naturalism says behave as if it were and get on with it. Physicalism seems like a vacuous piece of extra metaphysical naturalist baggage in that context. — Baden

I'd tend to agree, but I think what's going on here is that physicalism is a set of beliefs that one commits to when answering questions regarding the nature of things. Presumably, you can have the same critique of any number of metaphysical takes on reality, not just physicalism. These metaphysical takes can be grounded in non-supernatural beliefs, even but be very disparate. For example, the metaphysics of someone, let's say like Richard Dawkins (who I would presume comes close to what @Wayfarer means by a "scientism") and the metaphysics of someone like apokrisis (who whatever else you think of his ideas, is scientifically oriented in regards to his metaphysics), would be very different.

Presumably, BOTH consider metaphysical questions, but maybe not. Perhaps it is the case that someone like Richard Dawkins, may not really grapple with metaphysical questions, yet unknowingly takes a metaphysical stance anyways (i.e. physicalism). My question then is:

Which is worse?
1) Being scientifically-oriented (using methodological physicalism), considering the metaphysical questions and making a (critical yet speculative) stance on it.

OR

2) Being scientifically oriented (using methodological physicalism), but not consciously considering metaphysical questions at all, YET inadvertently making metaphysical conclusions about reality from it?

If 1 is worse, then you have something against any metaphysical speculation. If 2 is worse, you simply don't like non-critically examined metaphysical theories.

Baden

In particular, it’s a crucial point whether physicalism has to declare by fiat that anything that exists or happens has a lawlike physical basis, thus in effect relabeling what most of us would call “non-physical” in ordinary circumstances. Leontiskos mentioned Nagel’s The Last Word, and as usual Nagel puts it well: “I [want to] interpret the concept of ‛physics’ restrictively enough so that the laws of physics by themselves will not explain the presence of . . . thinking beings in the space of natural possibilities. Of course, if ‛physics’ just means the most fundamental scientific theory about everything, then it will include any such laws if they exist.” If that’s all physicalism amounts to, then you’re right, it adds nothing conceptually. — J

I think this highlights an important tension within physicalism. Broad physicalist interpretations certainly add nothing conceptually, but the more physicalism is restricted, the more objections arise. There's an ironic tradeoff there where in order to make physicalism meaningful, you pretty much have to make it wrong or at least so problematic as to be questionably worth defending.

This feeds into Hempel's dilemma as mentioned by @Michael "if physicalism is defined via reference to contemporary physics, then it is false — after all, who thinks that contemporary physics is complete? — but if physicalism is defined via reference to a future or ideal physics, then it is trivial — after all, who can predict what a future physics contains?"

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#HempDile

Hempel's dilemma wasn't exactly what I had in mind writing the OP. The later criticism I discovered by Chomsky though is almost identical to my main point as he essentially makes the same argument--that movement beyond the boundary of methodological naturalism adds unnecessary and undesriable metaphysical commitments, i.e. creates the empty suitcase.

Here are the clearest formulations I've been able to find online so far:

https://plato.stanford.edu/archIves/sum2020/entries/physicalism/

"[Chomsky argues that] the physicalist project in philosophy of mind is on the face of it rather different from the naturalistic project. In the first place, the physicalist project is, as we have noted, usually thought of a piece of metaphysics. But there is nothing metaphysical about the [methodological] naturalistic project, it simply raises questions about what we can hope to explain.

...

It is precisely at the place where the physicalist project departs from the naturalistic project that Chomsky's criticism begins to take shape. For insofar as it is different from the naturalistic project, there are a number of ways in which the physicalist project is questionable. First, it is hard to see what the project might be — it is true that throughout the history of philosophy and science one encounters suggestions that one might find out about the world in ways that are distinct from the ones used in the sciences, but these suggestions have always been rather obscure. Second, it is hard see how this sort of project could recommend itself to physicalists themselves — such a project seems to be a departure from methodological naturalism .but most physicalists endorse methodological naturalism as a matter of fact"

And:

https://teorievedy.flu.cas.cz/index.php/tv/article/download/271/293

'Chomsky’s objection is that the doctrine has no clear content. He thinks that those who advocate physicalism and those who would endeavour to prove it false are both wrong in thinking that there is a substantive doctrine at issue. Chomsky holds this general view about physicalism because he also holds the more particular view that the concept of the “physical” (or the “material”), which must inevitably enter into any characterisation of physicalism, is devoid of clear meaning. At best, talk of “the physical” acts as a placeholder for whatever we discover, or could discover, to be true about nature. He writes:

"There is no longer any definite conception of body. Rather, the material world is whatever we discover it to be, with whatever properties it must be assumed to have for the purposes of explanatory theory." '

Baden

↪Wayfarer

Thanks for the references. :up: I will take a look at that article.

There's an ironic tradeoff there where in order to make physicalism meaningful, you pretty much have to make it wrong or at least so problematic as to be questionably worth defending. — Baden

Good point. My response to @T Clark, above, is an attempt to mount such a defense, in the spirit of charity. But you're right, it's open to a lot of questions.

Baden

But then the same can be said of methodological naturalism. What does it mean to be natural or supernatural? — Michael

In this context, amenable to the scientific method or not. In order to employ the scientific method, you employ it on that which it can be employed but you don't make a prior assumption that everything is this or that, you act only as if it were and the results justify your efforts (or not). The supernatural is just that which can't be reliably measured, replicated etc. in principle.

Baden

That's to say, you don't get on the plane naked, but an empty suitcase isn't any further help as long as you've got clothes on.

Leontiskos

This is where I wonder if a certain logic to the situation is obscured. Is there something practical to the suitcase I can't see? What is the minimum we should need to get on with science optimally? Methodological natualism seems to be the answer to me. But I am open to reasons why more might be needed. — Baden

Right, and I think this is a good way to capture methodological naturalism:

Methodological naturalism says behave as if it were and get on with it. — Baden

I want to ask whether this is coherent, and perhaps the physicalist would want to ask that too. How much mileage can we really get out of "behave as if it were," or, "pretend"?* My nephew recently told me that it was incumbent upon me to pretend that the dog is a tiger. If I had asked him why, he might have said, "Because it will be fun!"

I think methodological naturalism asks us to do more than behave as if reality were measurable. It seems that it asks us to behave as if naturalism were true, at least for the duration of our inquiry. If I asked methodological naturalism why, what would it say? Whatever its answer, I suspect that the answer will betray metaphysical commitments that it purports to not have.

On this account we might have an interaction like the following:

Methodological Naturalist: "Stop doing metaphysics. We should be metaphysically neutral."
Physicalist: "No one is metaphysically neutral. You are fooling yourself. Every thoroughgoing methodology comes with metaphysical commitments."
Methodological Naturalist: "Even if that is so, it remains true that your metaphysics is too thick for science."

(I would say that the second and third statements are both true.)

More succinctly, you seem to be saying, "Methodological naturalism is sound and solid in itself; physicalism is problematic; therefore we should take the former and leave the latter." I think there is a strong argument to be made that methodological naturalism is not sound and solid in itself. The first premise here aligns with your (1), which in the OP is more of a presupposition than an argument.

* It is curious to me how much pretending we are told to do with it comes to religion, both from secularists and religious alike. Apparently this began when the phrase "etsi Deus non daretur" took on a certain meaning.

-

'At best, talk of “the physical” acts as a placeholder for whatever we discover, or could discover, to be true about nature.' — Baden

But can't the same be said about talk of "the natural"? Is naturalism any less shifty than physicalism? In each case it would seem that certain explanations are ruled out a priori for no articulated reason, and whenever phenomena which support those explanations are encountered, the conception of what is "natural" or "physical" is simply broadened to accommodate. My thesis here is that these critiques of physicalism also function as critiques of naturalism, just in a mitigated way.

The supernatural is just that which can't be reliably measured, replicated etc. in principle. — Baden

This is a crucial attempt to articulate a reason for ruling out supernatural explanations, and as always it is bound up with a specific conception of science. On this definition science has to do with what is repeatable, and therefore the supernatural is ruled out (along with, perhaps, the psychological, the sociological, the historical, etc.). For the Western mind supernatural encounters fall into the genus of interpersonal encounters, and it is the interpersonal nature of the phenomenon that is not repeatable.

The alternative is a view of science which opens the door to the soft sciences, including theology. If the repeatability requirement is softened then interpersonal realities can be the subject of scientific study, because repeated interpersonal interactions do yield true and reliable knowledge, even though the repeatability is not as strict as that of the lab scientist who deals with a passive and subordinate substance.

The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories

More Discussions