So…
...Can we not apply Occam’s razor, rid ourselves of physicalism, remain metaphysically agnostic, and follow the scientific method where it leads? Leave the empty suitcase behind and go where the plane takes us? What is the real barrier to doing so? — Baden
Physicalism in relation to methodological naturalism seems to me like an empty suitcase taken on a plane. — Baden
3. Physicalism’s close association with methodological naturalism and the confusion there engendered risks denigrating the latter. — Baden
[Methodological naturalism's] justification as a method rests on its results rather than any metaphysical presumptions. — Baden
But I think that can be problematised by pointing out that while physicalism does provide a background context that is inviting towards scientific inquiry, none of the successes of science required physicalism– the scientific method and its accompanying tools being enough to do the job. — Baden
So, wherein lies the attraction of physicalism for scientists? The majority associate themselves with the doctrine, but why? Why not simply maintain metaphysical agnosticism? Is it simply because, as above, physicalism resonates with the idea of scientific inquiry? Is it just an honorary badge to display anti-idealist credentials? Do scientists generally even know or care what they’re committed to? — Baden
My central criticism is not that physicalism is wrong—it's unfalsifiable — Baden
2. Physicalism is unscientific.
The core metaphysical assumptions of most metaphysically naturalist / physicalist positions may be summarized as follows:
A. There is only one substance, that substance is physical and that substance encompasses all known and all potentially knowable phenomena
B. The universe is deterministic.
C. The universe is comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding. — Baden
The consequences of this apparent circularity are somewhat jarring. Physicalism does not really do away with the supernatural, but must presume there is some, in principle, discoverable law to account for it, and simply redefine it as natural as necessary. — Baden
As we move up the hierarchies of scale, then maybe it makes sense to talk about non-physicalist answers, e.g. what is the nature of the mind. — T Clark
Methodological naturalism stands as a respectable framework for the employment of the scientific method. It has nothing necessarily to say about whether the universe contains supernatural elements or not, only that it may be investigated as if it were entirely natural. — Baden
What is the real barrier to doing so? — Baden
That's the nub of the issue - methodological naturalism is taken to be a metaphysics, which it actually is not. — Wayfarer
...the questionable assumption that methodological naturalism was born metaphysics-free — Leontiskos
2. Physicalism is unscientific.
The core metaphysical assumptions of most metaphysically naturalist / physicalist positions may be summarized as follows:
A. There is only one substance, that substance is physical and that substance encompasses all known and all potentially knowable phenomena
B. The universe is deterministic.
C. The universe is comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding. — Baden
OK, it's a methodology, not a premise. Scientific investigation proceeds as if there is nothing supernatural. If this is wrong, then science will presumable hit a wall at some point.Methodological naturalism ... has nothing necessarily to say about whether the universe contains supernatural elements or not, only that it may be investigated as if it were entirely natural. — Baden
It proceeds as if.. Saying 'posit' makes it sound like naturalism itself.But the metaphysical naturalism of the physicalist posits that ...
Sort of. QM behavior is not, for instance, something predictive, except as a mathematical statement of probability, which quantum theory predicts very accurately.must behave in a law-like manner, i.e. in a way which is replicable and predictive — Baden
That came up in the other topic, especially when taking observer selection biases into account. Any observation is necessarily biased by this, and cannot be objective.Modern science - that is, science since Galileo - pre-determines certain parameters, foremost of which is that the object of analysis be objectively measurable and empirically intelligible — Wayfarer
the real challenge for physicalism is to explain the lawlike behaviors, if there are such, of the entities studied in psychology, sociology, history, literature – in short, the human sciences. — J
And if you responded by telling her that her discipline did not produce objective facts and theories, was in short not scientific, she would laugh at you, — J
So in order to defend physicalism, I think a philosopher has to argue for why physicalism is not reductive in the sense just described. — J
an Aeon essay by Evan Thompson, Adam Frank and Marcello Gleiser — Wayfarer
There are plenty of valid scientific interpretations that are non-deterministic, notably Copenhagen interpretation of QM. — noAxioms
there are good arguments for the involvement of us humans in the establishment of reality, — T Clark
Published in 1924, Burtt's work explores how the shift to a scientific worldview in the 17th century was underpinned by (often unstated) metaphysical assumptions. He argues that the major figures of the Scientific Revolution—such as Galileo, Descartes, and Newton—operated within a novel metaphysical framework that emphasized the mechanistic view of nature, displacing older Aristotelian and theological cosmologies.
Burtt’s book is especially insightful in showing how modern science was not merely the result of empirical discoveries but was also driven by philosophical commitments. These commitments included the belief in a mathematically structured universe and the idea that nature operates according to impersonal, mechanistic laws—concepts central to metaphysical naturalism.
Burtt emphasizes that the scientific revolution didn’t eliminate metaphysics but rather replaced one set of metaphysical assumptions with another. Burtt’s analysis makes it clear that scientific progress was bound up with this broader transformation in how reality was conceived. It’s a classic in the history and philosophy of science, often cited for its depth in tracing how metaphysical ideas shaped the development of modern scientific thought.
E A Burtt, is relevant: — Wayfarer
I am wondering if the empty suitcase is actually methodological naturalism. Who needs it? Not the naturalist. — Leontiskos
psychosomatic — Wayfarer
Don’t want to go there. I was just trying to think of some ‘edge cases’ where there might be actual metaphysical considerations. — Wayfarer
I would guess that most people who agree with the physicalist approach also agree that a reductionist approach is also correct. I think the argument could be made that they are the same thing. — T Clark
Where methodological naturalism needs to be made explicit is when it appears in the guise of a metaphysic - which happens most often in the attempt to subject philosophical problems to scientific scrutiny. To scientism, in other words. That's when it becomes metaphysical, as distinct from methodological, naturalism. — Wayfarer
Yes.The term “physical” starts losing clarity if it encompasses everything. — schopenhauer1
Still, I believe we can distinguish between physical and non-material realities. Physical reality consists of things we can observe, measure, and interact with directly. Physicalism is most useful when it suggests that reality is, in principle, measurable. — schopenhauer1
I do see methodological naturalism being presented as justified based on results, but it is an open question whether the success of modern science is independent of metaphysical presuppositions.
The other question is whether a robust methodology can perdure independent of metaphysical presuppositions. — Leontiskos
Can it be done without physicalism? — T Clark
(A) sounds like materialism. Physicalism doesn't really say that. I mean, what is this substance? — noAxioms
(B) is untrue. There are plenty of valid scientific interpretations that are non-deterministic, notably Copenhagen interpretation of QM. — noAxioms
OK, it's a methodology, not a premise. Scientific investigation proceeds as if there is nothing supernatural. If this is wrong, then science will presumable hit a wall at some point.
But then you treat it like it is a theory with this:
But the metaphysical naturalism of the physicalist posits that ...
It proceeds as if.. Saying 'posit' makes it sound like naturalism itself. — noAxioms
Methodological naturalism says behave as if it were and get on with it. Physicalism seems like a vacuous piece of extra metaphysical naturalist baggage in that context. — Baden
In particular, it’s a crucial point whether physicalism has to declare by fiat that anything that exists or happens has a lawlike physical basis, thus in effect relabeling what most of us would call “non-physical” in ordinary circumstances. Leontiskos mentioned Nagel’s The Last Word, and as usual Nagel puts it well: “I [want to] interpret the concept of ‛physics’ restrictively enough so that the laws of physics by themselves will not explain the presence of . . . thinking beings in the space of natural possibilities. Of course, if ‛physics’ just means the most fundamental scientific theory about everything, then it will include any such laws if they exist.” If that’s all physicalism amounts to, then you’re right, it adds nothing conceptually. — J
There's an ironic tradeoff there where in order to make physicalism meaningful, you pretty much have to make it wrong or at least so problematic as to be questionably worth defending. — Baden
But then the same can be said of methodological naturalism. What does it mean to be natural or supernatural? — Michael
This is where I wonder if a certain logic to the situation is obscured. Is there something practical to the suitcase I can't see? What is the minimum we should need to get on with science optimally? Methodological natualism seems to be the answer to me. But I am open to reasons why more might be needed. — Baden
Methodological naturalism says behave as if it were and get on with it. — Baden
'At best, talk of “the physical” acts as a placeholder for whatever we discover, or could discover, to be true about nature.' — Baden
The supernatural is just that which can't be reliably measured, replicated etc. in principle. — Baden
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