Then you wouldn't be an atheist about a necessary entity and you wouldn't commit the contradiction.
— Hallucinogen

You are misusing the term "atheist". An atheist is someone who believes that no deities exist [outside of the heads of true believers]. — Michael

:up:

The etymology of 'agnostic' leads directly to the definition i gave "Not-knowledge". — AmadeusD

No, because to claim that reality can't furnish a proof of God is a knowledge claim.

to not knowing. — AmadeusD

No, to knowing that God is unknowable. That's a knowledge claim.

It's not a commitment anymore than thinking you could know is — AmadeusD

It is, because for an agnostic to think God is unknowable is to place constraints on reality and on what we can know. For an agnostic to only think God's existence is unknown is to remain skeptical and uncommited about whether knowledge is constrained in such a manner.

This is how Atheism is used in the 'broader sense'. — AmadeusD

I thought you were arguing that atheism is only denial of a personal God?

Even if I agree to this (it's how I used it in the thread title), it doesn't mean that it's not how agnostic is used in the broader sense, so my point would still stand. Accepting a broad sense of the term atheism doesn't displace the broad sense of the term agnostic, especially because the latter is accepted by dictionaries.

Your conception of 'theism' is wrong, on my account — AmadeusD

My account of theism is belief in an omnipotent, eternal, omniscient, omnipresent entity. A necessary entity is all of those things, but I grant that you can be an atheist who believes in a necessary entity just by denying that it entails those characteristics. I have spoken with very few atheists who acknowledge an omnipotent, eternal entity, most argue vehemently against such a claim. So your concept of theism is different to mine?

Your conception of 'theism' is wrong, on my account, and doesn't capture what 'theism' represents. It would also capture deism — AmadeusD

Deism is a variant of theism: it's belief in a God. The non-intervention of that God doesn't change this, it's still belief in the existence of a God.

The sources I found agree with the way I defined deism.

: a movement or system of thought advocating natural (see natural entry 1 sense 8b) religion, emphasizing morality, and in the 18th century denying the interference of the Creator with the laws of the universe — Merriam Webster

Belief in a god who created the universe but does not govern worldly events, does not answer prayers, and has no direct involvement in human affairs. — Oxford Reference

the belief in a single god who created the world but does not act to influence events: — Cambridge Dictionary

spawned “deism”, the idea that God set the initial conditions of the universe and then left it to play out on its own — Stanford Encyclopedia Philosophy

Wikipedia says a deist God is not necessarily impersonal.

Deism is the belief in the existence of God—often, but not necessarily, an impersonal and incomprehensible God who does not intervene in the universe after creating it, — Wikipedia — Hallucinogen

An omnipotent and eternal non-contingent entity is either inherently theistic or not, why would it be unlikely that an atheist would believe in such? — Hallucinogen

The bold doesn't bear on the non-bold here, at all, in any way. — AmadeusD

?
If belief in an omnipotent and eternal non-contingent entity entails theism, then no atheist would believe it, by definition. It wouldn't just be "unlikely". If in an omnipotent and eternal non-contingent entity doesn't entail theism, then an atheist could believe in it. So the bold is actually quite decisive in bearing on the non-bold.

The reason an atheist is hardly taken to believe in a deistic God (of some kind - make it super-vague if that helps) is that an atheist is far more likely to be thinking rationally and wanting evidence instead of settling for an inference — AmadeusD

OK, multiple things. Firstly, I don't agree. But second, why would an atheist be "more likely" to be thinking rationally and wanting evidence than a deist? I asked why an atheist would be unlikely to believe in an omnipotent and eternal non-contingent entity, but you've answered by just shifting the claim onto an atheist being more likely to be rational, but why is that the case? Thirdly, why is making an inference separate from thinking rationally? As far as I can see, all thinking involves making inferences, and using inference is ubiquitous when it comes to judgments about evidence.

I am explaining that "if some A is the nth term then some B must have been the 1st term" does not entail "the 1st term necessarily exists (and is omnipotent)". — Michael

The argument at the beginning of the thread doesn't claim that's how it's entailed. You've decided to base your critique on removing premises from the argument.

Hence, why your first comment was unclear to me.

If not-A entails (B and (not-B)), then A is entailed. Is that what you're saying isn't the case?
Is B here the proposition that the universe has an nth term? And A is the proposition that there's a non-contingent entity in the universe's series of terms? — Hallucinogen

You didn't answer these questions, instead, you chose to double-down on simplifying the argument into absurdity.

The example of the Presidents explains what I mean in simple terms.
You conflate "A is required for B" and "A is necessary". The former does not entail the latter. — Michael

So, going back to what I wrote in the argument. The entailment to what you've described as "the 1st term necessarily exists" is provided by the impossibility of all entities being contingent, given that, (2) for all series, having no 1st term implies having no nth term, and (3) the universe has an nth term. If it's the 1st term then it isn't contingent on anything, because there's no term prior for it to depend on.

If it's the 1st term then it isn't contingent on anything, because there's no term prior for it to depend on. — Hallucinogen

You’re equivocating.

That something exists without having being caused to exist by something else does not entail that this thing necessarily exists, and it certainly doesn’t entail that this thing is eternal and omnipotent.

The universe is the product of an initial singularity and inflation. This initial singularity may have come into existence by accident/chance, and even if its existence was “necessary” it certainly isn’t anything like God.

:100: :up:

That something exists without having being caused to exist by something else does not entail that this thing necessarily exists — Michael

I didn't describe anything "without having being caused", I've been describing an entity which is non-contingent. Causation isn't contingency. And yes, it does entail it necessarily exists, because lacking contingency means lacking dependency, in which case that thing can't fail to exist.

and it certainly doesn’t entail that this thing is eternal and omnipotent. — Michael

False. I'll re-post what I wrote to you earlier.

Something's eternal if it isn't dependent on conditions. Contingency means to have a condtional dependency, so a non-contingent entity is eternal.
Something's omnipotent if everything stands in dependency to it. Everything in a contingent series is dependent on the non-contingent member of the series, so it is omnipotent.

Your earlier reply was inadequate, you gave synonyms for "eternal" and "omnipotent" as if they contradict the above; they don't.

This initial singularity may have come into existence by accident/chance — Michael

Then it wouldn't be non-contingent/necessary. Accidents are contingent, they obey laws of physics and they only occur under certain conditions.

and even if its existence was “necessary” it certainly isn’t anything like God. — Michael

The term "God" makes no sense without metaphysical necessity. If it's dependent on something outside of itself, it's not God.

Something can do anything if everything is dependent on it. Something exists forever if it isn't dependent on conditions. — Hallucinogen

These are non sequiturs. — Michael

Prove it.

And you are, again, equivocating. That a 2nd term depends on a 1st term to have existed does not entail that the 1st term must still exist. — Michael

I didn't say that it does.

A clock must have been made by a clockmaker, but the clock doesn't cease to exist after the clockmaker dies. — Michael

Not analogous to the argument. The 1st term of existence is metaphysically necessary, it doesn't depend on conditions, so it doesn't go out of existence (it's eternal).

Your conclusion, that there is a God that necessarily exists, simply isn't proven by the claim that causation is not an infinite regress. — Michael

Still not getting the argument right. My conclusion is that a necessary entity exists. The reasons I'd call that God aren't in the argument. And I didn't say it's proven by the claim that causation is not an infinite regress, it's proven by the contradiction inherent to an infinite regress of contingent entities.