I see no obvious reason why consciousness cannot perceive itself as an object.
— ucarr

Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back. — Wayfarer

I think consciousness is sufficiently different from physical things that we cannot know that it has this same "limitation." Consciousness may be the only thing that can study consciousness. If consciousness is feeling and thinking, then that which feels and thinks can feel and think about itself. Maybe?

Ehhhh…..no correcting coming from me. puts out thought-provoking stuff I find worth addressing, is all.

Consciousness may be the only thing that can study consciousness. If consciousness is feeling and thinking, then that which feels and thinks can feel and think about itself.
Maybe? — Patterner

:up:

I think consciousness is sufficiently different from physical things that we cannot know that it has this same "limitation." Consciousness may be the only thing that can study consciousness. If consciousness is feeling and thinking, then that which feels and thinks can feel and think about itself. Maybe? — Patterner

‘The eye cannot see itself’ really has ancient provenance, in the Upaniṣads, in the teaching of ātman, the ‘I am’ that animates the cosmos:

An online version puts it thus:

You have only told me, this is your inner Self in the same way as people would say, 'this is a cow, this is a horse', etc. That is not a real definition. Merely saying, 'this is that' is not a definition. I want an actual description of what this internal Self is. Please give that description and do not simply say, 'this is that'. Yājñavalkya says: "You tell me that I have to point out the Self as if it is a cow or a horse. Not possible! It is not an object like a horse or a cow. I cannot say, 'here is the ātman; here is the Self'. It is not possible because you cannot see the seer of seeing. The seer can see that which is other than the Seer, or the act of seeing. An object outside the seer can be beheld by the seer. How can the seer see himself? How is it possible? You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the Thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the Understander of understanding. Eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntaraḥ: That is the ātman."

Nobody can know the ātman inasmuch as the ātman is the Knower of all things. So, no question regarding the ātman can be put, such as "What is the ātman?' 'Show it to me', etc. You cannot show the ātman because the Shower is the ātman; the Experiencer is the ātman; the Seer is the ātman; the Functioner in every respect through the senses or the mind or the intellect is the ātman. As the basic Residue of Reality in every individual is the ātman, how can we go behind It and say, 'This is the ātman?' Therefore, the question is impertinent and inadmissible. The reason is clear. It is the Self. It is not an object.

"Everything other than the ātman is stupid; it is useless; it is good for nothing; it has no value; it is lifeless. Everything assumes a meaning because of the operation of this ātman in everything. Minus that, nothing has any sense”. Then Uṣasta Cākrāyana, the questioner kept quiet. He understood the point and did not speak further.

This is something which is barely said in the history of Western philosophy, although nowadays one aspect of it has been revived by phenomenology. See It Is Not Known But It Is the Knower, Michel Bitbol (.pdf).

The whole 'hard problem' arises from regarding consciousness as an object, which it is not, while science itself is based on objective facts. It's not complicated, but it's hard to see.

In our context here, it is a measurement system. This is a fact about consciousness, thus establishing its identity as an object. — ucarr

No, consciousness is obviously a flying unicorn, or maybe a rock, or a planet. Consciousness can indeed associate itself with all kinds of objects, but doing so creates a self referential problem, aka the hard problem of consciousness.

What does consciousness do? In our context here, it changes the state of superposition into the state of (well-defined) position. — ucarr

So what? How does that have anything to do with this self referential problem?

This is something which is barely said in the history of Western philosophy, — Wayfarer

I haven't researched it. But I have heard of one exception. in his introduction to his translation of The Bhagavad Gita, Eknath Easwaran speaks of Ruysbroeck.

I have described the discovery of Atman and Brahman – God immanent and God transcendent – as separate, but there is no real distinction. In the climax of meditation, the sages discovered unity: the same indivisible reality without and within. It was advaita, “not two.” The Chandogya Upanishad says epigrammatically, Tat tvam asi: “Thou art That.” Atman is Brahman: the Self in each person is not different from the Godhead.

Nor is it different from person to person. The Self is one, the same in every creature. This is not some peculiar tenet of the Hindu scriptures; it is the testimony of everyone who has undergone these experiments in the depths of consciousness and followed them through to the end. Here is Ruysbroeck, a great mystic of medieval Europe; every word is most carefully chosen:

The image of God is found essentially and personally in all mankind. Each possesses it whole, entire and undivided, and all together not more than one alone. In this way we are all one, intimately united in our eternal image, which is the image of God and the source in us of all our life. — Easwaran

Later philosophers explained maya in surprisingly contemporary terms. The mind, they said, observes the so-called outside world and sees its own structure. It reports that the world consists of a multiplicity of separate objects in a framework of time, space, and causality because these are the conditions of perception. In a word, the mind looks at unity and sees diversity; it looks at what is timeless and reports transience. And in fact the percepts of its experience are diverse and transient; on this level of experience, separateness is real. Our mistake is in taking this for ultimate reality, like the dreamer thinking that nothing is real except his dream.

Nowhere has this “mysterious Eastern notion” been formulated more succinctly than in the epigram of Ruysbroeck: “We behold what we are, and we are what we behold.” When we look at unity through the instruments of the mind, we see diversity; when the mind is transcended, we enter a higher mode of knowing – turiya, the fourth state of consciousness – in which duality disappears. This does not mean, however, that the phenomenal world is an illusion or unreal. The illusion is the sense of separateness. — Easwaran

However, although I believe there are benefits to viewing things that way, I don't have reason to think it's how things are. As I said, I think consciousness can examine itself. The problem is the western world is so adamant that things can only be examined using specific methods. But if the nature of something is not amenable to those methods...

Sidebar -- Firstly, Skalidris, I'm glad you're again posting to your conversation here. After your long absence, I was afraid you'd checked out permanently, and that's less fun.

The whole 'hard problem' arises from regarding consciousness as an object, which it is not, while science itself is based on objective facts. It's not complicated, but it's hard to see. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer above makes a good point. Herein, we're all talking about consciousness, voicing factual claims about it. These actions treat consciousness as an object grammatically speaking: "voicing factual claims about it." Predicate: voicing claims; Preposition: about; Object: it. Grammatically speaking, if you can predicate claims about something, then that something is an object, a thing. It's out there in reality to be examined and understood. If it's not out there, then what the heck are we talking about in this conversation? If subjectivity were ineffable, nobody would be talking about it. Nearly everybody talks about it at one time or another. I'm not seeing any modal difference between the efforts of neuroscience and the efforts of the typical layperson trying to understand the human psychology of their families and friends.

I think subjectivity and objectivity are always paired; I suspect their relationship is the bi-conditional logical operator. Regarding Nagel's: "There's something that it's like to be a bat." I'm waiting for an immaterialist to prove logically the necessity of the metaphysical separation of subjectivity from objectivity.

I'm trying to understand why the obvious grammatical objectification of consciousness doesn't carry over into objective reality. I don't, however, want to sidetrack us into lengthy discussions about the limitations and distortions of language; we all know that's a full topic unto itself.

Consciousness can indeed associate itself with all kinds of objects, but doing so creates a self referential problem, aka the hard problem of consciousness. — Skalidris

I take this to be the heart of your premise for this conversation. I'll try to parse it:

"Consciousness can indeed associate itself with all kinds of objects..." Why is this not a simple and clear example of one thing: consciousness, associating itself with other things: all kinds of objects? Isn't connection of things to things what "associate" means?

No, I haven't forgotten the immaterialist mantra: "Consciousness is not a thing." I know, your above statement is not literal. So what is it saying? If consciousness is not a thing, how does it perform actions, like "associate itself with all kinds of objects." Usually, subjects who execute actions are things. It's hard to authorize pundits who make statements that grammatically contradict the intended meanings of said statements.

"...but doing so creates a self referential problem, aka the hard problem of consciousness."

Have you elaborated how it is the case that when one thing associates itself with another thing, with one of the things being consciousness, a self-referential problem always ensues? Do either Nagel or Chalmers examine this self-referential problem?

Yes. Indeed you have a problem making predications about a subject that's not a subject. From the get-go, you're inhabiting the realm of paradox.

To me, this type of reasoning implies impossible premises. And to show that, let's first start with possible premises. We know that:

1) One indispensable element for the perception of objects is consciousness.
2) Time flows in one direction.

The logical conclusion from this is that consciousness cannot be viewed solely as an object since it has to be there for the perception of objects. Consciousness can only be viewed as consciousness (cannot be broken down into something else since it is always there as a whole in our reasoning). — Skalidris

Your first sentence implies consciousness cannot examine itself. Can you explain how this is the case given the fact that, in this very instant, we are examples of consciousness examining itself? If we're not doing that, then what are we doing?

In the second sentence you mysteriously claim "Consciousness can only be viewed as consciousness..." as if consciousness viewing itself doesn't objectify itself. In order to make your claim consciousness is not an object, you have to turn it into an object.

Can you explain why this premise is not an impossible premise leading to the logical circularity you're propounding?

You claim consciousness is not approachable by setting up yourself in a paradox, then claim the paradox you've created is the proof objective examination of consciousness is impossible. Well, yeah, by your own setup.

Suppose we discard your premise and replace it with another premise: consciousness can examine itself. This gets us out of the paradox, at least grammatically speaking.

Can you show why we're still existentially locked within paradox and circularity when consciousness tries to examine itself?

Any materialistic theories about it is followed by this question "why are these materialistic phenomena accompanied by experience?". And any materialistic attempt to answer that question also ends up being followed by the same question, creating a circularity that seems impossible to escape. — Skalidris

However, when we ask ourselves “why are these materialistic phenomena accompanied by experience?”, we trigger a self referential explanation that has no other outcome than being circular because it circles back to incorrect premises that contradict the rest of the reasoning. — Skalidris

Above I've underlined an important sentence. I'm surmising it expresses your core belief there is no possible materialist explanation connecting brain functions with subjectivity. I'm guessing you justify this belief by taking recourse to emergence and supervenience. I think your core belief is supported by a metaphysical commitment: consciousness exists outside of the subject/object bi-conditional.

If, as you imply, consciousness is thwarted by the self-referential state into useless circularity, then that's a claim that supports: consciousness exists outside of the subject/object bi-conditional.

Do you have an argument to support this claim?

How can it be that consciousness exists outside of the subject/object bi-conditional?

I'm supposing immaterialism puts forward consciousness as its star witness for the possibility of existence uncoupled from materialism, and this uncoupling is centered within the circularity to which you refer.

You name the possible premises; do you name the impossible premises?

Let me try to name an impossible premise: a subject that is not its own object.

Can an existing thing not be self-referential (to itself) as an object? If it can, we must ask where is it located in space and time (both of which are material)?

Speaking generally, existence precedes essence and, speaking more specifically, brain precedes mind, at least from the materialist point of view: brain and mind always co-exist, but there's no thought without brain, as demonstrated causally by the maxim: absent brain, absent mind.

Of course, immaterialism posits existence of essences outside of space and time.

Are we now afoot within Kant's transcendental idealism? Are we hearkening back to its ancestor, Platonic idealism?

No. Today's immaterialists have probably nuanced their positions beyond Kant.

What if: "when we ask ourselves 'why are these materialistic phenomena accompanied by experience?', we trigger a self referential explanation that has no other outcome than being circular..." is an important clue to the reason why consciousness as an objective thing appears to be immaterial?

I'm suggesting consciousness as a phenomenon is rooted in mnemonic echoings upwardly mobile through higher-orders of the self-referential. These higher-orders are essential to subjectivity. They play fast and loose with matter, but never uncouple from it completely.

The abstractionism of multi-tiered feedback looping via neuronal circuits of the brain is how we arrive at useful concepts such as infinity, sets and Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis.

Mnemonic circularity, ethereal but still material.

I think there's been a misunderstanding: I don't believe consciousness is an illusion, and I don't believe it is immaterial, I believe we cannot know either of these things.

The hard problem of consciousness arises when one believes consciousness can successfully study (and explain) itself as an object in the world. And the problem is that you need consciousness to study anything. If you've ever heard of primitive notions, it's the same principle: you cannot define and explain primitive notions with concepts other than themselves. Have you ever tried to explain what a "unit" is? What the logic connector "and" means? To use the latter example, imagine our brain had some kind of logic gate (in electronic circuits) that serve as "and" connector, we would know that whenever we use "and" or any process of linking things together, we use that logic gate. So naturally, we could try to define "and" as the physical process. It could be: “And” is a circuit that receives several inputs and gives an output of 1 if all inputs are 1. You can see that “and” is already in the definition and even if we try to phrase it differently to avoid the “and”, you’ll still need to talk about the several inputs being received, and what’s “several”? It is at least one unit AND another. Do you see the circularity?

Your first sentence implies consciousness cannot examine itself. Can you explain how this is the case given the fact that, in this very instant, we are examples of consciousness examining itself? If we're not doing that, then what are we doing? — ucarr

So even if we can associate physical processes with consciousness, we cannot break down the intuitive meaning into smaller parts, and breaking something into smaller parts is how we explain things. In other words, consciousness can examine the physical processes responsible for its existence, but it cannot examine its intuitive meaning inside the mind. Just like we can't explain what "and" means (using other concepts) even if we knew the physical processes behind it.

Can you explain why this premise is not an impossible premise leading to the logical circularity you're propounding? — ucarr

Because of the premise that consciousness is required for any explanation, any thought (including the perception of objects).
To go back to the "and" example, any definition or description of the material processes behind "and" includes the concept "and".

If, as you imply, consciousness is thwarted by the self-referential state into useless circularity, then that's a claim that supports: consciousness exists outside of the subject/object bi-conditional. — ucarr

No, it simply implies that we do not know. We don't know if it's material, causal, an illusion, we can't know anything because we use it to build any knowledge...

brain precedes mind, at least from the materialist point of view: brain and mind always co-exist, but there's no thought without brain, as demonstrated causally by the maxim: absent brain, absent mind. — ucarr

I agree. That's why we can study the physical processes responsible for consciousness. Just how we could explain the "And" logic gate but yet never be able to explain the "And" concept.

I don't believe consciousness is an illusion, and I don't believe it is immaterial, I believe we cannot know either of these things. — Skalidris

You're telling me the category type for consciousness is unknowable.

The hard problem of consciousness arises when one believes consciousness can successfully study (and explain) itself as an object in the world. — Skalidris

You're telling me the category type being unknowable is intimately tied to consciousness being necessary to the examination of consciousness.

You can see that “and” is already in the definition and even if we try to phrase it differently to avoid the “and”, you’ll still need to talk about the several inputs being received, and what’s “several”? It is at least one unit AND another. Do you see the circularity? — Skalidris

You're telling me "and" is fundamental, and thus cannot be analyzed down to smaller parts.

So even if we can associate physical processes with consciousness, we cannot break down the intuitive meaning into smaller parts, and breaking something into smaller parts is how we explain things. — Skalidris

You're telling me the intuitive meaning of consciousness inside the mind is fundamental.

To go back to the "and" example, any definition or description of the material processes behind "and" includes the concept "and". — Skalidris

You're telling me examination of "consciousness," like examination of "and," always leads to a circular definition, and thus the identity of these terms cannot be illuminated by analysis.

If, as you imply, consciousness is thwarted by the self-referential state into useless circularity, then that's a claim that supports: consciousness exists outside of the subject/object bi-conditional. — ucarr

No, it simply implies that we do not know. — Skalidris

In this case, I think your claim: consciousness examining consciousness always leads to circularity implies beyond doubt that self-examination, in the case of consciousness, cannot lead to a bi-conditional interweave of subject/object. This, in turn, implies subjectivity is pure; it stands outside of the subject_object duet. Mysteriously, this has something to do with the claim: we can't examine how subjectivity arises from brain functions.

...we could explain the "And" logic gate but yet never be able to explain the "And" concept. — Skalidris

So far, I'm not understanding why you think the concept of the conjunction operator cannot be explained: ¬ {x ∧ Y} both x and y are negated; {¬{x} ∨ {y}} x is negated, y is not. By contrasting "and" with "or," the two operators clarify and explain each other. In other words, the "and" operator is an attractor that puts multiple members into one set, whereas the"or" operator is a separator that puts multiple members into separate sets, as demonstrated by the two expressions above. Now there, I've defined the "and" operator without any circularity.

although I believe there are benefits to viewing things that way, I don't have reason to think it's how things are. — Patterner

The purpose of the quote from Indian philosophy was mainly to demonstrate the provenance of the aphorism that 'the eye cannot see itself' and its link to phenomenology.

So naturally, we could try to define "and" as the physical process. It could be: “And” is a circuit that receives several inputs and gives an output of 1 if all inputs are 1. You can see that “and” is already in the definition and even if we try to phrase it differently to avoid the “and”, you’ll still need to talk about the several inputs being received, and what’s “several”? It is at least one unit AND another. Do you see the circularity? — Skalidris

I do. It's that 'primitive' concepts like "and", "equals", "is", "is not" are required for any form of rational inference. That includes rational inference about consciousness.

From the OP:

. It seems that people sometimes either forget that something cannot exist prior to its conception, or can reason with a distorted vision of time, leading them to enter a reasoning of how something was created as if it did not already exist and was not used throughout the reasoning. As if things could exist and not exist at the same time.
It's kind of like the liar paradox “this sentence is false” that implies the attribution of a truth value before the sentence is created, which creates some kind of weird time distortion where future and past events get mixed up and circle back to each other because they are contradictive.
"This sentence" refers to a future reference which is "this sentence is false". So it's attributing a truth value to itself that is not constructed yet. And the analysis after the creation contradicts the analysis based on events that did not happen yet so it's continuously changed — Skalidris

First, isn't being conscious subjective?

At least I assume that somebody that is conscious is a subject: he or she or it can think and act on it's own choosing. The acting is not a simple mechanism like throwing a burning matchstick in a pool of gasoline and the liquid blowing up. And Philosophers like Chalmers and Searle hold that consciousness is necessarily subjective or first person in character and that subjectivity is an ontological feature of consciousness. So at least here I'm not way off.

But let's think about this.

If subjectivity is an ontological feature of consciousness, can we then really accurately model consciousness with a conventional model, that is objective?

Let me try to explain what I'm after here: If we try to model consciousness objectively, the rules of objectivity come immediately into consideration and we have a logical problem in modelling this subjectivity. We usually end up with some kind of a black-box model: something is happening in our "black box", in our brains, and somehow, out comes consciousness. In the black box happens something, what could be said to be our consciousness.

And then we start to compartmentalize just where is this "black box" and how it works... usually in a similar fashion that we model some engine, computer or network. Yet we are still looking at all of this objectively from the outside, think that the logic here is equivalent to some simple mechanical or chemical reaction that a scientist can easily do in the lab. Especially as something that you can give a computable model.

The logic of the subjective is likely different from this.

The whole 'hard problem' arises from regarding consciousness as an object, which it is not, while science itself is based on objective facts. It's not complicated, but it's hard to see. — Wayfarer

Presumably, Science studies reality "as-is", while Philosophy studies the world "as-if"*1. That's why scientists observe the Brain, but philosophers imagine the Mind. Consciousness is not a material object, but our Minds can picture the state or qualia or function of Knowingness*2 as-if it is an object-of-interest in a hypothetical context.

What makes the scientific study of a metaphysical concept "hard" is the tendency to analyze the Function*3 of the brain as-if it's the material product of a mechanism instead of the immaterial purpose of that system. Metaphysical disputes are "impossible to solve" analytically, they can only be resolved holistically --- by placing the parts into a universal context. Not by substance dualism, but by essence monism.

If we can't agree on the Nature*4 of the Cosmic context --- Materialism vs Idealism or Physical vs Metaphysical --- we will continue to disagree on the possibility of an emergent Mind-function. Ideas are "hard to see". Hence, factionally "impossible to solve". :smile:

*1. “As if” thinking concerns the ability to think in some imagined context other than the reality that is presented in front.
https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-319-98390-5_5-1
Note --- As-Is thinking looks at actual things. As-If thinking looks at possible states.
"A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. Possible worlds are widely used as a formal device in logic, philosophy, and linguistics in order to provide a semantics for intensional and modal logic." ___Wikipedia

*2. What is another word for knowingness?
synonyms: awareness, cognisance, cognizance, consciousness.
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/knowingness
Note --- The suffix "-ness" means "state, condition, or quality"

*3. A "function" refers to the specific purpose or role something or someone has, essentially describing what something does or is designed to do;
___Google AI overview

*4. "The nature of" is an expression that refers to the basic character or quality of something."
___Google AI overview

"Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back." — Wayfarer

IMPOSSIBLE IDEA : AS-IF not as-is

No, no, no. It's not nearly so complicated, there's no need for all this complicated verbiage. Science studies objects and objective facts - how big is it, where is it, how fast is it moving, how does it interact, what causes it, etc. This it does for everything from the sub-atomic to cosmic scales. But as consciousness does not appear as an object, it is not included in that analysis as a matter of principle. Let's not loose sight of the forest for the trees.

↪Gnomon
No, no, no. It's not nearly so complicated, there's no need for all this complicated verbiage. Science studies objects and objective facts - how big is it, where is it, how fast is it moving, how does it interact, what causes it, etc. This it does for everything from the sub-atomic to cosmic scales. But as consciousness does not appear as an object, it is not included in that analysis as a matter of principle. Let's not loose sight of the forest for the trees. — Wayfarer

Are you saying that scientists should simply leave the Mind/Body problem to impractical philosophers? I suspect that pragmatic scientists and Buddhists, with no metaphysical axe to grind, would agree with you : "shut-up and calculate"*1. Yet, metaphysical monistic Materialists also simplify the "problem" by insisting that Mind is nothing but Matter doing what comes naturally*2. So, they resolve the "problem" by telling Idealistic philosophers to butt-out.

The OP concluded that the circularity of the Science vs Philosophy battle makes the problem insoluble*3. If it's as simple as you imply, why can't we drive a stake into the heart of the Hard Problem? Maybe the eternal recurrence of this topic is due to the Materialism vs Idealism divide within philosophy. My unorthodox BothAnd philosophical worldview simplifies the problem by assuming a monistic substance (Information) that can exist as both Matter and Mind. Problem solved! :wink:

*1. The Hard Problem of Consciousness is only hard within the context of materialism.
https://www.reddit.com/r/consciousness/comments/169rqih/hard_problem_of_consciousness_is_not_hard/

*2. Some argue that the hard problem of consciousness is not actually hard, and that it can be solved through further analysis of the brain and behavior:
___Google AI overview

*3. Excerpt from the OP :
"Let's first assume that the hard problem of consciousness is not the lack of scientific knowledge in that domain but the paradox it creates when thinking of consciousness as an object in the world. Any materialistic theories about it is followed by this question "why are these materialistic phenomena accompanied by experience?". And any materialistic attempt to answer that question also ends up being followed by the same question, creating a circularity that seems impossible to escape."
____Skalidris

By contrasting "and" with "or," the two operators clarify and explain each other. In other words, the "and" operator is an attractor that puts multiple members into one set, whereas the"or" operator is a separator that puts multiple members into separate sets, as demonstrated by the two expressions above. Now there, I've defined the "and" operator without any circularity. — ucarr

Okay, now define "multiple" :razz: . Have you ever tried following the definitions in a dictionary, looking up each word used in a definition, only to discover it eventually loops back to the same terms? There's no escaping the circularity but you can try if you want to see it for yourself!

multiple | ˈməltəp(ə)l |
adjective
having or involving several parts, elements, or members
The Apple Dictionary

Have you ever tried following the definitions in a dictionary, looking up each word used in a definition, only to discover it eventually loops back to the same terms? There's no escaping the circularity but you can try if you want to see it for yourself! — Skalidris

If you configure a circle of any size, and you construct it by using the sequence: apple_orange_pear, you can start at any point in the circle and stop at any other point on the circle, and the three parts remain distinct. If you make a complete circle from, say, an apple back to itself, it's not conflated with either the orange or the pear.

...we could explain the "And" logic gate but yet never be able to explain the "And" concept. — Skalidris

Above you say "and" is undefined. "Circular" and "undefined" are two different things. If you cannot define something, you cannot establish it as distinct from other things. In other words, if you cannot say what something is, you also cannot say what it isn't.

In this example here, and in the previous example from 22 days ago, I establish "and" as distinct from other things.

multiple | ˈməltəp(ə)l |
adjective
having or involving several parts, elements, or members
The Apple Dictionary — ucarr

Define several.

If you configure a circle of any size, and you construct it by using the sequence: apple_orange_pear, you can start at any point in the circle and stop at any other point on the circle, and the three parts remain distinct. If you make a complete circle from, say, an apple back to itself, it's not conflated with either the orange or the pear. — ucarr

I don't understand what you mean. Do you agree that it's circular?

"Circular" and "undefined" are two different things. If you cannot define something, you cannot establish it as distinct from other things. In other words, if you cannot say what something is, you also cannot say what it isn't. — ucarr

If it's circular, if it sends back to itself directly, then you cannot define it in a meaningful way. In other words, you cannot explain it, break it down into smaller parts. And you could "know" when something is even if you cannot define it: we can feel when we're conscious but that doesn't mean that we can explain it and define it in a meaningful way.

If it's circular, if it sends back to itself directly, then you cannot define it in a meaningful way. — Skalidris

In a relationship between a thing and a sign that points to it, we find meaning. At the fight club, guys engage with each other in bare-knuckle fighting for the excitement and satisfaction of it. There's the fight club, the thing itself. There's also the raised fist, the sign that secret fight club members raise to each other when they cross paths on the street. So, the raised fist, the sign, "points" to the fight club. The sign "means" fight club.

Consider that the sign, i.e., the raised fist, is also a thing. Pretend for a minute there is no fight club. There’s only the raised fist. If there’s only the raised fist, we can say the raised fist means the raised fist. If we let A = raised fist, then we can say the raised fist means the raised fist another way: A = A.

A = A is the circularity you’re talking about.

Within the scope of this equation, there’s only A defined in terms of A. This definition is not useful because its journey from start to finish adds nothing to the start point.

Don’t make the mistake of exaggerating the scope of jurisdiction of circularity over meaning.

A thing not usefully meaningful within circularity can be usefully meaningful outside of circularity.

If A = raised fist and B = fight club, then we can say A means B.

In the scope of this equation, A is usefully meaningful.

So, as with the case of A herein, the conjunction logical operator "and" likewise can be defined meaningfully, as I've already shone in an earlier post.

Yes, yes, yes.

The naming of something—anything at all—the describing it, the identification of it, the indication of it, the characterisation of it—is the objectification of it, the making of it into an object, the reification of it, the conceiving it as something material, or as something physical.

So the very pointing towards experience, towards the subjective, is the materialisation of it.

(It is not a coincidence that we typically think of objects—things perceived, or known, or apprehended—as material things.)

So either you point to experience (in some way or other), in which case you make it into something physical, or you concede that it cannot be pointed to at all.

Indeed the very process of thought, the very project of philosophy, is the materialisation of Reality.

What is impossible is the identification of the subjective, of experience, or indeed of anything at all that is non-physical, as something non-physical. There isn’t some special, as-yet-undiscovered way of objectifying experience that neither materialises it nor fails to respect its non-material nature.

This is not to say that Eliminatism is false (though in fact I believe it is false).

And nor is to say that it is impossible to identify experience (though I believe that it is impossible).

It is only to say that experience cannot be characterised as something non-physical.

The naming of something—anything at all—the describing it, the identification of it, the indication of it, the characterisation of it—is the objectification of it, the making of it into an object, the reification of it, the conceiving it as something material, or as something physical. — Dominic Osborn

Perhaps you could articulate your objection with reference to the main article, Facing Up to the Problem of Consiousness, David Chalmers.

Summary of Feinberg and Mallatt with a few of my own thoughts:

— Dissolving the Mysteries of Consciousness —

Consciousness is a brain process. It cannot float around in space by itself. Every so-called ‘thing’ is a process, an event, some of which may continue for a long time, like a tree or the sun.

The content in consciousness correlates to what the brain has already analyzed and produced in the subconscious, this neural ‘voting’ being quick, but not instant, taking about 300-500 milliseconds. The content reflects the brain’s mapping, which map is the territory since the noumena are left behind.

Consciousness makes no reference to brain states, which is called ‘referral.’

Neuroscience informs us of the ‘projection’ of neural states with no perceiving of neural firings/states, else we wouldn’t know about the ‘basement’ first storey, being unaware of it in our already written conscious second story.

So, consciousness is not live, but a kind of tape-delayed broadcast, ever showing the just past. Thus consciousness does not cause anything right then and there, for it arrives too late in the process. This rather tricks us into thinking that consciousness is in control, as directly causal.

The consciousness brain process is ever ongoing; other interested brain areas will respond with their products, and so it goes, even into long ruminations.

Conscious is Compositional; It is structured with many phenomenological distinctions. It is Intrinsic, as one’s own, as independent. It is Informational, as particular and specific. It is Integrated/Whole, as Unified and no longer Reducible. It is Exclusive, as having Definite content, no more and no less.

It is Subjectively felt. In addition to the ‘referral’ already mentioned, there is Mental Unity, as Experienced as a unified field, whereas its sources are all over the brain.

There are Qualia, as the felt qualities of sensory consciousness. It has Continuity, as the seamless stitching of the ongoing changing contents.

Mental causation?—How can consciousness itself right then and there—an intangible, unobservable, and fully subjective entity—cause material neurons to direct behaviors that change the world?

Subconscious brain analysis, taking 300-500 milliseconds to complete, is all done and finished in its result before consciousness gets hold of the product.

Consciousness has Uses/Advantages over such as reflexes or all purpose schemes, for it grants Flexibility of Reaction, as we’re better able to react to conscious content, in our further subconscious decisions beyond just the automatic reflex-like responses triggered by non conscious content. There’s Focus, as Selective Attention allows the brain to focus its activity on what’s important, so that our subconscious decisions can attend to that foremost.

It grants Evaluations, the Feelings make one aware of what is good or bad, from both emotions and logic. It grants Survival Value, as Complex decisions are possible.

We have Behavioral Flexibility, as unlimited associated learning combines multiple cues into a single perception. There’s Discrimination, making small perceptual differences possible, such as between good and poisonous food.

For Diversification of Species, such as in the Cambrian explosion and a kind of evolutionary arms race in finding new ways to avoid detection, spurring predators to become more sophisticated. Beauty appears, such as plants evolving colorful flowers to attract pollination. For Actionizing, as the pondering of the consequences of scenarios before committing to action.

There is reality ‘out there’, for sure;
We have senses to take it in, as pure.
The brain paints a useful face upon it,
Such as colors for wave frequencies, etc.

Consciousness is ever a brain process,
One which can be halted, never-the-less,
By anesthesia, poison/drugs,
A blow to the head, a faint, or by sleep.

Change the brain and consciousness changes too.
Take drugs and the emotions change, anew.
Damage the brain and the mind’s damaged too.
Consciousness emerges only from the brain!

In identifying consciousness,
We often confuse what is floating in
The stream of consciousness with the water itself;
Thus, we note not the sea in which we ‘see’.

The brain interprets reality, and puts
A face on the waves of sound, light, color, touch,
And a sense on molecules’ smell and taste.
Consciousness is the brain’s perception of itself.

Consciousness mediates thoughts versus outcomes,
And is distributed all over the body,
From the nerve spindles to the spine to the brain—
A way to actionize without moving.

Physics describes well the extrinsic causes,
While consciousness exists just for itself,
As the intrinsic, compositional,
Informational, whole, and exclusive—

As the distinctions toward survival,
Though causing nothing except in itself,
As in ne’er doing but only as being,
Leaving intelligence for the doing.

The posterior cortex holds correlates,
For this is the only brain region that
Can’t be removed for one to still retain
Consciousness, it having feedback in it;

Thusly, it presents a unified Whole,
And this Whole forms consciousness directly,
A process fundamental in nature,
Or it’s the brain’s own symbolic language.

The Whole can also be well spoken of
To communicate with others, as well as
Globally informing other brain states,
For nonconscious states know not what’s been formed.

Mental causation?—How can consciousness itself right then and there—an intangible, unobservable, and fully subjective entity—cause material neurons to direct behaviors that change the world? — PoeticUniverse

Yes, how? Do tell!

Yes, how? Do tell! — Wayfarer

Well, the result in consciousness of the reflected prior subconscious voting/analysis does not cause what it is about in consciousness, for it comes too late in the process, but perhaps the result is an input to further subconscious figuring; however, I don't see why the subconscious couldn't just continue on its own without the quale of what it just came up with, unless qualia are part of the brain's own invented communication language that it has to use.

Though causing nothing except in itself,
As in ne’er doing but only as being,
Leaving intelligence for the doing.

Thanks. As it happens, I googled Feinberg and Mallatt The first hit was a review of their book by Stephen Rose which concludes:

As they cheerfully admit, neuroevolution does not solve the “hard problem”. But then perhaps it isn’t a real problem at all, but a ghostly remnant of a past dualistic way of thinking.

So they seem to be hewing to the same path as the late Daniel Dennett. And I don't think he even addresses the hard problem, although I'm not going to launch into an argument about it all over again. It's too hard! ;-)

(Incidentally Rose's book is Can Neuroscience Change our Minds? which looks much more congenial to my way of thinking.)

Working on it - getting to grips with my own thoughts about consciousness and relating them to those of Chalmers is certainly a hard problem for this consciousness.