I see no obvious reason why consciousness cannot perceive itself as an object.
— ucarr

Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back. — Wayfarer

I think consciousness is sufficiently different from physical things that we cannot know that it has this same "limitation." Consciousness may be the only thing that can study consciousness. If consciousness is feeling and thinking, then that which feels and thinks can feel and think about itself. Maybe?

Ehhhh…..no correcting coming from me. puts out thought-provoking stuff I find worth addressing, is all.

Consciousness may be the only thing that can study consciousness. If consciousness is feeling and thinking, then that which feels and thinks can feel and think about itself.
Maybe? — Patterner

:up:

I think consciousness is sufficiently different from physical things that we cannot know that it has this same "limitation." Consciousness may be the only thing that can study consciousness. If consciousness is feeling and thinking, then that which feels and thinks can feel and think about itself. Maybe? — Patterner

‘The eye cannot see itself’ really has ancient provenance, in the Upaniṣads, in the teaching of ātman, the ‘I am’ that animates the cosmos:

An online version puts it thus:

You have only told me, this is your inner Self in the same way as people would say, 'this is a cow, this is a horse', etc. That is not a real definition. Merely saying, 'this is that' is not a definition. I want an actual description of what this internal Self is. Please give that description and do not simply say, 'this is that'. Yājñavalkya says: "You tell me that I have to point out the Self as if it is a cow or a horse. Not possible! It is not an object like a horse or a cow. I cannot say, 'here is the ātman; here is the Self'. It is not possible because you cannot see the seer of seeing. The seer can see that which is other than the Seer, or the act of seeing. An object outside the seer can be beheld by the seer. How can the seer see himself? How is it possible? You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the Thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the Understander of understanding. Eṣa ta ātmā sarvāntaraḥ: That is the ātman."

Nobody can know the ātman inasmuch as the ātman is the Knower of all things. So, no question regarding the ātman can be put, such as "What is the ātman?' 'Show it to me', etc. You cannot show the ātman because the Shower is the ātman; the Experiencer is the ātman; the Seer is the ātman; the Functioner in every respect through the senses or the mind or the intellect is the ātman. As the basic Residue of Reality in every individual is the ātman, how can we go behind It and say, 'This is the ātman?' Therefore, the question is impertinent and inadmissible. The reason is clear. It is the Self. It is not an object.

"Everything other than the ātman is stupid; it is useless; it is good for nothing; it has no value; it is lifeless. Everything assumes a meaning because of the operation of this ātman in everything. Minus that, nothing has any sense”. Then Uṣasta Cākrāyana, the questioner kept quiet. He understood the point and did not speak further.

This is something which is barely said in the history of Western philosophy, although nowadays one aspect of it has been revived by phenomenology. See It Is Not Known But It Is the Knower, Michel Bitbol (.pdf).

The whole 'hard problem' arises from regarding consciousness as an object, which it is not, while science itself is based on objective facts. It's not complicated, but it's hard to see.

In our context here, it is a measurement system. This is a fact about consciousness, thus establishing its identity as an object. — ucarr

No, consciousness is obviously a flying unicorn, or maybe a rock, or a planet. Consciousness can indeed associate itself with all kinds of objects, but doing so creates a self referential problem, aka the hard problem of consciousness.

What does consciousness do? In our context here, it changes the state of superposition into the state of (well-defined) position. — ucarr

So what? How does that have anything to do with this self referential problem?

This is something which is barely said in the history of Western philosophy, — Wayfarer

I haven't researched it. But I have heard of one exception. in his introduction to his translation of The Bhagavad Gita, Eknath Easwaran speaks of Ruysbroeck.

I have described the discovery of Atman and Brahman – God immanent and God transcendent – as separate, but there is no real distinction. In the climax of meditation, the sages discovered unity: the same indivisible reality without and within. It was advaita, “not two.” The Chandogya Upanishad says epigrammatically, Tat tvam asi: “Thou art That.” Atman is Brahman: the Self in each person is not different from the Godhead.

Nor is it different from person to person. The Self is one, the same in every creature. This is not some peculiar tenet of the Hindu scriptures; it is the testimony of everyone who has undergone these experiments in the depths of consciousness and followed them through to the end. Here is Ruysbroeck, a great mystic of medieval Europe; every word is most carefully chosen:

The image of God is found essentially and personally in all mankind. Each possesses it whole, entire and undivided, and all together not more than one alone. In this way we are all one, intimately united in our eternal image, which is the image of God and the source in us of all our life. — Easwaran

Later philosophers explained maya in surprisingly contemporary terms. The mind, they said, observes the so-called outside world and sees its own structure. It reports that the world consists of a multiplicity of separate objects in a framework of time, space, and causality because these are the conditions of perception. In a word, the mind looks at unity and sees diversity; it looks at what is timeless and reports transience. And in fact the percepts of its experience are diverse and transient; on this level of experience, separateness is real. Our mistake is in taking this for ultimate reality, like the dreamer thinking that nothing is real except his dream.

Nowhere has this “mysterious Eastern notion” been formulated more succinctly than in the epigram of Ruysbroeck: “We behold what we are, and we are what we behold.” When we look at unity through the instruments of the mind, we see diversity; when the mind is transcended, we enter a higher mode of knowing – turiya, the fourth state of consciousness – in which duality disappears. This does not mean, however, that the phenomenal world is an illusion or unreal. The illusion is the sense of separateness. — Easwaran

However, although I believe there are benefits to viewing things that way, I don't have reason to think it's how things are. As I said, I think consciousness can examine itself. The problem is the western world is so adamant that things can only be examined using specific methods. But if the nature of something is not amenable to those methods...

Sidebar -- Firstly, Skalidris, I'm glad you're again posting to your conversation here. After your long absence, I was afraid you'd checked out permanently, and that's less fun.

The whole 'hard problem' arises from regarding consciousness as an object, which it is not, while science itself is based on objective facts. It's not complicated, but it's hard to see. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer above makes a good point. Herein, we're all talking about consciousness, voicing factual claims about it. These actions treat consciousness as an object grammatically speaking: "voicing factual claims about it." Predicate: voicing claims; Preposition: about; Object: it. Grammatically speaking, if you can predicate claims about something, then that something is an object, a thing. It's out there in reality to be examined and understood. If it's not out there, then what the heck are we talking about in this conversation? If subjectivity were ineffable, nobody would be talking about it. Nearly everybody talks about it at one time or another. I'm not seeing any modal difference between the efforts of neuroscience and the efforts of the typical layperson trying to understand the human psychology of their families and friends.

I think subjectivity and objectivity are always paired; I suspect their relationship is the bi-conditional logical operator. Regarding Nagel's: "There's something that it's like to be a bat." I'm waiting for an immaterialist to prove logically the necessity of the metaphysical separation of subjectivity from objectivity.

I'm trying to understand why the obvious grammatical objectification of consciousness doesn't carry over into objective reality. I don't, however, want to sidetrack us into lengthy discussions about the limitations and distortions of language; we all know that's a full topic unto itself.

Consciousness can indeed associate itself with all kinds of objects, but doing so creates a self referential problem, aka the hard problem of consciousness. — Skalidris

I take this to be the heart of your premise for this conversation. I'll try to parse it:

"Consciousness can indeed associate itself with all kinds of objects..." Why is this not a simple and clear example of one thing: consciousness, associating itself with other things: all kinds of objects? Isn't connection of things to things what "associate" means?

No, I haven't forgotten the immaterialist mantra: "Consciousness is not a thing." I know, your above statement is not literal. So what is it saying? If consciousness is not a thing, how does it perform actions, like "associate itself with all kinds of objects." Usually, subjects who execute actions are things. It's hard to authorize pundits who make statements that grammatically contradict the intended meanings of said statements.

"...but doing so creates a self referential problem, aka the hard problem of consciousness."

Have you elaborated how it is the case that when one thing associates itself with another thing, with one of the things being consciousness, a self-referential problem always ensues? Do either Nagel or Chalmers examine this self-referential problem?

Yes. Indeed you have a problem making predications about a subject that's not a subject. From the get-go, you're inhabiting the realm of paradox.

To me, this type of reasoning implies impossible premises. And to show that, let's first start with possible premises. We know that:

1) One indispensable element for the perception of objects is consciousness.
2) Time flows in one direction.

The logical conclusion from this is that consciousness cannot be viewed solely as an object since it has to be there for the perception of objects. Consciousness can only be viewed as consciousness (cannot be broken down into something else since it is always there as a whole in our reasoning). — Skalidris

Your first sentence implies consciousness cannot examine itself. Can you explain how this is the case given the fact that, in this very instant, we are examples of consciousness examining itself? If we're not doing that, then what are we doing?

In the second sentence you mysteriously claim "Consciousness can only be viewed as consciousness..." as if consciousness viewing itself doesn't objectify itself. In order to make your claim consciousness is not an object, you have to turn it into an object.

Can you explain why this premise is not an impossible premise leading to the logical circularity you're propounding?

You claim consciousness is not approachable by setting up yourself in a paradox, then claim the paradox you've created is the proof objective examination of consciousness is impossible. Well, yeah, by your own setup.

Suppose we discard your premise and replace it with another premise: consciousness can examine itself. This gets us out of the paradox, at least grammatically speaking.

Can you show why we're still existentially locked within paradox and circularity when consciousness tries to examine itself?

Any materialistic theories about it is followed by this question "why are these materialistic phenomena accompanied by experience?". And any materialistic attempt to answer that question also ends up being followed by the same question, creating a circularity that seems impossible to escape. — Skalidris

However, when we ask ourselves “why are these materialistic phenomena accompanied by experience?”, we trigger a self referential explanation that has no other outcome than being circular because it circles back to incorrect premises that contradict the rest of the reasoning. — Skalidris

Above I've underlined an important sentence. I'm surmising it expresses your core belief there is no possible materialist explanation connecting brain functions with subjectivity. I'm guessing you justify this belief by taking recourse to emergence and supervenience. I think your core belief is supported by a metaphysical commitment: consciousness exists outside of the subject/object bi-conditional.

If, as you imply, consciousness is thwarted by the self-referential state into useless circularity, then that's a claim that supports: consciousness exists outside of the subject/object bi-conditional.

Do you have an argument to support this claim?

How can it be that consciousness exists outside of the subject/object bi-conditional?

I'm supposing immaterialism puts forward consciousness as its star witness for the possibility of existence uncoupled from materialism, and this uncoupling is centered within the circularity to which you refer.

You name the possible premises; do you name the impossible premises?

Let me try to name an impossible premise: a subject that is not its own object.

Can an existing thing not be self-referential (to itself) as an object? If it can, we must ask where is it located in space and time (both of which are material)?

Speaking generally, existence precedes essence and, speaking more specifically, brain precedes mind, at least from the materialist point of view: brain and mind always co-exist, but there's no thought without brain, as demonstrated causally by the maxim: absent brain, absent mind.

Of course, immaterialism posits existence of essences outside of space and time.

Are we now afoot within Kant's transcendental idealism? Are we hearkening back to its ancestor, Platonic idealism?

No. Today's immaterialists have probably nuanced their positions beyond Kant.

What if: "when we ask ourselves 'why are these materialistic phenomena accompanied by experience?', we trigger a self referential explanation that has no other outcome than being circular..." is an important clue to the reason why consciousness as an objective thing appears to be immaterial?

I'm suggesting consciousness as a phenomenon is rooted in mnemonic echoings upwardly mobile through higher-orders of the self-referential. These higher-orders are essential to subjectivity. They play fast and loose with matter, but never uncouple from it completely.

The abstractionism of multi-tiered feedback looping via neuronal circuits of the brain is how we arrive at useful concepts such as infinity, sets and Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis.

Mnemonic circularity, ethereal but still material.

I think there's been a misunderstanding: I don't believe consciousness is an illusion, and I don't believe it is immaterial, I believe we cannot know either of these things.

The hard problem of consciousness arises when one believes consciousness can successfully study (and explain) itself as an object in the world. And the problem is that you need consciousness to study anything. If you've ever heard of primitive notions, it's the same principle: you cannot define and explain primitive notions with concepts other than themselves. Have you ever tried to explain what a "unit" is? What the logic connector "and" means? To use the latter example, imagine our brain had some kind of logic gate (in electronic circuits) that serve as "and" connector, we would know that whenever we use "and" or any process of linking things together, we use that logic gate. So naturally, we could try to define "and" as the physical process. It could be: “And” is a circuit that receives several inputs and gives an output of 1 if all inputs are 1. You can see that “and” is already in the definition and even if we try to phrase it differently to avoid the “and”, you’ll still need to talk about the several inputs being received, and what’s “several”? It is at least one unit AND another. Do you see the circularity?

Your first sentence implies consciousness cannot examine itself. Can you explain how this is the case given the fact that, in this very instant, we are examples of consciousness examining itself? If we're not doing that, then what are we doing? — ucarr

So even if we can associate physical processes with consciousness, we cannot break down the intuitive meaning into smaller parts, and breaking something into smaller parts is how we explain things. In other words, consciousness can examine the physical processes responsible for its existence, but it cannot examine its intuitive meaning inside the mind. Just like we can't explain what "and" means (using other concepts) even if we knew the physical processes behind it.

Can you explain why this premise is not an impossible premise leading to the logical circularity you're propounding? — ucarr

Because of the premise that consciousness is required for any explanation, any thought (including the perception of objects).
To go back to the "and" example, any definition or description of the material processes behind "and" includes the concept "and".

If, as you imply, consciousness is thwarted by the self-referential state into useless circularity, then that's a claim that supports: consciousness exists outside of the subject/object bi-conditional. — ucarr

No, it simply implies that we do not know. We don't know if it's material, causal, an illusion, we can't know anything because we use it to build any knowledge...

brain precedes mind, at least from the materialist point of view: brain and mind always co-exist, but there's no thought without brain, as demonstrated causally by the maxim: absent brain, absent mind. — ucarr

I agree. That's why we can study the physical processes responsible for consciousness. Just how we could explain the "And" logic gate but yet never be able to explain the "And" concept.

I don't believe consciousness is an illusion, and I don't believe it is immaterial, I believe we cannot know either of these things. — Skalidris

You're telling me the category type for consciousness is unknowable.

The hard problem of consciousness arises when one believes consciousness can successfully study (and explain) itself as an object in the world. — Skalidris

You're telling me the category type being unknowable is intimately tied to consciousness being necessary to the examination of consciousness.

You can see that “and” is already in the definition and even if we try to phrase it differently to avoid the “and”, you’ll still need to talk about the several inputs being received, and what’s “several”? It is at least one unit AND another. Do you see the circularity? — Skalidris

You're telling me "and" is fundamental, and thus cannot be analyzed down to smaller parts.

So even if we can associate physical processes with consciousness, we cannot break down the intuitive meaning into smaller parts, and breaking something into smaller parts is how we explain things. — Skalidris

You're telling me the intuitive meaning of consciousness inside the mind is fundamental.

To go back to the "and" example, any definition or description of the material processes behind "and" includes the concept "and". — Skalidris

You're telling me examination of "consciousness," like examination of "and," always leads to a circular definition, and thus the identity of these terms cannot be illuminated by analysis.

If, as you imply, consciousness is thwarted by the self-referential state into useless circularity, then that's a claim that supports: consciousness exists outside of the subject/object bi-conditional. — ucarr

No, it simply implies that we do not know. — Skalidris

In this case, I think your claim: consciousness examining consciousness always leads to circularity implies beyond doubt that self-examination, in the case of consciousness, cannot lead to a bi-conditional interweave of subject/object. This, in turn, implies subjectivity is pure; it stands outside of the subject_object duet. Mysteriously, this has something to do with the claim: we can't examine how subjectivity arises from brain functions.

...we could explain the "And" logic gate but yet never be able to explain the "And" concept. — Skalidris

So far, I'm not understanding why you think the concept of the conjunction operator cannot be explained: ¬ {x ∧ Y} both x and y are negated; {¬{x} ∨ {y}} x is negated, y is not. By contrasting "and" with "or," the two operators clarify and explain each other. In other words, the "and" operator is an attractor that puts multiple members into one set, whereas the"or" operator is a separator that puts multiple members into separate sets, as demonstrated by the two expressions above. Now there, I've defined the "and" operator without any circularity.

although I believe there are benefits to viewing things that way, I don't have reason to think it's how things are. — Patterner

The purpose of the quote from Indian philosophy was mainly to demonstrate the provenance of the aphorism that 'the eye cannot see itself' and its link to phenomenology.

So naturally, we could try to define "and" as the physical process. It could be: “And” is a circuit that receives several inputs and gives an output of 1 if all inputs are 1. You can see that “and” is already in the definition and even if we try to phrase it differently to avoid the “and”, you’ll still need to talk about the several inputs being received, and what’s “several”? It is at least one unit AND another. Do you see the circularity? — Skalidris

I do. It's that 'primitive' concepts like "and", "equals", "is", "is not" are required for any form of rational inference. That includes rational inference about consciousness.

From the OP:

. It seems that people sometimes either forget that something cannot exist prior to its conception, or can reason with a distorted vision of time, leading them to enter a reasoning of how something was created as if it did not already exist and was not used throughout the reasoning. As if things could exist and not exist at the same time.
It's kind of like the liar paradox “this sentence is false” that implies the attribution of a truth value before the sentence is created, which creates some kind of weird time distortion where future and past events get mixed up and circle back to each other because they are contradictive.
"This sentence" refers to a future reference which is "this sentence is false". So it's attributing a truth value to itself that is not constructed yet. And the analysis after the creation contradicts the analysis based on events that did not happen yet so it's continuously changed — Skalidris

First, isn't being conscious subjective?

At least I assume that somebody that is conscious is a subject: he or she or it can think and act on it's own choosing. The acting is not a simple mechanism like throwing a burning matchstick in a pool of gasoline and the liquid blowing up. And Philosophers like Chalmers and Searle hold that consciousness is necessarily subjective or first person in character and that subjectivity is an ontological feature of consciousness. So at least here I'm not way off.

But let's think about this.

If subjectivity is an ontological feature of consciousness, can we then really accurately model consciousness with a conventional model, that is objective?

Let me try to explain what I'm after here: If we try to model consciousness objectively, the rules of objectivity come immediately into consideration and we have a logical problem in modelling this subjectivity. We usually end up with some kind of a black-box model: something is happening in our "black box", in our brains, and somehow, out comes consciousness. In the black box happens something, what could be said to be our consciousness.

And then we start to compartmentalize just where is this "black box" and how it works... usually in a similar fashion that we model some engine, computer or network. Yet we are still looking at all of this objectively from the outside, think that the logic here is equivalent to some simple mechanical or chemical reaction that a scientist can easily do in the lab. Especially as something that you can give a computable model.

The logic of the subjective is likely different from this.

The whole 'hard problem' arises from regarding consciousness as an object, which it is not, while science itself is based on objective facts. It's not complicated, but it's hard to see. — Wayfarer

Presumably, Science studies reality "as-is", while Philosophy studies the world "as-if"*1. That's why scientists observe the Brain, but philosophers imagine the Mind. Consciousness is not a material object, but our Minds can picture the state or qualia or function of Knowingness*2 as-if it is an object-of-interest in a hypothetical context.

What makes the scientific study of a metaphysical concept "hard" is the tendency to analyze the Function*3 of the brain as-if it's the material product of a mechanism instead of the immaterial purpose of that system. Metaphysical disputes are "impossible to solve" analytically, they can only be resolved holistically --- by placing the parts into a universal context. Not by substance dualism, but by essence monism.

If we can't agree on the Nature*4 of the Cosmic context --- Materialism vs Idealism or Physical vs Metaphysical --- we will continue to disagree on the possibility of an emergent Mind-function. Ideas are "hard to see". Hence, factionally "impossible to solve". :smile:

*1. “As if” thinking concerns the ability to think in some imagined context other than the reality that is presented in front.
https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-319-98390-5_5-1
Note --- As-Is thinking looks at actual things. As-If thinking looks at possible states.
"A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. Possible worlds are widely used as a formal device in logic, philosophy, and linguistics in order to provide a semantics for intensional and modal logic." ___Wikipedia

*2. What is another word for knowingness?
synonyms: awareness, cognisance, cognizance, consciousness.
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/knowingness
Note --- The suffix "-ness" means "state, condition, or quality"

*3. A "function" refers to the specific purpose or role something or someone has, essentially describing what something does or is designed to do;
___Google AI overview

*4. "The nature of" is an expression that refers to the basic character or quality of something."
___Google AI overview

"Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back." — Wayfarer

IMPOSSIBLE IDEA : AS-IF not as-is

No, no, no. It's not nearly so complicated, there's no need for all this complicated verbiage. Science studies objects and objective facts - how big is it, where is it, how fast is it moving, how does it interact, what causes it, etc. This it does for everything from the sub-atomic to cosmic scales. But as consciousness does not appear as an object, it is not included in that analysis as a matter of principle. Let's not loose sight of the forest for the trees.

↪Gnomon
No, no, no. It's not nearly so complicated, there's no need for all this complicated verbiage. Science studies objects and objective facts - how big is it, where is it, how fast is it moving, how does it interact, what causes it, etc. This it does for everything from the sub-atomic to cosmic scales. But as consciousness does not appear as an object, it is not included in that analysis as a matter of principle. Let's not loose sight of the forest for the trees. — Wayfarer

Are you saying that scientists should simply leave the Mind/Body problem to impractical philosophers? I suspect that pragmatic scientists and Buddhists, with no metaphysical axe to grind, would agree with you : "shut-up and calculate"*1. Yet, metaphysical monistic Materialists also simplify the "problem" by insisting that Mind is nothing but Matter doing what comes naturally*2. So, they resolve the "problem" by telling Idealistic philosophers to butt-out.

The OP concluded that the circularity of the Science vs Philosophy battle makes the problem insoluble*3. If it's as simple as you imply, why can't we drive a stake into the heart of the Hard Problem? Maybe the eternal recurrence of this topic is due to the Materialism vs Idealism divide within philosophy. My unorthodox BothAnd philosophical worldview simplifies the problem by assuming a monistic substance (Information) that can exist as both Matter and Mind. Problem solved! :wink:

*1. The Hard Problem of Consciousness is only hard within the context of materialism.
https://www.reddit.com/r/consciousness/comments/169rqih/hard_problem_of_consciousness_is_not_hard/

*2. Some argue that the hard problem of consciousness is not actually hard, and that it can be solved through further analysis of the brain and behavior:
___Google AI overview

*3. Excerpt from the OP :
"Let's first assume that the hard problem of consciousness is not the lack of scientific knowledge in that domain but the paradox it creates when thinking of consciousness as an object in the world. Any materialistic theories about it is followed by this question "why are these materialistic phenomena accompanied by experience?". And any materialistic attempt to answer that question also ends up being followed by the same question, creating a circularity that seems impossible to escape."
____Skalidris